Anastasia Kozyreva

PHENOMENOLOGY
OF AFFECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY

Analyses on the Pre-reflective
Unity of Subjective Experience

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About the Author

Anastasia Kozyreva completed her PhD in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg in 2016, where she was a member of Prof. Thomas Fuchs' research group "Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy." Before that, she studied philosophy in Russia, France, Germany, and Belgium. Her main areas of research include phenomenological philosophy, philosophy of cognitive science, as well as philosophical and psychological approaches to uncertainty.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

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The online version of this publication is freely available on the ebook-platform of the Heidelberg University Library heiBOOKS
http://books.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/heibooks (open access).
urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heibooks-book-196-9
doi: 10.11588/heibooks.196.263

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Cover image: © pogonici — fotolia.com

ISBN 978-3-946531-42-5 (Softcover)
ISBN 978-3-946531-43-2 (PDF)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is a result of the doctoral research conducted at the University of Heidelberg during the period from January 2013 till April 2016. I am very grateful to the University, the Graduate Academy, and the Landesgraduiertenförderung (LGF) of Baden-Württemberg, whose funding permitted me to study in Germany and to write this book. During these three years, I was welcomed by the department of philosophy of Heidelberg University and by the section for Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy at the University Clinic that provided an outstanding interdisciplinary environment.

One could not overestimate the importance of someone's place of work and of the people one works with. Most of all, I would like to thank my scientific supervisor, Professor Thomas Fuchs, who from the very start of this project has shown his support, provided valuable advice, and many precious comments. I have always felt inspired by his thinking and research. Moreover, his work on body memory acted as an important influence and inspiration for some of the ideas developed in this text.

Many thanks go to my second advisor, Professor Lanei Rodemeyer. I am very grateful for her precise and helpful comments on my text, for her kind attention and valuable advice. I consider myself fortunate to have attended her seminar on Husserl's *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* at Heidelberg University, which was very motivating for my work on this topic.

I am also very grateful to my current place of work, Center for Adaptive Rationality at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, all my colleagues there, and especially the director Professor Ralph Hertwig for supporting my interest in interdisciplinary research and development of my new projects.

Beyond words is my gratitude to my parents and family who have been as encouraging and kind as one could only hope. I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues from so many different countries whose friendship, ideas, and conversations contributed to both my work and life during the time of my doctoral studies: Daniel Pucciarelli, Zaida Olvera, Zeno Van Duppen, Michela Summa, Sonja Frohoff, Mike Finn, Joshua Connor, João Machado Vaz, Philipp Schmidt, Thiemo Breyer, Samuel Thoma, Laura Galbusera, Remy Rizzo, Allan Køster, Stefan Kristensen, Kriszta Sajber, Till Grohman, Leonor Irarrázaval, Monika

Dullstein, Rixta Fambach, Evelien Holvoet, André Mata, Danil Razeev, Maria Sekatskaya, Ksenia Kapelchuk, Daria Chirva, Sergei Levin, Natalia Artemenko, Vlad Orsher, Andrei Patkul, Georgy Chernavin, Kristin Gissberg, Nicolás Garrera, Inês Hipólito, Vera Pereira, Sofia Miguens, Rob Clowes, Dina Mendonça, Jorge Gonçalves, Alexander Gerner, Caio Novaes, and Vasco Correia.

With special affection and gratitude, I want to remember two people who are no longer with us but whose influence withstands the passage of time: Julia Orlova from Saint Petersburg University, who introduced me to phenomenological philosophy and who was one of the most inspiring, strong, and original personalities I happened to get to know; and Professor László Tengelyi, under whose supervision I was happy to study at the University of Wuppertal during my master's program. This book could not have happened without their influence and encouragement to pursue my studies and research in phenomenology.

Finally, I would like to thank the editors and collaborators at the Heidelberg University Publishing for their work that made possible this publication and Tessa Marzotto for her tremendous help with the proofreading of this manuscript.

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Introduction: Towards an understanding of pre-reflective subjectivity

> It is so hard to describe what I feel when I feel I really exist and my soul is a real entity that I don't know what human words could define it (Pessoa 1991).

> If we succeed in understanding the subject, this will not be in its pure form, but rather by looking for the subject at the intersection of its various dimensions (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433).

Alongside an increasing interest of contemporary philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in the problems of consciousness and the nature of self-awareness, we are now witnessing a remarkable shift in our views on the very foundations of mind and subjectivity. From both the everyday and scientific points of view, it has become clear that subjectivity no longer stands for a uniform kind of being, defined as cognitive, conscious, or mental, and that it cannot be understood as detached from its embodied and affective dimensions, its interaction with the world and other living beings.

Subjectivity is clearly such a multifaceted phenomenon, so richly charged with various meanings and connotations, that we can hardly speak about it without first defining the general theoretical framework within which it is to be considered. Even though the themes of selfhood, phenomenal consciousness, and first-person perspective have firmly established their philosophical and scientific importance in the contemporary research, subjectivity remains fundamentally ambiguous, with some thinkers still reluctant to acknowledge it as being more than just an illusionary construction.[1] Such ambiguity can be regarded not as a lack of common theoretical ground, but rather as the mark left by the radical changes in our views concerning the very foundations of subjec-

[1] See as examples the well-known positions of Thomas Metzinger in his book *Being no One* (Metzinger 2003) or of Daniel Dennett in *Consciousness explained* (Dennett 1991).

tivity, whose notion has undergone many changes and developments within the timeframe of modern philosophy.

In order to support this claim one would not be short of examples: the abandoning of the strictly Cartesian perspective can be observed not only in philosophy, but equally in psychology and nearly any scientific or artistic approach to the human being and his or her experience in the world. The recognition of the limits of rationality and rational cognition in respect to the self- and world-understanding characterizes not one single, but the majority of philosophical, psychological and artistic movements in the second half of the 19th and the whole of the 20th century. Edmund Husserl famously refers to this process as to the *crisis of European rationality*, implying that the crisis of the scientific world-view corresponds to the observable crisis of humanity and subjectivity itself. Through the major scientific and historical (and, largely speaking, humanitarian) dramas and perturbations of the 20th century, we have hardly come to any new and at the same time widely accepted theory of subjectivity and its place in the world. Such a new perspective is not simply missing, but rather not yet determined, since there are a certain number of competing theoretical positions struggling to win its place.

One may legitimately ask the following question: what exactly does this change of perspective in our understanding of subjectivity consist in? It is arguably a matter of overcoming the "cognitive" attitude according to which all the diversity of the mental sphere can be perfectly reduced to the activity of cognition or of the *cogito*, which allegedly represents some sort of universal structure of consciousness.[2] Nevertheless we could equally state the fact that today the fields of psychology and philosophy of mind are still, for the most part, considered *cognitive* sciences and therefore oriented towards the investigation of most psychic phenomena based on *cognition*, even though not in the purely Cartesian sense of the word.

Generally speaking, cognitive science—understood as "the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence" (Thagard 2014)—is concerned with the understanding of mental processes (as well as the underlying

[2] Generally speaking, it is the Cartesian perspective. See for example Descartes in P*rinciples of Philosophy*: "By the word 'thought' I understand all those things which occur in us while we are conscious, insofar as the consciousness of them is in us. And so not only understanding, willing and imagining, but also sensing, are here the same as thinking" (Descartes 1983, 5). In the words of Michel Henry, "I think" in Descartes means everything except thinking: "Je pense chez Descartes veut tout dire sauf la pensée" (Henry 1985, 7).

neural processes) involved in cognition. According to the so-called computational model of cognitive science, cognition refers mostly to the representational and computational processing of individual interactions with the environment (Thagard 1996). Thus conceived, cognitive science intends to explain not only what mind *is* and what kind of mental states it performs, but also *how it works*, what mechanisms underlie our mental activity, and how our brains process information. Nevertheless, one of the founders and main figures of the cognitive research in psychology, Jerome Bruner, in his book *Acts of Meaning*, argued that the key concept of cognitive science is not information processing, but *meaning*. According to this perspective, cognition is not seen as a result of mental representations combined with computational procedures (Thagard 1996, 11),[3] but as a process involved in the construction of meanings and unthinkable outside of the individual's intentional states and cultural context (Bruner 1990, 33).

Moreover, the development undergone by cognitive science since the cognitive revolution shows that its research scope has become much larger than it was initially conceived, so that it currently transcends by far the purely cognitive level of mental life. To summarize the main challenges to the computational and representational view of mind, we could mention three important topics: (1) the hard problem of consciousness (phenomenal qualia, subjectivity of experience in its narrow meaning[4]); (2) the embodiment and more generally the embodied and enacted view of mind, seen as interdependent with the world and the social environment; and (3) the study of emotions, or affective science as to a certain extent opposed to cognitive science (Thompson 2007).[5] Each of these thematic developments within cognitive science suggests challenges to its basic conceptual presuppositions—those belonging not only to the sphere of empirical studies but to the conceptual level as well.

[3] Here, Thagard refers to the central thesis of "the computational-representational understanding of mind," which builds upon the analogy between minds, brains, and computers and features cognition in terms of mental representations and information processing. Later in his book, Thagard accounts for the several challenges to this model as they have been developed within cognitive science.

[4] For the distinction between narrow and broader meanings of subjectivity see §1 of the first chapter.

[5] Compare to Thagard's list of critical challenges: the emotion challenge; the consciousness challenge; the world challenge; the body challenge; the social challenge; the dynamical systems challenge; the mathematics challenge (Thagard 1996, 2014).

In the framework of the phenomenological approach, a similar shift occurred much earlier: Beginning with Husserl's late inquiries and up to the present day, an increasing interest in the pre-reflective and passive constitution of subjective experience testifies to a radical change in perspective. This transition inside phenomenology does not presuppose the abandoning of its initial interest in the nature of cognition. As conceived originally by Husserl, transcendental phenomenology's task was to "clarify the sense of cognition and its validity, and that clarification here means nothing else than to go back to the origin, to the evidence, thus to consciousness, in which all cognitive concepts are realized" (Husserl 1956, 356; Murphy 1980). Clearly it was Husserl's quest for the origins of cognition that led him to question the most basic structures of our experience and thus to go beyond the cognitive level of inquiry itself.

Along with the challenges which allowed widening the scope of cognitive science in the end of the 20th century, we might also outline some of the main problems and domains of research that permitted the broadening of the scope of the basic universal structures of subjectivity, in particular within Husserl's phenomenological project as it was already sketched in the 1920s.

The first domain concerns the investigation of the so-called *passive constitution* of subjective experience. Passivity describes the realm of pre-predicative experience that precedes and makes possible the explicit and thematic relation between the subject and the world. Another term to refer to this pre-cognitive dimension is "affectivity." The notion of affectivity in this context serves to designate not exclusively the sphere of emotions, but rather the impressional, receptive character of subjective experience in general. Structurally, it is based on *affection* as the original pre-cognitive correlation between the self and what is foreign to the self.[6] Husserl introduced this dimension during his genetic phenomenology period. He insisted that, before any cognitive correlation, the subject finds himself already affected by the world, which led him to claim the self lives not only in the *cogito*.[7]

The second area is that of *embodiment* (*corporeality*), which represents a breakthrough transition from a dualistic conception of separated mental and bodily existences, and contributes to an understanding of human subjectivity as essentially embodied and embedded in the world. Along

[6] I will concentrate on Husserl's notion of affectivity in § 8 of the second chapter.
[7] "Die Reflexion findet aber zeitlich vor dem Cogito eventuell eine Strecke der Affektion, des Reizes einer nichterfassten Gegenständlichkeit auf das Ich, das also nicht nur im Cogito lebt" (Husserl 2001b, 284).

this line, Evan Thompson, describing both enactive and phenomenological approaches to embodied subjectivity, claims: "Human mind is embodied in our entire organism and embedded in the world, and hence is not reducible to structures inside the head" (Thompson 2005, 408). This implies that the human subject cannot be understood merely as a "pack of neurons" (Crick 1994, 2). On the contrary,—continues Thompson—"you are a living bodily subject of experience and an intersubjective mental being" (Thompson 2005, 408). Thomas Fuchs also makes a similar claim: "The individual mind is not confined within the head, but extends throughout the living body and includes the world beyond the membrane of the organism, especially the interpersonal world of self and other" (Fuchs 2009, 221).

This last indication leads to another fundamental dimension, namely to *intersubjectivity*, which of course cannot be associated solely with the level of pre-reflective experience. Intersubjectivity transcends the very idea of self-enclosed subject and allows us to envisage subjectivity not only as constantly related to others in the shared life-world, but also as constituted through these relations. For example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes:

> True reflection presents me to myself, not as an idle and inaccessible subjectivity, but as identical to my presence in the world and to others, such as I currently bring it into being: I am everything that I see and I am an intersubjective field, not in spite of my body and my historical situation, but rather by being this body and this situation and by being, through them, everything else (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 478).

One may notice that this general attitude, especially common for contemporary phenomenological and enactivist approaches, however inspiring and productive it may be, faces certain theoretical problems. These problems become particularly apparent on the conceptual level, when it comes to the very notions that are supposed to describe this new understanding. At this point, no notion at hand seems to be fully reliable as all are the product of those traditions which tried to find a uniform way of understanding and defining the kind of beings we are. The most significant examples are the notions of mind and subjectivity, stemming respectively from naturalist and transcendentalist approaches. Notably, they both have the same content, that is to say they aim to describe the totality of psychic life. And at the same time, they have different meanings: while "mind" tends to underline the "mental" or distinctively cognitive characteristics of our experience, "subjectivity"

implies the ownership of experiences as their essential characteristic. Moreover, also the meaning attributed to subjectivity in these two approaches differ considerably: while in philosophy of mind, it is seen as a phenomenal quality of mental states, for phenomenology, subjectivity describes not a quality, but the totality of one's experience.

Despite their differences, in the present theoretical situation these two traditions face the same challenge, namely, how to include in their content all these new dimensions, which transcend their traditional conceptual frameworks by definition. It is rather difficult to imagine how the "subject" can include "otherness" in itself, how "mental" can account for embodiment, or, finally, how cognition can be consistent with affection, since they all originally have opposite meanings. Inside the phenomenological approach, in particular, this challenge appeals to such an idea of subjectivity that could account for its intrinsic multidimensionality. Not accidentally, the contemporary discussion on the pre-reflective self-experience develops in the direction which tries to go beyond merely formal definition of the minimal selfhood.

The idea of the pre-reflective self-experience is based on a highly significant step within phenomenology. First, it was constructed as a response to those accounts of the self calling upon an independent entity or substance. Unlike Kant, Husserl could not postulate the self as a mere *a priori* principle of unity without linking it to the structure of experience. At the same time, he could not agree with Hume, who famously stated that one would never find any self in experience but the multiplicity of distinct perceptions. This double divergence places Husserl's approach at the intersection of empiricism and transcendentalism, and effectively defines his philosophical ambition to account for *a priori* structures of experience, which must be found *inside* experience itself. According to Husserl, the self-conscious character of our subjectivity belongs to its intrinsic definition, and there is no self to enable experiential unity independently of the multiplicity of experiences. Although Husserl himself is still committed to an "egological" vocabulary and mostly speaks about the "pure I" (*reines Ich*) and the transcendental ego as a pole of affections and intentions, he already wonders whether he should rather employ the term "self" (*Selbst*) instead of "I."[8] In French phenomenology, one can detect a clear tendency to overcome such a terminology which implicitly and probably even unwillingly makes of the subject an independent entity. In Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Mer-

[8] "Statt 'Ich' müsste ich vielleicht besser immer sagen 'Selbst'" (Husserl 1973c, 48).

leau-Ponty, and Michel Henry, subjectivity of experience is already described in terms of "ipseity" and selfhood, thus marking its clear separation from a transcendent ego. In contemporary phenomenological philosophy, this tendency reached its peak and an ego-subject as a center of cognitive activity has unanimously given way to the exploration of primary and pre-reflective selfhood. As Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi write:

> We should not think of the self, in this most basic sense, as a substance, or as some kind of ineffable transcendental precondition, or as a social construct that gets generated through time; rather it is an integral part of conscious life, with an immediate experiential character (Gallagher and Zahavi 2015).

It should be noted that diverse conceptions of the minimal or core self and pre-reflective self-awareness occupy not only the forefront of phenomenology, but also hold strong positions in the philosophy of mind, neuroscience and psychopathology. Though there might be a certain consensus concerning the sense of "mineness" and possession of the first-person perspective as essential characteristics of the minimal selfhood, there are nevertheless disagreements that prevail on the level of its internal structure and the scope of its impact. For example, neuroscientist Antonio Damasio points out that "the scope of core consciousness is here and now" (Damasio 1999, 16), so that this minimal form of self is reduced to the always new spatial-temporal point and, as such, has no past,[9] nor future, though it retains a sense of self—a paradoxical sense of self given that the self appears as always different from moment to moment. Galen Strawson also follows this line of argument in his "minimal subject" conception, proposing to understand it as a mere experiencer, being "present and alive in the living moment of experience" (Strawson 2011) without necessary relation to his or her temporal[10] or embodied dimension. Phenomenologically grounded interpretations of core consciousness differ considerably from the above mentioned accounts and tend to explore minimal selfhood in the first place through the pre-reflective self-experience. Thus, Zahavi proposes to see it, following Husserl, as an inner time-consciousness that is not a mere here-and-

[9] "The only past it vaguely lets us glimpse is that which occurred in the instant just before" (Damasio 1999, 16).

[10] Even though Strawson underlines that this living moment is not "a durationless instant," his understanding of its temporal scope is limited to a singular experience time interval and thus is quite close to Damasio's.

now-point, but rather a "stream" and duration (Zahavi 2003, 2005). The same concerns the question regarding the embodied dimension of the minimal selfhood, which phenomenologists see as one of its fundamental characteristics (Fuchs 2008, 2012c).

A distinctive feature of phenomenology, as compared to the other disciplines, consists in its interest not in mere descriptive characteristics of the pre-reflective selfhood or in the underlying brain structures, but rather in its transcendental constitution. A reference to "transcendental" means that we are asking the question: What is the internal structure of this primary self that makes its phenomenal manifestations possible? What constitutive organization of our pre-reflective experience gives rise to the character of "mineness" or "selfness" that always implicitly belongs to it? In this sense, it is of course reasonable to doubt how minimal this minimal self actually is (Zahavi 2010), since, seen from the phenomenological standpoint, it possesses a complex inner structure.

Thus, while "mineness," first-person perspective, pre-reflective and non-objectifying character of self-relation can be listed among most important *descriptive* characteristics of this primary level of subjectivity, there still remains a question of the transcendental structure which makes this phenomenal self-manifestation possible. There are three basic and *constitutive* features which are held among the contemporary phenomenologists to be responsible for the constitution of the pre-reflective self-experience: (1) structure of inner-time consciousness or implicit *temporality* of experience; (2) *affectivity* or self-affection; and (3) *embodiment or* corporeality *(Leiblichkeit).*[11] It is also often stated that primary *intersubjectivity* should be considered as a part of the self-constitution, as even the minimal subject cannot be separated from its environment and other people (Fuchs 2012c).

This brings us back to my main claim in this introduction, which is best expressed in Merleau-Ponty's words that "If we succeed in understanding the subject, this will not be in its pure form, but rather by looking for the subject at the intersection of its various dimensions" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433). I hold this idea as central for understanding what subjectivity stands for in the phenomenological tradition: While Husserl brought the subject back to its lived experience, contemporary research has shown how multifaceted and heterogeneous this experience actually is. Among the main dimensions of subjectivi-

[11] See for instance: (Gallagher and Zahavi 2015; Zahavi 1999, 2005; Fuchs 2010, 2012c; Sass and Parnas 2003).

ty, which I have just mentioned, there are some which received more attention than the others. Temporality, embodiment, and intersubjectivity beyond doubt belong to the most studied and productive directions in both traditional and contemporary phenomenological philosophy. The focus of the present work will be, however, on the dimension of affectivity.

Inside the phenomenological approach, this term received at least two related but distinct meanings.[12] The first corresponds to "self-affection" and designates an immediate and non-objectifying way of subjective self-manifestation. Merleau-Ponty claimed that the essence of time lies in its being "self-affection by itself" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 449). Henry was considerably more radical and posited self-affection at the very essence of ipseity. He defined affectivity as "the identity of the affecting and the affected" (Henry 1973, 468) and claimed that being affected by oneself implies no exteriority and no objectification. For Henry, therefore, affectivity is essentially self-referential and precedes any possible hetero-affection.

The second meaning of affectivity follows from Husserl's analyses of passive constitution. In this perspective, affectivity is not merely self-referential but rather describes the most basic level of contact with the world and its radical alterity. Not only intentionality but also affectivity is defined in terms of relation between the self and otherness: while objectifying intentionality is an active relation between the self-conscious subject and an object of its experiences, affectivity is described by Husserl as a passive relation between the self and the foreign-to-the-self (*Ichfremdes*) which affects it.[13] Therefore, in Husserl, even basic level of self-manifestation and self-affection cannot be separated from hetero-affection. The two are in principle correlative: it is by being affected by something other than myself that I come to feel my own existence and the other way around: being affected by otherness means that I feel myself as thus affected. Self-affection precedes and underlies self-reflection but there is no ontological priority of the self over the otherness as both are two terms of the same equation: "The I is not something for itself and the foreign-to-the-I is not something sepa-

[12] I will return to this distinction between two meanings affectivity in § 8.3 of the second chapter.

[13] This point is also defended and thoroughly analyzed by Dan Zahavi in his book *Self-awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* (Zahavi 1999) and his paper *Self-Awareness and Affection* (Zahavi 1998).

rated from the I […]. Instead the I and what is foreign to it are inseparable" (Husserl 2006b, 351–352).[14]

Thus, affectivity in this latter perspective designates, first of all, the level of passivity and the pre-cognitive correlation defining the subject as always and necessarily finding himself in the world and affected by it. Another important aspect which allows conceiving of affectivity as fundamental dimension of subjectivity lies in its meaning for the issues of the unity of consciousness and pre-thematic organization of subjective experience. As Husserl shows, affection is never an isolated occurrence but is always part of the affective configuration. In the second chapter, I will show what role affectivity plays for formations of distinct unities and how it allows conceiving of experiential unity beyond merely formal conditions provided by temporality of consciousness.

The notion of *affective subjectivity* in this work designates, therefore, the totality or unity of the pre-reflective experience. Such a unity is above all not formal and is constituted on the level of content of subjective experience. It is not a unity as enabled by the transcendental subject of cognition or by the overarching temporal form of consciousness, but rather by multiplicity of connections making up a living affective identity of a subject.

Thus, the two main directions to be explored in this work are affectivity and pre-reflective unity of subjective experience. In order to develop my approach to affective subjectivity, I have decided to concentrate on the three following topics. The first questions the basic conditions which are responsible for the unified and coherent way in which subjective experience is organized. The second addresses the unity as constituted by associative and affective connectivity of consciousness. And the third explores the pre-reflective level of past-experience and affective dimension of memory. Accordingly, the work is divided into three chapters each of which focuses on the organization of the pre-reflective experience in what concerns (1) unity of consciousness; (2) associative and affective connectivity; (3) affective memory and the unconscious.

The first chapter "Subjectivity and the Unity of Consciousness: a Phenomenological Approach" deals with the phenomenological notion of subjectivity and the unity of consciousness. It has a systematic role for the whole project, since it addresses the constitutive principles of

[14] My translation of: "Das Ich ist nicht etwas für sich und das Ichfremde ein vom Ich Getrenntes und zwischen ihnen ist kein Raum für ein Hinwenden. Sondern untrennbar ist Ich und sein Ichfremdes."

the unity of subjective experience and paves the way to the phenomenological ideas of synthetic consciousness and connectivity of subjective experience. The chapter is divided into three parts (§ 1–3). The first deals with the phenomenological idea of subjectivity, as well as its distinction from the similar notion employed in the analytic philosophy of mind. The second part addresses the problem of the unity of consciousness and the idea of synthetic consciousness as developed in the tradition of transcendental philosophy (Hume, Kant, and Husserl). The third part situates this phenomenological approach within the context of the contemporary debates on the nature of consciousness and its unity, and it provides some arguments supporting the theoretical advantages of the synthesis-based model of consciousness compared to the qualia-based model of consciousness. The phenomenological explication of the unity of consciousness in terms of synthesis implies that, besides formal unity ensured by temporal connectivity, there is another conceivable type of unity, namely, the unity of subjective experience established through concrete, content-based connections.

The second chapter "Associative Syntheses, Affectivity, and Pre-reflective Connections in Subjective Experience" intends to account for this second type of unity. Its aim, therefore, is to explore the topics of associative syntheses and affectivity as they provide some principles for such content-based connectivity of consciousness. The chapter is divided into five parts (§ 4–8). I start with a general introduction to Husserl's account of associative connectivity (§ 4) and then proceed by situating this topic in the larger philosophical context in order to show how the topic of association was supposed to explore "the inherent lawfulness of mental life" (§ 5). Secondly, I provide some methodological clarifications concerning eidetic phenomenology and its distinction from the methodology of psychological investigation (§ 6). Then, I discuss some theoretical points involved in the dispute between associationist and Gestalt psychologies (§ 7.1) in order to clearly show, as a result, how Husserl's idea of associative syntheses should be distinguished from both (§ 7.2). After these general clarifications, the aim of which is essentially to present the phenomenological approach to associative connectivity in the larger context of psychological and philosophical discussions of the time, I focus on Husserl's transcendental doctrine of passive synthesis and discuss the topics of association and affection and their meaning for the phenomenological theory of synthetic consciousness and the genesis of subjectivity (the rest of § 7 & § 8).

The third chapter "Affective Memory and the Unconscious" inquires into the organization of subjective experience with regard to its pre-thematic unity with the past. My main intention here consists in questioning how the present and the past stay connected in the affective life of consciousness, especially before the institution of representational relation to the past in remembering. The chapter is divided in two thematic blocks: the first explores the phenomenological approaches to the unconscious (§§ 10 & 11) and the second deals with the topic of implicit memory (§ 12). I suggest that Husserl's investigations on affectivity allow for the overcoming of the strict separation between consciousness and the unconscious by inquiring into non-representational past-experience. In the same vein, phenomenological contribution to the issue of implicit memory can be grounded on Husserl's ideas of the "affective awakening of the past" and of the "affective past-horizon." As the most of this chapter is dedicated to exploration of the non-representational accounts of memory and the unconscious, I also consider Merleau-Ponty's and Fuchs' ideas on perceptual consciousness and body memory.

In the conclusion, I summarize the central arguments and topics covered in each chapter and then address the perspectives for future research, among which I distinguish three most important, namely: the idea of synthetic consciousness and its meaning for experiential coherence, the issue of personal identity, and the phenomenological approach to uncertainty.

CHAPTER I

SUBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

1. The phenomenological notion of subjectivity: Unity and heterogeneity

There are at least two different ways of approaching subjectivity in contemporary philosophy. In its narrowest definition, subjectivity concerns the so-called phenomenal quality of human experiences, which presupposes that mental phenomena, along with being defined as such or such (thoughts, memories, feelings, and so on), have an additional quality experienced by their owner, accessible to him or her from the unique first-person perspective—namely, the "what it is like" character, which cannot be shared with anybody else (Nagel 1974). Based on this position, consciousness is understood in essentially qualitative or phenomenal terms. For instance, John Searle and David Chalmers claim that the problem of consciousness is identical with the problem of qualia (Searle 1998; Chalmers 1996). Michael Tye underlines that phenomenal consciousness necessarily involves experiential first-person perspective which is further clarified as the immediate subjective "feel" or experiential quality (Tye 1995). Similarly, Owen Flanagan speaks of self-consciousness in the weak sense of the word: "[...] all subjective experience is self-conscious in the weak sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have that experience. This involves a sense that the experience is the subject's experience, that it happens to her, occurs in her stream" (Flanagan 1992, 194).

For the sake of discussion, I suggest distinguishing this narrow meaning of subjectivity in terms of phenomenal qualia from the broader meaning which belongs to the continental, especially to the phenomenological, tradition. In this latter sense, subjectivity encompasses, not

just a certain quality, but rather the totality of human mental life as an *open unity of subjective experience*. Experience in this sense refers to everything that is lived by a subject in the world, everything that happens in his or her field of awareness. Such an experience cannot be restricted to the present moment, but also includes in itself the past and possible future—the unity of history and becoming of one's life. Moreover, essential to the phenomenological idea of subjective experience is its situated, embodied, intentional and intersubjective character—its relation to the interpersonal world of shared meaning. In this regard, it is clear that in the phenomenological tradition subjectivity designates not merely the "what-it-is-like" character of experiences, but rather the multidimensional unity of one's experience as a whole. And since the phenomenological notion of subjectivity refers to the *totality* of experience and not just to its *quality*, the principle of unity clearly plays a crucial role for the very definition of subjective experience.

There is no doubt that Husserl referred to what he called "transcendental subjectivity" or "pure subjectivity" in this more encompassing sense and not in the mentioned narrow sense of the word. According to Husserl, "subjectivity" and "mind," while both originating from the Cartesian discovery of the *cogito*, represent its different interpretations and consequently different philosophical traditions, namely the tradition of transcendental philosophy and the Anglo-American philosophical tradition of empiricism.[15]

Thus, it is important to note that the meaning of subjectivity in these two respective traditions essentially depends on whether it is taken as a certain quality subordinated to the larger notion of the mind, or whether it is taken as a notion describing the whole of subjective experience. In the last sense, subjectivity is analogous to the mind and not subordinated to it. The choice to turn to the investigation of transcendental subjectivity and its further development, which Husserl states as the main task of his philosophy (transcendental phenomenology in this sense is itself a science of transcendental subjectivity), presupposes its radical differentiation from the naturalist account of the

[15] "Descartes "Doubting" first disclosed "transcendental subjectivity," and his "Ego Cogito" was its first conceptual handling. But the Cartesian transcendental "Mens" became the "Human Mind," which Locke undertook to explore; and Locke's exploration turned into a psychology of the internal experience" (Husserl 1997, 187). Moreover, as Husserl underlines, the double sense of "subjectivity" finds its roots in the same distinction, one leading to psychological and the other to transcendental clarification.

mind. In contrast to any distinction between mental and physical reality (mind and nature) or to the statement of their unity (mind in nature), phenomenology seeks to understand the correlation between subjectivity and the world as essential and constitutional for the both its parts, united in and through the experience.[16] One of the main implications of this view consists in claiming that subjectivity, as the central characteristic of an individual being, cannot be deduced from the naturalist understanding of mind and hence cannot be naturalized.

The notion of subjectivity in this larger sense rests upon the major assumption that the totality of mental life is thematizable only in so far as its subjective and experiential character are made an explicit object of investigation. This implies that the task of phenomenology is to uncover the basic structures of subjective experience as well as the main principles of its organization. The full notion of subjectivity, therefore, is dependent on the way we understand its experiential organization. For example, if it was claimed that subjective experience can be sufficiently clarified through its cognitive structure (such as the cognitive correlation between the subject and object of cognition), then a notion of subjectivity as an essentially cognitive phenomenon would ensue. Similarly, if one would rather insist that subjective experience should be clarified through its embodied and embedded dimensions, which thereby are taken as necessary conditions for anybody to have experience, then the very idea of subjectivity would change and it would be considered as essentially embodied.

In my view, within the current theoretical state of affairs the crucial point in understanding subjectivity is to assume what I shall call the *heterogeneity* of subjective experience. This implies that all mentioned modifications in our understanding of mind and subjectivity and the corresponding changes on the conceptual level cannot be seen as mere transitions from one conceptual framework to another. It is neither merely a shift from cognition to affection, nor from the mind as reduced to the brain towards the mind as enacted and embodied. I would rather

[16] An analogy to the distinction between "mind" and "subjectivity" would be the one between "nature" and "world," which one finds in Kant, Husserl and also in contemporary phenomenological metaphysics (Tengelyi 2014): while "nature" represents "einer Einheit des räumlich zeitlichen Seins nach exakten Naturgesetzen" (Husserl 2009, 9-10), the idea of the "world," on its turn, enclose in itself its necessary correlation with subjectivity, the world is what we experience: "[…] die Existenz einer Welt undenkbar ist ohne Mitexistenz eines Subjekts ihrer möglichen Erfahrung" (Husserl 2003, 167).

say that we need to envisage a transition from a uniform approach to the definition of the human being towards a mainly heterogeneous approach. This means that there is no single quality which can sufficiently define our mind or subjectivity. We have to assume subjectivity as an essentially multidimensional phenomenon which cannot be restricted neither to the neuronal structures inside the head, nor to its behavior or cognitive processes, nor to its embodied and affective being in the world. Accordingly, my claim is that any consistent scientific approach to the mind and subjectivity in both respective traditions has to account for the principal heterogeneity of its object.

Thus, I take the *heterogeneity* or multidimensionality of the constitutive experiential dimensions of subjective experience as one of the two basic principles defining subjectivity in its phenomenological understanding. By heterogeneity I mean the mentioned feature of subjective experience as not bound exclusively to the "I think" or cognitive dimension, but including all experiential diversity, such as affectivity, embodiment, and intersubjectivity.

The other essential principle of the phenomenological approach to subjectivity is the principle of *unity* of subjective experience. This implies that, first, subjective experience is intrinsically characterized by its coherence and preference for consistency and, second, that it is experienced as such a unity from the first-person perspective. As a result, the ownership of experience can be regarded as crucial in order to understand why the mental sphere is not a collection of random experiences and why it manifests itself in a coherent and unified way.

The phenomenological approach to the unity of consciousness traditionally emphasizes the role of the self and of pre-reflective self-awareness as central to the understanding of the unified character of experience (Zahavi 2005, 2011). This implies that the self is not taken as an abstract ego, which unites separate experiential parts in the whole, but rather as an experiential dimension. According to this perspective, the unified character of subjective experience is closely related to the minimal sense of "mineness" and "is constituted by first-personal character" (Zahavi 2011, 329). Moreover, the pre-reflective self-experience and first-personal givenness are further understood as essentially constituted through such dimensions as self-affection, corporeity, and inner temporality. The basic conditions of subjectivity and its self-identity are thus seen as related to the temporal continuity of consciousness and the bodily background feeling of "being alive" (Fuchs 2012c, 889). A differ-

ent direction in the phenomenological understanding of the unity of subjective experience is closely related to the one described above, but instead of placing most weight on the self, it emphasizes the synthetic function of consciousness. Despite being somewhat less prominent in the contemporary phenomenology, it has a primary role in the tradition of transcendental and phenomenological philosophy to which Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl belong.

It is one of the aims of this chapter to highlight the importance of the synthesis-based model of consciousness for the phenomenological clarification of the unity of consciousness. In order to do so I will (1) outline the problem of the unity of consciousness in the tradition of transcendental philosophy, namely in David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Edmund Husserl; and (2) compare the synthesis-based model of consciousness, as stemming from the tradition of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology, with the qualia-based model of consciousness prominent in the non-reductionist versions of the philosophy of mind.

Before entering into a more detailed account on this topic, there is another important point regarding the phenomenological idea of unity of subjective experience that should be made clear. As we have seen, subjectivity in the phenomenological tradition cannot be reduced to phenomenal consciousness or to "what-it-is-likeness" of experiences, but rather refers to the totality of experience. This implies that the investigation of the experiential unity in phenomenology cannot be restricted to the synchronic unity of phenomenal consciousness, but it has to take into account also the temporal continuity of experience. The understanding of the unity of one's experience as an open totality extended in time makes it clear that the problem of the unity of consciousness should be regarded as closely related to the problem of personal identity. Even though the specific nature of this relation is controversial, the connection of the two topics cannot be left unnoticed.

I take the problem of experiential unity (in both perspectives: unity of consciousness and personal identity) as central to my account of subjectivity within the phenomenological perspective. Hence, the main part of the first chapter is dedicated to the following questions: what does it mean that our experience is unified? And how can we understand connectivity of subjective experience within the perspective opened by the tradition of transcendental and phenomenological philosophy?

2. Connectivity of subjective experience and unity of consciousness: Exposition of the problem in Hume, Kant, and Husserl

Most contemporary discussions on the issue of personal identity revolve around more or less the same historical pattern, having the source and the beginning of their account in Locke's first disclosure of what a person's identity should be.[17] However, the history of ideas does not write itself on its own; it is always a reflection of the position of the narrator. And such a position stresses the first part of the formula, the "person" part, the one that presupposes an individuality in the foreground of debates. It is, indeed, Locke who motivated this kind of interest, especially thanks to his distinction between the identity of a man and a person (Locke 1975).

A person's identity, according to Locke, depends on one's reflective and reason-oriented capacity to be conscious of who he or she is. And such an understanding does not refer to a merely formal determination of the subject, but to a whole personality, one with a particular rationality, a past, a life story and its related responsibility.[18] Behind this scenery made of persons and their lives lingers an open question concerning a specific aspect of the "identity" issue, namely the question of unity. Upon first deliberation, one would definitely deny equality between these two questions: "what makes me the same person throughout the constant changes of a lifetime?" and "what unites all of my constantly changing and manifold experiences?". These questions are obviously different, and this difference is one of importance. We consider our personal being (for now, regardless of what exactly it consists in) as what matters and what should be preserved in the course of time. In this regard, the identity of myself, as this concrete individual, is a very personal problem: it is crucial for my life to be able to rely on my self-identity and continuity, even if in a finite perspective only. When no question is asked, this identity is not ruled out, but rather simply taken for granted.[19]

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[17] See a wide discussion on the personal identity in the analytic philosophy: S. Shoemaker, D. Parfit, E. Olson, M. Schechtman, J. Whiting and others.

[18] It is quite remarkable to notice that Parfit's view that it is mental connectivity and not numerical identity what really matters in issue of personal identity (Parfit 1984) follows directly from Locke's definition of a person.

[19] At least, in the dominating western kind of culture and society. Though, the universality and seeming self-evidence of this statement should be relativized, especially when taking a multicultural perspective.

The question of unity, on the face of it, does not tell much about self-identity. It introduces instead a special problem concerning the connections bringing different states of our mind or distinct kinds of experiences together, inasmuch as they might compose a coherent whole, instead of a disconnected chaos of impressions. But does this coherence or connectivity of our experience, which comes here into question, have something to do with our being the same person in the course of time?

There is no univocal solution to this matter. On the one hand, in this perspective, two parts of the identity-problem are kept apart: the issue of pure continuity of experience, regardless of its content, and the issue of personality (in the sense: what it means to be a person). Distinguishing one from the other allows us to avoid the traps of psychologism as well as any commitment to the natural illusion of the hypostatized self-consciousness, from which Kant prevents us in his Third Paralogism.[20] On the other hand, by focusing solely on the problem of mind's connectivity, one may seem to ignore Locke's achievement, which consists precisely in separating different kinds of identities (of substances, man and person) and revealing the different entities responsible for their sameness through time. In other words, the problem of personal identity is apparently altogether ignored and replaced by another problem, that is that of subjective unity. In fact, I take this contradiction between personality and pure subjectivity of experience to lie at the very center of the identity-problem, glaring in both main approaches (transcendental and empiricist) and their variations throughout the history of philosophy.

By following this lead, a somewhat different story may be outlined, and this story starts with another illustrious thinker in modern philosophy, David Hume. It would be my claim, which I will try to confirm, to say that Hume was the first to see the core of the identity problem in the connections between different mind states. Indeed his focus was not so much on the issue of why we think of ourselves as one same person (at the end, it all may be just a matter of habit). What was really crucial for Hume was to determine what "gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves

[20] According to Kant, from such a unity of experience would not necessarily follow any continuous personality. Thus, in *Paralogisms*, he claims that in the empirical subject as such "there may, after all, have occurred such variation as does not permit us to retain (the claim to) its identity, although we may still go on to accord to this subject the homonymous *I*" (Kant 1996, A363). More on this matter in what follows (§ 2.2.b).

possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives?" (Hume 2003, 181). The main point here is precisely the accent on the unity of successive perceptions, which represented such a great and almost insuperable problem for Hume that he himself had to admit it in the famous Appendix to *A Treatise of Human Nature.* He also admitted in the same place that however promising the theory of personal identity as arising from consciousness may be (a clear reference to Locke), it could not convince him at all when it came to the issue of unity and connections between distinct perceptions. As we shall see, this problem was of great importance within Kant's and Husserl's enquiries concerning the experiencing subjectivity, and eventually led to what might be called the synthesis-based model of consciousness. As for now, in the following section, I shall first outline an approach to the issues of personal identity and the unity of consciousness based on the perspective opened by the question about mind's connectivity.

2.1. Hume: The labyrinth of the self

> I find myself involved in such a labyrinth [...] (Hume 2003, 450).
>
> All my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness (Hume 2003, 452).

Hume was deeply concerned with understanding the self and personal identity. He found himself in the middle of many vivid discussions concerning these issues, which were inspired equally by the metaphysics of substances and its aspiration to account for the soul's immortality, as well as by the relatively new and historically significant scientific will to locate the human being in the objective order of nature. Nevertheless, the problem of personal identity only truly imposed itself as a problem concerning the unity of subjective experience when Hume submitted it to his radical self-skepticism and finally admitted the impossibility of providing any convincing solution, which would either render a philosophical account of the self consistent or eliminate it completely. The core of this philosophical problem should then be detected neither in the pure affirmation of some immutable fact (be it empirical or metaphysical), nor in the simple and well-grounded skepti-

cism about it (which would be then equal to the dissolution of the problem), but rather in the paradox, that is to say in the theoretical impossibility of either accepting or rejecting.[21] Thus, our story starts with a paradox, with David Hume finding himself in the labyrinth of the self.[22] Let us have a closer look at his steps in this labyrinth.

The introduction of the problem, or the first step, is provided by Hume's skeptical approach to the self, as presented in the part of *Treatise* entitled "Of personal identity." Here, he famously denies the existence of any self or substance because there is no impression or idea derived from the original impression, which could correspond to it. Thus, he claims, "we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense" (Hume 2003, 451). What we have or perceive by means of the inner sense are only distinct perceptions, and of these we indeed have impressions and correspondent ideas (which, for Hume, differ only in intensity, not in principle). From this point follows a correlative claim, which is also widely known as the bundle-theory of the self: we are "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (Hume 2003, 180). And later on in the Appendix he adds: "I never can perceive this *self* without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. It is the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self" (Hume 2003, 451).

As we can see, in both the original section on personal identity in Book 1 and later in the Appendix, Hume advocates two related positions: (1) "there is no self or substance" and (2) "the mind is just a composition of different perceptions." More difficult is for him to explain the principle of connection which binds together such distinct perceptions. This issue is, in my view, the most crucial in regard to his approach to the problem of personal identity. I would indeed argue that Hume's second step, which truly entices him in the self-labyrinth and influences no less than the subsequent tradition of transcendental phi-

[21] Probably, it is for the similar reasons that the problem of personal identity receives so much attention in the contemporary thought, in which the remarkable rise of self-sceptics corresponds to the no less impressive request for plausible solution to the "hard problem" of consciousness.

[22] "But upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity*, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent" (Hume 2003, 450).

losophy, is an attempt to account for the connection between different perceptions, the *connection which, even in the absence of the self-principle, brings distinct pieces of our mind together*. It is precisely concerning this issue that he admits his previous account (in Book 1) to be defective. In order to understand the significance of this step, it is worth quoting his position it its integrity:

> If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connections among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only *feel* a connection or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprise us. Most philosophers seem inclined to think, that personal identity *arises* from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.
> In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences*, and *that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences*. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions (Hume 2003, 452).

What we see in this text is an extraordinarily condensed train of thought that leads to the acknowledgment of a true and, for the time being, unsolvable problem concerning personal identity. First, he claims that the whole of our mind consists of distinct perceptions, which do not cause each other's existence and which are nonetheless somehow connected while preserving their independence. They do not represent a whole as something simple and individual, but, for sure, there exists some whole of all our perceptions, even though in the vague form of a "bundle." And that means that even if there is no self, who is responsible for binding the perceptions together, they are nonetheless somehow connected. However,—and here comes the problem—our human understanding cannot see any *real connection* between these distinct percep-

tions, we can only *feel* the connection. It would be misleading to suppose then that there is a kind of a *felt connection* in the mind. What Hume actually means could be phrased as follows: in our perceptions as such we cannot find anything that would imply they are necessarily connected to each other. For example, our perceptions of a sunny day and of smiling faces do not, in any part, produce a perception or feeling of happiness. The same perceptions could as well be connected in our mind to a feeling of sorrow and vainness of all being. The connection is simply not there; it is not *real*. It is, continues Hume, a connection we make in our thought: "the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind," (Ibid) and by this thinking (or habit of imagination, as Hume will write in *An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*) we come to feel the connection between mind-states.[23]

This might be an "extraordinary" conclusion, as he points out, and it is also remarkably close to Locke's position about consciousness, from the reflective operations of which what we call self-identity arises. Seen from this angle, self-identity is thus in no way real, but only an identity established by thinking about oneself. Therefore, it can only prove that my thoughts about myself in different moments are thoughts about the same thing, which is the self. But such an idea does not answer Hume's question about the connections that *unite* our mind, or, in his own words, about "the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness." According to him, this is precisely the question one should be able to answer if one hopes to understand how personal identity is possible, and, for that matter, how Locke's identical self-consciousness is possible, since *any possible thoughts or memories of oneself should be connected in the first place in order to produce any kind of personality.*

Thus far, we have tackled Hume's aporia about self-identity, which is at the same time his greatest difficulty and greatest contribution to the problem. The aporia consists of the following dilemma: on the one hand, we have a bundle or a whole of distinct perceptions and among

[23] The meaning of the felt connection can be elucidated by the following passage from the *Inquiry*: "It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connection among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events [...] This connection, therefore, which we *feel* in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection" (Hume 1854, 85-86).

them there is none which would give us an idea of an identical self, but all the distinct perceptions constitute a certain unity, or we should, at least, perceive them as such a unity. On the other hand, we have no means of explaining how these different perceptions are connected to each other or to the whole, or, in Hume's words, "*the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences*" (Hume 2003, 452). One should not forget that Hume was an empiricist and that he considered experience to be the only source of certainty and of all our ideas. Thus, from this perspective, we may reach the conclusion that Hume actually demonstrated that there is nothing in the experience we have of ourselves and nothing in the reality of this experience that can be held responsible for the connections between its distinct parts.

To conclude with Hume's contribution to the problem, I would like to emphasize another consequence of his account of personal identity. As previously made clear, it is the issue of connections between different mind states that determined his main perplexity concerning self-identity. But besides the question of *how* these states or perceptions are connected, there is another crucial point to which one should pay attention, and it is the very introduction of "connection" as the essential characteristic of our mind. According to Hume, the mind is not only about the whole or the composition of multiple perceptions (impressions and ideas); rather, the workings of the mind consist in seeing connections between these things, and representing itself as some sort of interconnected unity.[24] This point is constantly present in Hume's enquiries, as we can see him struggling to firmly determine the principles regulating these connections, principles that he calls associations of ideas. And it was this point, namely the formulation of the main problem on the level of connections and the unity of mind, that the subsequent tradition, beginning with Kant, took on and attempted to solve.

[24] It is reflected in the very development of the *Inquiry* and the *Treatise*, where, after the basic distinction between impressions and ideas, one finds question concerning associations of ideas, or of those principles of connection between different perceptions which constitute mind's life. Though I hold this thought as determinative for Hume's philosophy, it is not his exclusive possession. One finds the idea of "relation" between ideas also in John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. The difference which matters in this context concerns first of all the source of these "relations" and "connections" between distinct perceptions and ideas. While Locke was of opinion that relations are real and can be perceived by us (Locke 1975, Ch. XXV-XXVI), Hume was convinced of exactly the opposite.

The decisive step in elaborating this topic comes with Kant's critical turn. In Kant, we find Hume's question elevated to a completely new level and framed as the general problem of *synthesis*. For Hume, the problem of connections refers to both objective connections (be it matters of fact or relations of ideas) and connections between mind-states. In fact, these two moments are not that different in his view, since all connections are, essentially, connections in the experiencing mind (not discoverable *a priori* nor by means of reasoning, but only by experience). This is why the problem of self-identity is so closely related to the problem of causation, especially on the level of argumentation. Strikingly similar arguments are given, in fact, in his analyses of the "necessary connection" between cause and effect (*Inquiry,* VII) and of the "real connection" between distinct mind-states (*Treatise* 1.VI). In this regard, one can argue that the problem of causation and self-identity are just two distinct instances of the more general problem of "connections" in the mind.

Kant also first formulates the question of synthesis in the general context of objective cognition. He asks how the connections that our mind sees in nature (and that cannot be derived from our notions of things analytically) are generally possible and objectively valid. In other words: how are synthetic connections in our cognition possible, if they are not derived from experience? This question seems to follow directly from Hume's conclusion. Kant accomplishes a crucial step following Hume's conviction that synthesis is not only a problem of the objective order of cognition, but rather lies in the activity of our mind, and that mind itself can be understood only as a synthetic unity. This conclusion is only implicit in Hume's work but it clearly presents a problem that Kant took up to explore.

In spite of some vagueness concerning the level of Kant's acquaintance with Hume's work, it has been convincingly shown that he read at least a brief exposition of the *Treatise* in the German version of James Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*.[25] It means that he was at least familiar with the first step of Hume's account of personal identity; however, he apparently knew neither about the relation between the self and passions[26] nor about Hume's dissatisfaction with

[25] See: (Kitcher 1982).

[26] We may name this relation between the self and passions a *third step*, which came before Hume's dissatisfaction with his account of personal identity. It represents a sort of alternative to this problem, not touched by his own critique. According to Hume, there is distinction between "personal identity, as it re-

the hard question of connections between distinct perceptions, which had brought him such despair. But, at the same time, we have seen that the problem of personal identity, as it was formulated by Hume, represents only a particular case of the more general problem of connections in the mind, which is central to both the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*, and which is definitively central for Kant in his exploration of the problem of *synthesis*. In her article, *Kant on Self-Identity*, Patricia Kitcher argues that Kant should have seen the problem of the real connection in Hume not only in regard to objective synthesis and causality, but also to its subjective side and the question of self-identity. According to this point, she proposes to understand the *Subjective Deduction* as a reply to Hume's skeptical account of the self, with the result that its "real argumentative goal" would be in that case "to justify the imputing of existential connections[27] among mental states" (Kitcher 1982, 50).

2.2. Kant: Synthetic unity of consciousness

> Only because I can combine a manifold of given presentations *in one consciousness,* is it possible for me to present the *identity itself of the consciousness in these presentations* (Kant 1996, B133).

While introducing the central question of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, concerning the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*, Kant mentions Hume as the one who "came closer to this problem than any other philosopher" (Kant 1996, B19). As Graciela De Pierris and Michael Friedman claim in their article, *Kant and Hume on Causality*, Kant's approach to Hume's problem concerning the relation between cause and effect is essentially marked by his understanding of it in terms of *synthesis* (De

gards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (Hume 2003, 181). Though this particular moment concerning Hume's account of self-identity does not play a crucial role in our present story of personal identity, as based on the quest for unity of consciousness, it will nevertheless be of importance than it comes to the limits of the formal theory of subjective unity.

[27] By existential connection, Kitcher means Hume's real connection, interpreting it in terms of existential dependence between distinct mental states, so that one cannot exist without the other (Kitcher 1982, 46). Kirchner's claim in this article is that "if Kant can defend the idea of existential connection among mental states, he will have countered Hume's skepticism about personal identity".

Pierris and Friedman 2013). We could bring this argument a step further and say that, in the first *Critique*, Kant elevates the problem of the connections between distinct perceptions (that is, the relation that cannot be explicated analytically) to the level of the universal problem of synthesis *a priori*. Concerning our specific problem of subjective connection, it would mean that we are no longer searching for any "given" real connection in experience (which Hume discovered to be absent), but rather, we are asking (along with Kant): what kind of synthetic activity is responsible for connecting the manifold in our mind?[28]

Kant starts where Hume sees an insuperable problem, namely: if identity consists of having the same consciousness of the self in different moments of experience, if, so to speak, it "*arises* from consciousness" (Hume 2003, 452), then one should try to understand how it is possible that at different moments in time one has precisely the same consciousness and not a plurality of them. Accordingly, even if we were to accept that there is a plurality of consciousness at different moments of time, then how exactly is this plurality related to the same self or subject? Hume would have argued that there is no way to explain it or find any self at all. However, he also showed that if we do not want to give up on this matter, then we would have to explain, first, how one consciousness of something is connected with another and, second, how they are all connected together. These questions remain valid, even if one is not willing to recognize any self-principle in experience.

The crucial step Kant undertook to solve the paradox of connectivity was to introduce a distinction between *sensibility*, as pure receptivity (only the form of which would be given *a priori*), and *spontaneity*, as an active power of understanding, responsible in the first place for the combination of the manifold of intuition and the whole experience in general: "[…] among all presentations, *combination* is the only one that cannot be given through objects, but—being an act of the subject's self-activity—can be performed only by the subject himself" (Kant 1996, B 130). Thus, combination, which Kant also calls *synthesis*, is defined as an act of understanding prior to any experience, and as what allows the presentation of the manifold in the first place. However, Kant does not content himself with the simple indication that the combination of experiences is due to the *a priori* spontaneity of understanding. His crucial point consists in

[28] The change of terms from "connection" to "synthesis" may also indicate Kant's refusal to understand principles of connections as depending ultimately on the empirical laws of associations.

revealing that such a combination is possible only because of what he calls the "synthetic unity of apperception" or "the transcendental unity of self-consciousness" (B132), or, simply, thanks to an identical subject of experience to whom all multiple presentations belong. In clearer terms: for Kant, as for Hume, there is, strictly speaking, nothing in the experience we have that would allow us to infer any necessary connection between its distinct parts; the only connection one is allowed to state is that all presentations and intuitions I have are *mine*. The self is thus elevated (or cut down) from a bundle of perceptions to a mere principle of identity and—most importantly—of unity. Nevertheless, between the statement, "all experiences are *mine*," and the principle of unity of distinct experiences there is, to say the least, a conceptual gap, which we should now attempt to clarify.

If one were to define what exactly "unity of consciousness" means for Kant, one would have to start with an important distinction between (1) the original unity of apperception, i.e. unity as it concerns the pure form of understanding; (2) unity as it concerns the synthesis of the manifold of subjective experience (understanding combined with intuition); and, (3) unity as it concerns the identity of a person.[29] This distinction does not mean that there are different kinds of unity, but rather that there are different implications of the first principle of the synthetic unity of consciousness on separate levels of inquiry (respectively: on the level of pure thought; on the level of thought as combined with the manifold of intuition, that is of experience as possible *a priori*; and on the level of psychological inquiry about a subject's persistence over time). The first two moments are discussed in the chapter *On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding*. The third moment is dealt with in the *Paralogisms of Pure Reason*. We shall then proceed further according to this division.

[29] I must underline that this distinction does not concern the objective unity, i.e. the level of application of the synthetic unity of apperception to the cognition of an object.

a) *The original unity of apperception and the synthesis of the manifold in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*

The first form of unity is the original unity of apperception[30] or the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, which stands for two basic principles: analytic and synthetic unity. The first is the pure and simple *analytic* principle of identity, according to which all kinds of experiences share the same condition—being *mine*. It is to this kind of unity that the judgment *I think* "capable of accompanying all my presentations" (B132) corresponds:

> [the proposition *I think*] says no more than that all *my* presentations in some given intuition must be subject to the condition under which alone I can ascribe them—as *my* presentations—to the identical self, and hence under which alone I can collate them, as combined synthetically in one apperception, through the universal expression *I think* (B138).

As Kant clearly stresses in the second Paralogism, the proposition *I think* itself is not an experience, but merely a form of apperception (A354). Wilfred Sellars writes in this regard that the unity of apperception merely enables what can be called the *analytic* unity, namely: "The I which thinks *a* is identical with the I which thinks *b*" (Sellars 1970, 7). Kant himself declares the same thing: "it is true that this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself merely an identical and hence an analytic proposition" (Kant 1996, B135). Thus, although this first principle of unity is synthetic, in itself it provides *only* an analytic kind of subjective identity, and in no way represents an actual self-experience. Through this simple presentation nothing manifold is given (B135) and no experience is lived by the *I* or the "transcendental subject of thoughts" (B404). This also presupposes an atemporal character of this subject, since time is understood as a form of intuition and this latter as essentially an experiential feature.

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[30] In Kant, the term "apperception" (*lat.* Ad (to, toward)-percipere (perceive)) refers to self-conscious perception, but with a strong emphasis on the consciousness of oneself or self-consciousness (B68) and with less emphasis on perception. Thus, the original synthetic unity of apperception is the same as the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Husserl's use of the term "apperception" underlies the conscious character of intentional acts. For example, in *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* he explains it as follows: "Apperceptions are intentional lived experiences that are conscious of something as perceived [...] Defined in this general way, apperception is a concept that encompasses every self-giving, thus every intuitive consciousness" (Husserl 2001a, 624-625).

Nevertheless, by stressing the analytic nature of the judgment *I think*, we should not forget that Kant insisted that this *analytic* unity (or identity of consciousness in different presentations) is strictly dependent on the *synthetic* unity of apperception. As he writes in § 16, the subjective unity consists not in a mere accompanying of each presentation with consciousness, but rather in "my *adding* one presentation to another and being conscious of their synthesis. Hence only because I can combine a manifold of given presentations *in one consciousness*, is it possible for me to present the *identity itself of the consciousness in these presentations*" (B133). And a little bit later: "The thought that these presentations given in intuition belong one and all to me is, accordingly, tantamount to the thought that I unite them, or at least can unite them, in one self-consciousness" (B134). Thus, we must distinguish this transcendental subject, who actively unifies all presentations, from the analytic identity (the one of the *I think* accompanying all my presentations) which it enables. I assume that it is precisely this idea of synthetic activity that allows us to see Kant's conception of transcendental subject as an example of an egological theory of consciousness. Nevertheless, it is also theoretically possible to see Kant's idea of transcendental apperception just as "the requirement that any cognition must be represented in a unity," without insisting on the existence of some independent self (Ameriks 1982, 141).

Then, a clear distinction should be taken into account between this primordial unity of apperception (in its synthetic and analytic meanings) and the synthesis of the manifold in thought and intuition (i.e. in the experience as possible *a priori*), which this unity enables. The challenge faced by Kant in this context can be summarized as follows: granted that the presentation of the synthetic original unity of apperception is only a thought and not an intuition, and that our experience is always subjected to the limiting conditions of intuition and is as such a combination of both (thought and intuition), then how exactly can one proceed from the original unity of apperception and the identity of the *I think* to the unity regarding the experience and the identity of the self as a subject of this experience? How can one deduce this kind of unity and identity, given that experience itself does not provide any? The solution Kant proposes lies in the combination of the unifying principle provided by the understanding with the form of time as a universal form of the inner sense:

> [The pure thought or intelligence] is conscious solely of its power of combination. But as regards the manifold that it is to combine, this intelligence is subjected to a limiting condition (which it calls inner sense). As subjected to this condition, it can make that combination intuitable only in terms of time relations, which lie wholly outside the concepts of understanding, properly so called (Kant 1996, B159).

When it comes to the experience, the pure principle of identity has to be subjected to time relations; the self-consciousness must descend from a pure thought to the cognition, and, moreover, it must descend to the intuition of oneself, as it appears to itself, and not as it is in itself (B156). It is through experience that the first distinction of the self from itself is given. This distinction is rooted in the fact that in the inner sense "we are inwardly affected *by ourselves*" (B156) and, therefore, can intuit ourselves and possess an actual self-experience and not merely a tautological thought. In the experience I am "conscious of myself as I appear to myself" (B157), I am therefore conscious of this difference of the self from itself, which is presented clearly as a difference between my different states in time and as a difference between the I "who thinks" and the I "that intuits itself" (B155). On the theoretical level, this difference creates a problem of self-identity. But, for Kant, this problem, *even if engendered on the level of self-experience, cannot be solved on this level.* In other words, the identity of the self in the manifold of experience remains dependent on the original synthetic unity of apperception. It implies as well that this identity of the self in time is not due to the temporality of the inner sense. Time is only an experiential condition, to which the unified activity of the transcendental ego is applied: "By no means does the understanding already find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold; rather, the understanding produces it, inasmuch as the understanding affects that sense" (B155).

What is important to underline here is the idea that self-identity *over* time or *in* time remains, strictly speaking, an identity of the thought of oneself, a thought accompanying temporally extended experiences. The sameness of a subject in time, as well as the sameness of a subject "who thinks" and "who intuits," is still a *formal* sameness of analytic kind and does not enable any necessary connection on the level of the content of the subjective experience.

Thus far, one may conclude that for Kant identity is always a function of original unity: the identity of the *I think* is functionally dependent on the synthetic unity of apperception; and the identity of the consciousness of the self at different times results from the combining of

the original synthetic unity with the pure form of inner sense. The question to account for now is: Would personal identity also follow from the unifying activity of the transcendental subject?

b) Personal identity in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason

When it comes to the question of personal identity, in the sense of the numerical identity of oneself as the same subject in time, Kant acts very cautiously. He makes sure to prevent his reader from giving in to the natural illusion of taking the purely *subjective unity* of the *I* (of that which can only be a subject) as an intuition of an object. In other words, he sets a clear limit to our use of the principle of unity, from which the numerical identity of a person and a soul's persistence over time does not follow. His main point being the following:

> [...] the identity of the consciousness of myself in different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, but does not prove at all the numerical identity of myself as subject. In this subject—regardless of the logical identity of the *I*—there may, after all, have occurred such variation as does not permit us to retain [the claim to] its identity, although we may still go on to accord to this subject the homonymous *I* (A363).

As previously explained, the problem of self-identity initially arises from the distinction between the *I* as a pure (logical) subject of apperception and the *I* as an object of inner sense—the distinction first appearing in the experience, in which the pure principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is subjected to the conditions of the intuition. Thus, contemplating myself in the form of inner sense, I always find myself *in* different times or as an object in time (Kant also calls this object of inner sense a soul [A342]). In each moment of time there is a different state of this I-object and thus its identity could be naturally regarded as a numerical identity of the self *in* the time-change. That is precisely the conclusion that Kant wants to question, as it follows from *mistaking two ways of representing itself for two ways of objective being.* It means that the distinction between the *I* as a logical subject of thought and the *I* as an object of inner perception is in no way a real or an objective one, but merely a twofold manner of self-representation (Kant 1798/2007,7:134). Thus, this difference is valid only subjectively—that is, for the subject of the experience. Consistently, he states in the

third Paralogism that "in my own consciousness, identity of the person is unfailingly to be met with" (Kant 1996, A362), and subsequently comes up with an argument "from a standpoint of a stranger," which, as I see it, does not presume an actual reference to intersubjectivity. Differently, Kant argues that a numerical identity of myself in time is given *only* from "inside" my own perspective, since only I can have myself as an object and as a subject simultaneously.

As soon as the application of the principle of self-identity is extended to the object of inner sense as such, we inevitably fall prey to the misuse of the transcendental concept of subjective unity or, as Kant calls it, the natural illusion of the hypostatized self-consciousness.[31] Such a hypostasizing of one's own self-representation is what gives rise to an idea of the soul as an objective entity capable of persistence in time. However, this idea, according to Kant's argument, directly follows from the attempt to find personal identity in the wrong place—in the inner sense and, therefore, in time—while it can only be met on the side of purely formal subjective unity. An identical self, as Ameriks points out, can be regarded as a mere "reference to the unity of apperception" (Ameriks 1982, 142). The main point of Kant's critique of the misuse of the transcendental concept of apperception in the third Paralogism consists, then, in separating the claim of self-identity as a mere principle of the unity of consciousness from the claim that there is a personal identity over time based on this unity. Probably one of the clearest explications of this idea can be found in Ameriks's interpretation:

> Kant's premise is not that my consciousness really *is* in these various times but only that there are various times 'in my consciousnesses.' My consciousness is 'identical' then not in any numerical-persistent sense, but only in the sense of being a unified awareness directed to a plurality of times (Ameriks 1982, 134).

Therefore, according to Kant's argument, an attempt to qualify personality as a subject in time would be just an unnecessary duplication of the self, which, moreover, can lead to ambiguous consequences, such as, an idea of the soul's immortality or, simply, an affirmation of personality as a distinct kind of ontological entity. In the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic*

[31] "Nothing is more natural and tempting than the illusion of regarding the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts" (A402).

Point of View, Kant goes back to this argument and stresses an apparent theoretical ambiguity lying at the center of the identity problem:

> To ask, given the various inner changes within a man's mind (of his memory or of principles adopted by him), when a person is conscious of these changes, whether he can still say that he remains *the very same* (according to his soul), is an absurd question. For it is only because he represents himself as one and the same *subject* in the different states that he can be conscious of these changes. The human "I" is indeed twofold according to form (manner of representation), but not according to matter (content) (Kant 1798/2007, 7:134).

Though Kant clearly opposes the idea of personal identity, which leads to the affirmation of a soul's persistence over time, he does not reject that there is a personal identity based on the unity of consciousness. For example, in the *Anthropology*, he claims that one is a person precisely because of the unity of consciousness, which allows him to stay the same through all change: "Because of this [the *I*] he is a *person*, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person" (Ibid, 7:127). Now, having in mind Kant's reasoning for being against personal identity in the third Paralogism, should we regard this statement as a contradiction or rather as an elaboration of the same thesis? I would be inclined to accept the second option, that Kant does not reject the idea of personal identity altogether, but rather rejects its variation as advocated by what he calls rational psychology (in our days, one would classify it in the frame of the "psychological approach" to personal identity[32]). This means that he, first of all, rejects the very idea of personal identity as a numerical identity of a persistent subject *in* time, and, secondly, the corresponding hypostasizing of such a subject and respectively of a soul as an independent ontological entity, and finally, also the very possibility of accounting for it *a priori*. Conversely, he does assume the concept of personality as what remains the same through the time-changes, but as valid only subjectively and, mainly, for practical uses (Kant 1996, A366), and not for "our self-cognition through pure reason" (Ibid).

In his lectures on the First Critique, Theodor Adorno emphasizes that the unity of personal consciousness can only mean identity in the

[32] See for example an article of Eric Olson on personal identity in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in which he distinguishes between the psychological and somatic approaches as representing two main ways of accounting for personal identity in the contemporary philosophy (Olson 2010).

most abstract sense, repeating Kant's own words that the singularity of the *I* of the subjective identity cannot explain the identity of the person. Adorno claims this to be the liberation from the mythology of the soul's identity and a reduction of such an identity to something purely apersonal, so that "when we think of ourselves as having a permanent identity, we mean something so formal that, actually, we do not mean anything at all" (Adorno 2001, 199).

Nevertheless, such liberation may eventually face the paradox of individuality, namely: if the unity of consciousness and one's own identity can be reduced to something so formal, how can we account for the individuality of consciousness at all? How exactly can one subject be distinguished from another? If the unity of consciousness as such has nothing to do with personality, how can we account for the individuality of a concrete subject of experience? Obviously, according to Kant, it can be done only on the level of empirical observation and cannot lead to a science of subjectivity. But, at the same time, as Adorno points out, we are able to come up with the problem of our own subjectivity, concerning the connections in our mind, and eventually the original unity *a priori*, only insofar as we experience ourselves as individual persons (Adorno 1995, 139). Thus, Adorno points to a radical problem which stands behind Kant's attempt to account for the original unity of consciousness and consequently for personal identity, without falling into the paralogism of rational psychology:

> I would add only that the problem of which subject is under discussion is in no way resolved, since the critique of reason has made it its task to ground empirical facts and not to presuppose them. This means that the empirical self, the individual person that everyone in this room is, cannot be taken for granted. On the other hand, the assumption of a specific individual consciousness which is able to unify disparate perceptions is absolutely indispensable for the Kantian critique. We thus find ourselves confronted by a contradiction […] that, on the one hand, the concept of subjectivity cannot be conceived of without the personal subject from which it has been derived; but that, on the other hand, the personal subject has first to be constituted and so cannot be presupposed in advance. Kant, however, could not bring himself to stop worrying away at this contradiction […] (Adorno 2001, 90).

This is clearly a perfect example of what I earlier referred to as the contradiction between personality and the pure subjectivity of experience, which lies at the heart of the identity-problem. This contradiction first appears in Locke's formulation of the problem of personal identity, when he presents

a human personality as dependent on the sameness of the self-consciousness one has of his present and past experiences. The subsequent tradition, which I prefer to call transcendental philosophy, took up the task of exploring and criticizing this contradiction, which led to an affirmation of the unity of consciousness as its central problem. As previously discussed, Hume discovered that the principle of connections between distinct perceptions (or simply, the principle of unity) should underpin the principle of identity. Kant then developed this idea of Hume and postulated that there should be an original and *a priori* principle of unity, making the whole of experience possible and enabling the self-identity of the subject through manifold experiences. At the same time, Kant restricted the principle of unity as responsible only for a certain kind of subjective identity (that of the self-consciousness), from which the numerical identity of a person does not ensue (as Locke had hoped it should).

In spite of the clear opposition against the psychological account of subjectivity, which claims that identical self-consciousness enables an identical personality (including its psychological characteristics) through time change, Kant could not avoid the challenge of individual consciousness. We have seen that the main issue in Kant's approach to subjective unity concerns a certain conflict between experiential and pure (*a priori*) levels of inquiry: on the one hand, the original principle of apperception, which grants unity to the experience, allows the statement of *only* a formal and analytic kind of identity (the sameness of the subject of thoughts). Even though transcendental self-consciousness is considered the ultimate source of any synthetic activity enabling the manifold of experience to be unified in one consciousness, the subject as such stays, so to speak, beyond or above its own experience, since through the "*I think*" no experience is lived. On the other hand, this transcendental subject comes to be inevitably involved in the experience and thereby subjected to the conditions which the inner sense, in the form of time, imposes on it. It becomes, therefore, a subject of self-experience, in which it can only cognize itself as it appears (and not as it is). A new problem of subjective identity appears, indeed, concerning the subjective experience in its temporal extension. This problem concerns a constitutive difference affecting the subject of this experience, namely the difference between the subject as such and the way it appears to itself. Kant prefers not to solve this issue on the experiential level. Although I can only notice it in passing, this problem was of great importance for the subsequent tradition of German Ideal-

ism and, notably, for Hegel, who took the experiential dimension, in its inner dialectic, to be constitutive for subjectivity as such. But what is even more relevant to this exploration of unity as a central characteristic of subjectivity is the development of this problem in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

2.3. Edmund Husserl: Formal unity of time-consciousness

One of the main challenges Husserl encountered in his philosophy was precisely the question of how to conceive of subjectivity as not being separate from its experience, but as, essentially, being constituted in and through its inner temporality. Thus, we could say that Husserl undertook the task of accounting for subjective unity at exactly the level where Kant left it unresolved—that is, at the level of manifold temporal experiences.

This task in the context of the present inquiry represents an alternative way of solving Hume's problem of connections between distinct mind states—namely an alternative to Kant's approach, which assumes that the principle of connection cannot be found in the experience itself, but rather on the side of the synthetic activity of the transcendental self-consciousness. We have seen that this idea eventually led to a separation between abstract and pure subject of thoughts and the experiencing subjectivity, which was left outside any possible transcendental explication. As for Husserl's phenomenological project, his work can be seen as an attempt to account for subjectivity in the framework of an essentially experiential field, while, at the same time, overcoming psychologism which inevitably endangers any experience-oriented inquiry into subjective phenomena. Thus, seen from the perspective of the preceding tradition of transcendental philosophy, Husserl's phenomenology tends to solve the Kantian dilemma[33] (between the unifying subject of thoughts and of experience) without falling for psychological explications.

Since I take the problem of connections formulated by Hume to be crucial for the understanding of subjective unity, I will continue using it

[33] Pointing out this distinction nevertheless cannot conceal the fact that Husserl himself eventually came to the conception of a unifying ego-pole, which is indeed highly comparable with Kant's theory of transcendental unity of apperception. Relationship between ideas of temporal unity of consciousness and of unity as based on the ego-pole inside Husserl's project are quite ambiguous. In the later texts, both seem to coexist not excluding one another.

as a guiding thread to lead us through the labyrinths of Husserl's contribution to the topic. Indeed, I will try to present what could otherwise be the subject of a long and possibly contradictory story (evolving from Husserl's early view of the egoless conscious unity through absolute time-consciousness to the later remarks on the I-pole, personality, and monadological subjectivity[34]), only as far as it may suggest a solution to the initial question of this part of the chapter, namely: what is the nature of the connections which enable distinct experiences to compose the whole we call "subjectivity"? Thus, we shall proceed with Husserl's most significant—and for the time also quite original—contribution to the problem, namely his idea that the form of time can be seen as a principle of subjective connection.

a) Early Husserl: Form of time as a real (reell) connection

A first attempt to account for subjective unity can be found in Husserl's early work, *Logical Investigations.* In the 5th investigation, *On intentional Experiences and their "Contents,"* he applies the results of the part-whole analysis in order to comprehend the unity of consciousness and to formulate how different experiences are unified in the frame of one temporal stream.

According to Husserl's argument in this text, phenomenological consciousness can be identified as an interconnected unity of all experiences (*Erlebnisse*) (Husserl 1970b, 541). It is important to note that, at this stage of his thought, Husserl held the opinion that there is no need for a transcendent ego-principle which would be responsible for the unified character of conscious experience: "The phenomenologically reduced ego is therefore nothing peculiar, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own interconnected unity" (Ibid, 541). The "experiencing consciousness" is therefore defined not as an independent subject, but as a totality of experiences, whose unity is viewed as a relationship in which each part of the whole (single experience) stands for the whole itself. Any reference to the unity of consciousness would then imply that different experiences or even kinds of

[34] An influential account of the development of the problem of the *I* in Husserl's phenomenology can be found in Eduard Marbach's *Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls* (Marbach 1974) and in his contribution to the seminal book *An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology* coedited together with Rudolf Bernet and Iso Kern (Bernet et al. 1993).

experiences coexist as parts within one totality. The main task, then, is to understand the nature of the bond bringing these different elements together. In concrete terms, the question is: how are our perceptions, bodily sensations, emotional feelings, thoughts, and memories connected to compose a coherent unity of experience? Husserl's answer can be found in § 6 of the aforementioned 5th investigation:

> When I say here "continuously cohering with it in unity" I mean the unity of the concrete [phenomenological] whole whose parts are either [dependent] *moments*, mutually founding and requiring each other in their co-existence, or [independent] *pieces* that, through their own nature in their co-existence, found forms of unity, real forms which actually belong to the content of the whole as internally indwelling moments. These unities of co-existence pass continuously from moment to moment into one another, constituting a unity of change [of the stream of consciousness], which, for its part, demands the continuous persistence or, at least, continuous change of a moment essential for the unity of the whole and, thus, inseparable from it as a whole. This role is played by subjective time-consciousness [...].[35]

In order to understand this fragment, we have to return to § 17 of the 3rd investigation, where Husserl distinguishes between two basic types of the concept "part," namely "moments" and "pieces." He defines moments (*Momente*), or abstract parts, as inseparable from one another and relatively non-independent on the whole: "These parts permeate one another in such a way that one cannot be given unless the others are also present" (Sokolowski 1968, 538). Pieces (*Stücke*), however, do not require each other for their co-existence and hence are independent from the whole they comprise (Husserl 1970b, 467). Different and independent pieces can have a common identical moment, on the basis of which they compose a certain unity, while this moment would be as such abstract and dependent on the whole, like a form requiring its content.

What happens then when Husserl applies this distinction to consciousness? He suggests that the unity of the whole conscious experience depends on the form of time, which defines distinct parts of the experiential whole. Thus, distinct pieces (different experiences) are taken to share a common formal element, which allows them to be unified on the basis of this similarity. However, the resulting "forms of

[35] I quote this fragment based on Donn Welton's translation, given in his book "The Other Husserl" (Welton 2000, 212). In my view, it grasps Husserl's thought more clearly than the published translation of the *Logical Investigations* provided by J. N. Findlay (Husserl 1970b, 545).

unity," which these independent pieces found through their co-existence, are themselves *moments* of the conscious stream, and hence dependent parts constituting the totality of experience in time.

Thus Husserl opts for a kind of unity that, although it consists of independent pieces (different experiences), also requires some formal element inherent to each experience establishing its belonging to the whole. He claims that this element is the form of subjective time-consciousness, through which the whole is constituted as a coherent unity of experience, that is, as a stream of consciousness,[36] but which, as such, is non-existent outside this stream. Therefore, the here outlined concept of subjective unity is founded on the common essence or formal identity of each experience and of consciousness itself, which is performed by subjective time-consciousness. As such, this unity does not require any transcendent ego-principle, but rests upon the fundamental insight that time is a general form of subjective experience. As a non-reducible moment of experience, temporality defines *the way* in which all the elements compose a whole, so that this whole becomes a stream, conscious and temporal in each phase and overall.

Although understanding the form of time as a principle of subjective connection and unity of consciousness is indeed an elegant solution to our problem, it poses some theoretical difficulties. An important question to account for is the following: provided that the form of time is the principle of connection between distinct experiences, then what kind of connection is it? How does it bring distinct experiences to temporal unity? In other words, should we understand time as a real moment of experiences—that is as something in each experience that connects it to all the others?

First of all, it should be remarked that, in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl operates with a notion of consciousness itself as a "*reell-phänomenologische Einheit*," which also presupposes that the whole stream of consciousness and its individual parts (be they abstract moments or independent pieces) are already understood as real contents and real parts (*reell*) of the whole. The idea of the "*reelle Inhalt*" (real content) refers to the *experiential* side of intentional acts, thus being distinguished from the *intentional content*. Parts and moments of the unified stream of consciousness are experienced, lived through (*erlebt*),

[36] "Each phase of the stream of consciousness [...] possesses a form overreaching all its contents, which remains the same form continuously, though its content steadily alters" (Husserl 1970b, 545).

and thus they belong to the real contents of consciousness, while intentional objects of these experiences are not experienced (*erlebt*) in the same sense, but are rather intended. Simply put, we do not live through tables, unicorns and symphonies, but we do live through perceptions, phantasies and sensations of those things, in which they are seen, imagined or heard.[37] While tables or unicorns can be wooden or pink, our perceptions and phantasies cannot have either horns nor rustic design. Objects appear to us, but appearances themselves do not appear, they are experienced: "Die Erscheinungen selbst erscheinen nicht, sie werden erlebt" (Husserl 1984, 362).

This clarification allows us to claim that the form of time at this stage of Husserl's thinking was indeed considered as a real (*reell*) moment of experiential unity, as an abstract, i. e. non-independent, part of experiences. This point may also be confirmed through the reference to the so-called schematic interpretation, which, according to Rudolf Bernet and John Brough, dominated Husserl's early theory of time-consciousness (Bernet 1985; Brough 1972). Schematic interpretation is understood as the schema "apprehensions – contents of apprehension" endorsed by Husserl until approximately 1907, according to (Brough 1972), and which, with regard to the issue of temporality, was based on understanding time-apprehensions as real (*reelle*) parts of conscious experiences animating temporally neutral sensations.

Hence, the initial approach to understanding temporal connection and unity of consciousness in Husserl's work rests upon the idea that the form of time belongs to the real part of experiences (*Erlebnisse*). Nevertheless, how the form of time belongs to the real component of experience is admittedly different from how the ever-changing contents of sensation do (i.e. as a formal moment). The problematic character of time's "real containing" became apparent quite soon and, as Brough argued, eventually led Husserl to abandon the schematic interpretation and reconsider the very idea of temporal consciousness (Brough 1972, 331). The main issue was the impossibility of comprehending how consciousness of succession could be constituted through a series of temporal apprehensions. If temporal apprehensions are understood as a real

[37] "[…] truly *immanent contents*, which belong to the real make-up (*reellen Bestande*) of the intentional experiences, are *not intentional*: they constitute the act, provide necessary *points d'appui* which render possible an intention, but are not themselves intended, not the objects presented in the act. I do not see color-sensations but colored things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song etc." (Husserl 1970b, 559).

part of each experience (making the originally neutral content of sensations be experienced as "now"), then, following this logic, they should either disappear with all the rest of the content when the temporal phase flows away, or stay somehow present in the new now-phase. The last option leads to a clear contradiction, namely, to the real containing, in the actual phase of the experience, of both past and present moments. The first option (i.e. the disappearance of the past content in the actual phase) puts the very idea of temporal connection into danger, as it fails to explain the experience of temporal continuity between past and present moments.

Much later, in *Erste Philosophie* (1923/24), Husserl underlined precisely the point that is here at stake: "jeder *Teil* eines Erlebnisses verschwindet mit ihm selbst, und kein neues Erlebnis kann einen *Teil* mit dem vorigen reell identisch haben" (Husserl 1956, 105). If that is so, then the focus on time's real containing in Husserl's early approach to time-consciousness was indeed misleading. Furthermore, it is clearer now why he eventually conceived of the temporal unity of consciousness as not pertaining to the real content of experience. As Brough points out: "The implication of such real containing in truth, however, is that consciousness of elapsed objective phases—in effect, consciousness of succession—would be impossible" (Brough 1972, 311). However, the opposite of such real containing would imply that we cannot prove the existence of any real connection in experience and hence should opt either for some kind of transcendent unifying principle (be it the transcendental ego or something else) or temporal connection should be conceived of on another level. In Husserl's case, both options were eventually developed and seemed not to contradict one another.[38]

As for the constitution of temporal succession and unity of consciousness, Husserl finally endorsed the idea that temporal connection and time-consciousness cannot be seen as a real part of experience. This refers to the famous distinction of the level of constitution between the enduring content of consciousness (immanent temporal unities or distinct enduring experiences, such as perceptions) and the level of an absolute, time-constituting stream of consciousness (Husserl 1991).

[38] As Eduard Marcbach argued, reference to the ego-pole in Husserl's phenomenology founds its motivation in the intersubjective problematic, which allowed him to consider the issue of the unity of consciousness not merely in regard to "a continuously *temporal* interconnection of immanent experiences" (Bernet et al. 1993, 206) but to question of how one stream of consciousness can be delimited from another.

I will not go into the various possible interpretations of this decisive step in Husserl's thinking, but rather simply focus on the definition of this distinction regarding the whole idea of subjective unity and the issue of connectivity.

b) *Inner time-consciousness: Temporal connection as a universal structure of consciousness*

> The proper place of consciousness is the "in-between" of the present and the past; it apprehends itself as being what it has already ceased to be (Bernet 1993, 4).

Nothing less than the definition of consciousness is at stake here. Already in the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl distances himself from Brentano's conception of inner consciousness as a pre-reflective inner representation accompanying mental experiences (Brentano 1973). Such a view entails a certain duplication of representational consciousness (as an inner representation of intentional representation) and, despite the attempts to avoid the problem of infinite regress, still relies on subject-object relations between two sorts of acts (intentional experience of an object and the inner consciousness of this experience). At the beginning of his phenomenological enquiry, Husserl endorses neither Kant's idea of the transcendental unity of apperception accompanying experience, nor Brentano's psychological definition of consciousness as the unity of intentional representations accompanied by an internal representation. For Husserl, the question about what consciousness is has been, from the very start, more a question of "how are real contents consciously experienced?" than "how are real contents made objects of inner consciousness?" As previously argued, certain theoretical problems forced Husserl to review his theory of consciousness and to look for an alternative to the "inner consciousness" as advocated by Brentano, as well as to his own early view on consciousness as "*reell-phänomenologische Einheit.*"

As Husserl writes in his lectures on time-consciousness: "Every act is consciousness of something, but there is also consciousness of every act" (Husserl 1991, 130).[39] Given that the idea of inner presentation relating to the manifold of experiences in an objectifying way is already out of ques-

[39] "Jeder Akt ist Bewusstsein von Etwas, aber jeder Akt ist auch bewusst" (Husserl 1985, 126).

tion, what can this "being conscious" of experiences possibly mean? Is this a certain extra quality that defines experiences alongside other characteristics? (As, for example, one could say "my experience of a red apple is perceptive, intentional and, alongside that, also conscious.") To what does this distinction between an "act as consciousness of something" and "consciousness of this act" really point? In truth, we will not come nearer to the answer if we do not consider what brought Husserl to establish this difference, and consequently to elaborate further on the whole conception of absolute consciousness and transcendental subjectivity.

For this purpose, let us return to Husserl's objection to his older theory of real temporal connection between the present and the past moments of experience. He was facing nearly the same problem as Hume, when he asked whether there is any connection between distinct existences (experiences, in our terminology). Empirical evidence suggests that no such connection can be ever discovered by human understanding. Nevertheless, we do perceive our experiences as not only composing a whole, but also as composing it in a certain way, namely as succeeding "each other with an inconceivable rapidity, [...] in a perpetual flux and movement" (Hume 2003, 180). But as we have seen in Husserl's own theoretical enquiry, it could be misleading to comprehend this temporal connectivity of our experience as a real connection, because this interpretation can only identify a temporal form inherent to each experience, but fails to explain the very idea of succession and the constitution of a unitary stream of experiences, and hence the very idea of temporal connection.

Let us linger on a simple example: after hearing the phone ringing, answering it and consequently hearing someone saying "Hello," I perceive these as connected events, succeeding each other in exactly that order (and therefore do not consider the possibility that my phone itself unexpectedly said "Hello"). One could say that, along with experiencing each of these intentional acts (hearing the phone ringing, picking it up, and hearing someone say "Hello"), I also experienced their succession, that I was conscious of them as successive experiences. One could not claim, however, that this experience of succession would be an additional experience because, in that case, it must also be experienced and hence to form part of an experiential succession. That would create the famous "infinite regress" problem, of which Husserl was perfectly aware and which he wanted to avoid at all costs. To this end, he suggested abstaining from interpreting this second-degree experience of

succession in terms of subject-object relations, for instance, as "internal representation" or as any kind of "accompanying" consciousness.

Although the plausibility of the "internal representation" view is unconvincing, the alternative view is not an obvious one. To begin with, it consists mainly in claiming that pre-reflective awareness is inherent to each intentional act or experience, namely, that along with being conscious of something, we are also pre-reflectively and in a non-objectifying way conscious of the experiencing itself (Zahavi 2003). This simply implies that our experiences are *conscious* experiences, and that this *being conscious* is supposed to add something not only to the description of our experiences, but also to their constitution.[40]

Returning to our example of the temporal connection between two parts of the same enduring experience or between two successive experiences, we might say that what is added to this pre-reflective conscious experiencing is precisely the *connection* between them, this latter understood as a consciousness of temporal change itself. Husserl calls this consciousness of temporal connection between present and past moments "retention." As John Brough pointed out in his article "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-consciousness," after abandoning the schematic interpretation and focusing on inner time-consciousness, Husserl starts using such terms as "primal impression," "retention," and "protention," referring to them as to the "three fundamental forms of inner time-consciousness" (Brough 1972, 314–315). So, retention would correspond to the *consciousness* of the just elapsed experiential phase, while the immanent temporal object itself (by temporal object he means an experience, such as perceiving or remembering) would be experienced as "now" or as "just past."

This idea brings us to the following important point: Husserl has attempted to understand the form of time as a form of consciousness, and not only as the form of enduring immanent objects (experiences). Only as such can time fulfill its function and constitute consciousness of succession, thereby unifying enduring objects as well as constituting its own unity. Two main components in Husserl's time analysis, (1) retentional consciousness and (2) reproductive consciousness, contribute to this idea.

[40] For Husserl, exploring this new constitutive dimension of inner consciousness does not only add something to the already given bundle of experiences, but rather it opens up a whole new experiential field, a new dimension of "absolute time-consciousness." He was convinced enough of the explanatory force of this inner consciousness dimension to make it a main topic of the entire transcendental phenomenological investigation.

Retentional consciousness (as a consciousness of a just elapsed phase) allows for an explanation of how the last phase of a musical tone (or any other continuously perceived object) stays co-present even if it has already vanished and is not really present anymore. Husserl repeatedly underlines that the phase of the melody which has just elapsed in no way makes "real" part of the present (impressional) phase of the experience: "The retentional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone "primarily remembered" in the now: it is not really (*reell*) on hand in the retentional consciousness" (Husserl 1991, 33).[41] Nevertheless it is still "there," in our retentional consciousness of the tone: the past tone is retained, not on the level of its content, but as a modified consciousness of the past.[42]

Thus the first important point is that retention represents a temporal connection between two parts or phases of the experiential flow. The second point is that this connection is not neutral in terms of the experiential character of conscious acts, but is essentially a *retentional modification* which constantly modifies not only the original impression but the whole retentional continuum as well. Husserl describes retention as a continuous modification which transforms present impressions into past in an uninterrupted modificational flux. What is equally important to note here is that understanding retention in terms of *modificational connection* forms part of Husserl's definition of inner consciousness itself. In this regard, Rudolf Bernet proposes the most revealing interpretation:

> At each moment consciousness is conscious both of the present moment and of the elapsed moments of the same "flux of consciousness." In leaping over the gap between the now and the not-now, in associating them in an "indissoluble" manner, the present moment of consciousness is conscious of the temporal duration of consciousness, i.e., of its continuous change and unitary flux. Present consciousness is aware of its own renewal as well as of its being dispossessed of what was its own. The proper place of consciousness is the "in-between" of the present and the past, it apprehends itself as being what it has already ceased to be (Bernet 1993, 4).

This "proper place of consciousness," as Bernet outlines, is not found on the level of the real or intentional content in experiences. It rather manifests itself in the way these contents are experienced in connection

[41] "Der retentionale Ton ist kein gegenwärtigen, sondern eben im jetzt 'primär erinnerter', er ist im retentionalen Bewusstsein nicht reell vorhanden" (Husserl 1985, 31).

[42] "Die Retention ist keine Modifikation, in der impressionalen Daten reell erhalten blieben, nur eben in der abgewandelten Form: sondern sie ist eine Intentionalität eigener Art" (Husserl 1985, 118).

with each other. Husserl's "absolute" or inner consciousness finds its place or function in the "in-between" of distinct experiences by bridging the gaps amidst them. Consciousness, in this perspective, is not an additional quality of "what it is like," nor is it a representation or inner perception accompanying intentional acts. Inner consciousness is itself a modificational connection. Inner consciousness can be seen, at this point, as not that distant from Kant's idea of synthetic activity of apperception, from which it should nevertheless be distinguished as principally *experiential* consciousness (and thus not distinct from our manifold experiences). Returning to Hume's perplexity, we could say that even if the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct experiences, those distinct experiences are always experienced as being connected. Connection belongs not to their being "perceptions" or "phantasies," nor to their being "perceptions of horses" or "phantasies of centaurs," but to their "experiential character," i.e. to their being consciously lived experiences.

Husserl's idea of *reproductive consciousness,* which is supposed to explain the possibility of recollection (*Wiedererinnerung*), is another example showing how the inner time-consciousness theory contributes to our understanding of the temporal connectivity of subjective experience.

Let us consider an example: I am now sitting in the library and remembering a story I was told last week. This act requires two experiences: (1) perceiving the story and (2) remembering the story I was told last week. What do these two experiences have in common? Based on Husserl's distinction between intentional content and real content, we could argue that both experiences have the same intentional object—the story—but, concerning the experience itself (perceiving and remembering), they share nothing (or no real content), which means that these are two different acts occurring under different circumstances. So, again, they share the same intentional content, but no real content. It is clear that the sameness of the object cannot explain the possibility that something will be remembered, it can merely confirm that we are indeed talking about a memory of the same thing and not of different things. The question then becomes: how can I remember something I have once perceived if there is nothing between these two experiences that brings them together or makes one (recollection) connected to the other (perceiving)? Any attempt to understand the original act of perceiving as somehow being part of the act of recollecting will inevitably reach a contradiction:

while I am remembering hearing a story I am also hearing it, which is obviously false. Memory has no capacity for resurrecting past experiences as such, it can only bring some objects of past experiences to present awareness by presentifying them (Husserl uses the term *Vergegenwärtigung*). As in the case of retention, Husserl's solution suggests that we should look for an answer "in-between" the acts, that is, in the realm of our inner consciousness of these acts. He proposes understanding recollection as a reproduction of the original perception, not by reproducing its real content, but by being a reproductive modification of the original impressional consciousness (of the perceiving act in question). Temporal consciousness once again is proved to be required in order to activate the link between past experiences and the present acts of remembering.

> The inner consciousness of a memory is therefore not an impressional consciousness of a perception but a reproductive consciousness which bears within itself the earlier perception in the manner of an intentional implication (and not as a real (*reell*) component). [...]
> As reproductive consciousness, inner consciousness is thus the consciousness of a modificational connection between two acts and not the consciousness of an act that directs itself towards another act (Bernet 2002, 337-8).

On the basis of these two major examples from Husserl's time-analysis and Bernet's ingenious interpretation, it becomes clear that understanding inner consciousness as a temporal and modificational connection cannot be reduced merely to particular cases of retention or recollection. It is the matter of a universal structure of consciousness which comes into question, here. This structure receives its especially pregnant expression when Husserl links these retentional and reproductive accomplishments to the constitution of the unitary stream of consciousness.

As Husserl claims in the § 39 of the *Lectures on time-consciousness*: "There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once" (Husserl 1991, 84). Husserl's answer to the condition of possibility of such a unity of the stream of consciousness lies in his idea of the double intentionality of retentional consciousness: the transverse intentionality (*Querintentionalität*) and the horizontal or longitudinal intentionality (*Längsintentionalität*). The first is directed to temporal objects (such as the tone in its duration) and serves for the constitution of object's duration in the present consciousness. The second is directed to the modification itself and is constitutive of the unity of expe-

rience in the flow (Husserl 1991, 85, 390). Longitudinal intentionality of retention concerns consciousness of the continuity of retentions in the flow of constant modifications. By means of this double intentionality consciousness comes to be conscious of itself as a continuity and a process of constant change and fulfillment.[43]

From this moment onwards, Husserl's view of this structure as being essentially temporal remained unchanged. According to his final idea, consciousness is understood as a continuous connection of experiences, so that we always have (1) consciousness of a present experienced moment with its temporal horizon (moments which have just passed and those which are to come) and (2) consciousness (not distinct from the first one) of the whole of experience, including distant past and possible future. A single experience does not exist outside the whole, just as the whole cannot exist without single experiences.

Before concluding this section, two important points should be underlined. First, it is worth emphasizing that Husserl conceived of the unity of subjective experience as accomplished in the form of the stream of consciousness. This suggests an essentially dynamic view on consciousness and its unity. The phenomenological idea of the unity of consciousness therefore relies on the idea that, foremost, to experience means to experience certain continuity and, moreover, that this continuity always presupposes an open, horizontal structure of conscious experiencing. In this perspective, any idea of synchronic unity can be seen only as an abstraction and by no means as representative of the conscious experience.

The second point concerns the indicated synthetic function of consciousness, which was present already in Kant, but has been transformed by Husserl in application to experiential consciousness. Synthetic consciousness in Husserl is originally explicated through the connecting form of time, which allows him to define inner consciousness as time-consciousness. This idea, presented in the *Lectures on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time*, is confirmed in several later works. For

[43] In *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis*, as Lanei Rodemeyer argues, Husserl extended these two aspects of intentionality and framed them under the terms of "near" and "far" retention. According to this interpretation, near retention contributes to the constitution of the living present and of the unities of particular objects. Far retention, on the other hand, is made responsible for the continuity of the retentional flow as a whole, it "is my retention of these phases in their relation to each other as a unified whole, even after their experiences are no longer in my present, active consciousness" (Rodemeyer 2006, 89). This shows an important link between Husserl's idea of the horizontal structure of consciousness and of the unitary character of conscious experience.

example, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl calls synthesis "the primal form belonging to consciousness" (Husserl 1960, 39) and maintains that time should be understood as a fundamental form of synthesis. A new aspect of this theory belongs to the genetic phenomenology which explores affectivity and associative syntheses.

3. Synthesis-based model of consciousness vs. Qualia-based model of consciousness

In our days, the previously outlined phenomenological approach to synthetic consciousness provides an interesting alternative to the prominent theory of consciousness as qualia as formulated in the realm of the philosophy of mind. In what follows, I will not analyze the idea of phenomenal qualities as such. Others have already contributed substantially to this discussion, providing interesting arguments both for and against the existence of qualia. Far from being merely critical, my aim here is rather to situate this phenomenological theory in the context of the contemporary debates on the nature of consciousness and its unity. In order to do so, I will concentrate on two important consequences of the theory of qualia upon our understanding of what consciousness is and then approach them from the phenomenological perspective.[44]

The first theoretical claim advocated by the supporters of qualia consists in identifying phenomenal qualia with consciousness. Many contemporary philosophers support this idea. For example, John Searle insists that "the problem of consciousness is identical with the problem of qualia" (Searle 1998). David Chalmers claims that "a mental state is conscious if it has a *qualitative feel*—an associated quality of experience" and consequently that "the problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness" (Chalmers 1996, 4).

The second theoretical claim or implication of the qualia-based model of consciousness concerns the problem of the unity of consciousness, which, according to qualia proponents can also be understood in quali-

[44] I am aware how extensive and profound debates on the nature of consciousness are in the field of the philosophy of mind. In this part, I have made a difficult decision not to go into depths of the analytic argumentation, but rather to concentrate on the general view on consciousness and its unity, which the qualitative theory of consciousness suggests.

tative terms (Bayne and Chalmers 2003; Bayne 2010). Whenever addressing the unity of consciousness, this approach applies the idea of phenomenal qualia to the unified experience, claiming that "there is something it is like" having different experiences at once (Bayne and Chalmers 2003, 28), or even having a phenomenal conjunctive state which "subsumes all of the phenomenal states of a subject at a time" (Ibid, 33). Tim Bayne formulates what he calls the unity thesis by making appeal to the idea of phenomenal unity: "what it is for a subject's consciousness to be unified [...] is for the subject to have a single conscious state—a total conscious state—which subsumes each and every one of the conscious states that they enjoy at the time in question" (Bayne 2010, 19).

In this part of the chapter, I will question the plausibility of what I call the qualia-based model of consciousness by analyzing these two main claims and consequently by contrasting this theory with the phenomenological idea of consciousness, which I call the synthesis-based model of consciousness.

3.1. Is the problem of consciousness identical with the problem of qualia?

The identification of subjective awareness and qualia is rather a novelty within the framework of the hard, but old, problem of consciousness. Introduced into philosophical vocabulary by C.I. Lewis[45] in 1929 (Crane 2000), *qualia* originally were meant to describe subjective, ineffable, directly given properties of our sensory experience, such as the immediacy of redness or loudness (Lewis 1929; Keeley 2009). Although the origin of the notion of "quale" is an interesting topic, what is most important for the current inquiry is how having phenomenal qualia came to be identified with consciousness and *vice versa*. Arguably, before a certain point in the intellectual history of the twentieth century, consciousness and qualia enjoyed a certain independence: while qualia were primarily referred to by psychologically-oriented theories in order to describe sensory data, consciousness was a general term for mental awareness—and, as such, for the most basic and essential characteristic

[45] In his article "The early history of the *quale* and its relation to the senses," Brian Keeley proposes an alternative exploration of the history of the notion of quale, pointing out the use of quale by C. S. Peirce in about 1866 (Keeley 2009).

of the human mind. Consciousness played a crucial role in many philosophical theories long before and without any consideration of qualia or anything similar.

However, the situation has changed drastically. Even a brief look at contemporary theories of consciousness in philosophy of mind shows the "what-it-is-like" agenda to be almost unavoidable. Consider the following statements:

> The problem of consciousness is identical with the problem of qualia, because conscious states are qualitative states right down to the ground. Take away the qualia and there is nothing there. This is why I seldom use the word "qualia," except in sneer quotes, because it suggests that there is something else to consciousness besides qualia, and there is not. Conscious states by definition are inner, qualitative, subjective states of awareness or sentience (Searle 1998, 1938).

> [...] a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a *qualitative feel*—an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or *qualia* for short. The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness (Chalmers 1996, 4).

> [...] fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience (Nagel 1974, 436).

The transition from accepting qualia as properties of subjective experiences to the identification of qualia and consciousness is anything but obvious, yet it is usually stated as if it were self-evident. On the one hand, thematization of qualia rehabilitated the problem of consciousness in the context of contemporary cognitive science and overcame the reductionist position by postulating an "explanatory gap" (a term due to (Levine 1983)) between subjective experience itself and some functions of matter by means of which a conscious experience happens. On the other hand, however, the central assumption that consciousness can be identified with qualitative feelings or phenomenal properties of mental states was largely taken for granted and, arguably, maintained its implicit reliance on the psychological theories of sensory qualia. As Austen Clark points out, sensory qualities (such as sensations of colors or pain) were taken by philosophers as paradigmatic states of consciousness (Clark 2008, 445). But the transformation of "sensory" qualities into "phenomenal" qualities,

which were taken to describe not merely sensations, but any kind of conscious, subjective experiences, has occurred without due clarification.

There are many ways to define qualia. They may be understood as *phenomenal properties* of mental states; they can be also described in terms of "how it feels," so that qualia become qualitative *feelings* (Chalmers 1996, 4); qualia can be further explicated as related to the *subjective character* of experiences (Nagel 1974), namely to "what-it-is-like" to experience something from the first-person perspective.[46] Indeed, it seems to be almost unanimous that qualia refer to the subjective character of mental states and to the what-it-is-likeness of experiencing something from the first-person perspective. However, this first-personal ownership is further linked to the phenomenal or experiential *properties* or qualitative *feelings*, so that the latter become responsible for the conscious or subjective character of mental states. Thus, the link is established between subjectivity and consciousness, on the one hand, and qualia or phenomenal properties, on the other. Whether this link as such can have an explanatory force largely depends on the question of how exactly such qualitative or phenomenal properties bring mental states to awareness.

One way of approaching this question would be to interpret qualia as distinct phenomenal feelings or sensations that accompany each mental state and which, thereby, make a mental state conscious. It is then presumed that a mental state not accompanied by such a feeling cannot be called conscious. Formulated this way, this theory might appear as a new version of the so-called higher-order accounts of consciousness. Even if qualia are not said to relate to mental states in a conceptually-objectifying way, they are nevertheless claimed to be inner (high-order) perceptions of the first-order senses: the latter become phenomenally conscious by means of the former.[47]

According to Carruthers' systematization of higher-order theories, this one falls into the category of inner-sense theories, which understand higher-order awareness as essentially perceptual (as opposed to

[46] See also: (Clark 2008, 1996; Tye 2013).

[47] In Carruthers' explication this argument (which he does not share himself) goes as follows: "In short, it is by virtues of perceiving our own percepts that the latter become phenomenally conscious. Hence the awareness in question is similar to the sort of awareness that I have of the redness itself—by perceiving the redness I am aware of it, and by perceiving my percept of redness, I am aware of *it*; and it is the latter awareness that renders the former phenomenally conscious" (Carruthers 2008, 278).

conceptual or propositional) (Carruthers 2008). Thus, what distinguishes qualia-based models of consciousness from the traditional versions of the higher-order accounts of consciousness is mainly the emphasis on the qualitative character of the accompanying states, which qualifies them as subjective feelings or sensations rather than as thoughts or mental representations.

Another way to address the problem would logically be to avoid taking qualia as distinct mental states associated with intentional mental states and to proceed on the level of first-order theories of consciousness. For instance, one can define qualia as phenomenal, nonrepresentational properties of mental states. As a result, they would count as a distinct class of mental phenomena, which are not intentional or representational states and, therefore, cannot objectify the experiences they accompany or with which they are associated.

If, as in the first case, one is inclined to see qualia as distinct mental states, then, as in most cases of higher-order theories of consciousness, the risk implied is either that of an infinite regress (if qualia are understood as conscious mental states) or that of the no less difficult issue of how to make sense of non-conscious (qualitative) mental states that make other non-conscious (intentional) mental states conscious. If, on the other hand, one understands qualia as non-intentional or non-relational phenomenal features of experiences (to be distinguished from their intentional features), then this leaves the following question unanswered: How, exactly, can a "property" enable a state to change its phenomenological meaning—from being unconscious to conscious? Either way, understanding qualia as distinct mental states or avoiding such a position, whenever philosophers accept qualia as necessary for the conscious experience, they inevitably face the problem of explaining how exactly qualia and consciousness are connected.

By pointing out the difficulties accounting for the precise relation between qualia and consciousness or to prove their identification, I did not intend to provide an exhaustive critic of the qualia-based theories, but rather to highlight the obscurity of their basic assumptions. There is seemingly no theoretically clear way to prove whether to be conscious of an experience is the same as experiencing the what-it-is-likeness associated with it and whether this what-it-is likeness can be explained by means of qualitative properties. The fact that our conscious experience can be described in qualitative terms does not necessarily entail that this is its fundamental definition. There might be different qualities

associated with manifold experiences, but, until proven otherwise, none of these qualities is identical with the consciousness of those states, even though it is only by means of consciousness that all qualities (including what-it-is-likeness) can be experienced. Thus, my claim is that the awareness of a mental state and of all its qualities does not entail that this "being aware of" is qualitative by nature. One might as well argue that the nature of consciousness is indifferent to the qualitative character of our experiences: it certainly feels different to see the sky from the window of a prison cell or sitting on the beach on the Atlantic Ocean coast, however both experiences may be conscious in just the same way. In other words, what makes an experience conscious is not necessarily the same that gives it a certain qualitative feel.

At the very least, these remarks indicate that qualia-based theories of consciousness face serious difficulties in what concerns (1) the assumption that consciousness and qualia can be easily identified and (2) that such identification can be productive in order to provide clues for other related issues. One of these is the problem of unity of consciousness.

3.2. What is it like to have a unified consciousness?

What it means for consciousness to be unified depends on how the relations or connections within conscious experience are understood. Proponents of the qualia-based model of consciousness tend to see these relations as essentially attached to the "conjoined experiential character" of simultaneously lived mental states (Bayne 2010, 10). This entails that, for instance, there is not only something it is like to feel angry and something it is like to listen to the news, but there is also something it is like to feel angry while listening to the news. Hence, Bayne and Chalmers claim that to have a unified experience consisting of two perceptions would mean to experience that "there is something it is like to be in both states at once" (Bayne and Chalmers 2003, 28). On the larger scale, this leads to the assumption that to have unified consciousness means to have a phenomenal conjunctive state which "subsumes all of the phenomenal states of a subject at a time" (Ibid, 33). Such a single state of consciousness encompasses all of a subject's experiences and is conceived of as an experience of its own. As Tim Bayne points out, "it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that there is a single encompassing state of consciousness that subsumes all of my

experiences: perceptual, bodily, emotional, cognitive, and any others" (Bayne 2010, 501).

In my view, there are two major difficulties which this theory fails to take into account. The first one concerns the already mentioned obscure status of qualia. It is already rather unclear how exactly qualia can be responsible for the conscious character of mental states, and things are even more unclear when it comes to the unified qualia or what-it-is-likeness of experiencing several mental states as parts of one total conscious state. The assumption of existence of qualitative feelings associated with each and every conscious mental state might already be considered a case of reduplication of subjective experience. Now, any assumption concerning the what-is-likeness of conjointly experienced conscious states leads to an infinite multiplication scenario: what-it-is likeness of seeing a black book and what-it-is likeness of seeing yellow letters on it, and hearing car noises and writing this text, and then what-it-is likeness of seeing a black book while hearing car noises, which is not the same as what-it-is-likeness of seeing a book and hearing cars while writing this text and thinking of infinite qualia multiplication on top. Bayne's idea about a phenomenal conjunctive state presumes that there is always an end to such a multiplication. Nevertheless, it is not quite clear how this conjunctive state is related to particular phenomenal unities supposedly subordinated to it.

The second problem concerns the self-imposed temporal limits of the phenomenal unity claim, which only accounts for simultaneously occurring conscious states as being phenomenally unified by a subject's total conscious state. The thus formulated unity thesis fails to explain how different experiences, which do not occur at the same time, are unified. Bayne claims that in that case they are just not phenomenally unified (Ibid, 18). Indeed, my experiences of writing this text and hearing car noises outside are phenomenally unified with each other (they are both parts of my present conscious state), but they are not phenomenally unified with my intention to write this paragraph which I formed earlier this morning. This means therefore that I have a series of unified phenomenal states, each of which is a phenomenal unity at one time. However, such an idea of phenomenal unity can by no means provide an answer on how all my experiences (occurring this morning, 10 minutes ago, right now or a year ago) are connected to each other. Not to mention the very fact—to which phenomenological philosophy was always very attentive—that also all the experiences belonging to an

actual field of awareness are necessarily experienced as continuous and following one another. In other words, the phenomenal unity claim is only able to explain the synchronic unity of consciousness, but not its diachronic unity (Brook and Raymont 2014), and it also fails to account for experiential continuity, which is instead a key feature of phenomenally conjoined experiences. The theory is, therefore, incomplete and, most of all, misses out on one of the central questions concerning the unity of consciousness.

Bayne is not ambiguous about this issue, since he takes his task to be exclusively the explanation of the phenomenal unity of consciousness, which, he claims, concerns simultaneously experienced states. Moreover, after reducing the problem to some sort of "'instantaneous snapshot' of a subject's experience," he also claims this amounts to be free from any "naively static metaphysics of experience" (Bayne 2010, 17). Nevertheless, as he takes such a snapshot as representative for subjective experience, his account faces inevitable limitations with regard to the diachronic continuity and unity of consciousness.

After having presented some problems involved in understanding consciousness on the basis of its "what-it-is-likeness" or qualitative character, I shall now return to the alternative account of consciousness provided by Edmund Husserl and especially to the idea of the *synthesis-based model of consciousness.*

3.3. The synthesis-based model of consciousness

It is my view that the phenomenological approach to consciousness and its understanding in terms of synthesis provides a promising alternative to the previously discussed theory of consciousness as qualia. Even though, quite often, qualitative feelings or qualia are seen as phenomenological features, one should not confuse them with the phenomenological theory of consciousness—at least, not with the one advocated by Husserl.

As I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, according to the phenomenological perspective, subjectivity cannot be reduced to a certain quality of experience; subjectivity rather describes the totality of experience. The unity of subjective experience therefore acquires a different meaning: through this concept one should not only be able to account for the synchronic phenomenal unity of conjointly experienced mental states and their what-it-is-likeness, but one should rather be able to explain how different, successive, and not-simultaneously lived

experiences are connected so that they are experienced as a whole, as an open totality.

The phenomenological approach to consciousness requires consciousness' unified character to be seen as its essential feature and function. Based on Husserl's account, the connectivity of subjective experience is not simply associated with consciousness; it is rather seen as what consciousness is essentially about.

The understanding of consciousness through its synthetic function does not belong exclusively to Husserl's phenomenology, as it originates in the wider tradition of transcendental philosophy. One of the aims of the present chapter was to show how exactly this idea has been forged in the tradition of transcendental philosophy. As Hume formulated the problem of connections, Kant made the most remarkable contribution, namely he proposed to see synthesis as an essential feature of consciousness itself, claiming that the unity of apperception is what makes experience possible as such. Therefore, combination is not only something that is enabled by the spontaneity of understanding; rather, combination (or synthesis) is its core and most essential function. Husserl further developed this synthetic principle by applying it to experiential consciousness. The idea of synthetic consciousness within the development of Husserl's thought is closely related to his idea of inner time-consciousness. Furthermore, it presents a viable alternative to Brentano's concept of inner consciousness understood in terms of accompanying inner representation.

The idea of synthesis in its application to consciousness finds its confirmation and further development in the *Cartesian Meditations*, where Husserl claims synthesis to be "a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness" and thus explicitly calls synthesis "the primal form belonging to consciousness" (Husserl 1960, 39). Consistently with his previous theory, he designates time as the fundamental form of synthesis responsible for "a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness" (Husserl 1960, 41).[48]

[48] By acknowledging synthesis as central element for the theoretical explication of consciousness, one does not reject the claim concerning the pivotal role of intentionality within consciousness. In Husserl's words: "Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of that is to say, Franz Brentano's significant discovery that 'intentionality' is the fundamental characteristic of 'psychic phenomena' and actually lays open the method for a descriptive transcendental-philosophical theory of consciousness (and naturally also for a corresponding psychological theory)" (Husserl 1960, 41).

An important consequence of understanding consciousness in terms of synthesis or connectivity is that the main character of consciousness is thereby envisaged as dependent upon the principles of connection. It is my view that, in Husserl, different theories of consciousness can be found that are grounded upon different approaches to the understanding of the several kinds of connections constituting the unity of subjective experience.[49]

The first kind of connection would be, as it has been already argued, *temporal*. Based on temporal connection inner consciousness is grasped under the title of *time-consciousness*. Conscious unity is thus approached under formal conditions, since temporal connection represents only a general form of consciousness. For example, temporal connection constitutes the experiential order of succession or simultaneity, and, on the highest level, the unity of the whole temporal stream.

The second type of connection is *associative or affective*. Contrary to formal temporal connections, associative syntheses relate experiences to one another on the level of content. Examples of associative connectivity are: (1) affective connections between past and present experiences, and (2) the connections organizing the actual field of perception by uniting sensory data according to principles of contrast and similarity (Husserl 1973a, 73). This type of connectivity is constitutive of the precognitive, affective level of subjective experience. One may call such consciousness, performing connections on the basis of associative syntheses, *affective consciousness.* This definition is only preliminary and should be further clarified in the following chapter.

This latter type of connectivity, constitutive of unified subjective experience, is the most difficult to explore. Indeed, because of its non-formal character, it presents us with connections that are difficult to generalize. However, Husserl attempts to provide an account of the principles of such connections in his *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis*. This account and its consequences for the phenomenological theory of consciousness and subjectivity will be the main topic of the second chapter of this work.

[49] However, this by no means suggest that there are two different types of consciousness in one's experience, but rather that there are two different constitutive aspects of the same consciousness. As distinguishing between active and passive constitution does not imply that consciousness becomes divided and disunified within itself, in the same vein, our distinction between time-consciousness and affective consciousness intends only to point out the difference in rules according to which subjective experience and its unity/unities are constituted. In this sense, both temporality and affectivity describe fundamental dimensions of consciousness and subjectivity.

CHAPTER II

ASSOCIATIVE SYNTHESES, AFFECTIVITY, AND PRE-REFLECTIVE CONNECTIONS IN SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

4. General introduction to Husserl's account of associative connectivity

The most important conclusion of the first chapter consisted in claiming synthesis to be the central function of consciousness in its phenomenological understanding. Yet such a claim is certainly just the beginning of the phenomenological inquiry, which by now should be able to account for the several types of syntheses defining the subjective experience's modes of unification and formation. Husserl introduces a distinction between the temporal syntheses responsible for the formal connectivity of the conscious experience and the associative syntheses which operate essentially on the level of content. Both associative and temporal connections belong to the group of the so-called passive syntheses—a topic extensively investigated by Husserl himself during the so-called genetic phenomenology period.

The inner temporality of consciousness is undisputedly one of the topics which received the greatest and the most deserved attention in phenomenological philosophy. As Husserl himself puts it, in the *ABCs* of the transcendental constitution, time is the *A* (Husserl 2001a, 170). This amounts to saying that the synthesis accomplished by time-consciousness is always presupposed whenever the constitution of subjective experience is mentioned. Nothing conscious can be altogether atemporal. Nevertheless, Husserl does not restrict his analyses of passive syntheses only to this universal and formal element, and he emphasizes its incompleteness and abstract character. Somehow close to Kant's famous statement in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* "thoughts without con-

tent are empty; [and] intuitions without concepts are blind" (Kant 1996, B75), Husserl claims that temporal syntheses without associative connections would be meaningless and empty, and associations without temporality would not be experienced at all (Husserl 2001a, 170).

What is important to remark here is not simply that Husserl stressed the importance of content for the constitution of subjective experience, which would be no bigger achievement than a mere reminder about Aristoteles' and Kant's distinction. More importantly, Husserl's claim states that on the level of content there are *other types of* connections at stake, that there are other transcendental rules, which should complement the formal analyses of time-consciousness. Those connections, which he calls associations or associative syntheses, are a distinct topic of the phenomenological investigation, known under the rubrics of "associations," "affectivity," and "genesis of subjectivity"[50] in the *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis, Experience and Judgment* as well as in some other related texts and manuscripts.

Unfortunately, these issues and Husserl's sophisticated analyses of passive syntheses are often seen as belonging to a very specific area of phenomenological inquiry exclusively of interest for dedicated Husserl scholars. This clearly should not be the case, since the questions at stake here are the most fundamental ones and relevant for a wide range of related interdisciplinary issues. Therefore, it is important to see this topic not in isolation from the broader context of philosophical and psychological problems to which it belongs both historically and substantially.

The scope of the topic of associations encompasses several questions. The first one is already familiar to us and concerns the unity of consciousness, or more precisely, the principles of connection governing subjective experience. This issue has its historical roots in Hume's deliberations about the connectivity of the human mind and leads, as we have seen in the first chapter, to Kant's and Husserl's transcendental philosophy of synthetic consciousness. The problem of unity is not restricted to the unity of one's conscious life, but extends to closely related questions concerning unity formations on the objective level, such as, for example, the perceptual organization and the constitution of identical objects. In this regard, the problem of associative connectivity is part of the constitu-

[50] Strictly speaking, subjective genesis refers not only to associative but also to temporal connections.

tive analyses—that is of the transcendental inquiry into the general conditions of any possible experience.

A second aspect, despite being historically related to the first, follows a somewhat different route. This concerns the so-called "associations of ideas" and is the hallmark of the tradition of the British empiricism. Here, association can be understood as, on the one hand, establishing potentially repeatable relations between distinct and otherwise separated objects or ideas (or even between reflexes or actions in the later behavioristic versions of associationism), or, on the other hand, as establishing complex wholes by associatively integrating simple parts. This view on association does not venture into the constitutive and hence transcendental inquiry, but rather operates on the already given empirical level. The main authors responsible for the introduction and development of this line of enquiry are John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, and David Hartley in the eighteenth century, and James Mill, his son John Stuart Mill, and Alexander Bain in the nineteenth century. From "associations of ideas" in their empirical understanding originated the associationist school of psychology. Its main focus dealt with the associative mechanisms of learning and memory. However influential it became for the newly born scientific psychology, associationism and its atomistic analyses were confronted with several theoretical problems and underwent serious questioning by the Gestalt psychology.

Where does the phenomenological conception of association fit in this story? Clearly, it belongs to the first line of development—namely, to the transcendental philosophy and its exploration of synthetic consciousness. As Husserl states: "In the broadest sense, association is nothing other than synthesis most broadly understood, the unity of the whole of the ego's consciousness [...]" (Husserl 2001a, 508). While writing about associations, Husserl repeatedly distanced himself from the psychological meaning of the term and especially from closely related presuppositions concerning the objective, psychophysical causality of psychic life (Husserl 2001a, 162). However, one could easily notice that he employs many terms that do not contradict traditional empiricists' accounts of associations. Husserl basically refers to the same principles of contiguity, similarity, and contrast which entered scientific vocabulary as early as in the philosophy of Aristotle (D. B. Klein 1970, 90–91) and which have been employed by most philosophical and psychological theories. Moreover, his phenomenology of perception, so ingeniously presented in the first part of the *Analyse*s, very often appears to be com-

patible with psychological conceptions of perceptual grouping, perceptual constancy and gestalt principles of perceptual organization.

Indeed, many psychological and phenomenological problems are the same and specific topics resemble each other, whereas methodologies and basic theoretical assumptions differ rather considerably. Such distance and closeness are relevant to the very essence of the phenomenological project, which was meant to be as much philosophical as psychological. Concerning the specific topic of associative syntheses, this suggests that the psychological perspective and the relevant research can be kept close to phenomenological analyses. But before we start looking more closely into the meaning of associations and the related topic of affectivity in Husserl's phenomenology, it is important to specify the general theoretical context to which the problem of associations in both empirical and transcendental understandings belongs.

The aim of the present chapter is to present Husserl's phenomenology of association and affectivity. In order to do so few related issues should be preliminarily clarified, as to avoid the risk to overlook the bigger picture to which our topic belongs. First, I will present the general historical context and I will refer to the philosophical question the topic of association was supposed to answer (§ 5). Secondly, I will provide some methodological clarifications concerning eidetic phenomenology and its distinction from the methodology of psychological investigation (§ 6). Then, I will discuss some theoretical points involved in the dispute between associationist and Gestalt psychologies (§ 7.1) in order to clearly show, as a result, how Husserl's idea of associative syntheses should be distinguished from both (§ 7.2). After these general clarifications, whose aim is essentially to present the phenomenological approach to associative connectivity in the larger context of psychological and philosophical discussions of the time, I will focus on Husserl's transcendental doctrine of passive syntheses and discuss the topics of association and affection and their meaning for the phenomenological theory of synthetic consciousness and the genesis of subjectivity (the rest of § 7 & § 8).

5. Principles of association and inquiry into "the inherent lawfulness of mental life"

From the historical perspective, the increasing prominence of the topic of association coincides with an aspiration of modern philosophy to discover regularities and inner lawfulness in mental events. As a clear parallel to the natural sciences, which at this time achieved immense progress in discovering laws of nature, philosophers sought to uncover "essential and universal properties of human nature" (Hume 1825, 449) and moreover to formulate the principles which could account for the organization of the mental life. Those principles were supposed to do "for the mental realm what Newton's law of gravitation had done for the physical realm" (D. B. Klein 1970, 563).

Such confidence in the existence of "the inherent lawfulness of mental life" (D. B. Klein 1970, 500), which, according to David B. Klein, can be thought of as the first serious step towards the establishment of psychology as a scientific discipline, was common to many philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, regardless of their empirical or rationalistic inclinations. Although almost every distinguished philosopher in the modern era was interested in the task of discovering such mental laws and principles, there was no general agreement on what exactly these laws may be and on which ground should they be thematized. Immanuel Kant, from his side, expressed this idea as follows:

> Everything in nature [...] takes place *according to rules*, although we do not always know these rules. [...] All nature, indeed, is nothing but a combination of phenomena which follow rules; and *nowhere* is there any *irregularity*. When we think we find any such, we can only say that the rules are unknown. The exercise of our own faculties takes place also according to rules, which we follow first *unconsciously*, until by a long-continued use of our faculties we attain the knowledge of them [...] like all our faculties, the *understanding*, in particular, is governed in its actions by rules which we can investigate (Kant 1963, 1-2).

As this quote illustrates, the general tendency was to distinguish and systematize the rules of mental life on the level of cognition most broadly understood. Since Descartes, cognition (*cogito*, or thinking) was to define a wide range of mental phenomena, including perception, memory, imag-

ination, judgment, will, and even feelings.[51] As one would frame it in contemporary terminology, the view of human being as an essentially rational agent was scientifically dominating. This implied that the way we scientifically cognize the world and ourselves was supposed to be grounded upon a solid rational foundation. Thus, even though human nature was conceived as composed of different kinds of experiences, the universal rules and lawful regularities characteristic of mental life were still seen as products of reason.

At the end of the nineteenth and in the whole course of the twentieth centuries, the assumption of human rationality was quite significantly challenged. However, what was challenged was not the capacity for rational thinking or decision making *per se* and hence not the existence and validity of principles of rational cognition, but rather their independence and alleged purity. The idea that rational cognition should take into consideration not only its capacities but also its limits is not new and can be found in every systematic approach to human reason. Any system of logical rules assumes that they can be misused or even not used at all. And even a system of transcendental rules presumes that those principles can be misused by applying them beyond the realm of possible experience.[52]

New scientific findings brought new challenges and set new limits on rational cognition. As previously, problems mainly resulted from illegitimate attempts to apply one set of rules to a domain where they had no validity or—which is relatively new—to disregard the fact that there may be some unexpectedly irrational rules which influence our rational thinking. This time, limits were found not outside but within the scope of the experience. The biggest challenge came from the discovery of unconscious mental processes. Whether one chooses to pay more attention to the psychoanalytical approach or rather to the progress in neurophysiological and psychological research, the evidence is compelling: a significant part of our mental life is outside conscious awareness, is automatic, follows its own rules and is out of our deliberate control.

Applications of this theoretical premise are quite significant and can be found on any level of human cognitive activity: from perception to moral reasoning. For instance, psychologists studying decision-making provided impressive amount of evidence on the fact that most people

[51] "What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels" (Descartes 2013, 75).

[52] See the paralogisms and antinomies of pure reason in Kant's first critique as a major example.

follow intuitive more than rational principles when faced with a choice, even if the choice in question clearly requires deliberative strategy of thinking. One of the most striking elements of these findings is of course not the fact that people make reasoning mistakes and thus simply disregard the rules. What is really important to notice here is that people do so because there are other rules or principles which come into play much quicker and with a greater ease than rational ones. In the psychology of decision-making and dual-process theories, those principles are called intuitive. They are immediate and effortless as opposed to reflective principles of deliberative rationality (Evans 2008, 2010).

To be fair to the tradition, however, we should not overestimate the primacy of rationality in modern philosophy. Some acknowledgement of the radical difference between two levels of subjective experience, or between intuitive and rational thinking, has always been present in philosophical accounts about human nature. Both "rationalists" and "empiricists" were concerned not only with the rules of rationality and rigorous scientific inquiry, but devoted no less attention to the hard problem of human passions and feelings. The relation between these two sides of human nature seems to have been a great issue for any system of philosophy and to have led to the systematic separation of moral and theoretical questions. As to illustrate the range of opinions, sometimes reaching perfect opposition, let me quote two famous claims by Spinoza and Hume respectively:

> Without intelligence there is not rational life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil (Spinoza 1677/2015, IV, 87)

> Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them (Hume 2003, 295).

The realm of emotions or passions of the soul was not the only place where reason had to meet its limitations. The advocate of the passions from the previous quote, David Hume, can certainly be seen as the predecessor of the contemporary view that principles governing much of the intuitive thinking are those of associations. Both in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*, he opposed the idea according to which our causal inferences are determined by reason, but insisted on associative principles as their true basis. Hume's philosophy

in this regard can be seen as the first attempt to give a systematic view on principles of pre-cognitive connectivity.

Thus, it should be once more emphasized that the topic of associations belongs to the scientific aspiration to account for the universal rules and principles according to which human mental life is organized. While the general tendency in modern philosophy consisted in distinguishing such rules as essentially rational and logical, several findings suggested that the affective, or pre-cognitive, level of subjective experience may rely on different principles of mental organization. In phenomenological philosophy, this tendency corresponds to the inquiry into pre-reflective self-experience. Accordingly, the aim of the present chapter is to discuss the idea of associative syntheses as universal principles of consciousness determining the inner, implicit organization of subjective experience.

The accomplishment of this task relies on two different scientific domains, namely, the phenomenological research on perception and memory and its counterpart in scientific psychology. This approach calls for a methodological clarification. And since our main interest concerns the regularities and principles of experience, the following methodological remarks will mostly account for how such principles and regularities are achieved in the two respective disciplines.

6. Phenomenology vs. scientific psychology: Intuitive, statistical, and eidetic regularities

Phenomenological and psychological investigations often deal with the same problems, while nevertheless almost never agreeing on the method. The phenomenological approach takes subjective experience as its starting point and aims to describe its general and universal structures, as well as the universal laws of subjective constitution. Scientific psychology, mainly based on experimental methodology, attempts to precisely overcome the subjectivity or individuality of experience, while approaching mental phenomena as objectivities that are representative not only of particular individuals but also of larger groups. This implies that the methodology of psychological research has a strong tendency towards objective measurements and statistical analyses of data.

Phenomenology tends to regard this ideal of objectivity in experimental psychology as essentially missing out on the most important

feature of the human mind—namely its capacity to *experience*, to live through whatever comes its way. Psychology, instead, does not trust anything that is merely "subjective" because of its inconclusive and potentially deceptive character. It should be stressed that both disciplines aim toward basic generalities concerning our mental life. However, how these generalities are achieved differ considerably. Generalities or universals operative in science are mainly those of categories and ensembles of data. This implies that individual cases are seen from the start as examples of groups of data, with clear preference given to larger and most representative samples. Phenomenology follows our path of experience more naturally; it moves from a particular experience to what is generalizable about it, or to what about the experience shows its essential structure and constitution. Multiplicity is not excluded from generalization; it is on the contrary enriching the original experience, potentially changing it. It can be argued, therefore, that phenomenology favors the natural historicity of subjective experience.

A legitimate doubt may now arise: can the phenomenological method provide us with any reliable generalities which are not merely introspective? The common answer is affirmative. From the very start, Husserl emphasized repeatedly that the phenomenological method is not the same as introspection, or the simple observation of one's own mental life. As Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi point out: "like ordinary scientific method, [phenomenology] also aims to avoid biased and subjective accounts. Some people mistake phenomenology for a subjective account of experience; but a subjective account of experience should be distinguished from an account of subjective experience" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 19). In other words, the phenomenological inquiry does start with a subjective experience, but the main focus is not on what is accidental or contingent about it, but on what is universal. Husserl called this step in his methodology the eidetic reduction. Hence, the phenomenological inquiry is interested in describing principles of genetic constitution and universal structures of subjective experience. But, unlike in the case of experimental psychology, these generalities or regularities are not statistical, but eidetic. This distinction demands an additional clarification. In what follows, I am going to delineate three types of regularities: (1) *intuitive* as derived from the common experience; (2) *statistical* as representing probabilities and ensembles of data and characteristic of the experimental scientific methodology; and (3) *eidetic* as representing the essential structures and properties of experiential phenomena and characteristic of the phenomenological methodology.

Intuitive regularities

Experience is the starting point for both phenomenological and psychological methodologies, hence they are both essentially empirical in what concerns their objects and area of interest. However, our experience is not a scientific achievement; it is a given—or pre-given in Husserl's terms—for the human condition in its being in the world. We do not need any specific experimental environment, laboratory equipment or even elaborate introspection in order to have an experience that would be interesting for psychology. This means that neither scientific psychology nor phenomenology start from scratch in their investigations. The everyday, most common and simple experience is already embedded in its pre-scientific understanding, as for instance, the implicit or explicit distinction between vision and hearing, imagining and remembering, feelings, desires, dynamics of relationships and meanings of behaviors, to name just a few. In the end, it amounts to folk psychology, which relies on a very elaborate system of common sense knowledge and accumulated interpretations. However significant and influential such common sense pre-scientific ideas may be, their origins are unclear and their objectivity is questionable. Their validity is derived from intuition, accumulated experience, language and cultural context. They are generalities formed in the process of social and individual development. They are, essentially, *intuitive generalities* about experience. This is not to say that such intuitively derived ideas are not valid or even important—quite the contrary—they constitute the indispensable basis for most of our cognition and behavior. The most common examples are familiar to anybody: recognizing familiar objects and people, identifying potential danger in a situation or sadness in a friend's voice. On the higher end of this experiential knowledge, there is so-called "expert intuition." This consists in the skillful and often immediate recognition of relevant patterns in an observed situation—patterns which would not be available for just a regular observer (Kahneman and Klein 2009).[53]

[53] Very representative for the study of the expert intuition is the work done by psychologist Gary Klein, who dedicated a lot of research to the understanding of this phenomenon and to the development of the naturalistic decision making approach. He and his research group studied expert intuition among highly skillful chess players, firefighters, nurses, army officers and other populations. See: Klein, G. *Sources of power*. (G. A. Klein 1999) for detailed information, or Kahneman and Klein's co-authored article (Kahneman and Klein 2009) for a concise and highly informative examination of the conditions of intuitive expertise.

Hence, the first and most basic way we distinguish generalities and regularities in experience is *intuitive*, that is to say pre-scientific, automatic, based on immediate perception and memory. Any scientific approach to experience always starts from this primary level and not from zero. It pursues, however, an essentially different outcome, namely to distinguish universal, objectively valid, and potentially verifiable regularities, rules, and principles in the experience. At this point, the methodology of scientific investigation comes to the fore. Here, I suggest distinguishing two types of regularities which correspond to two methodological approaches relevant for our topic. The first type, characteristic of contemporary experimental psychology, aims essentially at seeing *statistical regularities* and forming statistically inferred conclusions about psychological facts. The second type is the one favored by phenomenological philosophy and it targets the so-called *eidetic regularities*, as based on the Husserl's method of eidetic reduction and variation.

Statistical regularities

As Daniel Kahneman most accurately remarks: "statistical thinking derives conclusions about individual cases from properties of categories and ensembles" (Kahneman 2011, 77). The most important argument in favor of the need for the statistical methodology claims that an individual case cannot be representative of the phenomenon under investigation—in this case the phenomena studied by psychology. This implies that not all phenomena can be correctly approached by intuition, as based on the direct observation of concrete cases, and that in our experience there are such situations that require the discovery of the regularities which could account for the principles governing behaviors of groups or ensembles (Kahneman and Klein 2009).

What is the difference between intuitive and statistical approach? Which situations or phenomena can give us the best examples? First and foremost, statistics, and the theory of probability as its foundation, were designed to deal with random phenomena—those that do not contain any directly and, in our terms, intuitively recognizable patterns or regularities. Rolling dice would be a paradigm example of randomness. Psychologically relevant examples may not presuppose true randomness, but just satisfy such conditions as the impossibility of intuitive inference from one case to the class of similar cases or the

impossibility of pattern recognition due to the complexity of the environment.[54]

What does this tell us about the relevance of statistical methodology for psychological research? What is the main reason or motivation to account for the psychological phenomena as *samples* of random data and not individually? I think it is safe to say that the main motivation relies on the desirable universality of any scientifically oriented psychological research. Let us consider an example. Suppose, we want to know how deadline-related stress affects writing productivity in young and in experienced academics. Clearly, if we choose to assess such a relation by selecting one individual for each category—i.e. one postdoc researcher and one professor—the results would give us information only about the relation between deadline-related stress and writing productivity of these particular persons. Under no circumstances will we be able to draw conclusions from these data concerning other postdoc researchers and professors. That would be acceptable only provided that our goal is the psychology of these two individuals, which is very rarely the case.[55] But if we want to know how deadline-related stress affects writing productivity in academics *in general*, then we will have to find a representative sample of individuals to study in relation to this specific question. One or two persons are almost never representative for the respective population; unless it is very small and rather exceptional.

In this sense, the statistical experimental approach is advantageous insofar as it allows for generalizations not only about particular samples, but also for respective populations which such samples should be able to represent. The downside of such an approach is a certain vagueness in what concerns individual and exceptional cases and their relation to statistical generalities. If it is true that an individual case can rarely be representative of a group, then it is no less true that a statistical average can hardly be representative of each and every individual case. That is to

[54] The latter factor depends on the so-called "validity of the environment"—its inner capacity to provide distinguishable and learnable cues of its static and dynamic organization. For example, experts' long-term predictions concerning international politics or stock prices are less likely to be correct than the expert intuition of the experienced chess-players about the game, or of skillful nurses about the infant's health—precisely due to the factor of environmental validity, as in the first case there are fewer possibilities to get acquainted with the necessary regularities, and hence greater randomness is experienced (Kahneman and Klein 2009).

[55] Although it can be different in the areas where individual case studies are informative enough or represent a goal *per se.*

say: statistical generalities do account for what is most *probable* for each individual case, but not necessarily for what is actually and factually true. This is one of the reasons why statistical thinking is claimed to be advantageous in judgments under uncertainty as well as in any situation which requires the assessment of probabilities rather than direct observation (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1974).

To summarize what has just been said: (1) statistical regularities are those that account for the groups of data rather than for individuals or individual cases; (2) statistical regularities are those that account for probability rather than factuality; (3) the statistical approach is advantageous when an individual case cannot be representative of the group or category to which it belongs.

Eidetic regularities

Now, we should be able to distinguish between such psychological questions which require sampling and statistical inference and the ones which instead do not. The latter ones would entail that the respective questions target phenomena that could be in principle individually representative of their class, or, to be more precise, that they could be so under certain conditions. As we have already seen, most correlational or causal relations between distinct variables can hardly be generalizable on the basis of individual cases. But what about mental states as such? How relevant can statistical sampling be for the understanding of the general structure of perception or remembering, taken as subjective experiences and not as physiological states? Random selection of perceptions of a wooden table or phantasies about pink unicorns can provide a valuable multiplicity of experiences, but no statistical inference can tell us anything about what it means to have such experiences or what are their necessary structural components. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, statistical analysis already presupposes a certain understanding of what the collected data are about. This leaves any hypothetical researcher with two options: either to rely on the commonsensical, pre-scientific and intuitively available notions of what one means by "perception" or "imagination" and try to operationalize them, or to find a way of approaching these intuitively available ideas as universals.

This last scenario might seem excessive for an experimentally oriented researcher, since after all common sense ideas of mental phenomena can be taken as good enough for the purpose of specific experi-

ments. But let us contemplate for a moment the state of psychological or neuroscientific research on a complex phenomenon such as consciousness. All intuitively available notions of "awareness" or "being awake" are vague and leave little if any room for operationalization. Any empirical investigation on neural correlates of consciousness always starts with a theory of what consciousness might be. Thus, if one takes it to be related to a minimal form of self-awareness, then one is likely to design experiments looking for the self-related areas in the brain. If one believes instead in the currently popular theory of consciousness as related to "qualia" or the "what-it-is-likeness" of experience, then one faces the task to find something similar to that kind of ineffable entity, or to state in principle its inaccessibility for a neuroscientific explanation. In any case, it is clear that some kind of theory or at least theoretical hypothesis about the nature of consciousness is required for any possible empirical research to be conducted at all.

Consciousness is a good example because of its apparent complexity and even obscurity, but the same concerns many other phenomena as well. What is meant by such complex mental entities as perception, sensation, attention, memory, emotions, understanding another person or decision making is far from clear in the respective psychological disciplines. The operationalization of such "fuzzy" notions for the goals of experiments or empirical observations can be very helpful and provide fascinating results, which will indeed enrich—and have already enriched significantly—the meaning of the concepts we use as well as the understanding of the phenomena we seek to elucidate. Nevertheless, such an approach will behold an implicit reliance on the pre-given, commonsense understanding of those issues without the necessary clarification of their essence and experiential structure. Moreover, the "explanatory gap" between the phenomena under investigation and their theoretical and operational definitions appears to be the inevitable price to pay for the progress of empirical research. Operational definitions not only show the advantages of clarification and concretization, but also the disadvantages of simplification and potential departure from the essence and complexity of the phenomena they seek to investigate.

When one deals with essentially complex phenomena in psychology, the statistical method becomes of very limited use. In the words of the economist and philosopher, Friedrich Hayek:

> The statistical method is [...] of use only where we either deliberately ignore, or are ignorant of, the relations between the individual ele-

> ments with different attributes, i.e., where we ignore or are ignorant of any structure into which they are organized. […] While statistics can successfully deal with complex phenomena where these are the elements of the population on which we have information, it can tell us nothing about the structure of these elements. It treats them, in the fashionable phrase, as "black boxes" which are presumed to be of the same kind but about whose identifying characteristics it has nothing to say (Hayek 1964, 59-60).

It is precisely for these types of hard problems and complex phenomena in the mental realm that the phenomenological method was first designed by Edmund Husserl. Contemporary to the beginnings of scientific psychology in Austria and Germany, and dissatisfied with both purely introspective and quantitative approaches to the human *psyche*, he sought to elaborate such a method that could account for the general and essential structures of experience, without which such experience would be unthinkable or would be something completely different than it is.

It was clear for Husserl that intuitively available experience should always be a foundation for scientific generalizations. However, as he stated in his inaugural lecture at the Freiburg University, "Mere experience is not a science" (Bernet et al. 1993, 78). There are many regularities and patterns in nature and in social life that we recognize intuitively, by habit and observation. Such regularities are also not a science, but, it is to this general capacity of distinguishing such patterns and raising questions about them that "we owe the beginning of science" (Hayek 1964, 55). Husserl was primarily interested in a method of investigation that could account not for empirically induced but rather for essential generalities, which therefore would lead to a science of essences as distinguished from a science of facts.

Thus, the starting distinction which introduces the idea of eidetic phenomenology is the one between *fact* and *eidos,* or *essence*. Whereas empirical intuition is an experience of something individual in its concreteness and factuality, eidetic intuition is supposed to be a somewhat purified experience, an invariant of all possible experiences of the same kind. In order to achieve this eidetic intuition, Husserl introduced a method called eidetic variation—the idea being to grasp a pure eidetic universality of a phenomenon by mental comparison or running through all its possible types and particular variables. The aim of such a variation approach is to distinguish what is essential from what is accidental in a phenomenon, namely its indispensable structure and characteristics without which this phenomenon could not be the same.

Being a mathematician himself, Husserl was inspired by such pure eidetic sciences as mathematics and geometry. However, this does not mean that he took phenomenological philosophy and psychology to belong to the same class of eidetic disciplines as exact mathematical sciences. Phenomenology—he points out in the *Ideas I*—is not *exact*, but "a *descriptive* eidetic doctrine of transcendentally pure mental processes as viewed in the phenomenological attitude" (Husserl 1982, 167). As in geometry one deals with pure forms of space (*Raumgestaltungen*) notwithstanding their actual existence in the reality of nature, likewise in phenomenology one is supposed to regard mental phenomena as free from all their reality and concreteness in particular human experiences.

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl refers to the idea of eidetic analyses as to "a fundamental methodological insight, which, once it is grasped, pervades the whole phenomenological method" (Husserl 1960, 69). This insight builds upon the possibility to separate between the factual and the essential and to think of any fact as an example or a variation of a pure possibility, or *eidos*.[56] This does not presuppose any kind of pre-existence of such essences. Husserl's view on the *a priori* was never meant to go beyond experience, but merely to uncover generalities which belong to this latter essentially.[57]

The aim of this method is to achieve "an intuitive and apodictic consciousness of something universal" (Husserl 1960, 71). This suggests that, first, eidetic methodology itself belongs to some kind of intuitive experience, and, second, that it should be distinguished from empirical intuition as being capable to bring about a certain kind of scientifically acceptable evidence. Ordinary experiential intuition—such as external perception—is bound to be inadequate, as incompleteness and perspectivity are among its essential properties. Eidetic intuition, instead, is supposed to overcome this incompleteness. However, this does not happen through actual experiential fulfillment, which would only facilitate a higher degree of fullness, and not complete and adequate givenness. According to Husserl, evidence

[56] See, for instance, *Cartesian Meditations*: "Every fact can be thought of merely as exemplifying a pure possibility" (Husserl 1960, 71). *Ideas I*: "Experiencing, or *intuition of something individual* can become transmuted into *eidetic seeing (ideation)*—a possibility which is itself to be understood not as empirical, but as eidetic" (Husserl 1982, 8).

[57] "Of the concepts belonging to the ambiguous expression '*a priori*,' [the concept of the *eidos*] defines the only one to which we grant philosophical recognition. It is exclusively the *eidos* which is meant wherever I speak in my writings about the '*a priori*'" (Husserl, E. in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) – cited from (Bernet et al. 1993, 78–79)).

of eidetic intuition does not concern individual objects with all their multifacetedness, on the contrary, it aims at essences, about which its mode of givenness can present us with adequate or apodictic intuition.

Husserl himself insisted on the possibility of eidetic intuition which, in principle, could be adequate and free from all empirical implications, therefore allowing for pure and scientifically true descriptions of mental phenomena. The absoluteness of such ambition, however, has been put into question by several phenomenologists. For example, Alfred Schutz underlined that eidetic intuition originates from facticity and therefore can never be completely separated from the inductive methodology. His point in David M. Levin's exposition runs as follows:

> [...] in spite of important differences ideation is continuous with induction. It represents a more rigorous articulation of the inductive types already operative, in a prereflective capacity, in our encounter with the world. [...] Eidetic consciousness has its origins in facticity, and builds upon its given resources of typification (Levin 1968, 2).

Levin argues that eidetic intuition is bound to inadequacy just as much as empirical intuition. The one-sidedness and principal incompleteness of any spatial perception, which renders it inadequate, might as well be found in eidetic intuition since the latter also deals with essences as transcendent objects:

> Spatial profiles, or adumbrations, are, of course, considered to be the source of thing-transcendence. But, strictly, speaking, it is not spatial profile *as such* which entails transcendence; it is objective sense. And essences have objective sense just as much as things, regardless of how this sense is to be characterized more specifically, in other words, as transtemporal or, on the other hand, as spatio-temporal (Levin 1968, 5).

This is an important point, which I do not read as a refutation of Husserl's eidetic methodology, but rather as its elaboration. Both Schutz's and Levin's arguments highlight some close interconnections between empirical, factual intuition embedded in the ordinary experience and the phenomenological task of investigating the essential structures of intuitions. Such an acknowledgment of the necessary intrinsic limitations of eidetic methodology may appear inconsistent with Husserl's original idea of phenomenology as a strict science of pure essences. Conversely, it may just present such a science as an open project which corresponds to the open character inherent in and essential to the experience itself. In other words, as Elizabeth Behnke puts it: "Eidetic investigation, in

short, remains an 'open process' precisely insofar as it is true to an 'open experience' in which not only 'new', but the genuinely 'novel' can emerge" (Behnke 2010, 62).

The eidetic method aims not only to uncover essential characteristics and structural components of mental phenomena, but also their essential lawful regularities and *Wesensgesetze*. Such regularities and necessities concern types of connections, which are operative in the mental realm, and go beyond the level of static phenomenological analyses. Compared to static phenomenological descriptions, the concern of genetic phenomenology is no longer with analyzing "finished systems of correlation, but rather with inquiring into their genesis" (Bernet et al. 1993, 197). As much as phenomenology is interested in uncovering the essences of statically viewed phenomena, it is no less interested in bringing about essential rules which define the way these phenomena are constituted—rules which are to be found in multiplicities of appearances, temporal modifications, and associative connections.

To conclude these methodological clarifications, let us for a moment return to Daniel Kahneman, to whose work I owe the idea of distinguishing different types of regularities. His insight concerns the distinction between intuitive and statistical regularities: if intuitive thinking "represents categories by a prototype or a set of typical examples" (Kahneman 2011, 93), then statistical thinking—the advantages of which Kahneman is advocating—"derives conclusions about individual cases from properties of categories and ensembles" (Kahneman 2011, 77). Namely, thinking statistically means to judge a certain property or relation on the basis of its probable behavior, yet not in any particular case, but rather in a substantial number of similar and randomly selected cases. Thinking intuitively means to judge a case on the basis of available information and typical expectations about a particular situation from a particular perspective.

My point is that phenomenology operates with a third type of regularities, namely eidetic regularities, which can be described as invariants of intuitive regularities. Compared to the statistical approach, eidetic intuition deals with regularities or generalities not by analyzing properties of ensembles of data, but by defining essential properties and structures of experiential phenomena. Thus, it assumes the subjective perspective of intuitive experience, but arguably overcomes its limitations by representing what is essential and universal about it. Such method is advantageous when research is primarily concerned with complex mental phenomena which cannot be elucidated on the basis of mere data collection.

7. Associative connectivity and principles of content-binding

We will now turn our attention to the associative connectivity of consciousness and its role in the constitution of unified experience. We have already seen that Husserl approached the temporality of consciousness and temporal syntheses as fundamental types of connectivity, which provide continuity and unity to any possible subjective experience. The structure of temporal consciousness—exemplified by the model of primal impression, retention, and protention—contributes to our understanding of how experience always proceeds in a coherent flow of mental states "following one another in continuous sequence" (Husserl 1960, 40), in which expectations can be fulfilled by actual experiences, and subsequently sink into the recent and then remote past. Temporal connections are responsible for simultaneity, continuity, and—on the higher end—for the overall unity of one's conscious life. In the same vein, it is to this temporal connectivity that we owe the capacity for the development of our narrative integrity, and also a representation of the unified experience as linear and, to a certain extent, sequential.[58]

Nevertheless, however powerful and ubiquitous this temporal dimension of conscious life is, it does not account for all possible connections between our experiences, as well as between their objects. One way of seeing associative connectivity as a part of the unified experience problem is to conceive of the experiential organization as not only linear and continuous, but also as inherently linked through random content-based connections, which cannot be clarified in temporal and logical terms. Randomness concerns only the parts of experience that can be brought together; the principles of such connections, nevertheless, may imply a universality of mental laws, or "lawful regularities," as Husserl often prefers to call them. It should be clear by now that the phenomenology of associations deals precisely with these principles.

The first difficulty encountered in a phenomenological explication of associative syntheses concerns its almost inevitable confusion with the empirical notion of association. At the beginning of this chapter, I pointed out that the topic of association should be distinguished with regard to two different traditions—namely, the traditions of British empiricism

[58] It belongs to the "logic" of temporality to represent one's life as a coherent series of events.

and of transcendental philosophy. Then, some important methodological distinctions were introduced concerning how to approach the distinctive regularities of human mental life. The next step is to clarify exactly how Husserl's idea of associative syntheses should be separated from the associationist approach.

7.1. The "productive paradox" of associations: Gestalt vs. Atomistic psychology and phenomenology's distance from both

The problem of association belongs to one of those "persistent riddles of psychology," which are very likely to maintain their paradoxical character throughout the theoretical development of this discipline. According to Gordon Allport and David B. Klein, the topic of association represents a "productive paradox" (D. B. Klein 1970, 220), since, on the one hand, it can provide a satisfactory explanation of such phenomena as learning and memory, but, on the other hand, it can lead to an atomistic approach to mental organization. In other words, the successful explanation of certain mental phenomena comes at the price of an overall unsatisfactory psychological theory, which overlooks other essential properties of the mind, incompatible with the associationistic view.

The paradox in question entails the classical problem of part-whole relations and is crucial for the dispute between associationist and Gestalt approaches in psychology. It can be argued that our experience always manifests itself holistically: the perceptual experience in all its dimensions does not appear as a mere combination of different sensations, but rather as a unitarily—both diachronically and synchronically—structured whole; our bodily self-awareness presents us with a coherently functioning organism; our behavior, decision making, relations with the past and possible future are all strongly biased towards consistency. It appears that, from the experiential perspective, the parts only let themselves be distinguished on the basis of an already presupposed unity of mental life. However, an opposite perspective on the same phenomenon is also conceivable: the wholeness of experience can be regarded not as a presupposition, but rather as an accomplishment which is possible due to relations between otherwise unconnected parts. Such a perspective can be especially productive when attention is given to experienced unities which show no necessary connection among their components—unities which, in princi-

ple, could have been otherwise, or not been at all, if it were not for certain established relations between theirs parts. Most of the examples come from the realm of memory and learning processes, which show how distinct episodes or moments of one's experience can be unified by establishing a link between them and how such links can be voluntarily or involuntarily formed between originally unconnected units.

In other words, the wholeness of an experience may be seen as a necessary background for parts differentiation, or as the result of distinct parts being connected together. The tension between favoring one perspective over the other is best clarified on the level of perceptual organization. The central point of the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology, represented by Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang Köhler, consisted in claiming that "structured wholes or Gestalten, rather than sensations, are the primary units of mental life" (Wagemans et al. 2012, 1173). According to this view, the perception of organized unities cannot be understood on the basis of the mere integration of sensations. The whole must often be grasped before the parts, and must serve as a foundation for their discrimination. The classical examples include the perception of a melody, which is recognizable even when transposed in another key, or of any object which cannot be reduced to its constituents. There is something in the perception of a process or a figure—a certain order, a structure—which cannot be explained through a mere adding up of elements. Moreover, the abstraction of such elements appears to be secondary to the perception of the whole to which they belong.

Starting from the basic assumption that the perception of a whole should follow its own rules and be different from the sum of its parts, Gestalt psychologists were interested in defining the major principles of perceptual organization responsible for unit-perceptions. The necessary formulation of the principles of such holistic structures pertaining to any perceptual experience led to Wertheimer's proposal of the "Gestalt laws of perceptual organization" (Wertheimer 1923/2009, 1923).

> The perceptual field does not appear to us as a collection of sensations with no meaningful connection to one another, but is organized in a particular way, with a spontaneous, natural, normally expected combination and segregation of objects. Wertheimer's (1923) paper was an attempt to elucidate the fundamental principles of that organization. Most general was the law of Prägnanz. This states, in its broadest form, that the perceptual field and objects within it take on the simplest and most impressive structure permitted by the given conditions. More specific were the laws of proximity, similarity, closure, and good continuation (Wagemans 2015, 8).

Clearly, the "Gestalt laws" are at least partially very similar to the principles of associations, among which contiguity (or proximity) and similarity have always been two of the most indisputable. This indicates that the difference between associationist and Gestalt psychologies was not about principles of perceptual binding, but mostly about theoretical presuppositions concerning what should be taken as primarily constitutive elements of perceptual experience in particular and of any kind of subjective experience in general.

For Gestalt-oriented thinkers, unity and "wholeness" prevail at any level of experience. Indeed, we always find ourselves in a fully functioning coherence of experiencing, and a certain intellectual effort is required to separate distinct experiential parts from this pre-given unity, or to inquire, for instance, about how different sense modalities coincide in orderly perception. This latter question could not have been formulated if there were no coherent perception in the first place. Therefore, any approach which starts by describing principles of association or combination appears to be secondary in regard to the experiential factuality of the perceptual unity. Gestalt psychology seems then to be fully justified in its efforts to see whole-structures and whole-processes as primary elements of perceptual experience.

However, the Gestalt identification of the essential principles of any experience can be seen as just another way of approaching the same problem tackled by the associationists' attempts to clarify perceptual organization and interconnectedness, which manifest themselves at any level of mental life. The undeniable fact that such an approach ended up in a naturalistically bound causal system of explanatory psychology, should not obscure its initial intention to account for the same principles of connectedness and experiential structures which motivated Gestalt theorists. It is worth mentioning that this fact did not escape the attention of the Gestalt psychologists themselves. For example, Kurt Koffka in his *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* stated that:

> To apply the category of cause and effect means to find out which parts of nature stand in this relation. Similarly, to apply the Gestalt category means to find out which parts of nature belong as parts to functional wholes, to discover their position in these wholes, their degree of relative independence, and the articulation of larger wholes into sub-wholes (Koffka 1935).

This citation, apart from indicating the aforementioned affinity between the two rival approaches, also contains another crucial point, which

separates them both from phenomenological philosophy. This point concerns the presumed naturalization of the perceptual structures, be it the causal or associative relations among parts or the functional wholes.

It is important to understand that Gestalt principles of perceptual organization represent merely "a set of descriptive principles" (Bruce et al. 1996, 110), not only because they do not suggest any theory of perceptual processing (which would be of importance for the empirical account of perception), but also because they do not account for the constitutive side of experience. In this regard, the preference for one set of explanatory or descriptive principles over the other is just a matter of perspective.

Even though phenomenological philosophy is generally taken as rather sympathetic towards Gestalt theorists, we should point out that its aim was to go beyond both mentioned empirical approaches and to abandon the naturalistic assumptions they have in common.[59] In his introduction to the English edition of the second book of the *Ideas,* Husserl expressed his position as follows:

> Evidently and in principle, it makes no difference in this regard whether one lets the psychic data be blown into aggregates "atomistically," like shifting heaps of sand, even though in conformity with empirical laws, or whether they are considered parts of wholes which, by necessity, either empirical or apriori, can behave individually only as such parts within a whole—at the highest level perhaps in the whole that is consciousness in its totality, which is bound to a fixed form of wholeness. In other words, atomistic psychology, as well as Gestalt psychology, both retain the sense and the principle of psychological "naturalism" (as we have defined it above) or "sensualism" as it can also be named if we recall the use of the term "inner sense" (Husserl 1989, 423-424).

From the perspective of phenomenological philosophy, whether one sees the field of conscious experience as an "assemblage of forms" or as a collection of associatively linked sensations is only a case of choosing one side of the same approach. Thus, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty points out, Gestalt theory yields remarkable results when it stays on the purely descriptive level, but not when it attempts to construct a theory of consciousness based on the principles of perceptual grouping. The phenomenological view on Gestalt psychology in both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty consisted in emphasizing the importance of the transcendental

[59] For an elaborate account of the reception of Gestalt psychology in the tradition of phenomenological philosophy see Sara Heinämaa's article "Phenomenological Responses to Gestalt Psychology" (Heinämaa 2009).

approach, which by definition goes beyond mere description, refraining from causal explanations.

> Gestalt theory does not recognize that psychological atomism is but a particular case of a more general prejudice: the unquestioned belief in determinate being and in the world, and this is why it forgets its most valuable descriptions when it seeks to give itself a theoretical framework. Gestalt theory remains free of errors when it operates within the medium regions of reflection. When it wishes to reflect upon its own analyses, it treats consciousness—despite its own principles—as an assemblage of "forms" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 510).

Such a claim certainly should not be seen as a rejection of the important findings of Gestalt thinkers, but only as a rejection of the theoretical framework common to any empirical approach in psychology. Merleau-Ponty, whose *Phenomenology of Perception* is rich in Gestalt-influenced examples and analyses, intended to maintain the truth of the Gestalt-oriented descriptions by subjecting them to a transcendental-phenomenological inquiry.[60]

The main point of the phenomenological critique of both associationists and gestaltists concerned not the validity of their concrete findings, but rather the theory of consciousness which resulted from them. Pointing out "the failure of the modern attempts to distinguish between a psychological and a philosophical theory of consciousness," Husserl repeatedly emphasized that naturalistic atomism cannot be overcome by simple postulation of additional qualities which bind psychic data together:

> In advance, as though this were obviously correct, one misinterprets conscious life as a complex of data of "external" and (at best) "internal sensuousness"; then one lets form-qualities take care of combining such data into wholes. To get rid of "atomism," one adds the theory that the forms or configurations are founded on these data necessarily

[60] Such an attitude resulted, on the one hand, in his faithful adherence to the Husserlian problematic of constitution, and, on the other hand, in his clear preference for a Gestalt-inspired approach to perception over the atomistic approach of the associationists. For example, in the introduction to the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty unambiguously emphasized this primacy of unity over associative connections: "There are no indifferent givens that together set about forming a thing because some factual contiguities or resemblances associate them. Rather, because we first perceive a whole as a thing, the analytic attitude can later discern resemblances or contiguities there" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 16). And: "If we hold ourselves to phenomena, then the unity of the thing in perception is not constructed through association, but rather, being the condition of association, this unity precedes the cross-checkings that verify and determine it, this unity precedes itself" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 17).

> and the wholes are therefore prior in themselves to the parts (Husserl 1960, 38).

This point can bring to mind the discussion on the nature of consciousness in the contemporary philosophy of mind, to which we paid some attention at the end of the previous chapter. In this context, understanding consciousness as a mere quality of experience, which supposedly changes its phenomenological status, can be seen as just another variation of the old naturalistic tendency to attribute unresolved issues to made-up qualitative properties and to treat consciousness and subjectivity as constituted by such qualities.

The parallel is the following: if, on the descriptive level, we can state that there is a "what-it-is-likeness" to any experience or that in any perception there are necessary holistic relations to be distinguished, it does not follow—logically or otherwise—that "what-it-is-like"-qualia or holistic form-qualities are real entities inherent to the mind. Husserl saw it as one of the biggest naturalistic fallacies to treat consciousness and subjectivity in the same way as one treats objects and laws of nature, that is, as real things subject to real causal relations. The whole point of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction was to go beyond this relation between subjective and objective, which either makes subjectivity a part of "nature," or makes objectivity a part of the mind.[61]

The phenomenological *epoché*, as a suspension of the belief in the existence of the world, and consequently of all ontologically bound judgments, has nothing to do with radical subjectivism or the denial of external reality. Phenomenological reduction is not a philosophical position, stating that the world is a product of transcendental subjectivity, but rather a purely methodological move. This move ensures that no naturalistic predicates and judgments about reality can enter the realm of the pure phenomenological experience. Whereas, in the "real world," we believe that perceived qualities, relations, and predicates belong to objects and define actual state of affairs, according to the phenomenological attitude such relations or characteristics of things are taken as part of the appearing phenomena, without assuming any kind of natural causality. Phenomenological *epoché* aims to avoid naturalistic attributional biases by suspending the core presupposition of any independent reality and natural causality. This allows us to

[61] "Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts" (Husserl 1960, 26).

focus on the experiential side of phenomena and uncover their structure and functioning without relying on any external explanation.

This also applies to the investigation of regularities defining inner connectivity and forms of order in the subjective experience. The phenomenological intention is to describe such temporal and associative connections purely in terms of syntheses of consciousness and refraining from naturalistic attributions. Therefore, in order to understand Husserl's transcendental doctrine of association, we need to see it in the context of his theory of consciousness and *vice versa*: in order to understand the phenomenological conception of consciousness we need to clarify association as one of the fundamental types of synthesis.

7.2. Husserl's transcendental doctrine of association: Association as a synthesis of consciousness

Contrary to the rival psychological views debating primacy of wholeness over associative combination, Husserl holds these two moments—i.e., combination and unity—to be essentially inseparable. The unity and coherence of our subjective experience is an essential fact regarding experiential organization. The transcendental inquiry into its conditions of possibility does not presuppose that this unity should be broken down into distinct abstract pieces. There is no contradiction in seeing the same object or process as a whole or as a series of multiplicities. There is no rejection of an originally unified character of conscious experience in any inquiry concerning what made this unity possible in the first place.

Husserl's view, already familiar to us as far as time-consciousness is concerned, does not rely on a representation of the mind as a collection of experiences and sense data brought together by some additional quality or form. His early account of time as a real connection, which at some point can be comparable to seeing the form of time as an additional quality, was rejected as unacceptable by Husserl himself. The mind's interconnectivity was then conceived of as made possible by consciousness and its synthetic function. This step coincided with the general turn towards transcendental phenomenology, and not without reason: any psychological view on consciousness carries in itself an inevitable—both historically and ontologically—representation of it as some sort of objective reality. This then leads to the aforementioned tendency to see any descriptive attributes of subjective experience as real qualities or relations. One of the aims of transcendental reduction was to refrain from

transferring any given real-world relations and properties to the description of the transcendental realm. In this regard, understanding consciousness through its synthetic function does not mean that consciousness somehow causes things to be connected together, or that it connects some pre-existing entities. That would imply that the sensations are already there somehow unrelatedly, and they are then connected by conscious activity. This idea is not only absurd and far-fetched, but also at odds with our natural way of experiencing. Husserl points out that synthesis is not something that occurs "afterwards" bridging otherwise separated data, but rather concerns the way one is consciously aware of them as belonging together: "If two similar elements occur in a present, it is not the case that they first exist [separately] and that then their synthesis follows; rather, we call 'similar' what occurs in such a synthesis as coexistent" (Husserl 2001a, 494).

In every version of his systematization of phenomenological philosophy, Husserl claimed the centrality of the intentional correlation between *cogitatio* and *cogitatum*, i.e. the intentional act of perceiving, remembering and the like, and the object intended in such acts. Among other things, this implies that an identical object can be given in multiple modes of givenness and that any particular mode of givenness can be seen as a multiplicity of appearances of the same intentional object. The question of unity itself can therefore be seen as twofold: on the one hand, we have the unity of an object which appears identical—the unity of its multiple appearances, such as the same object seen from different angles; and on the other hand, we have the unity of the temporal flow of the perceiving itself, of a coherent sequence of appearing, of changing modes of seeing. These two sides of intentional experience are correlated: multiplicities of manners of appearing correspond to the synthetic unity of a perceived object.

> Always we find the feature in question as a unity belonging to a passing flow of "multiplicities." Looking straightforwardly, we have perhaps the one unchanging shape or color; in the reflective attitude, we have its manners of appearance (oriental, perspectival, and so forth), following one another in continuous sequence (Husserl 1960, 40).

Each *cogitatio*, each experience (*Erlebnis*) has its "structure of multiplicities," which does not contradict its unified character. Rather the two are complimentary: there is no conceivable unity without multiplicities of appearing being experienced in a continuous flow. This idea is directly related to how Husserl understood the dynamic structure of

experience in general and of perceptual experience in particular. That is why in order to apprehend the phenomenological idea of multiplicity and unity of conscious experience, we need to look closer into how he chooses to introduce the topic of passive constitution and therefore into his account of perception. The phenomenology of perception offers one of the clearest ways to understand synthetic consciousness in Husserl.[62]

First of all, in his lectures on transcendental logic, known as *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis*, Husserl chooses to introduce perception as being essentially characterized by its inadequateness—its "constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish" (Husserl 2001a, 39). One can easily notice that this is rather an unusual first step in discussing perception, which in phenomenology, had always been defined as the most original self-giving mode of consciousness. And yet, Husserl claims at the very beginning of the section "Self-giving in Perception" that such a self-giving can never fully happen. This does not mean that perception always simply fails to accomplish intuitive givenness of its objects, but rather, that such givenness remains incomplete: any new side of the object-acquaintance opens up to countless possibilities of seeing others.

> Every perceptual object in the epistemic process is a flowing approximation. We always have the external object in the flesh (we see, grasp, seize it), and yet it is always at an infinite distance mentally. What we do grasp of it pretends to be its essence; and it is it too, but it remains so only in an incomplete approximation, an approximation that grasps something of it, but in doing so it also constantly grasps into an emptiness that cries out for fulfillment (Husserl 2001a, 58-59).

The actual process of perception consists in a continuous interplay between fullness and emptiness: the becoming visible of new sides of an object is complemented by the gradual disappearing of the sides just

[62] In the part of his lectures on transcendental logic, which deals directly with the topic of passive synthesis and transcendental aesthetic, Husserl focuses on the two following thematic blocks: (1) the *phenomenology of perception*, whose goal is to uncover the mode of self-givenness in perception and its essential ways of fulfillment and modalization; and (2) the *phenomenology of association and affection*, which concerns the discovering of essential structures and regularities operative on the level of passive, pre-predicative constitution—this includes the thematization of the principles of associative content-binding and the affective interconnectedness of subjective life. The two mentioned thematic blocks (perception and association) are closely related. Descriptions of the former set the ground for the complicated genetic analyses of the latter. On the example of perception, we can assess the need for the explanation of passive connectivity of consciousness in its most concrete habitat.

seen. Thus, every appearance finds its place inside the multiplicity of other appearances and stays in relation to those. Husserl goes on claiming that "every perception *implicite* invokes an entire perceptual system" (Husserl 2001a, 48). Any single perceptual act is an abstraction from the whole experiential process to which it belongs. Any static perception can be seen as "complex, many-sided continuum" (Mohanty 2011, 167) and all unity and wholeness—as a multiplicity, a system of interrelated appearances. Finally, this paradoxical feature of perceptual experience turns out to be illuminating in order to understand subjectivity: it shows experience as, on the one hand, "a constant process of anticipation, of preunderstanding" (Husserl 2001a, 43) and, on the other hand, as a constant process of sedimentation and transformation.

Moreover, this description applies not only to perception, but to other modes of experience too, so that it ultimately embraces the whole subjective experience, "the whole of conscious life as unified synthetically" (Husserl 1960, 42). When Husserl says that every consciousness is ultimately a synthesis, he implies these two sides of the same coin: first, every intentional consciousness presenting or presentifying its objects as identical through multiplicities of appearances; and second, the synthetic consciousness as a dynamic whole of all of the conscious life.

By providing analyses of perceptual phenomena, Husserl encourages us to see subjective experience and, hence, subjectivity itself from a new angle: not as a relation between subject and object, but as a process, a unity constituted through continuous changes. This new, dynamic, perspective, highlighting historicity and openness of consciousness, demands also a new methodological approach. Such an approach is already known to us under the rubric of genetic phenomenology, which pursues precisely at the uncovering of "the most lawful regularities of genesis" of subjectivity. And it should not escape our attention that this is exactly what is at stake here. That is to say: the main question, i.e. the gravitational center of Husserl's transcendental aesthetic, concerns first and most of all a phenomenological clarification of "the basic, essential conditions of the possibility of subjectivity itself" (Husserl 2001a, 169).

The first, most basic and ubiquitous lawful regularity, "connecting all and governing within each single process in particular," is the universal form of the temporal flux—"a *formal regularity pertaining to a universal genesis*, which is such that past, present, and future become unitarily constituted over and over again, in a certain noetic-noematic formal structure of flowing modes of givenness" (Husserl 1960, 75). Such a tem-

poral unity of subjectivity is constituted as "the unity of a 'history'," a continuous history of acquisition, sedimentation, and transformation.

Another universal principle of subjective genesis, operative on the passive, pre-predicative level of constitution, bears the name of association. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl introduces the topic of association as "a *fundamental concept belonging to transcendental phenomenology*" (Husserl 1960, 80), whose meaning should be separated from the naturalistic tradition:

> It is phenomenologically evident, but strange to the tradition-bound, that association is not a title merely for a conformity to empirical laws on the part of complexes of data comprised in a "psyche"—according to the old figure, something like an intrapsychic gravitation—but a title (moreover an extremely comprehensive one) for a conformity to eidetic laws on the part of the constitution of the pure ego. It designates *a realm of the "innate" Apriori*, without which an ego as such is unthinkable. Only through the phenomenology of genesis does the ego become understandable: *as a nexus, connected in the unity of an all-embracing genesis, an infinite nexus of synthetically congruous performances* (Husserl 1960, 80-81).

Husserl's transcendental doctrine of association aims at defining the eidetic regularities describing the synthetic connectivity of consciousness and the genesis of subjectivity. Its task is to clarify how multiplicities of appearances relate to each other so that they result in an organized and coherent perceptual experience. In other words, the task of the phenomenology of association is to understand how perceptual experience can harmoniously relate to past experience or how, at the end, the whole of the present life can be connected with the whole of the past life without contradiction, without turning into the chaotic relation of everything with everything.

It was clear for Husserl that the analyses of time-consciousness were necessary, but not sufficient for the explication of this ultimate complexity of subjective interconnectivity. Contrary to Kant's formal transcendental aesthetic, Husserl's inquiry into the principles of passive constitution bears upon the most concrete, content-based, organization of pre-reflective experience, such as the organization of sense-fields and the associative awakening of the past. Moreover, Husserl takes affectivity, i.e. the way objects affect the ego, as a fundamental dimension of subjectivity and as a possible topic of transcendental explication.[63]

[63] For Kant, the phenomenon of affection was beyond the transcendental explication. While risking to venture into generalization, one might say that Kant's

In what follows, I will turn to a systematization of Husserl's account of associative syntheses and will present the main types of association, as well as the basic principles of associative connectivity. Anybody familiar with Husserl's writings concerning this topic might have experienced not only their insightful and observant force, but also a somewhat disorganized and intricate manner of presentation. Husserl barely ever sacrificed the complexity of his remarks to clarity of exposition, and it was certainly his privilege as a pioneer in the transcendental approach to association. My task, however, is more modest and compels me to favor structure and clarity which sometimes come at the price of simplification and a disregard of nuances, which anyway can always be experienced fully in Husserl's own texts.[64]

7.3. Types of associative syntheses

Introducing the topic of association in the *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis*, Husserl first of all recalls the distinction between the traditional account of association, relying on the idea of objective, psychophysical causality, and the phenomenological approach, which sees association as "a form and lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general" (Husserl 2001a, 162). We have discussed this important distinction enough already and can now focus on the function and systematization of associative syntheses in the immanence of conscious life. Based on the phenomenological descrip-

transcendental aesthetic was restricted to formal conditions of sensibility, such as the forms of time and space. Husserl instead includes also a dimension of affection and hence association as parts of the transcendental explication of the possibility of pre-reflective experience.

[64] As for the secondary literature, the most comprehensive and accomplished systematic account of the phenomenology of association is Elmar Holenstein's book *Phänomenologie der Assoziation: zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der Passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl* (Holenstein 1972). In his analysis, Holenstein touches upon all the most important points of the topic and also discusses notably the differences and similarities between the phenomenological and psychological approaches to association. In her book on *Intersubjective Temporality. It's about time* (Rodemeyer 2006), Lanei Rodemeyer provides an account of association and its relation to retention and recollection. On the topic of association in the context of Husserl's investigations on passive synthesis, see also Anthony Steinbock's introduction to his translation of the *Analyses concerning Active and Passive Synthesis* (Steinbock 2001); Yamaguchi, Ichiro: Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl (Yamaguchi 2013); Biceaga, Victor: The Concept of Passivity in Husserl's Phenomenology (Biceaga 2010).

tion of subjective experience, we find ourselves in the streaming present life of consciousness, to which retentional and protentional moments necessarily belong. To this life also belong emerging rememberings and expectations, as well as the whole past and future horizons. In other words, we find ourselves in the framework of the temporally organized experience, which, for Husserl, is the basic dimension for any possible analysis of experiential organization. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the division of the main types of associative syntheses directly mirrors this general temporal structure of consciousness.

Association delineates a specific type of conscious connectivity, which is not to be confused with the rules of temporal syntheses. Husserl claims that the first approach to subjectivity's consciousness of its life as streaming in the living present and in reference to the past and future is still incomplete and abstract. Meaningfulness is achieved only if subjectivity is conscious of itself concretely. The phenomenological task consists therefore in describing "the syntheses concerning content that extend beyond the transcendental synthesis of time" (Husserl 2001a, 171).

Nevertheless, it should not escape our attention that Husserl never drew a strict line between these two orders of synthesis. All along his descriptions of association and affectivity, the form of time holds its fundamental and exemplary status and dominates the understanding of association. We shall discuss later whether or not such an approach limits the possibilities of the phenomenological discussion of the passive constitution. As for now, it is important to keep in mind that, in Husserl's works, content-based associative syntheses rely on the form of time ubiquitously and are described as "a higher continuation of the doctrine of original time-constitution" (Husserl 2001a, 163).

In accordance with the general structure of temporal experience, association is also divided into three categories or three groups of phenomena, namely: (1) reproductive association; (2) anticipatory association; and (3) primordial association (*Urassoziation*).[65]

[65] This division is directly drawn from Husserl's account of association in the *Analyses*. Holenstein suggests distinguishing two groups of associations: (1) association in the ordinary sense, which includes reproductive and anticipatory associations, and (2) primordial association (*Urassoziation*) which then includes affective and pre-affective associations (Holenstein 1972, 32-39). Rodemeyer proposes distinguishing the following three types of association: (1) primordial association corresponding to *Urimpression* and the near retention, (2) motivated association corresponding to the far retention and typified memories, and (3) reproductive association which accounts for recollection (Rodemeyer 2006, 99).

The first and most fundamental type of associative connectivity is known under the rubric of *reproductive association*. It concerns the possibility of remembering as well as reproductive consciousness, and is relevant for both the traditional and phenomenological doctrines of association. In Husserl's words, "the doctrine of the genesis of reproductions and of their formations is the doctrine of association in the first and more genuine sense" (Husserl 2001a, 164). The here operating synthesis of consciousness delineates a "purely immanent connection of 'this recalls that,' 'one calls attention to the other'" (Husserl 1973a, 75). To be sure, reproductive association is not to be confused with the phenomenon of explicit, deliberate recollection. What is at stake here is rather the passive, pre-reflective conditions of anything being brought to the present awareness by means of associative connectivity, and, in a wider perspective, also the conditions of any possible interconnection between the past and present life of the same consciousness.

The second type of association is closely related to the first and concerns "a doctrine of the genesis of expectations" as well as the whole realm of anticipatory intentions. Husserl calls this connection inductive or *anticipatory association*. It concerns "essential conditions of the possibility of a subjectivity that can know itself as identically one, having its inherent endless future life" (Husserl 2001a, 169).

Then, from these two types of associative syntheses, which govern intuitive, content-based, relations between present, past, and future, Husserl proceeds to distinguish the third type, which brings the topic of association to a new level of inquiry. He designates it under such titles as "primordial forms of association or originary impressional associations," which are said to define the rules of "unification within a presence" (Husserl 1973a, 177). Husserl suggests to consider the structure of the living immanent present as a universal genetic phenomenon and to describe the regularities of connection essential to it. On this level, *primordial associative syntheses* are taken to be responsible for the organization of the sense-fields, group-formations, and "the coming into prominence of particular members from a homogeneous background" (Husserl 1973a, 76). In psychological terms, one would speak about such topics as perceptual organization, feature-integration, and multisensory integration.

Now that we have distinguished three groups of associations, we should discuss the principles of associative syntheses. Such principles are universal and concern primordial, reproductive, and anticipatory associations. However, specific details of such principles and formations of unity

are different for primordial and reproductive (including anticipative) types of syntheses. Following Husserl's own preferences, I will first present his analyses on the primordial level of constitution and then turn to the realm of reproductive association. The topic of anticipatory association falls out of the scope of this work. On the one hand, it is less significant for the constitution of the experiential unity, since, in Husserl's words, "the future does not fashion the unities of experience in the original sense, it presupposes them" (Husserl 2001a, 235). On the other hand, anticipatory association is conceptually close to primordial and reproductive association and relies on the same principles.[66]

7.4. Principles of primordial association and unity-formation

The particular task behind the analyses of the primordial association consists in accounting for the most basic level of unity-formations. Principles of primordial association are those describing the organization of the pre-reflective perceptual experience. This includes accounting for the types of connections through which this level of experience is made possible. Husserl underlines that these connections should not be understood as real, causal links, thereby referring back to Hume's point that an association does not establish any real connection between two separate events or things:

> To be sure, one can say that similarity between particular data establishes no real bond. But we are not speaking now of real qualities but of the way in which sense data are connected in immanence (Husserl 1973a, 74).
>
> We are speaking about immanent data, for example, about concrete color data in the unity of a streaming present [...] these necessarily have a unity through consciousness, a unity through kinship, as similar to one another or uniform with one another: several discrete color-data in the visual field are grouped together; they are especially united by virtue of their similarity (Husserl 2001a, 175).

The principles of connection here investigated are in fact quite abstract, in the sense that they delineate only general rules of synthesis, but do not account for the real qualities of connected elements. For instance, one can refer to the connection of homogeneity between a group of distinct ob-

[66] However, an important aspect of this topic concerns the affective dimension of anticipatory association. As Husserl writes, "affection has a unitary tendency toward the future" (Husserl 2001a, 204). Rodemeyer calls attention to this feature of affectivity and stresses that the protentional openness of experience towards the future enables affection to exercise its allure on the self (Rodemeyer 2006, 155-160).

jects as being united on the basis of a similar quality they all share (such as redness or squareness), or to the homogeneity of a red figure which distinguishes itself from a white background and thus makes it perceived as a distinct object. All these are experiential not real connections. The principles of the primordial associative syntheses account for the universal conditions of the basic level of perceptual experience, of the way one is pre-reflectively conscious of the contents of one's life. These principles, however, do not provide any ground for justification of necessary or real connections between things.

These particular structures of primordial content-binding, according to Husserl's work, include two basic types: (1) temporal associations of coexistence and succession; and (2) associations of homogeneity and heterogeneity (based on the principles of similarity and contrast respectively).

Temporal association of coexistence and succession. Nowhere do temporal and associative connections come so close to each other as in the living present. First of all, the unity of the living present as such is already an achievement of temporal synthesis. And since the form of time is "the presupposition of all other connections capable of establishing unity" (Husserl 1973a, 164), the basic forms of unification in the living present are universal syntheses of coexistence and succession, which establish the reciprocal relations among all immanent objects. Multiplicities of prominent objects or of immanent data are first connected temporally, as experienced simultaneously or continuously. These syntheses are temporal in essence, but at the same time they cannot be described as purely formal, because they associate immanent data as belonging together.

> We find in every such present essentially a hyletic core; a unified multiplicity of sensible data (visual data, sound data, etc.)—unified in the most loose manner—is essentially and constantly constituted in simultaneity and living succession (Husserl 2001a, 184).

Husserl points out that data configuration in coexistence and succession belong to the phenomenological exploration of association and that they actually shed light on a new aspect of association, which had not been established before.[67] In this case, one can speak about *temporal association*,

[67] "From phenomenology, which was very late in finding avenues to the exploration of association, this concept receives a completely new aspect, an essentially new delimitation, with new fundamental forms. Here belongs, for example, sensuous configuration in coexistence and succession" (Husserl 1960, 80).

which represents an interesting case of blending between formal and content-based connectivity.

Apart from these basic forms of temporal association, there are also purely content-binding *associative syntheses of homogeneity and heterogeneity* which establish connections of *similarity and contrast.*[68] These are two general principles of perceptual organization, which should be understood in relation to the phenomenon of gradation. It means that the connection of similarity has its degrees: from the strongest connection of uniformity to more differentiated—and less congruent—connections, when two elements are similar in some relation and contrasted in others. The connection based on uniformity in this sense is the higher degree on the scale of homogeneity, while the phenomenon of contrast is at the opposite end. Both these types of connections are fundamental for the most basic level of constitution and its unity: "The unity of the field of consciousness is always produced through sensible interconnections, in a sensible connection of similarity and sensible contrast. Without this there could be no world" (Husserl 2001a, 505).

Husserl describes the phenomenon of contrast as a primordial phenomenon responsible for the becoming prominent of objects as opposed to other objects or data. An example of such a prominence under contrast is figure-background differentiation in different sense modalities, such as red patches on a white surface or a loud noise against a homogeneous tonal background. Generally speaking, a relation of contrast makes differentiation possible so that one unity can be distinguished from another. The relation of homogeneity is responsible instead for binding immanent data. The application of this principle is multifaceted. It can apply to the unity of prominent objects or to the unity of a sense field, which as such is united by all its data being homogeneously visual or tactile. According to Husserl, every sense field as such is homogeneously unified and "stands in the relation of heterogeneity to every other field of sense" (Husserl 1973a, 73).

In order to make this systematization more meaningful, I suggest approaching the topic of primordial association by considering types of unities established by means of associative syntheses. Here, following Husserl's descriptions we can distinguish several questions concerning the unity of sense-fields for themselves, multisensory unity, the unity of prominent figures and groups of figures, and then the so-called forms of order.

[68] "The most general connections of prominent objects that are determined with respect to content are […] connection of homogeneity and connections of heterogeneity" (Husserl 2001a, 175).

Let us start with *the unity of sense-fields*. Here, the most important principle of unification is that of homogeneity, which ensures the unity of each sense-field based on a particular type of content. Husserl points out that temporal continuity cannot "be filled with just any content: we cannot mix color data together with sound data to form a unity of an immanent temporal datum" (Husserl 2001a, 188). The homogeneity of each sense-field in itself consists simply in the connection of everything visual through visual homogeneity, of everything tactile through tactile homogeneity, etc. (Husserl 2001a, 184).

Obviously, this is only an example of overall homogeneity concerning a sense-field, which does not account for the particularities of its inner organization. Within each homogeneous sense-field we can distinguish a number of separate dimensions or features, such as color, shape, brightness, orientation and so forth. All these dimensions are inherently united as homogeneous. This also implies that separated objects can be connected and/or contrasted on the basis of feature-similarity: for instance, everything green in the field of perception is connected together but contrasted to blue; similarly, all brightly illuminated surfaces are contrasted with dim ones. Furthermore, another type of unity-formation enabled by primordial associative syntheses concerns the *unities of prominent multiplicities,* or unities of groups of objects or any other kind of data. According to Husserl, multiplicities and groups of multiplicities can become prominent on the basis of their special homogeneity, e.g. a group of blue figures, a group of triangles, etc.[69] In general, gradations of homogeneity produce unity-formations based on similarity, which can vary depending on which bridging term is used to establish such a connection. Besides the similarity based integration, there is also a separate group of problems which concerns the integration of heterogeneous features in one object. Husserl did not discuss it as such in this text, but this topic is in principle consistent with his theory.[70]

Closely related to this issue is the problem of *heterogeneous multisensory integration*. This concerns the unity of the field of consciousness as a whole, or as the unity of various sense-fields. The main question can

[69] "It is thus only by associative blending (homogenous association) that a field of sense is a unity; likewise its order and articulation, as well as all formation of groups and likenesses, are produced in the field by the effect of association: the similar is evoked by the similar, and it contrasts with not similar" (Husserl 1973a, 75).

[70] Within the context of contemporary psychological research, this topic has interesting connotations with Anne Treisman's feature-integration theory of attention (Treisman 1998; Treisman and Gelade 1980).

be phrased as follows: How is it possible that we do not have isolated visual, auditory, and tactile experiences, but rather have one coherent experience in which different sense-modalities are perfectly integrated? In my view, Husserl anticipated at least three different directions to answer this question. Even if these directions extend beyond the scope of his account of primordial association, it is important to briefly mention them all. First of all, he clearly claimed that the overall unity of sense-fields in one consciousness is formal and due to the inner temporality and self-related character of consciousness:

> Within each field we have an inner connectedness of the field; such an inner connectedness of the field can only have the optical as the optical, etc. But beyond this we have a universal unity of form, which as such makes connections, but also only makes connections in the life of a single ego (Husserl 2001a, 510).

This is the most fundamental level of multisensory integration—the one related to formal conditions of time-consciousness. The second line of enquiry for the understanding of multisensory integration in Husserl's philosophy comes from his investigations on the corporeality of perception. In *Ideas II,* he depicts the lived body (*Leib*) as "the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject" (Husserl 1989, 152) in which different sensations are localized, and namely not as properties of a physical thing but as phenomenal fields. This implies that all sensory modalities are embodied and that their unity is not different from the unity of their bodily consciousness. Perception is a kinesthetic experience, and each modality of perception (vision, hearing, and so on) is a kinesthetic experience of its own, although not separated from the others but originally unified in one living body. Husserl features the lived body as "zero point" or as "center of orientation" and movement (Husserl 1989, 165-166). Bodily consciousness always unfolds as a synthetic unity of continuous movements in which spatial modes of appearances and multiple perspectives on identical objects are made possible. According to this perspective, different sense modalities are regarded as kinesthetic systems, whose integration is dependent on the pre-reflective unity of one's bodily existence.

The third direction concerns the presently discussed topic of association and affectivity. In the *Analyses*, Husserl suggests that heterogeneous elements united temporally can function as "affective nexuses,"[71] that is to

[71] "[…] we also have affective nexuses of heterogeneous elements through the homogeneous shape of time" (Husserl 2001a, 518).

say they can represent a particular sort of heterogeneous unity established through content-based connections. Furthermore he points to "the possibility of the unification of data from different sensuous fields given in a single presence (heterogeneous association)" (Husserl 1973a, 177). This content-based affective unity underlies the possibility of cross-modal association, so that pattern-similarity can be established between, for instance, visual and auditory sensations and the "usual association of sense-regions can also spread from sense-region to sense-region" (Husserl 2001a, 518).[72]

Thus, temporality, embodiment, and affectivity are three basic structures that account for the multisensory unity of perceptual experience. While time-consciousness is responsible for formal synchronic and diachronic integration, and corporeality is responsible for kinesthetic integration, then affectivity must account for the content-based integration of perceptual experience.

To conclude with the primordial association, we need to mention the topic of the so-called *forms of order*, which describe basic organizational types for groups of prominent figures. What distinguishes these forms of order from unity-formations is their particular type of connectivity, which relies on the same associative principles, but also functions as some sort of prefigured concatenation. Here, the phenomenology of association comes very close to Gestalt principles of perceptual organization. But unlike Gestalt psychologists, Husserl integrates different types of Gestalt-formations based on his basic principles of succession, coexistence, homogeneity, and contrast.

First, the principle of succession introduces a temporal order in the form of a sequence (linear, uniform concatenation), such as for example a sequence of lights' signals or sounds, melodies and the like. Subsequently, the principle of coexistence is generally responsible for any order of grouping on the basis of contiguity. As Husserl maintains, this form of order on the basis of coexistence is not available for the auditory field.

A unity based on homogeneity as such is not an order yet, but orders or groupings of similarity, uniformity, and gradation can be established on it.

> These types of connections through homogeneity can be connected differently by bridging terms, thus forming different groups of homogeneity that have the single terms in common. For example, a red triangle is in a unity with other differently colored triangles. […] The same red triangle, however, can form a uniform group with other fig-

[72] This is but a preliminary indication. The role of affectivity for the constitution of experiential unity will soon come to the fore of this inquiry.

> ures that are not uniform but that are all red—uniformity with respect to red (Husserl 2001a, 178).

For example, coexistence, contrast, and homogeneity all contribute to the formation of an order of coexistence of homogeneous random specks of color or sharply delimited figures. Interestingly, while discussing this issue, Husserl seems to freely interchange the use of such terms as "forms of order" and "primordial phenomenon." Under the last title he mentions, for example, the unity of a prominent object, the multiplicities of prominent objects, then phenomena of contrast, uniformity, gradation, and similarity. It is also worth mentioning such primordial orderly formations as part-whole relations. Husserl ascribes this kind of order to the framework of homogeneity, which therefore prefigure "the relationships of the object and of the inner, dependent feature, and of the object as a whole and as a part" (Husserl 2001a, 179).[73]

7.5. Reproductive association: Associative awakening of the past

The topic of reproductive association deals with one of the most puzzling phenomena in human mental life—our capacity to be conscious of ourselves as having a life which extends beyond just the present moment, to bring past events to current awareness—in other words, to have a memory which connects who we are with who we were and possibly will be. Already Aristotle linked memory with time-perception,[74] and the phenomenological description of reproductive consciousness firmly established this connection between temporality and remembrance. The real puzzle, however, concerns not only the temporal interconnectivity of experience, but also the concrete, content-based connections between present and elapsed moments, which defy time itself.

Everybody certainly knows what it is like to come back after a long absence to the place where you once lived: you still can find your way home without having to remember the number of the house; you can

[73] Holenstein, analyzing this concept in Husserl's writings, distinguishes the following main types of *Ordnungsformen*: coexistence and succession, sense-fields, and whole-part relations (Holenstein 1972). My view is close to his, diverging only in relation to sense-fields.

[74] "[…] the object of memory is the past. All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed; consequently only those animals which perceive time remember, and the organ thereby they perceive time is also that thereby they remember" (Aristotle and McKeon 1941, 607–608).

recognize the feeling of climbing that particular staircase, and then, of course, the smell which at first dominates all other sensations but after a while you just stop noticing. All such details and bodily sensations bring back the whole world of experiences connected with them: former thoughts and feelings, hopes and preferences, a former self, which might feel both recognizable and estranged.

"The world of perception and the world of memory are separate worlds" (Husserl 1973a, 160). However, in our experience, they manage to establish unity and communicate through innumerable associative connections. This connectivity between past and present is puzzling in many ways. The idea of the past as such is contradictory as far as it is taken as existent and capable of affecting the actual consciousness: it is nowhere to be found and yet there is hardly any present experience without recognition or influence of former experiences. Such an interweaving of presence with something which is no longer there, the possibility that a new experience will evoke things long forgotten, this very particularity of our mental life requires a phenomenological explication.

Moreover, one cannot help but noticing a very specific feature of these connections, a certain inner logic, which unite past and present on the basis of their similarity. However time separates the world of memory and the world of actual perception, there always remains something outside the time itself which ties them together. Marcel Proust undoubtedly came closer than anybody else to the essence of this mysterious capacity of our memory to bring these two worlds together and establish ineffable but meaningful identity between otherwise distinct and unrelated moments. For instance, in *Finding Time Again*, the protagonist discovers the extra-temporal character of his most valuable impressions in the famous library passage:

> And I began to divine this cause as I compared these varied impressions of well-being with each other, all of which, the sound of the spoon on the plate, the uneven flagstones, the taste of the madeleine, had something in common, which I was experiencing in the present moment and at the same time in a moment far away, so that the past was made to encroach upon the present and make me uncertain about which of the two I was in; the truth was that the being within me who was enjoying this impression was enjoying it because of something shared between a day in the past and the present moment, something extra-temporal, and this being appeared only when, through one of these moments of identity between the present and the past, it was able to find itself in the only milieu in which it could live and enjoy the essence of things, that is to say outside of time (Proust 2002, 179).

Fully in line with these remarks, Husserl provides some analyses of reproductive association. Their scope, however, extends far beyond involuntary memory and embraces the conditions of possibility of any memory as far as it brings together past and present moments of the same consciousness. The phenomenology of association, therefore, intends to clarify how it happens that subjective experience is interconnected throughout and how such concrete, content-based connections make the reappearance of the past in the stream of the living present possible. In Husserl's own words, the question is as follows: "How each present can ultimately enter into a relation with all pasts, how—extending beyond the living retention—it can enter into a relation with the entire realm of things forgotten" (Husserl 2001a, 169).[75] In its broader context, the phenomenology of reproductive association is here required to provide a full account of the possibility for subjectivity to be conscious of its entire life with its past and future-horizons; that is to say to have a life which is accessible through memory.

We have seen already that association in the phenomenological understanding accounts for the basic, universal principles of content-binding, among which similarity and contrast are the two most important ones. Reproductive association, in this regard, is a particular case of associative synthesis whose function consists in linking what is presently perceived to the not-present, including remote memories and even imaginary objects (Husserl 1973a, 177). The similarity principle has indeed the most important role, as the similar evokes the similar. As a result, something present reminds me of something from the past in virtue of a particular homogeneity between the two.

Similarity alone, however, indicates only the principle according to which experiences and their objects are connected in consciousness. According to this principle, all experiences of the same ego can be associatively connected with each other as long as they "objectively constitute in themselves anything similar and anything comparable" (Husserl 1973a, 180). Indeed, everything can be connected in principle, but not everything is connected *de facto*. This suggests that from this general principle of reproductive association we should distinguish the genetic

[75] "It is, to be sure, a fundamental problem of phenomenology to explain fully how every experience (e.g. every recollection) comes to have this connection with every other (e.g. a recollection has a connection with the corresponding actual perception) of the same ego or in the stream of consciousness of the same ego, a connection which produces the association of everything that is experienced in one time" (Husserl 1973a, 166-167).

phenomenon of actual awakening (*Weckung*). Such an associative awakening occurs passively and, according to Husserl, is a precondition of any remembering, be it explicit or implicit, deliberate or involuntary. Even "*active remembering* is possible only *on the basis of the associative awakening which has already taken place*; the awakening itself is an event which always occurs passively" (Husserl 1973a, 179).

Husserl suggests seeing such a phenomenon of awakening, which brings together temporally separated experiences, as a two-terms genesis with one term functioning as awakening and another as awakened. Something in the present (a smell, a particular light effect, an object, a voice, a combination of details) evokes something from the past. As Husserl says, there is a tendency which extends from the present to the past and brings it to awareness by means of associative synthesis. Such syntheses run their course mostly unnoticed and they secure the recognizable reality we all enjoy.[76] In a particular case of recollection, associative awakening ensures the connection between otherwise separated terms which then can be fulfilled by an intuitive act of reproduction.

The idea of a genetic understanding of memory through the phenomenon of associative awakening sets the theoretical framework for further, more elaborate analyses. Such analyses are required to clarify the general conditions for an actual awakening to occur. This happens mainly in the context of the discussions on affectivity, to which we are about to turn. For now it is important to underline Husserl's view that the tendency towards the awakening of the past and the motivation for such awakening always come from the living present:

> Every awakening goes from an impressional present or a present that is already non-intuitively or intuitively reproduced toward another reproduced present. This relationship, or as we can say forthwith, this synthesis presupposes a "bridging term," something similar; from here the bridge arches across a special synthesis by means of similarity. Transmitted in this way, a present enters into a universal synthesis with another submerged consciousness of the present, a synthesis which serves as the framework for special syntheses of awakening and for special reproductions (Husserl 2001a, 168).

In principle, "the awakening does not often lead to an intuitive memory, but instead to an empty presentation" (Ibid, 167). This suggests that not all

[76] "Just as we fail to notice so many different things that are in our field of consciousness, so too, we fail to notice the connections of association [...] while the entire associative nexus runs its course in consciousness, it is not noticed in any special manner" (Husserl 2001a, 167).

associative connections reach the level of actual reproductive intuitions and that the associative awakening should not, therefore, be confused with reproductive recollection. Husserl's indication that active remembering is possible only on the basis of associative awakening features reproductive association as the pre-condition of explicit memory. I hold, therefore, that the impact of reproductive association should not be restricted only to a particular type of involuntary associative memory, as, for instance, when a detail from the present evokes a similar memory from the past without any effort on my part. My view is that Husserl's intention was much more ambitious than that. Associative syntheses are involved in all kinds of remembering: be it recognition of familiar objects or situations, involuntary recall or active conscious effort to remember something. Thus, I believe that for Husserl, associative awakening and associative connectivity of consciousness were as fundamental phenomena and conditions of memory as temporal continuity itself.[77]

As temporal connectivity makes continuity, overall coherence, and unity of conscious experience possible, similarly associative connectivity is what makes it meaningfully interrelated. Temporality does not account for what is experienced; in principle, anything can be ordered in a coherent experiential sequence. But it is associative connectivity which ensures that the similar is connected to the similar and contrasted with its opposite. It is associative connectivity which makes any experience connected to various kindred experiences from the past or even from imagination. When the reproductive type of associative syntheses is actually at work, its function consists in reviving concrete links between different experiences, and correlatively—between their objects:

> [...] it is thus the function of association first of all to vivify the connection which all perceptions, past and present, of one ego have with one another on the basis of their being constituted in one time-consciousness and to establish among them an actual unity relative to consciousness. Only on the basis of an associative awakening can separated memories be related to one another and be inserted, as we move back from one member to the next, into *one* intuitive nexus of memory. This means that, once memories are associatively awakened, they can then be ordered in the temporal connection [...] Associative awakening thus constitutes the *presupposition for the constitution of temporal relations*, of the "earlier" and "later" (Husserl 1973a, 177-178).

[77] I will return on the topic of reproductive awakening and its distinction from explicit remembering in my discussion on implicit memory in § 12.3 of the third chapter.

As no meaning would make sense outside the context and relation to other meanings, in the same vein, no experience would be possible outside the experience as a whole in all its concreteness. One might notice how Husserl speaks of a *nexus* of associative connectivity, of memory, and consequently of a nexus of the whole conscious life. Such a view is in line with his general attitude regarding the topic of association and passive constitution, which underlines exactly this multiplicity and interconnectivity of subjective experience. "It is precisely the analysis of associative phenomena that draws our attention to the fact that consciousness must not necessarily be a consciousness of a single object for itself" (Husserl 2001a, 165). This applies not only to the objective realm, but also to subjectivity, which accordingly can be understood *not as a singular subject for itself, but as a concrete nexus of interrelated experiences.*

Indeed, the investigation of association greatly emphasizes subjectivity's dynamic and interconnected features. Hence, a new perspective on consciousness can be elaborated based on its description in terms of associative syntheses. The fulfillment of this intention implies the introduction of a new dimension of consciousness described in terms of affectivity. For the topic of association it implies, among other things, that what has just been described in terms of "associative awakening" will be clarified by Husserl as "affective awakening." Although these two terms might be often used as synonyms in Husserl's analyses, the notions of association and affectivity have to be distinguished. In what follows, I will focus on these distinctions and discuss why the phenomenological elucidation of association requires the consideration of the phenomenon of affection. It is my opinion that the investigation of affectivity in Husserl's genetic phenomenology (1) is indispensable for the understanding of associative syntheses and of the "inner logic" specific for prereflective connectivity and (2) introduces a new view on consciousness, subjectivity, and related phenomena.[78]

[78] On the topic of affection and affectivity in Husserl see: Bégout, Bruce: La généalogie de la logique (Bégout 2000); Zahavi, Dan: Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation (Zahavi 1999) and his paper "Self-Awareness and Affection" (Zahavi 1998); Montavont, Anne: De la passivité dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (Montavont 1999) and her paper "Le phénomène de l'affection dans les Analyzen zur passiven synthesis" (Montavont 1994); Depraz, Natalie: "Temporalité et affection dans les manuscrits tardifs sur la temporalité (1929-1935) de Husserl" (Depraz 1994); Steinbock, Anthony: Affection and attention: On the phenomenology of becoming aware (Steinbock 2004); Mishara, Aaron: "Husserl and Freud: Time, memory and the unconscious" (Mishara 1990).

8. Affectivity and "timeless structuration" of subjective experience

> An actual connection, an actual formation of unity always and necessarily presupposes affective force or affective differentiation (Husserl 2001a, 221).

After having assessed the role of associative syntheses and their basic types, Husserl turns to the phenomenon of affection. This topic is expected to enrich the phenomenological analyses of association and even to bring them to a new level. The description of associative syntheses based on the idea of affectivity and affective constitution of subjective experience is at the heart of the phenomenological account of the pre-cognitive level of mind's connectivity.

In order to account for how exactly affectivity contributes to an understanding of associative connectivity and of the pre-reflective organization of subjective experience, I will deal with the following topics: (1) the phenomenon of affection as presented in the *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis*; (2) Husserl's theory of association as affective awakening; (3) the affective awakening of the self and the possible meaning of affectivity for the constitution of the self; (4) the clarification of temporal relations in affective terms; and (5) the idea of affective consciousness and its application to the unity of subjective experience.

8.1. Definitions and conditions of affection

Throughout his writings on passive syntheses and genetic constitution, Husserl gives several viable definitions of affection. This does not suggest that there are several distinct phenomena referred to by the same name, but rather that there are different possible ways of approaching the issue. The first definition in the *Analyses* is given as follows: "By affection we understand the allure given to consciousness [*bewußtseinsmäßiger Reiz*], the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego" (Husserl 2001a, 196). Later on, with a slight change of perspective, it is said that: "Where the object is concerned, we can also characterize affection as the awakening of an intention directed toward it [i.e. the object]" (Husserl 2001a, 198). Based on these two sets of remarks by Husserl, we can already draw a first conclusion, namely, that the term *affection*

defines an original correlation which is established between the affected self or consciousness and the affecting object.

Bruce Bégout argues that for Husserl affection refers to something implicit as becoming explicit and then that affection means merely "the simple fact of sensing an effect provoked by something, without knowing whether this effect as such is of the affective or cognitive order" (Bégout 2000, 167-168).[79] In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the different meanings of the term "affective" and to point out that, here, affection refers mainly to the subject's receptivity rather than to the affectivity resulting from the emotional sphere specifically. Affects in this latter sense—referred to by Husserl using terms such as feelings (*sinnliche Gefühle*) and instincts (*Instinkte, Triebe*)—do indeed belong to the sphere of affectivity and sensibility, but they make up only a part of it. Therefore, with regard to affectivity in Husserl, we should rconsider affection as a general term which may refer to different subgroups but is merely intended to designate a passive, original correlation between the affecting and the affected, without any implication on what particular qualities it may have.

Since the phenomenon under investigation belongs to the level of pre-predicative experience, such a correlation cannot presuppose either subjectivity in the strong or reflective sense of the term, or objectivity in the intentional sense. As Husserl puts it in *Experience and Judgment*:

> It is once again necessary to remind ourselves that, when one speaks here of an object [*einem Objekt, einem Gegenstand*], the term is not being used properly. For, as we have already pointed out several times, one cannot yet speak at all of object in the true sense in the sphere of original passivity (Husserl 1973a, 77).

The same should apply to the "affected ego," although this question is more difficult to elucidate based on Husserl's writings. So far, it is only clear that Husserl is talking about the self or the ego in its receptivity, its pre-cognitive state of awareness (Husserl 1973a, 79). We shall return to this question later in the discussion concerning the affective awakening of the self.

While, in *Experience and Judgment* and in the *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis*, Husserl still speaks about affection in terms of a certain objectivity that affects the self or the I, in the late manuscripts of

[79] My translation of : "le simple fait de ressentir un effet provoqué par quelque chose, sans savoir si cet effet est à ce titre d'ordre affectif ou cognitif."

the 1930s (group *D*) he prefers to use the expression "foreign to the I" *(Ichfremdes)* instead of the term "object":

> To the universal structure of my being belongs, as inquiry indicates, I and foreign-to-the-I. What the term "*hyle*" grasps in its streaming totality is for me; I am in a broadest sense related to it, in the broadest sense it affects the I (Husserl 2014).[80]

It is not the object that affects the I but rather the "matter," as it can be described at this level, that is not the self, but rather that which is essentially foreign to the self. Thus, stressing on this point once again, Husserl doesn't speak about the correlation between subject and object, but rather about some sort of *original correlation which is established in affection as a relation between the self and that which is foreign to the self*. However, as Zahavi argues, this passive, affective correlation is comparable to the active, intentional correlation inasmuch as it expresses the same phenomenological principle, namely, that the subject of the experience, the self in its concreteness, "cannot be thought independently of its relation to that which is foreign to it" (Zahavi 1998). In the intentional correlation, each act of consciousness, each *cogito*, is necessarily conscious of something other than itself. In the pre-cognitive, affective correlation it is the relation between the self and the hyletic matter, the *Ichfremdes*, which affects it. The affective correlation belongs to the level of pre-givenness, which precedes an actual attentive grasping of objects in intentional consciousness:

> What is constituted for consciousness exists for the ego only insofar as it affects me, the ego. Any kind of constituted sense is pregiven insofar as it exercises an affective allure, it is given insofar as the ego complies with the allure and has turned toward it attentively, laying hold it. These are fundamental forms of the way in which something becomes an object (Husserl 2001a, 210).

The phenomenon of affection obviously cannot be reduced to this mere basic definition, as it opens up for Husserl a whole new topic for transcendental explication. His next step is to discuss the *essential conditions of affection* and consequently to define the *affective relations* which operate on the passive level of conscious experience.

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[80] My translation of: "Zur universalen Struktur meines Seins gehört, wie die Rückfrage ergibt, Ich und Ichfremdes. Was der Titel 'Hyle' befasst in seiner strömenden Totalität, ist für mich; ich bin darauf in einem weitesten Sinn bezogen, in einem weitesten Sinne affiziert es das Ich."

First of all, it is worth remarking that the phenomenon of affection is primarily clarified in terms of affective *intensity.* What affects the self has to be prominent above everything else;[81] it has to have a stronger *affective force* or *vivacity* in order to be able to stand out and reach conscious awareness. Affectivity itself in this particular regard can be seen as "that varying vivacity of a lived-experience" (Husserl 2001a, 214) that determines whether a datum will be salient for consciousness. As Husserl makes clear, this intensity is not to be confused with objective, qualitative intensity, such as that of sounds. The intensity in question has to do with the experiential rather than with an objectively measurable vivacity of particular data. It is the vivacity of consciousness of a sound as opposed to the vivacity of the sound itself.

Another significant point concerns the distinction between the actual affection and the *tendency* towards affection. Affective tendencies belong to the sphere of potentiality: they might reach or might not reach the ego's attention. Moreover, different affective tendencies compete with one another and are dependent on one another in terms of their relative intensity. Husserl refers to this property of the affective organization as to the "relativism of affective tendencies" (Husserl 2001a, 197).[82] It should be remarked that the conditions which determine whether a certain datum will become affectively prominent are not empirical according to Husserl. Certainly, the concrete conditions of affectivity are occasional, but the essential rules of affective organization are open to phenomenological explication. And such an explication takes into account the interrelations between different affective tendencies as well as other relevant conditions that may be influencing the affective intensity of a datum or an experience. Among such conditions, Husserl mentions affectively-charged predispositions from the realm of feelings, drives, and instincts:

> On the one hand, the emergent affection is functionally co-dependent upon the relative size of the contrast, on the other hand, also upon privileged sensible feelings like a passionate desire founded by a prominence in its unity (Husserl 2001a, 198).

[81] "Affection presupposes prominence above all else" (Husserl 2001a, 196).

[82] "What gives a single prominent datum the priority of affection? Yet in its interconnection, the single datum is dependent upon the others for its affective force, as these are dependent upon it. We stand in a relativism of affective tendencies, and the question is what kind of laws and ultimately essential laws prevail here?" (Husserl 2001a, 197).

This brings us to a further important point in the phenomenological clarification of affection, namely to the notion of *affective relief*. As we have seen, the definition of affection as an original correlational structure is only the first step in the phenomenological explication of affectivity. Such a definition alone is not sufficient as it does not take into account the fact that affection is never an independent occurrence, but it rather always presupposes a background of concurrent affective tendencies and other affective conditions.[83] Moreover, the degree of vivacity of any affection is essentially dependent on such conditions and has always only a relative prominence. This fact has quite a broad range of consequences: on the larger scale, it facilitates the understanding of the whole of conscious experience through gradations of affectivity and, on the smaller scale, of the living present as an affective unity with "a constantly varying affective relief" (Husserl 2001a, 212). Discussing the "affective peculiarity of the living present," Husserl points out that:

> Viewed as a whole, the latter is an affective unity, has accordingly a unitary vivacity into which all special affections that belong to the affective unity are integrated as moments, as moments that are unified synthetically within it (Husserl 2001a, 216).

To conclude with the general definition of affectivity, I suggest to underline one important distinction concerning the notion of affection and affectivity. At the beginning of § 35, Husserl suggests that we should distinguish between two meanings of affection:

> We must make an initial distinction here under the rubric of affection between: (1) affection as that varying vivacity of a lived-experience, of a datum of consciousness; whether the datum is salient in the special sense and then perhaps actually noticed and grasped depends upon the datum's relative intensity; and (2) this salience itself. Here affection has the special sense of a specific affection on the ego, and in doing so meets the ego, excites it, calls it to action, awakens and possibly actually rouses it (Husserl 2001a, 214).

The second meaning coincides with Husserl's initial definition of affection as relation between the self and the foreign-to-the-self. The first meaning brings new refinement to the notion, suggesting that affection

[83] In his account of affectivity in Husserl, Zahavi underlines a similar point: "the affection is always exerted by something which is part of a configuration, it is always an affection from within a passively organized and structured field" (Zahavi 1999, 119).

does not describe only the affective relation as such, but also refers to the vivacity of any experience. On a higher level, this definition of affection presupposes that the whole experience can be regarded as a dynamic unity of vivacity. This is precisely the meaning of affection that I prefer to call "affectivity." This terminological choice can also be helpful in order to avoid confusions. By affectivity, therefore, I understand the varying vivacity of subjective experience in what concerns not only its impressional organization but equally its connectedness with the past and its openness towards the future.

Clearly, the introduction of affectivity enables a new approach to the description of the constitutive relations of subjective experience in its passivity. One might ask: why is this considered to be constructive? What exactly are the benefits of these "affective" descriptions? To begin with, as it was promised at the end of § 7, the topic of affection is supposed to clarify and enrich the phenomenological account of association.

8.2. Association as affective awakening

Our field of conscious experience is not uniformly organized: there are objects and groups of objects which stand out against the background; there are sounds which attract more attention than others; there are thoughts and feelings that are more salient, while others are less prominent and yet constantly present; there are memories which suddenly occur and others already incorporated within our way of being. Nevertheless, the fact that our experience is multifaceted and variable does not mean it is chaotic or disorganized. Even a brief examination of the multiplicity of experiences reveals their inherent organization and structure. We have already discussed some of the principles of this experiential organization in the sections dedicated to associative connectivity. As previously argued, certain phenomena are to be found everywhere: e.g. foreground and background differentiations, contrasts among opposite features and the homogeneity of the similar, sustained Gestalt formations (forms of order in Husserl's terminology), and occasional unities formed by particular affinities.

However, such a description of basic principles of experiential organization remains incomplete as long as the affective dimension of subjective experience is not taken into account. The main reason for this is that association principles and the unity-formations alone are not sufficient to

explain the conditions of prominence of particular experiences. This was already clear in the previous discussion on associative awakening of the past. Everything in the present can in principle be connected with everything in the past as long as there are similarities to be found. Nevertheless, an actual awakening—be it impressional awakening in the living present or retroactive awakening—still requires a certain degree of vivacity for it to happen at all. In Husserl's own words: "An actual connection, an actual formation of unity always and necessarily presupposes affective force or affective differentiation" (Husserl 2001a, 221).

Husserl insists that "only by virtue of affective force does connection come about at all" (Husserl 2001a, 224), suggesting thereby that affectivity plays a crucial role in experiential organization. On another occasion, he describes affection as "an essential condition for the emergence of every constitutive synthesis" (Husserl 2001a, 213). In this regard, as far as the unity of experience is concerned, affectivity becomes indispensable in order to understand the synthetic function of consciousness:

> These are all processes of phenomenal formations of unity that seen from within are processes of affective connection, and affective connection is at the same time the awakening peculiar to affective force [...] the most essential feature of this process (i.e. of association) consists in affective interconnections (Husserl 2001a, 420–421).

This is why further explanation of affection in its relation to association and *vice versa* is required. In § 33 of the *Analyses*, Husserl marginally defines association as "the awakening transference of affection" (Husserl 2001a, 201). Affection and association are not identified as being the same thing but are rather mutually clarified: while affection concerns intensity and the prominence of data in conscious awareness, association refers to the principles according to which data interrelate and form unities. Moreover, such interrelations also function affectively, as they can either increase or reduce the relative vivacity of affective tendencies. That is to say that *unities formed associatively function affectively*.

Hence, the role of associative connection in this context is to increase the vivacity of associated data and prevent their affective decrease: "An affection which is currently weak will become strong by means of a radiating affection which awakens" (Husserl 2001a, 211). Such transference of affective force is not random according to Husserl, but follows the rules of associative syntheses discussed in the previous chapters. Both types of associative connections—namely, of homogeneity and contrast, as well as of coexistence and succession—determine

how exactly affectivity might be "distributed" in the field of consciousness. The examples provided by Husserl include the perception of melodies or of a string of lights. In the latter case, the group of lights functions as an affective whole in itself and produces a strong affective allure as a whole. If one of the lights changed its color or intensity, not only would it become more prominent and accentuated, but it would also alter the affective prominence of the whole string. A similar affective relation is active in the perception of a melody. Even a slight change of tone immediately influences the perception of the melody as a whole. For instance, in the "transition to *pianissimo*, the beginning loud tone carries the tone in affective force to the softest *piano* that would otherwise remain unnoticeable" (Husserl 2001a, 200). The phenomenon of contrast is crucial here. As Husserl points out, "contrast is the affective unification of opposites" (Husserl 2001a, 514). Contrasting elements, however, can not only form unities of opposites but also be in rivalry with each other. This suggests that transference of affection can account not solely for the increasing vivacity and prominence of associated tendencies but also for the suppression and affective weakening of the tendencies which are in conflict with other more favorable ones.[84]

To summarize the foregoing: transference of affective force from one member to another is what association is essentially about. Or, in slightly different words, association can be understood as the awakening of an affection through another affection: "within every living present [...] affections are constantly at work beyond themselves (*beständig Affektionen über sich hinauswirken*); we always find affective awakenings, that is, associations" (Husserl 2001a, 205–206).

In general terms, the concept of affective awakening (*affective Weckung*) refers to "the augmentation of vivacity" (Husserl 2001a, 515) and to the associated affective prominence of a tendency. Since this can occur both as the awakening of a new affection and as an awakening from the past, Husserl introduces a distinction between awakening in the impressional sphere and retroactive awakening.[85] Interestingly, affective awakening can also refer to a somewhat different topic, namely, to the awakening of the self. It might be worth pointing out already

[84] See, Husserl on affective conflict in § 8.4; and especially § 10.3 of the present work.

[85] Thus, "affective awakening" can be used interchangeably with the term "associative awakening" in those cases in which the augmentation of vivacity is enabled by associative connection, as it is the case in retroactive awakening and in the impressional awakening of associatively formed unities.

that what is meant here under the expression "affective awakening of the self" arguably belongs to a rather speculative account, which nevertheless presents an interesting direction in understanding the role of affectivity for the constitution of the primary self-awareness.

8.3. Affective awakening of the self

I have already recalled that affection can be understood as an original pre-cognitive correlation between the self and the foreign-to-the-self. This relation is reciprocal, meaning that through affection both of its parts come to prominence, or are awakened. Accordingly, one might suppose that the affected self does not precede the event of "awakening," but is awakened by it as we wake up from sleep. To clarify this idea we need to address Husserl's later manuscripts of the group D—now published in Husserliana XLII *Grenzprobleme phänomenologischer Philosophie* (Husserl 2014). There, a distinction is introduced between the awakening in the sphere of the wakeful life ("*der Weckung in der Sphäre des Wachlebens*") and the awakening from sleep ("*Erweckung vom Schlaf*"). The former apply to both the retroactive and impressional awakening, as they both take place in the living present of consciousness. The latter, instead, besides the reference to the mere awakening of certain affection, also apply to the awakening of conscious life as such, that is to say the awakening of the totality of present awareness. While retroactive awakening corresponds to what Husserl calls "*Ent-Sedimentierung*,"[86] the awakening from sleep means that the field of present awareness of not-sedimented is brought to life:

> Das Wachwerden würde für den soeben noch Schlafenden bedeuten, dass die von der einen weckenden Abhebung (als Prozess) erfolgende Weckung sofort universale Weckung ist für die Totalität des Nichtsedimentierten (Husserl 2014, 37).

In the *Analyses*, as in the *Bernau Manuscripts*, Husserl makes a distinction between affection as a specific and pre-thematic relation of the self and a hyletic object on the one hand, and the pre-affective and pre-egoic level of constitution on the other hand. The pre-affective sphere pro-

[86] "Das 'Wachwerden' in der Wachheit für das Sedimentierte gründet in der weckenden Assoziation, einem Überströmen der Kraft auf ein Assoziiertes der sedimentierten Sphäre" (Husserl 2014, 38).

vides the preconditions for affection which must be found in pre-conscious passivity, where there is yet no self involved.[87]

The interpreters[88] who discussed the issue of passive constitution in Husserl's works have repeatedly emphasized the problematic character of this pre-affective and pre-egoic level of subjectivity.[89] Whereas affection is defined as the original relationship between the affecting object and the affected self, the pre-affective sphere, from which affection emerges, remains itself beyond any correlation. Husserl describes it as selfless (*ichlose*), as not given to any consciousness and at the same time as "the core of the foreign-to-the-I" (*Ichfremde Kern*) (Depraz 1994, 72). As far as the phenomenological description is concerned, here the very limit of the describable is reached. Since the pre-affective level is beyond the I and the thematic consciousness, it is also arguably out of reach for any possible phenomenologically oriented investigation. But this is the case only from the standpoint of the subject. Provided that, following Husserl, an "abstractive reduction" is accomplished in order to access the underlying and constitutive layers of ego-consciousness, an effort is

[87] See, for example, an important passage from the *Bernau Manuscripts*: "Die Reduktion, die wir meinen und die uns eine apriorisch notwendige Struktur ergibt, ist die Abstraktion von einem Ich und allem Ichlichen— freilich eine bloße Abstraktion, aber eine wichtige. Dann haben wir in der ersten immanenten Zeitordnung Empfindungsdaten und sinnliche Gefühle. Sinnliche Triebe sind Affektionen auf das Ich hin, und passives Gezogensein des Ich, ebenso 'sinnliche' Realisationen, 'Triebhandlungen' sind passive Reaktionen, aber passiv, nichts kommt da aus dem Ich her, ihm selbst entquellend als actus. Das ist also die Sphäre der 'Reize' und Reaktionen auf die Reize: Irritabilität. Aber diese wollen wir nun auch noch ausschalten, denn es bringt das Ich mit ins Spiel. Nämlich von diesem Gebiet unterscheiden wir die 'völlig ichlosen' sinnlichen Tendenzen: sinnliche Tendenzen der Assoziation und Reproduktion, dadurch bestimmte Horizontbildungen. Die Frage ist, wie es sich schon beim ursprünglichen Zeitbewusstsein verhält. Passive Intentionalität. Hier ist das Ich auch als Pol der Affektionen und Reaktionen außer Spiel gedacht, oder vielmehr davon abstrahiert. Wir haben dann also eine erst 'abstrakt' heraushebende Struktur, die der Passivität der ursprünglichen Sensualität" (Husserl 2001b, 275–276).

[88] See for example: Bégout, Bruce: La généalogie de la logique (Bégout 2000); Montavont, Anne: De la passivité dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (Montavont 1999); Depraz, Natalie: Temporalité et affection dans les manuscrits tardifs sur la temporalité (1929-1935) de Husserl (Depraz 1994).

[89] The reader should not be led astray by the term pre-affective. In this case it is the genetic precedence over affection which is meant and not the absence of affectivity. The pre-affective or pre-egoic sphere is precisely the sphere of affectivity which is structured by its principles of unity and contrast; it is the sphere of totally egoless (*völlig ichlosen*) affective tendencies: the sensory tendencies of association and reproduction (Husserl 2001b, 276).

required to see the intentional consciousness itself and the correlation between the self and the object not as the starting point or the absolute beginning, but rather as the result of some prior constitution.

From the pre-egoic point of view (which is of course in itself a contradictory expression) there is neither self nor object before an affection is born from inside the original impression. We can only suggest that this moment of generation of affection is at the same time the one instituting the awakened consciousness and the passive intention. Thus, what is actually at stake is the constitution of the affective and intentional consciousness inasmuch as it is affected by its immanent object. Husserl describes such an institution with the expression "affective awakening" (*affektive Weckung*), which in this context he proposes to understand not only as the awakening of an intention directed at the object (Husserl 2001b, 198) but also as the awakening of the affected self. Before this affective awakening, the self was not exactly nothing, and yet: "Nur war ich eben nicht wach, für nichts, also auch nicht für mich 'wach'. Mein Selbstbewusstsein war latent, abgewandelt, sozusagen verdunkelt, aber doch nicht nichts" (Husserl 2014, 53). In the §5 of the *Ideas II,* Husserl expresses this thought quite clearly:

> But what about a supposed beginning? In the beginning of experience, no constituted "self" is pre-given yet and present as an object. It is completely latent for itself and for others, at least in terms of intuition [...] Furthermore, must we not say that, in contrast to the waking Ego, the sleeping is complete immersion in Ego-matter, in the *hyle*, is undifferentiated Ego-being, is Ego-sunkenness, whereas the awake Ego opposes itself to the matter and then is affected, acts, undergoes, etc.? The Ego posits the non-Ego and comports itself towards it; the Ego unceasingly constitutes its "over and against," and in this process it is motivated and always motivated anew (Husserl 1989).

We find a similar idea in Anne Montavont's book, *De la passivité dans la phénoménologie de Husserl,* where she draws on this citation from Husserl's *Ideas II* and suggests that:

> The self is always already there, at first, engulfed in the matter from which it doesn't differentiate itself, i.e. as the dormant self; then, opposed to the matter, which it posits as the non-self, i.e. it is there as the self awakened by affection. *It is in fact in "facing" the hylé posited as the non-I that the self constitutes its ipseity* (my emphasis – *A. K.*) (Montavont 1999, 239).[90]

[90] My translation of : "Le moi est toujours déjà là, d'abord englouti dans la matière dont il ne se différencie pas, c'est-à-dire moi endormi ; ensuite, opposé à la

Here, as we can see, some emphasis is given to the certain pre-existence of the self in the dormant state, while in Husserl it is not entirely clear how this dormant self can be understood. In my view, there are at least two possible ways to interpret this point: one way leads to some kind of metaphysical statement according to which the very fact of the existence of the ego is non-explicable and only its phenomenal status and appearance can be investigated; the other way is to understand the "affective awakening" of the self literally as its initial appearance and therefore as the original institution of the self in affection, to which there is no pre-existence in the pre-affective sphere, or at least there is no pre-existence in the sense of the ego or the self.[91]

This latter interpretation can contribute to the understanding of the role of affectivity for the constitution of the pre-reflective selfhood. From this angle, we could point out that Husserl actually suggests taking the constitution of original consciousness as a correlation between the affected self and the foreign-to-the-self (*Ichfremdes*) that affects it. This correlation as a first principle of differentiation and unification is made possible by the pre-egoic affectivity and its intensity. It is important to stress that this differentiation within affectivity itself is essential for the generation of original subjectivity: the self is awakened to the same degree as the non-self. This idea of the "auto-constitution of the self" in the affective awakening provides an important key in order to understand it as essentially non-cognitive and non-reflective. As Montavont puts it: "The subject doesn't *appear* to himself as the affected subject; but rather he *senses* himself through this affection" (Montavont 1999, 239).[92] This indicates that subjective awakening is a matter of "feeling itself" and "being affected" rather than "knowing itself" or "representing itself."

Husserl's view on affectivity and its role for the self-constitution should be distinguished from the one advocated by Michel Henry and employed in several contemporary phenomenological approaches. In the contemporary phenomenology, affectivity is often mentioned as a basic

matière qu'il pose comme non-moi, c'est-à-dire moi éveillé par l'affection. *C'est en effet en affrontant la* hylé *qu'il pose comme non-moi que le moi constitue son ipséité.*"

[91] It is important to point out that such an affective awakening can by no means be sufficient for the constitution of the self-awareness. An important issue is how a continuous awakening and identity of the self is then possible. This question indicates that the temporality of consciousness is indispensable for the self-constitution.

[92] My translation of : "Le sujet ne *s'apparaît* pas à lui-même comme sujet affecté ; bien plutôt, il *se sent* lui-même à travers cette affection".

structure of the pre-reflective level of self-experience, alongside temporality, embodiment and primary intersubjectivity. The prominent meaning of affectivity in contemporary discussions is usually derived from the philosophy of Michel Henry, who understands the core level of subjectivity in terms of auto-affection and interprets the sense of "mineness" as a "sense of subjective vitality and self-presence" (Parnas and Sass 2010, 235). It is also argued that the priority of self-affection resides in the most original bodily experience, consisting in the background "feeling of being alive" and enabling the possibility of any subsequent contact with the world (Fuchs 2012c).[93] According to this view, auto-affection or self-feeling ontologically precede and make possible the affective and intentional relations with the life-world and the others.

In Henry's fundamental work, *The Essence of Manifestation*, affectivity is explicitly and strongly established as the essence of ipseity. First of all he defines affectivity as "the identity of the affecting and the affected"[94] or as auto-affection, as "self-feeling by self" (Henry 1973, 462), and he distinguishes it from sensibility whose main feature is to be affected by something else as itself, as a hetero-affection. For Henry, being the self means in the first place to be affected by itself, "feeling itself," which provides a necessary condition for being affected by something else than the self.

Strictly speaking, affectivity can be understood, according to Henry, only on the basis of *feeling* which, as auto-affection, has an ontological priority over hetero-affection. He refers, in this regard, to the essence of feeling as lying in "the identity of the feeling and its content" (Ibid, 466): it is love which is felt in love, "it is love or boredom, *it is the feeling itself which receives itself and experiences itself …*" (Ibid, 464). There is no foreign content for feeling which could be felt in it. Feeling "itself is what it experiences and what is experienced, it itself is the power of being affected and

[93] This approach is highly influential in contemporary phenomenological psychopathology and underlies the phenomenological understanding of self-disorders, such as schizophrenia. In the works of contemporary psychiatrists and phenomenologists, such as Louis Sass, Joseph Parnas, and Thomas Fuchs, the principal disorder of schizophrenia is taken to be a *fundamental disturbance of ipseity and of the pre-reflective self-experience* (Fuchs 2012, 891). It presupposes disturbances of self-affection, of internal continuity, of self-experience, and of the implicit relation to one's own living body. The role of affectivity in schizophrenia is specifically elaborated in Sass' and Parnas' works: (Sass and Parnas 2003; Sass 2004, 2003; Parnas 2000).

[94] "The identity of the affecting and the affected is affectivity and affectivity alone, as auto-affection of the essence in its radical immanence, its Self, the Self of the essence, ipseity" (Henry 1973, 468).

that which affects it" (Ibid). It is this auto-referentiality of feeling that grants it a central position in Henry's notion of affectivity.

However, Henry's view on affectivity is not the only one existing in the phenomenological tradition. As it has been previously shown, an alternative account of the constitutive role of affectivity is provided by Husserl's later enquiries on the phenomenon of "affective awakening." An important difference between the two accounts of affectivity concerns precisely the understanding of the self-referentiality of affection. Unlike Henry, whose idea of "self-affection" is auto-referential, Husserl conceived of the affective dimension of the self-manifestation as essentially hetero-affective.[95] This means that the self-feeling of the self, i.e. its original self-referentiality, necessarily presupposes it being affected by something other than itself. For Husserl, the self and the foreign-to-the-self are inseparable.[96]

Thus, we can refer to Husserl's account of affective self-constitution as to a correlational model of affectivity, by contrast with the self-referential model advocated by Henry. These two different approaches to affectivity lead to very different phenomenological frameworks as well as to different metaphysical positions. While, for Henry, affectivity is the ultimate realm of self-constitution and radical immanence, for Husserl, the affective dimension is the first and the most basic level of being in the world. This implies that alterity is already included in the sphere of immanence at the very heart of subjectivity and is necessary for the constitution of the self.

In his analysis of Husserl's idea of affectivity, Zahavi underlines the same point and states that the ego is surrounded and affected by "an interior non-egological dimension." This is "an immanent type of alterity which manifests itself directly in subjectivity, which belongs intrinsically to subjectivity, and which subjectivity cannot do without" (Zahavi 1998). Zahavi further argues that the connection between this immanent alterity and self-awareness can be made clear only on the basis of bodily experience. His argument builds upon the co-dependency of the constitution of perceived spatial objects, on the one hand, and of the perceiving body, on the other. In Zahavi's words: "The body only appears to itself when it relates to something else" (Zahavi 1998).

[95] The similar distinction and a very comprehensive account of self-affection and hetero-affection is developed by Zahavi in his book *Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation* (Zahavi 1999).
[96] "[…] untrennbar ist Ich und sein Ichfremdes" (Husserl 2006b, 352).

Similar arguments can be drawn from Husserl's understanding of corporeality in terms of minenness and foreigness. On the one hand, he describes the living body (*Leib*) as having the most original character of "mineness"—"*das ursprünglichst Meine*" (Husserl 1973c, 58)— that is of something that belongs to me, as opposed to what is foreign (*das Fremde*), which I receive in the pure passivity and which is radically different from what is mine. On the other hand, the living body, as affective and affected body, is the source of all foreign content, coming through the senses. But this *foreignness* in regard to the original embodied experience is not a simple characteristic of external objects, but rather *a way of experiencing one's own passivity* in affection. As Husserl writes: "the greatest foreignness is here the one that I merely experience external things, in pure passivity" (Husserl 1973c, 58).[97] Foreignness can concern not exclusively external things, but also the passivity of one's inner senses and feelings, for example, the passivity of being in pain, hungry, sad or afraid. A subsequent perception of one's own living body as *Körper*, a physical thing, built upon the original embodied experience, can be understood as a way to adjust oneself to one's own passivity, to give an expression to the original experience of one's foreignness to oneself. Thus, I think it is fully consistent with Husserl's theory of affectivity to understand the living body not only as the first "mine," but also as the first "foreign," meaning that both features of embodiment are co-original and co-constitutive ways of self-feeling: self-feeling in the passivity of affection (original foreignness) and self-feeling in the ownership and spontaneity of embodied functioning (original mineness).

An interesting ground for discussing the priority of hetero- or auto-affection can be found in the empirical research on sensory and perceptual deprivation. Deprivation usually describes those experimental conditions in which the quantity, intensity or patterning of sensory stimuli is reduced. In children, sensory and social deprivation leads to impairments of development, as well as to intellectual and emotional disturbances (Suedfeld 1969). Also in adult subjects, prolonged sensory deprivation can be experienced as highly uncomfortable and, in extreme cases, lead to psychotic outbreaks and hallucinations.[98] The most basic and

[97] My translation of: "die größte Fremdheit ist hier die, dass ich Aussendinge bloß erfahre, in reiner Passivität".

[98] "Observations have shown the following common features in cases of sensory deprivation: intense desire for extrinsic sensory stimuli and bodily motion, increased suggestibility, impairment of organized thinking, oppression, and, in extreme cases, hallucinations, delusions, and confusion" (Solomon et al. 1957,

general conclusion drawn from the research in this field consists in claiming that "the stability of man's mental state is dependent on adequate perceptual contact with the outside world" (Solomon et al. 1957, 362). It should be also noted that a case of complete sensory deprivation, which would include suppression of all sensory dimensions (including intero- and proprioception), is not only beyond current experimental capacities but it also appears unimaginable. And even if such a complete deprivation of senses were possible, it would arguably amount to the loss of consciousness and the dissolution of subjectivity. However, clinical cases of total loss of sensory input with preserved consciousness as in total locked-in syndrome (Bauer et al. 1979) can provide an additional challenge to the previously discussed ideas.

8.4. Clarification of temporal relations in affective terms: Retention as affective modification

So far, I have argued that the investigation of affectivity allows Husserl to introduce a new perspective for the understanding of the precognitive organization of subjective experience in what concerns conscious connectivity within the living present. Furthermore, it also sheds some light on the affective constitution of the self. However, the story does not end here. Another important implication of affectivity entails the reassessment of temporal relations within conscious stream and therefore a new approach to the interrelations between the past and present life of consciousness. Ultimately, it amounts to a new way of seeing consciousness, the unconscious, and subjectivity itself. But let us not jump too far ahead and proceed with the topic of affectivity as it concerns temporal structure of the conscious stream.

The topic of affectivity has a direct influence on the understanding of temporal relations and *vice versa*: affective relations are also understood as dependent on temporal modifications. According to this idea, the living present is taken to have the strongest affective intensity, while the progressive fading away of retentions is associated with a weakening of affective force. For instance, Husserl claims that "the primordial source of all affection lies and can only lie in the primordial impression and its own greater or lesser affectivity" (Husserl 2001a, 217).

363). See also the volume *Sensory deprivation: fifteen years of research* edited by John Zubek (Zubek 1969).

This implies that the living present possesses a constant source of affective force and that the past (retentional or remote) must be affectively relative to this affectively prominent unity of the living present. And indeed, this is precisely the case in Husserl's approach. The retentional process, which consists in the "continuous modification of the primordial impression" (Husserl 2001a, 217) is accordingly described as a process of "clouding over," as a constant diminishing of affective vivacity. Fresh retentions continuously pass over into empty presentations, which still maintain the objective sense, but lose intuitiveness and affective prominence. The "end" of this retentional process corresponds to a "complete powerlessness of affection":

> By every retentional procession losing its affective force in the process of change it itself becomes dead, it can no longer progress by fusing under prominence; for positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life in dynamic connection and differentiation; if it is decreased to zero, its life ceases, precisely in its vivacity (Husserl 2001a, 219).

This idea allows us to distinguish—at least for the sake of discussion—between two meanings of retention, namely between retention as temporal and as affective modification.[99] On the one hand, temporal modification in retention consists in syntheses of identification and succession, which make possible the constitution of the continuity of experiences and of the temporal identity of the conscious stream. On the other hand, retentional process consists in the gradual modification of the affective force of original impression; the original vivacity of impression is maintained only as retentional till it becomes completely undifferentiated and "affectively anesthetized," to quote Bruce Bégout's expression (Bégout 2000). These two sides of the retentional modification are complementary and usually follow the same course. However, Husserl is aware of counter-examples, where retention may correspond to the increase of affective force by means of some conflict between concurrent affective tendencies. In some cases, "affective conflict" may indeed become the source of greater affective impact of repressed tendencies:

> [...] in the living conflict, repression takes place as a suppression, as a suppression into non-intuitiveness, but not into non-vivacity—on the

[99] Husserl expresses this point quite clearly when he writes that "corresponding to the temporal perspective, to the phenomenal moving-closer-together of those matters that have just been, is an affective perspective; flowing is a flowing together of affections" (Husserl 2001a, 423).

> contrary, the vivacity gets augmented in the conflict, as analogous to other contrasts (Husserl 2001a, 515).

By complementing his analyses of retention as temporal and affective modification, Husserl achieves an important result, namely, he now has means to explain the process of sedimentation and of forgetting. The principles of temporal modification alone could account only for the preservation of what was experienced in the past, but it could not explain why these past senses are forgotten. Affectivity explains this latter phenomenon by pointing out that the retentional process consists not only in the modification of the temporal modi of experiences, but also in the modification of their affective force. And such modification, as Husserl holds, is not objective—it is rather a modification of consciousness itself.

> [...] *retentional modification is a transformation of consciousness itself*, a transformation that is so peculiar that for all syntheses of identification it ultimately leads to the inability to be differentiated. But insofar as it contains the objective sense, precisely by having been integrated into the different lines of the synthetic coinciding that forms identity, we can say from the standpoint of the object: Less and less becomes affective from it. And when there is no affection coming from the diverse objects, then these diverse objects have slipped into sheer nightfall, in a special sense, they have slipped into the unconscious (my emphasis – *A. K.)* (Husserl 2001a, 221).

In the same vein, affectivity contributes to the understanding of other memory-related phenomena, such as the constitution of the "affective past-horizon" (Husserl 2001a, 204) and of remembering. Within this framework, the past is taken as affectively less prominent than the present, and moreover gradually so. This allows Husserl to speak about the remote past as reaching the point of affective exhaustion or the zero-level of affection, which he also calls the affective unconscious. The affective awakening of the past (or simply retroactive awakening) means then bringing back past intentions through some sort of affective reinforcement coming from the sphere of the affectively strong impressional present.

Thus, three constitutive phenomena of memory—retention, constitution of the past, and remembering—are clarified here as essentially affective phenomena. Retention is conceived of as affective modification; remote past—as the constitution of the affective horizon, and remembering as affective retroactive awakening. I will turn again to these phenomena

in the third part of this work, which is devoted to the phenomenological approach to implicit memory and the unconscious. As for now, it is important to remark that Husserl's analyses of affectivity go hand in hand with the analyses of temporality: in most cases, it is even possible to claim that they are subordinated to the principles of temporal organization. Nevertheless, Husserl is not always unambiguous about this issue and there are numerous examples from his works suggesting that the "logic" of affectivity must not always coincide with the "logic" of temporality.

8.5. The idea of affective consciousness and "timeless structuration" of subjective experience

The differences between the temporal and the affective structuration of subjective experience suggest that there are different rules of syntheses prevailing on each level. These rules are more complementary than contradictory, and nevertheless there are good reasons to see them independently. In my view, this approach would be generally consistent with Husserl's own position. For instance, in the Appendix 19 to the *Analyses*, we find several hints that Husserl saw affectivity and affective awakening as a necessary condition "preceding" the institution of temporal continuity:

> Awakening as the augmentation of vivacity, that is, of affectivity, radiating out from a place: Temporal awakening as propagation, that is, presupposing that the vivacity [or] affectivity has undergone augmentation at this place.
> But must we not say that what takes place here temporally is in action in a non-temporal manner in connection to a present that is being augmented. […]
> In succession, in structuring the process, this structuring is such a continual becoming, continual fusing and coming into relief. But what is presupposed here is the "timeless" structuration, the structuration which is not becoming in every momentary present (Husserl 2001a, 515).[100]

On the level of the temporal structuration of experience the rules are those of continuity, identification and preservation of the formal identity of the conscious stream. Inner time-consciousness is constitutive of "the temporal forms of the simultaneity, succession and duration of the

[100] See also our discussion on the associative connectivity in § 7.5: "Associative awakening thus constitutes the *presupposition for the constitution of temporal relations*, of the 'earlier' and 'later'" (Husserl 1973a, 177–178).

whole intentional life of a subject's acts" (Bernet 2002, 335). Thus, the "logic" of temporality is that of formal continuity. The "logic" of affectivity, instead, is characterized by relations of contrast and similarity, by the relativity of affective tendencies, and by all the factors influencing the intensification or decrease in vivacity of the subjective experience. In short, while temporality is responsible for the experiential continuity and *formal identity* between the present, future, and past life of the subject, affectivity and associative connectivity is what makes possible its concrete, *affective identity* and meaningful coherence. This distinction is consistent with the differentiation between the two types of syntheses—namely temporal and associative—that was introduced earlier in § 7. There are then two important consequences to take into account: one has to do with the idea of consciousness and correlatively of the unconscious, and the other concerns the issue of the unity of subjective experience. Let us start with the former.

First of all, affectivity allows a new approach to the organization of subjective experience—namely a dynamic and content-related view on consciousness itself based on the idea of affective intensity. Husserl suggests that taking vivacity and gradations of vivacity as determining factors of the organization of experience can provide a certain idea of consciousness, which would differ greatly from static, representational accounts.

> This gradation is also what determines a certain concept of consciousness and the opposition to the unconscious in the appropriate sense. The latter designates the nil of this vivacity of consciousness and, as will be shown, is in no way a nothing: A nothing only with respect to affective force and therefore with respect to those accomplishments that presuppose precisely a positively valued affectivity (above the zero-point) (Husserl 2001a, 216).

This idea allows us to conceive of consciousness and the unconscious not as opposite and mutually exclusive notions, but as different levels on the scale of affective intensity. As a result, a mental state can be called conscious not because it is accompanied by a high-order thought, inner perception or phenomenal feeling, nor because it represents a certain content, but because its intensity is high enough to reach the level of awareness. In the same vein, the unconscious does not need to correspond to the contradictory notion of "unconscious mental states/representations," but can be understood as the zero level of affectivity or as repressed by means of affective conflict. Obviously, this idea, however promising, is far from being clear. I will return to it in the third part of this work.

The second implication concerns the unity of consciousness and the idea of affective unity. Indeed, Husserl unambiguously and repeatedly claims that the bigger issue behind his analyses of association and affection is the question regarding the conditions of possibility of subjectivity itself—subjectivity which is conscious not only of its present, but also of its past and possible future life as a whole. His remarks about "interconnective affectivity" (Husserl 2001a, 515) and the function of affection in the constitution of particular unities suggest that he saw affectivity as a necessary component for the understanding of unity-formations. On the one hand, it concerns the possibility of particular unities in the experience: unity of an object, groups of objects, unities of different sorts of experiences—affects, memories, perceptions, motivations—related to the same object, unity of different sense-fields. On the other hand, it concerns the possibility of the unity of subjective experience as a whole. I made clear in § 8.2 on the *Association as affective connection* that Husserl regarded affectivity as the essential condition for associative synthesis or, even more directly, he saw associative syntheses as affective syntheses. This means that any kind of content-related binding functions affectively and increases the vivacity of related elements. For example, the reproductive association which brings together past and present moments of consciousness enables them to be experienced as a unity—a unity which awakens and can eventually lead to an actual intuitive recollection. This unity is of a particular kind, since it is not given as such before awakening: past senses stay exactly the same, but they are affectively powerless; they may however regain their vivacity through their connection with present impressions. Such a connection is an affective associative connection. In temporal terms, the unity of the present and the past can only be formal as an experience of something past in the present, which still maintains their formal separation as "now" and "then." This unity is preceded, genetically speaking, by the affective awakening, which is a content-related unity, functioning, in Proustian terms, extra- or rather a-temporally. The allusion to the a-temporal character of affective awakening entails no mystery, but simply indicates that the rules of conscious connectivity at stake here are those of association and of affective structuration rather than those of formal temporal syntheses. This view suggests that the totality of the subjective experience can be seen not only as a continuity of conscious becoming, but also as a throughout interrelated affective nexus.

CHAPTER III

AFFECTIVE MEMORY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

> I can live more things than I can represent to myself, my being is not reduced to what of myself explicitly appears to me (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 310).

> What we call reality is a relation between those sensations and those memories which simultaneously encircle us (Proust 1931).

9. Explicit and implicit dimensions of past-experience

I have started this work by pointing out that, within the phenomenological tradition, subjectivity has been understood as a notion describing the totality of the subject's experience—totality which not only extends in time over one's life but also encompasses its different dimensions. As previously argued, the unity of experience proved to be much more than just a unity of cognition, and the self proved to be much more than just an abstract subject of thought. The unity of experience is rather constituted by the multiplicity of temporal and affective connections which are constantly at work on the pre-reflective, passive level of experience. In this perspective, not only any particular perception becomes an infinite task, but the whole experience of one's life turns out to be an open-ended dynamic whole and a process of never completed synthesis. One of the consequences of this unity, which characterizes subjective experience, is that it can never be fully given to us as a totality at given moments, nor can it be exhausted by any representational or narrative construction. There is an essential inadequacy of any particular experience and of our knowledge thereof regarding this experience as a whole. Hence, on the one hand, we do relate to our life as a totality or a unity in time, but on the other hand, we never possess it in its fullness.

The paradoxical character of this experiential condition is especially clear when the phenomenon of memory is taken into account. Notably, memory shows that subjectivity can relate to its past life and is essentially defined by this relation, although the contact with the past can never be fully exhausted through remembering alone. In order to fully investigate this idea, I suggest distinguishing two perspectives on memory and past-experience, mirroring the distinction between the cognitive and affective (or reflective and pre-reflective) levels of subjectivity.[101]

According to the first perspective, memory is related to the reflective capacity of a subject to represent his or her past objectively, to construct narratives and to integrate different events and experiences within the meaningful connection of a life-story. The main role here is played by explicit remembering, as it constitutes the basis for any further memory constructions. The thus represented past is experienced as an intentional object of explicit remembering, or as a transcendent past. According to Husserl, "memory places an absent reality before our eyes, not indeed as present itself, but certainly as reality" (Husserl 2006a, 4). However, this past reality is, in the words of Fernando Pessoa, "a reality of nothing."[102] For the subject, it means that its own past self becomes alienated and experienced as foreign to itself. As Anna Akhmatova writes, this past can "become almost as foreign to us as to our neighbor in the next apartment."[103] Similarly, in his later works on

[101] This brings us back to one of the most remarkable questions which arises from the discussion about the distinction between the minimal and the narrative self. The question concerns the status of memory and whether it can be regarded as belonging only to a higher, reflexive level of subjective experience. If, as it is the case in some interpretations (Damasio 1999; Gallagher 2000), the whole dimension of the past is left within the domain of the narrative subject, then the pre-reflective subjectivity risks to be reduced to the ineffable moment of presence without any connection to what is lost. In the same vein, the unity of subjective experience on its basic level may come to rely merely on the synchronic unity of simultaneously occurring events without taking into account the multiplicity of connections which constitute the totality of one's experience. As it has been argued in the previous chapters, such an idea would simply contradict the view of pre-reflective subjectivity featuring it as the interconnected unity of experience. Moreover, it would leave unexplained the affective impact of the past which extends beyond our explicit recollections and manifests itself through phenomena belonging to the area of implicit memory and the unconscious.

[102] "Vivo sempre no presente. O futuro, não o conheço. O passado, já o não tenho. Pesa-me um como a possibilidade de tudo, o outro como a realidade de nada" (Pessoa 1982, 186).

[103] From Anna Akhmatova's poem *Memories have three epochs* (1945).

intersubjectivity, Husserl compares this past-experience to *Fremderfahrung*, and the unity with oneself to the unity with the others.[104] From this separation between the present experience and the transcendent past arises the problem of personal identity, which should instead reconcile past, present, and future selves.

Despite the fundamental role that explicit remembering plays for the phenomena of memory and personal identity, it is still not sufficient to describe how subjectivity relates to its past life. Even if, "the horizon of the past is disclosed by remembering" (Husserl 2001a, 529), as Fink remarks, it can never be exhausted by remembering.[105] Thus, the second perspective, which intends to conceive of memory on the level of the prereflective experience, must face the question of how in the affective life of consciousness a connection between the present and the past is established, namely before the institution of any representational relation to the past in remembering. In what concerns the issue of personal identity, this line of inquiry introduces the idea of the affective identity of a subject—identity that is constituted not based on temporality or reflective self-consciousness but on the basis of affective connectivity between the present and the past experience.

The central point of this chapter is to address this second perspective to subjective past-relations by exploring the phenomenological approach to the phenomena of implicit memory and of the unconscious. These two topics are so closely related that it is impossible to address one without approaching the other. What brings them together is first of all the fact that the past has the ability to be affectively present despite its temporal distance and to have a strong impact on the ongoing experience. Such a presence is not necessarily bound to recollections or any objectively graspable "possession" of what is lost. It is not represented but incorporated in our way of being and relation to other people.

Different disciplines approach this problem from different angles. In cognitive psychology, with its clear orientation towards experimental research methods, this topic is explored under the rubric of implicit memory. In the psychoanalytic tradition, which draws its insights from therapeutic practice, this tacit influence of the past on subjective experi-

[104] See, for example, Text Nr. 24 "Personale (ichliche) Gemeinschaft mit mir selbst als Parallele zur Gemeinschaft mit Anderen" (Husserl 1973b).

[105] "[…] keineswegs ist es möglich, erinnerungsmäßig je die Ganze der transzendentalen Vergangenheit auszuschöpfen. […] Die Endlosigkeit der Vergangenheit ist wesensmäßig ein aller möglichen Wiedererinnerung vorausliegendes Dunkel" (Fink 1966, 38).

ence has acquired the prominent name of the unconscious. In phenomenological philosophy, both these topics are reunited, as they equally challenge the representational idea of consciousness and demand a reformulation of the notion of subjectivity accounting for its unity with the past beyond the explicit intentionality of remembering.

The problem of the unconscious, as brought to light by the psychoanalytic exploration of the human mind, has been understood not merely as the riddle of consciousness, but more precisely as the riddle of the *consciousness of the past*. Similarly, in the psychological explorations of implicit memory, this phenomenon is defined in terms of influences of past experiences without any awareness of remembering (Schacter 1996, 161). In other words: as the phenomenon of memory cannot be exhausted by the phenomenon of recollection, in the same vein, the problem of the unconscious is much more than the problem of its appearance/representation.

In the previous chapter, I have already outlined how Husserl's idea of affectivity and associative syntheses may lead to the reconsideration of the very idea of consciousness and its unity. In this chapter, I will continue exploring this direction by presenting Husserl's approach to the unconscious (§ 11) and by positioning it within other phenomenological approaches to the same issue (§ 10). In the last section of this chapter, I will address the psychological research on implicit memory and present a phenomenological approach to the issue based on Husserl's exploration of affectivity (§ 12). It is my firm belief that implicit memory and the unconscious are two related phenomena which are best suited to account for the pre-reflective level of subjective experience in what concerns our prethematic relations with the past. Clarifications of these relations through phenomenological analyses of the unconscious and implicit memory can also contribute to the understanding of personal identity—namely such an identity which is grounded not on the level of narrative constructions and explicit autobiographical memory, but rather on the implicit dimension of subjectivity.

10. Phenomenological accounts of the unconscious

The above defined task of this chapter belongs to the area where phenomenology enters into dialog with the psychoanalytic tradition, on the one hand, and with cognitive psychology, on the other hand. I have already reviewed the methodological differences between phenomenology and psychology in the second chapter (§ 6). As for phenomenology and psychoanalysis, their respective relations have been the subject of numerous investigations[106] and have changed significantly over time. Whereas in Freud's and Husserl's time the dialog would have been rather conflictual, the development of both phenomenological and psychoanalytic investigations of subjectivity in the last century testifies that they can productively challenge each other. In the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty:

> The accord of phenomenology and of psychoanalysis should not be understood to consist in phenomenology's saying clearly what psychoanalysis had said obscurely. On the contrary, it is by what phenomenology implies or unveils as its limits—by its *latent content* or its *unconscious*—that it is in consonance with psychoanalysis (Merleau-Ponty 1993, 71).

In accordance with this idea, in what follows I will attempt to delineate how exactly phenomenology tackles the problem of the unconscious and which are the main approaches to this issue inside the phenomenological tradition.

10.1. Brentano-Freud-Husserl: The riddle of the unconscious as the riddle of consciousness

In Husserl's and Freud's time, it would still have been right to claim that, given its clear orientation towards the exploration of subjectivity mainly in terms of consciousness, phenomenology had nothing to say about the psychoanalytical notion of the unconscious. Both thinkers, even despite

[106] See, for instance, the volume *Founding Psychoanalysis Phenomenologically*, edited by Dieter Lohmar and Jagna Brudzinska and featuring different approaches to this topic (Lohmar and Brudzinska 2012), as well as a collection of essays *Approches phénoménologiques de l'inconscient* co-edited by Maria Gyemant and Délia Popa (Gyemant and Popa 2015). Other relevant recent contributions to the topic, such as those by Rudolf Bernet, Aaron Mishara, Dan Zahavi, Thomas Fuchs, Bruce Bégout, Jagna Brudzinska, Nicolas De Warren, and Nicholas Smith, are all to a larger or lesser extent discussed in the present chapter.

sharing a common psychological background[107] and working in the same historical context, clearly chose to pursue different paths in their explorations of the human mind. The difference is especially clear regarding the apparent inconsistency between the phenomenological and the psychoanalytic views on the nature of consciousness and on the respective place of the unconscious. While Freud is never tired of expressing his skepticism towards theoretical abstractions, and is rather unconvinced that philosophy could possibly solve the challenge of the unconscious, Husserl, for his part, is known for criticizing the naivety and narrowness of psychological approaches to consciousness. He sees no genuine challenge in the idea of the unconscious, the real challenge lying, according to him, in the possible understanding and theoretical grasp of a new idea of consciousness and of its constitutive function for subjective experience. Despite these differences, both thinkers agree at least on one issue, namely, that the problem of the unconscious is the problem of consciousness itself and cannot be solved without changing the way we understand their respective relations.

This agreement nevertheless has never been enough to find a solution suitable for both theories. Freud is convinced that the notion of consciousness has strict boundaries and that it makes no sense to expand it so that it could somehow include in itself all the complexity of the unconscious. Thus, in *A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis*, he claims that not only the form of presentation, but also "the laws of unconscious activity differ widely from those of the conscious" (Freud 2008, 39) and that "we have no right to extend the meaning of this word [i.e. conscious] so far as to make it include a consciousness of which its owner himself is not aware" (Freud 2008, 36).

Husserl, on the other hand—especially at the early stages of his thought—agrees with Brentano that the idea of the unconscious as opposite to consciousness, and yet influencing it without subject's awareness, bears on a serious contradiction. Along these lines, in *Logical Investigations*, he dismisses the task to account for "obscure, hypothetical events in the soul's unconscious depths" (Husserl 1970b, 105). In the Appendix IX to his lectures on time-consciousness, Husserl refutes the idea that there can be any "unconscious" content that subsequently becomes conscious in retention and insists that "consciousness is necessarily *consciousness* in

[107] According to Aaron Mishara, both Freud and Husserl were developing their theories in the common theoretical context and were influenced by the same psychologists. He specifically mentions Herbart, Brentano, Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt and Mach (Mishara 1990).

each of its phases" (Husserl 1991, 123). For Husserl, consciousness encompasses both the sphere of explicit wakeful awareness and the obscure background of conscious life. In this spirit, in the *Ideas II*, he points out that the sphere of self-consciousness cannot be restricted only to the narrow scope of attentive or alert awareness, but must include in itself equally all "background," obscure conscious experiences (Husserl 1989, 115).

In the Appendix to *Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, written by Eugen Fink, the phenomenological stance regarding the problem of the unconscious finds a somewhat different elaboration. Instead of dismissing the significance of the challenge altogether, Fink states that the problem of the unconscious relies on "a naïve and dogmatic *implicit theory about consciousness*" that requires systematic reconsideration. This suggests that a phenomenological idea of the unconscious is possible, but should be necessarily based on "an *explicit* analysis of consciousness" that employs the methodical means of phenomenological philosophy in general and of the intentional analysis in particular:

> As long as the exposition of the problem of the unconscious is determined by such an implicit theory of consciousness, it is in principle philosophically naïve. Only *after* an *explicit* analysis of consciousness can the problem of the unconscious be posed at all. But only in the working mastery of this problem will it be revealed whether or not the "unconscious" can be treated according to the methodical means of the intentional analysis (Husserl 1970a, 387).

Fink's proposal clearly goes in the direction of *the intentional theory of the unconscious* and supports Husserl's brief remarks in the same text concerning "unconscious" intentionalities (Husserl 1970a, 237). The above-mentioned appendix was written by Fink in 1936 and is consistent with the general attitude of Husserl's phenomenology towards "depth psychology" and especially towards the critical position the latter assumes in relation to the "consciousness-idealism of phenomenology." It shows that disagreement exists on the level of the basic theoretical presuppositions of the two disciplines and mainly concerns the understanding of consciousness. What is meant here by the supposedly naïve "implicit theory of consciousness" deserves closer consideration.

In his seminal paper *Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud*, Rudolf Bernet points out that both thinkers initially shared the same psychological idea of consciousness originating from Franz Brentano's work (Bernet 2002). Brentano famously argues against possibility of

unconscious representations claiming that it amounts to the idea of an unconscious consciousness which in turn bears on a serious contradiction. This contradiction, however, is not a contradiction in terms: the idea of an unconscious consciousness, as he puts it, is not the same as a non-red redness (Brentano 1973, 79). The contradiction is rather a contradiction in essence: something analogous to an unconscious representation would be "an unseen seeing," that is such a seeing that does not see. Maurice Merleau-Ponty brings this line of thought even further when he writes that "an unconscious thought would be a thought that does not think" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 396).

This argument, developed in Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Brentano 1874), is directly related to his view on consciousness as *inner representation (innere Vorstellung*)[108] which accompanies mental acts, but in such "a peculiarly intimate way" that would not lead to an objectifying, reflexive relation, nor to infinite regress.[109] As he points out, the term "consciousness" refers to the mental phenomenon insofar as this phenomenon has certain content and can therefore be conceived of as a representation of this content accompanied by the representation of the mental phenomenon itself. This implies that, for Brentano, the inconceivability of an unconscious consciousness ensues from the inconceivability of an internally unperceived representation. It also suggests that only mental phenomena with representational content are necessarily accompanied by inner consciousness. For Brentano, of course, this encompasses the totality of mental states since they all are defined by intrinsic intentionality, i.e. directedness towards their primary objects.

Thus, the central point in understanding the problem of consciousness and correlatively of the unconscious, in this perspective, revolves around the representational nature of conscious phenomena. This perspective has

[108] *Vorstellung* is often translated as either "presentation" or "representation." The latter appears to be more common and adequate and will be preferred here as well. The main reason for this is that the use of the term in its current philosophical meaning was established in Kant's philosophy, who employed it as a German version of the Latin term *representatio* (Cassin and Rendall 2014, 891). Note, however, that in the English translation of Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* the term is translated as "presentation."

[109] In this spirit, he claims: "The presentation (*Vorstellung*) of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon; it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations" (Brentano 1973, 98).

been implicitly adopted in both Freud's and most of Husserl's writings on the matter and shaped the way they approached the issue.

Unlike Brentano, Freud is not threatened by the conceptual contradiction involved in the idea of unconscious representations and instead advocates the possibility of non-conscious mental states which can influence one's conscious life and behavior. As Bernet points out, Freud's aim is to understand "the way in which unconscious representations appear in consciousness without negating their origin in the unconscious" (Bernet 2002, 329). In this sense, Freud, in his attempts to clarify the unconscious, still largely relies on the possibility to conceive of the unconscious representations or, more generally, of the unconscious way of appearing and manifestation.

As for Husserl, it is important to understand that he transforms Brentano's idea of inner consciousness into the absolute inner time-consciousness and therefore deals with a different conception of consciousness altogether. Such an understanding, as Bernet argues, is not at odds with the idea of the unconscious and paves the way to the possible detecting of the "unconscious mode of appearance" in acts of presentification (*Vergegenwärtigung*). In this regard, consciousness and the unconscious are understood as two different types of representations. Such a position is generally consistent with Fink's indication in the mentioned *Appendix* that phenomenological analysis of consciousness might contribute to the intentional theory of the unconscious.

This direction in the phenomenological exploration of the unconscious still relies on the theory of the representational structure of consciousness, even if with significant differences from the one advocated by Brentano and implicitly accepted by Freud. However, this is not the only possible way of exploring consciousness and the unconscious phenomenologically. Another way would be to approach this issue in non-representational terms and to question not merely the mode of appearance of the unconscious, but rather its intrinsic immanence to consciousness and subjective experience. This latter perspective explores the complexity of the unconscious that cannot be easily reduced only to a question of manifestation and representation. The most elaborate version of this approach is pursued in the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Thomas Fuchs. Another non-representational approach to the unconscious can be found in Husserl's later woks related to genetic phenomenology and passive constitution of subjective experience.

Thus, I assume that there are two main directions in the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious: one exploring the intentional theory of the unconscious and the other inquiring into a non-representational way of approaching consciousness and the unconscious respectively.[110] In what follows I will look into two major examples of both accounts, namely Rudolf Bernet's investigation of the unconscious representations in phantasy and then Maurice Merleau-Ponty's and Thomas Fuchs' proposal for an approach to the unconscious as "a horizontal dimension of the lived body, lived space, and intercorporeality" (Fuchs 2012a). Afterwards, I will return to Husserl's idea of affective consciousness and examine another possible non-representational phenomenological account of the unconscious.[111]

10.2. Bernet's intentional theory of the unconscious: the unconscious way of appearing in phantasy

It has already been made clear by many authors, and by Freud himself, that his notion of the unconscious is not a univocal one. According to Freud, in such texts as *A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis* (1912) and *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1933), there are at least three possible meanings of the term, namely: the unconscious in the descriptive, the dynamic, and the systematic (topographic) sense. The unconscious in the descriptive sense refers to the static understanding of it in terms of mental representations which are not accessible to awareness.[112] It is the unconscious as latent and pre-conscious. The

[110] Fink's proposal that the phenomenological theory of the unconscious should follow the direction opened by the intentional analytics of consciousness is not necessarily misleading, as Aaron Mishara suggests (Mishara 1990, 54). Indeed, Husserl's own most consistent attempt to provide an account of the unconscious is founded on the level of pre-predicative experience and passive constitution, and not on the level of intentional analyses. However, it is still phenomenologically consistent to explore both directions.

[111] The systematic presentation of this argument can also be found in my paper: "Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty" (Kozyreva 2016).

[112] "The oldest and best meaning of the word 'unconscious' is the descriptive one; we call a psychical process unconscious whose existence we are obliged to assume—for some such reason as that we infer it from its effects—, but of which we know nothing. In that case we have the same relation to it as we have to a psychical process in another person, except that it is in fact one of our own. If we want to be still more correct, we shall modify our assertion by saying that we call a process unconscious if we are obliged to assume that it is

dynamic sense designates the unconscious as repressed: what is kept apart from consciousness and cannot reach it despite its intensity. The systematic or topographic sense refers to the unconscious as a particular system of the mental apparatus (the Id). In the psychoanalytic literature, it is also common to distinguish a fourth—"economic"—sense of the unconscious, designating it in terms of instinctual energy and its transformations.[113] In this sense, the unconscious can refer to the connection of primal drives, instincts, and their representations (*Triebrepräsentanz*).

The topographic sense is highly speculative and relies on Freud's metapsychological model of the mental apparatus and is mostly seen as implausible in the phenomenological perspective (Bernet 2002, 348). Bernet's enquiry on the unconscious mode of appearance concerns mainly the descriptive sense of the unconscious. He then suggests possible ways to phenomenologically ground the "dynamic" and the "economic" unconscious. As both proposed directions are clearly dependent on the phenomenological clarification of the descriptive unconscious, as developed in the main part of the paper *Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud*, this will be the main focus of my account of Bernet's approach.

For Brentano, understanding the unconscious was equal to accounting for the possibility of internally unperceived representational consciousness—what has ceased to be conscious, but that could be reawakened and brought back to awareness. Bernet suggests that the phenom-

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being activated at the moment, though at the moment we know nothing about it. This qualification makes us reflect that the majority of conscious processes are conscious only for a short time; very soon they become latent, but can easily become conscious again. We might also say that they had become unconscious, if it were at all certain that in the condition of latency they are still something psychical" (Freud 1977).

[113] In Freud, "economic" designates a particular point of view on the psychic processes. As Laplanche and Pontalis point out: "Freud defines metapsychology as the synthesis of three standpoints–the topographical, the dynamic and the economic" (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988, 127). In this sense, another possible classification of the unconscious may just distinguish two standpoints on the unconscious: the descriptive and the systematic/topographic. The latter would then include the dynamic, economic, and topographic meanings. This classification can be found in Laplanche & Pontalis' *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988) and, in the phenomenological literature, in Jagna Brudzinska's dissertation *Assoziation, Imaginäres, Trieb. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Subjektivitätsgenesis bei Husserl und Freud* (Brudzinska 2004). The distinction between the four mentioned meanings of the unconscious is also employed by Bernet in his paper on *Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud* (Bernet 2002). Since his interpretation is central for this part of my work, I have chosen to start by introducing this version.

enological approach to this issue necessarily implies the critique of this explanation of the unconscious and relies on the revised idea of inner consciousness. According to Bernet's interpretation, descriptive unconscious can be clarified phenomenologically not as "amputated, unperceived consciousness," but as another type of self-consciousness—such a type which allows for the "the presence of the non-present" (Bernet 2002, 331), or, in Jagna Brudzinska's terms, for the appearance of the not-appearing (*Erscheinen des Nicht-Erscheinens*) and the manifestation of the absence (Brudzinska 2004, 220).

This type of self-consciousness is characteristic of particular act-intentionalities, which Husserl designated as intuitive presentifications (*anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen*) and which include experiences of recollection, phantasy, pictorial consciousness (*Bildbewusstsein*), and empathy. Such acts are distinguished from the acts of presentation (a paradigm example of which is perception) because they do not present directly what is given, but rather *bring to present awareness* objects which are not there. For instance, recollection is a present experience whose intentional object as such is absent and can only appear as past. The same goes for phantasy, which is an even more radical example of the "presence of the not-present," since it does not need to refer to any kind of perceived reality, but implies a certain coexistence of two orders of reality—present and imagined—within one experience. Such coexistence however does not imply any real connection between intentional objects of imagination and perception: according to Husserl, they have no connection and "no temporal position in relation to one another" (Husserl 1973a, 168).[114]

An important step in Bernet's interpretation relies on the analogy drawn between such acts of presentification and the descriptive unconscious—an analogy mainly based on the similarity between the intentionality of phantasy and recollection, on the one hand, and the intentionality of the unconscious representations, on the other hand. Justifying this analogy, Bernet claims that:

> Freud's "*descriptive*" concept of the Unconscious corresponds exactly to Husserl's determination of the appearance of the presentified: in both cases it is a matter of something alien that belongs to the self but

[114] "The centaur which I now imagine, and a hippopotamus which I previously imagined, and, in addition, the table I am perceiving even now have no connection among themselves, i.e., they have *no temporal position in relation to one another* [...] the centaur is neither earlier nor later than the hippopotamus or than the table which I now perceive" (Husserl 1973a, 168).

> which the self cannot immediately lay claim to as real presence (Bernet 2002, 341).

In this perspective, the unconscious is understood as *another* modus of appearance and representation—in Brudzinska's words, not as absence or "anti-phenomenon," but as another kind of presence (*eine andere Anwesenheit*), found not in the sphere of the impressional, but rather in reproductive consciousness (Brudzinska 2004, 221). The unconscious is thus defined in respect of what appears (the absent, the alien) and how it appears in consciousness (reproductively as opposed to impressionally), and not in terms of this appearance being itself devoid of a certain "conscious" quality or accompanying representation. This suggests that one possible way to phenomenologically ground Freud's concept of the unconscious lies, according to Bernet, in Husserl's understanding of the unconscious intentionality and of the particular function of inner time-consciousness which makes such intentionality possible. More precisely, this way leads to understanding the unconscious on the basis of Husserl's theory of reproductive inner consciousness, manifesting itself in phantasy and related phenomena. Bernet sees a decisive contribution of phenomenology to the understanding of the unconscious in the account of reproductive consciousness, since it presents a case of a "doubling" of consciousness (Bernet 2002, 336). Such a "doubling" implies that the presentification of an absent (e.g. past) object is possible not due to the replication of an original perception, but rather due to the reproduction of an original impressional consciousness of this perception.[115]

The alleged affinity between reproductive consciousness and the unconscious is based on the essential possibility inherent to consciousness to take distance from itself within its own experience and on the corresponding view on subjectivity as capable of living "in two different worlds (a real and an unreal one)" (Bernet 2002, 333). Among other things, this implies that intuitive presentifications—such as memory and phantasy—are best suited to serve as conscious presentations of unconscious desires and to fulfill the ego's tendency to establish an ambiguous relation to affectively charged objects. In this perspective, unconscious representations

[115] "The inner consciousness of a memory is therefore not an impressional consciousness of a perception but a reproductive consciousness which bears within itself the earlier perception in the manner of an intentional implication (and not as a real (reell) component)" (Bernet 2002, 337). I am not going into the details of the Husserl's idea of reproductive consciousness and Bernet's take on it, since it has already been discussed in the first chapter, § 2.3.b.

overcome an immediate, impressional relation to objects, as characteristic of instinctual drives, and represent them in the form of phantasies, dreams or other kinds of reproductive consciousness (Bernet 2002, 341).

Bernet's account of the unconscious deals with a particular aspect of the issue, namely with the manifestation of the unconscious presentations in the reproductive inner consciousness. This latter is understood as another form of consciousness—distanced and more self-alienated, as opposed to the immediate, affective, and sometimes even traumatic impressional inner consciousness. Bernet himself acknowledges that reproductive consciousness can account only for a particular type of unconscious intentionality and that there is a form of unconscious representation inherent to the impressional consciousness itself. The latter is related to the "impressional immediate affection" and grounds a second concept of the unconscious realized in the impressional consciousness (Bernet 2002, 343). Such an unconscious however also takes on a form of representation—it appears as affective representation in the feeling of *Angst*.

Arguably, this approach to the unconscious still handles the issue by taking the intentional representation as a fundamental form of consciousness, and looks for a solution in what Fink called the intentional theory of the unconscious. Hence, the problem of the unconscious in its relation to consciousness is grasped under a question of "how consciousness can appear to itself as something alien" (Bernet 2002, 349). Bernet's approach presupposes that, in his own words, "nothing unconscious remains without appearance in consciousness, instead, there is a double—both representational and affective—form of conscious representation of the unconscious" (Bernet 2002, 343).

However, the complexity of the unconscious cannot be easily reduced only to a question of manifestation and representation. Similarly, the interconnectivity of subjective experience, its constant interweaving with the past cannot be exhausted by the phenomenon of recollection. The question at stake here concerns the possibility to conceive of both our relation to the past and the unconscious in non-representational terms. This aspect of the unconscious has been elaborated by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and by Thomas Fuchs' phenomenology of body memory, on which I will focus in the following section of this work.

10.3. Non-representationalist accounts of the unconscious: Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs on the unconscious and body memory

The critique of the representationalist approach to consciousness and correspondingly to the unconscious is characteristic of several post-Husserlian phenomenological projects.[116] Arguably the most fruitful account of non-representational consciousness inside the phenomenological tradition is given by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who emphasizes the role of embodiment, being in the world, and of intersubjectivity as fundamental constitutive dimensions of subjectivity. He asserts that "there is no private sphere of consciousness" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 395) and that consciousness is entirely transcendence, "the simultaneous contact with my being and with the being of the world" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 396). For him, this implies the reevaluation of the very idea of transcendence and of intentionality, which accordingly can be understood not as a cognitive relation to an object by positing it mentally in one's mind, but rather as a concrete embodied and situated directedness towards the world.

In his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl's notion of "operative" intentionality (*fungierende Intentionalität*) and interprets it as a pre-reflective directedness which establishes a natural, pre-predicative unity of our being in the world (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxxii). Contrary to act-intentionality, which describes the relation to objects on the level of judgments and reasoning, and thereby constitutes the basis for objective knowledge, operative intentionality can be understood as "the body-subject's concrete, spatial and pre-reflective directedness towards the living world" (Reuter 1999, 72). While bringing the subject's embodiment and the practical nature of bodily directedness to

[116] For example, Bernet underlines that "the development of the analysis of intentionality by Heidegger, Aron Gurwitsch, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry has been basically nothing other than a putting into question of the representationalist objectivism and the egological subjectivism progressively installed by Husserl at the beginning of this century" (Bernet 1994, 231). In the framework of contemporary phenomenology, the importance of non-representational approaches to the unconscious has been emphasized by Dan Zahavi in his book *Self-Awareness and Alterity*. Notably, he claims that when "phenomenology moves beyond an investigation of object-manifestation and act-intentionality, it enters a realm that has traditionally been called the unconscious" (Zahavi 1999, 207). By drawing attention to Husserl's analyses of affectivity and passivity, Zahavi proposes that we see the phenomenological unconscious as a fundamentally altered form of consciousness and a "depth-structure of subjectivity" (Zahavi 1999, 206).

the foreground of the constitutional issue, Merleau-Ponty points to an apparent insufficiency of representational accounts. Such accounts, so his argument goes, fail to make sense of a particular intentionality involved in the performance of movements[117] and all essentially bodily phenomena. Furthermore, they lead to an altogether false image of subjectivity, featuring it as consisting of distinct representations which are either available or unavailable to conscious awareness.

Merleau-Ponty highlights two main problems in understanding consciousness and the unconscious in representational terms. The first problem, which he ascribes to the philosophies of consciousness, consists in the impossibility to conceive of any content of experience beyond the "manifest content spread out in distinct representations" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 171). The second problem, belonging to the theories of the unconscious, "is to double this manifest content with a latent content, also made up of representation" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 171). He uses an example of sexuality to make a point that featuring it in terms of either conscious or unconscious representations does not come any closer to understanding its continuous presence "in human life as an atmosphere" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 171).

Merleau-Ponty's critique of the approach to consciousness and the unconscious as consisting of representations is directly related to his idea that subjective experience cannot be made transparent to itself, but is instead intrinsically characterized by its self-opacity and fundamental ambiguity. In this case, Merleau-Ponty clearly diverges from Cartesian as well as Husserlian ideal of certainty and their belief that self-consciousness provides us with a perfect vantage point towards inner workings of our minds. Instead, he draws on the idea of bodily structure of perception, where the body is both what perceives and what stays invisible for itself: "it [the body] is neither tangible nor visible insofar as it is what sees and touches" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 94). The ambiguity of bodily experience and the non-representational character of bodily awareness and perception lie at the foundation of Merleau-Ponty's view of subjectivity and inspire his descriptions of various phenomena. Con-

[117] "This [accomplishment of a movement] is only possible if consciousness is not defined as the explicit positing of its objects, but rather more generally as a reference to an object that is practical as much as theoretical. That is, if consciousness is defined as being in the world, and if the body in turn is defined not as one object among others, but as the vehicle of being in the world. So long as consciousness is defined through representation, the only possible operation for it is of forming representations" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 525).

trary to representational approaches that feature contents of conscious experience through what appears to the subject, Merleau-Ponty believes that what we acquire through experience is not represented in our minds in either conscious or unconscious way.[118] He claims that we can live more things than we can represent to ourselves and that our experience is by no means restricted to the content of intentional representations (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 310).

> The idea of a consciousness that would be transparent for itself and whose existence would amount to the consciousness that it has of existing is not so different from the notion of the unconsciousness. In both cases we have the same retrospective illusion: everything that I will later learn about myself is introduced into me as an explicit object (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 400).

Thus Merleau-Ponty makes a radical suggestion for the phenomenological theory of the unconscious—to avoid talking about conscious vs. unconscious representations altogether, and rather understand the unconscious as a "sedimented practical schema" (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 191) and as our own self-opacity. In a similar vein, in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, he gives examples of situated feelings and actions, which are defined as much by their directedness to objects as by their ambiguity and obscurity regarding their own contextuality:

> We would be equally wrong by making sexuality crystallize in "unconscious representations" or by setting up in the depths of the dreamer a consciousness that can identify sexuality by name. Similarly, love cannot be given a name by the lover who lives it. It is not a thing that one could outline and designate, it is not the same love spoken of in books and newspapers, because it is rather the way the lover establishes his relations with the world; it is an existential signification. The criminal does not see his crime, nor the traitor his betrayal, but not because these exist deep within him as unconscious representations or tendencies, but rather because these crimes or betrayals are so many relatively closed worlds and so many situations. If we are situated, then we are surrounded and cannot be transparent to ourselves, and thus our contact with ourselves must only be accomplished in ambiguity (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 401).

Here we can see that such ambiguity and self-opacity refer not merely to impossibility of complete self-knowledge but rather to what Merleau-

[118] On the non-representational account of learning and skill acquisition see Hubert Dreyfus' paper *Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation* (Dreyfus 2002).

Ponty calls "situatedness" of subjective experience. In other words, we are intransparent to ourselves because our experience is not restricted to representational content and thereby cannot be made an explicit object of observation.

Along the same lines, in his lecture courses on *Institution and Passivity* and *Visible and Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty presents the unconscious as "perceptual consciousness,"[119] drifting not that far from the definition of the unconscious in terms of the intrinsic self-opacity of conscious experience. Already in Husserl, perception is described as an unending process, in which objects appear only to a certain degree of approximation and never in fullness (Husserl 2001a). For Merleau-Ponty, it means that perceptual consciousness relies on unconscious syntheses which complete our otherwise fragmentary view of reality by means of particular subjective predispositions and a sedimented history. The unconscious can be therefore understood as a background against which we see objects, not as something that can be grasped in our representations of these objects:

> This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our "consciousness," but in front of us, as articulations of our field. It is "unconscious" by the fact that it is not an object, but it is that through which objects are possible, it is the constellation wherein our future is read—It is between them as the interval of the trees between the trees, or as their common level. It is the *Urgemeinschaftung* of our intentional life, the *Ineinander* of the others in us and of us in them" (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 180).

The description of the unconscious as the "interval between the trees" appears to be quite a precise analogy: the unconscious is literally taken to be the way we fill in the gaps of uncertainty in objects' perception—and what is more—a way which determines how exactly we will relate to them. Different people will fill up the gaps between these metaphorical trees quite differently: depending on their background and individual history, someone might see a situation as threatening, while someone else might see an equivalent situation as promising and exciting. It is an interesting feature of our experience that when a certain amount of information is missing (which is the case for any kind of inadequate or essentially incomplete experience, such as perception and interaction

[119] "These descriptions [i.e. of oneric consciousness] mean that the unconscious is a perceptual consciousness, it proceeds like perceptual consciousness by means of a logic of implication and promiscuity, it gradually follows a path whose total slope it does not know […]" (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 208).

with other people), we tend to fill it in with our expectations based on previous experiences. Even if we see objects only from a certain perspective and never from all possible angles, our perception still functions as if it were complete.

Thus, when Merleau-Ponty claims that "perception is unconsciousness" (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 189), he intends to emphasize not what one directly perceives as an object as being unconsciousness, but that perception functions as a medium through which objects are perceived in this or that manner. He states that uconsciousness "is and is not perceived. For one perceives only figures upon levels—and one perceives them only by relation to the level, which therefore is unperceived" (Ibid). Such a definition of the unconscious as a perceptual consciousness however does not imply that Merleau-Ponty ever intended to reject the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious altogether. He rather sought to avoid understanding the unconscious in terms of another psychic reality or some kind of other "I think," which forms representations "behind the back" of the conscious subject (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 207). Instead of the strictly dualistic idea separating conscious and unconscious processing, Merleau-Ponty develops the idea that the unconscious is a necessary part of any conscious experience. The unconscious thus is not the opposite of consciousness, it is "the very perceptual consciousness in its ambiguity, opacity, multiplicity of meanings, and unending quest for interpretation" (Stawarska 2008, 62).

A similar critique of representationalism regarding consciousness and the unconscious returns in Merleau-Ponty's accounts of memory in his lecture course on *Institution and Passivity*. In this course, the problem of memory oscillates between two modes of our relation to the past: memory as "construction" and memory as "conservation" of the past. In the first mode, roughly corresponding to that of explicit memory, the past is constituted as an object of one's recollections. This is a transcendent past which gets to be constantly recreated in the history of subjective transformations. It is a "construction" as long as it becomes the past which I can remember and bring to my present awareness and link it actively to other events in my life. This is not the past which merely happened, but rather the past as it is remembered. As to the second mode, Merleau-Ponty first calls it "conservation" of the past, only to subsequently criticize this formulation as it relies on the idea of memory-traces or representations residing in some kind of reservoir or collector of past experiences.

Refuting this idea, Merleau-Ponty nevertheless claims that there is the past for us, which exists not in the mode of remembering but in the mode of oblivion.[120]

Once again, the very idea of representation proves to be the main enemy obstructing the comprehension of subjective relations with the past, which makes the past either a mere construction of one's memory or a mere collection of memory-traces. Merleau-Ponty thinks that the truth lies in between these two modes of past-relation and can only be articulated when the idea of representation regarding memory is abandoned altogether. He claims that memory should not be seen as an opposite of forgetting but that it could be elucidated through our relation with a past on the pre-reflective level of embodied existence:

> The problem of memory is at dead end as long as we hesitate between memory as preservation and memory as construction. We will always be able to show that consciousness finds in its "representations" only what it has put into them, that memory is thus construction—and that, however, behind the construction there must be another memory which evaluates the products of the first, a past given gratuitously and in inverse ratio to our voluntary memory. The immanence and the transcendence of the past, the activity and the passivity of memory, can only be reconciled if we give up posing the problem in terms of representation. If, to begin with, the present is not a "representation" (*Vorstellung*), but a certain unique position of the index of being in the world; if our relations with the present when it slips into the past, like our relationships with our spatial surroundings, were attributed to a postural schema which keeps in possession and designs a series of positions and temporal possibilities; and if the body is that which in every case answers the question "Where am I and what time is it?" then there would not be this alternative between preservation and construction. Memory would not be the opposite of forgetting, for we would see that true memory is found at the intersection of the two, at the instant in which the recollection which is forgotten and guarded by forgetfulness returns. We would see that explicit recollection and forgetting are two modes of our oblique relation with a past that is present to us only through the determinate emptiness that it leaves in us (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 208–209).

To summarize, there are several important steps clarifying Merleau-Ponty's approach to psychoanalysis and to the problem of the unconscious. First of all, unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology finds itself confronted with the same challenge which was central to the psychoanalytic endeavor and which concerns the issue of consciousness being intransparent to itself and defined as much by its explicit as by its

[120] "Le passé existe dans le mode de l'oubli" (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 272).

implicit or latent dimensions. As he puts it: "Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel; much better, they are aiming toward the same *latency*" (Merleau-Ponty 1993, 71). Secondly, Merleau-Ponty believed that the idea of representation obscures the understanding of both consciousness and the unconscious. He aims to overcome this limitation in his theory of operative intentionality, embodiment, and perceptive consciousness. In the perspective opened by these ideas, he features the unconscious as a sedimented practical schema and as the subject's ambiguity with regard to his own situatedness in the world. And finally, he applies his critique of representationalism to the phenomenon of memory and suggests that the subject's relation to the past is mediated by forgetting as much as by remembering.

These last two directions in understanding the unconscious (via situated, embodied, perceptive consciousness and via non-representational relations to the past) remain very close to each other within Merleau-Ponty's thought. The necessary step to bring them together has been accomplished by Thomas Fuchs' phenomenology of body memory, one of the aims of which is to bring to the fore the basic temporal structure of embodied existence. By analyzing the phenomenon of implicit memory, Fuchs shows that it consists in a different kind of presence of the past than that of the explicit memory. While explicit recollection presumes the presentification of one's past experiences in a personal autobiographical memory, implicit memory, for its part, cannot be clarified via any kind of representational relation. As embodied subjects we cannot be said to *have* the past as an object, but rather we *are* ourselves this past (Fuchs 2000, 76). This past becomes a modus of one's bodily existence and stays unnoticed but effective, unseen but present through bodily dispositions, familiarities, habits, unintentional avoidances and omissions.

Body memory serves as a foundation for our personal identity—such an identity which exists beyond explicit memory and narratives we tell about our lives, but instead constitutes the indispensable basis for our self-familiarity. It is *personal* inasmuch as it accumulates experiences and dispositions specific for each particular individual. As Fuchs points out:

> The basic continuity of the personal subject [...] emerges not from the store of explicit knowledge about one's own biography, or from its momentary presentification in memory recall, but rather from a history, which has accumulated and sedimented in body memory and as such remains always implicitly given in every present moment (Fuchs 2015, 28).

The unconscious character of body memory once again is not due to any incarnation of an implicit core of subjectivity behind the back of consciousness in the form of either subconscious psychic or else automatic brain processes. Similar to Merleau-Ponty's views, Fuchs understands the unconscious not in terms of representations or hidden intentionalities but as a sum of bodily dispositions which tacitly define the individual relation to the world and to other people. For instance, a shy person does not need to form representations either consciously or unconsciously, in which her attitude would find its manifestation. Instead, as Fuchs remarks, such a person would exhibit her attitude in her very posture or tone of the voice, in her avoidance to assert herself firmly in front of other people or to risk expressing her opinions in public. In the same vein, in Merleau-Ponty's example, love is described not as relation to a person which could be grasped in a particular object-directed intentionality, but rather as "an existential signification," as a "way the lover establishes his relations with the world" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 401).

Another example can be found in the phenomenon of traumatic experience, which contributes to the phenomenological clarification of the dynamic unconscious. The repressed trauma does not survive as some kind of representation, objective "trace" or "image," which cannot be erased. Instead, it survives "only as a style of being and only to a certain degree of generality" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 85). As Fuchs points out, the influence of past traumatic experiences on a traumatized person manifests itself in resistance and defensive behavior (not necessarily transparent for the person) in situations triggering such unconscious dispositions (Fuchs 2012a, 98). The unconscious influence of traumatic experiences persists not in the form of explicit menacing objects, but as a medium making these objects appear as threatening. The dynamic unconscious is therefore not understood as a reservoir for repressed feelings, thoughts or desires, but as transformations of the lived body and the lived space, which restructure one's field of experience and determine against which background one would see and judge new existential situations and interactions with other people.

By extending the life of consciousness beyond the narrow focus of self-knowledge and present awareness, by bringing the experiencing subject back into the intersubjectively shared world and into the concreteness of its embodied and affective being, the phenomenology of the lived body overcomes the idea of the unconscious as hidden "behind the

back" of consciousness, and takes it as the practical schema of our bodily being in the world and as the structure of our field of perception. Summarizing this position, Fuchs writes:

> [The unconscious] surrounds and permeates conscious life, just as in picture puzzles the figure hidden in the background surrounds the foreground, and just as the lived body conceals itself while functioning. It is an unconscious which is not located in the vertical dimension of the psyche but rather in the horizontal dimension of lived space, most of all lodging in the intercorporeality of dealings with others, as the hidden reverse side of day-to-day living (Fuchs 2012a, 100).

While Bernet claims that the unconscious is the presence of the absent, appearance of the non-appearing, Fuchs develops Merleau-Ponty's opposing view that the unconscious is "absence in presence, the unperceived in the perceived" (Fuchs 2012a, 101). This absence however is not the concealed or isolated reverse side of consciousness, but rather its own way of being—the sum of incorporated predispositions, habits and the like, which themselves do not appear in any graspable way, but instead constitute a background against which we relate to the world.

Both the above presented approaches to the phenomenological clarification of the unconscious rely on the presupposition that this issue demands a fundamental reconsideration of our idea of consciousness itself. Whether understood in terms of reproductive inner consciousness or through the pre-reflective dimension of embodiment and especially body memory—there is a clear tendency to provide a new way of approaching the basic definitions of consciousness which could account for the unconscious in a non-conflicting way. As I have already pointed out, this idea is consistent with Husserl's own view. What's more, in his later texts we can find a relevant outline of the phenomenological theory of the unconscious as founded on the exploration of affective consciousness.

11. The affective unconscious in Husserl's *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* and later manuscripts

Husserl's own most consistent attempt to provide an account of the unconscious hinges upon the level of pre-predicative experience and passive constitution. Similarly to the two previously discussed phenomenological approaches, for Husserl the unconscious is also the problem of consciousness. He decides, however, to work on it against the background of the idea of affectivity and associative syntheses, and not starting from the idea of *cogito* or intentional representation. A sketch of the phenomenological theory of the unconscious can be found in Husserl's *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* and later manuscripts, which are now published in the volume 42 of Husserliana: *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte, Metaphysik, späte Ethik: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908-1937).*[121]

In my view, there are three important aspects of the affective unconscious in Husserl that should be made explicit here. The first concerns its formal definition in terms of *Grenzphänomen* which designates the unconscious as the zero-level of affective vivacity and features it as relative to the graduality of consciousness. The second corresponds to the idea of the affective past-horizon and the unconscious as "sedimented." The third explores the topic of the affective conflict and Husserl's take on the issue of repression.[122]

11.1. Zero-point of affective vitality and the unconscious as *Grenzphänomen*

The first and the most basic sense of the unconscious for Husserl is the non-vivacity as opposed to different degrees of vivacity of consciousness.

[121] As for secondary literature, the topic of the affective unconscious as elaborated by Husserl in the *Analyses* has been discussed in Aaron Mishara's article *Husserl and Freud: Time, memory and the unconscious* (Mishara 1990), as well as in parts of Bruce Bégout's book *La généalogie de la logique: Husserl, l'antéprédicatif et le catégorial* (Bégout 2000).

[122] An important aspect of this topic, namely the one that concerns drives and instincts, will as such be absent from the current interpretation. However, it is essential to Husserl's analyses of association and affectivity and thereby makes up part of what I designate here as the affective unconscious.

In the *Analyses*, Husserl employs several metaphors to describe this. Some of them, as Aaron Mishara illustrates (Mishara 1990, 36), evoke images from the German Romantic literary tradition, such as those of the "nightfall" or the "night of the unconscious." Nicolas de Warren underlines Husserl's employment of wakefulness and sleep as metaphors for transformations of time-consciousness, where de-presentification in retention and loss of "intuitivity" are seen as analogous to "falling asleep" (de Warren 2010). Other terms are used to feature the unconscious as the underworld, the realm of death and sleep. Closely related to these metaphors are the archeological images of sedimentation.[123] Other expressions play with the psychological and even psychophysical vocabulary of the time and situate Husserl's notion of the unconscious at the threshold of affective intensity. The difference between conscious and unconscious is grasped in terms of foreground/background differentiations and in reference to affective power and powerlessness (*Kraftlosigkeit*). The mathematical vocabulary provided Husserl with another useful term for the unconscious as the zero level of vivacity and an "affective zero-horizon" (*affektiver Nullhorizont*) (Husserl 2001a, 216/167).

What brings these different metaphors and analogies together is an attempt to situate the unconscious at the border of the affective vivacity of consciousness. Such a border, however, is not something that exists objectively, which could be measured or determined in quantitative terms. Moreover, Husserl does not need to suggest any functional relation between the intensity of conscious representations and the intensity of physical phenomena,[124] since from the start he attributes intensity or vivacity to consciousness itself and not to its content.

> [The unconscious] designates the nil of this vivacity of consciousness and, as will be shown, is in no way a nothing: A nothing only with respect to affective force and therefore with respect to those accomplishments that presuppose precisely a positively valued affectivity (above the zero-point). It is thus not a matter of a "zero" like a nil in the inten-

[123] All those metaphors get mixed in Husserl's descriptions, as for instance : "…every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes *sedimented* in the *realm of the dead*, or rather, *dormant horizontal sphere*, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the *head*, the living process receives *new, original life*, at the *feet*, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis becomes *steadily sedimented*" (Husserl 2001a, 227) – my emphasis.

[124] Cf. Brentano's discussion on the intensity of presentations and the question of the unconscious in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Brentano 1973).

> sity of qualitative moments, e.g., in intensity of sound, since by this we mean that the sound has ceased altogether (Husserl 2001a, 216).

The unconscious in Husserl is clearly a concept founded on the idea *of affective graduality of consciousness* and designates the zero-level of affective vivacity. However, the unconscious in this sense is by no means an opposite of consciousness, but is necessarily relative to it. It should be noticed that this formulation makes of the unconscious a *Grenzphänomen* and does not contribute to the substantial definition of the phenomenon. However, based on this general definition, Husserl succeeds—if not in fully developing a phenomenological account of the unconscious—at least in sketching several directions of its possible elaboration.

According to Mishara, there are two different types of the unconscious which can be separated here: the pre-affective unconscious in the impressional sphere of consciousness and the unconscious as the sphere of forgetfulness and the remote past (Mishara 1990). In Husserl, this distinction can be found in the appendix 22 to § 35 of the *Analyses* (Husserl 2001a, 525). The pre-affective unconscious mostly designates all the multiplicity of affective tendencies which do not reach the ego's awareness and thereby stay in the background against which prominent tendencies come to be differentiated.[125] In my view, this sense of the unconscious as pre-affective should rather be called pre-conscious and distinguished from the proper unconscious which refers to the past-horizon.[126] Later, this distinction is further clarified by Husserl by differentiating the sphere of the affective past-horizon and of "sedimentation," on the one hand, and the pre-affective background, on the other hand. The term "unconscious" was then reserved for the sedimented: "there are no other unconscious backgrounds than those of sedimentation" (Husserl 2014, 37).

[125] "Affective syntheses are those that reach consciousness, 'penetrating' the topological surface as the highest peaks of the relief structure. 'Preaffective' syntheses are those, which at any given moment, do not 'penetrate' to egoic awareness. They form the valleys and the background relative to the 'raised saliency' (*Abhebung*) of the more prominent figures" (Mishara 1990, 39). And in Husserl: "Something that is given as unconscious here would be something that is not grasped and that toward which the ego does not let itself to be drawn even one step of the way. Something forgotten however is something that no longer has any prominence" (Husserl 2001a, 525)

[126] In what follows, I will restrict my analyses to the unconscious in this last sense.

Thus, in order to understand Husserl's idea of the unconscious in this sense, we need to focus on the three following notions: background consciousness, past-horizon, and sedimentation. These clarifications will allow to go beyond merely formal definition of the unconscious as *Grenzphänomen* and to make explicit the important link between the problem of the unconscious and the problem of memory.

11.2. Affective past-horizon and the unconscious as "sedimented"

The past is a real stumbling block for any theory of memory which seeks not only to explain processes of retention and remembering but equally to understand how the past experience can be preserved so that it can be brought back to awareness. Merleau-Ponty pinpoints a certain paradox here, consisting in the fact that any idea of past-preservation already presumes that this past should be present in some peculiar way (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 436). Husserl successfully deals with this paradox in the case of retention which serves the double purpose of being past in the present and preservation of this present at the same time. The same goes for remembering which, by definition, is a *presentification* of the past. Only the remote past, the sphere of forgetfulness and sedimentation, appears to have this status of inexplicable absence: it is nowhere to be found, it does not appear in any way, and yet it must be somehow preserved since it affects our present life implicitly and can be reawakened in the explicit memory.

It is almost impossible to avoid this paradox within the frame of the temporal analytics of consciousness since this paradox itself belongs to the temporal order. As long as an approach to the problem of the past exclusively based on its temporal distance is chosen, this inconsistency is inevitable and there is no option but formulating a theory which makes the existence of this past in the form of neural traces or even unconscious representations plausible. In this perspective, the past becomes necessarily transcendent to the present life of consciousness.[127] However, as already argued in the previous section, the presence of the remote past and its effectiveness in nearly any domain of one's present life, can be approached without necessarily conceiving of it in terms of

[127] In the same vein, the issue of personal identity revolves around the question of identity between past or future self as transcendent for the present self.

hidden representations, but rather as an implicit dimension incorporated in one's way of being. Both Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs appeal to this dimension in terms of one's personal history as sedimented in the living body and the way it inhabits its space. Husserl also developed an idea of sedimentation and the remote past which served the purpose to solve the mentioned paradox and to explain how the "sphere of forgetfulness" can remain connected with the present life of consciousness.

In order to do so, Husserl speaks of the constitution of the past in terms of *horizon,* which makes the inclusion of the past in the sphere of living present possible only in its potentiality and not in its actuality. This potentiality of the past-horizon is made possible thanks to the retentional structure of consciousness in its double—affective and temporal—meaning as well as thanks to the fact that near retention belongs to the impressional present which serves as a source of all affective force.

The past-horizon is further divided into spheres of close past, as "the near horizon, and the realm of the retention that is still living" (Husserl 2001a, 529), and the horizon of the distant past or "empty horizon," as "'the forgotten' that carries on the differentiated retentional path of the past" (Ibid). This retentional path is carried on into an indeterminate empty horizon, that Husserl describes as "dead horizon," "endless past," "sphere of forgetfulness" (Husserl 2001a, 513), and finally as the unconscious: "this is original forgetfulness, the retentional element that has become 'unconscious,' the just past that has become unconscious" (Husserl 2001a, 525).[128]

[128] Similarly, in her analyses on retention in Husserl, Rodemeyer distinguishes between "near" and "far" retention (Rodemeyer 2006, 88-91). Whereas the former is involved in the constitution of the living present, the latter designates what is here called the distant past-horizon. In Rodemeyer, the past is thematized in the perspective of the temporal analytics of consciousness. Here, I am focusing instead on the affective dimension of subjectivity and memory. Based on their use made by Husserl, both terms "far (distant) retention" and the horizon of the distant past (or past-horizon) are very close to each other: "[…] everything that is retentional turns into the undifferentiated unity of the distant retention [*Fern-retention*] of the one distant horizon, which extinguishes all differentiations" (Husserl 2001a, 422). Sometimes he even combines these two terms into "the distant horizon of retention" (Ibid, 418). In my work, I prefer maintaining this distinction in terms of retention and "past-horizon" (instead of distinguishing between near and far retention) for several reasons. First, this terminological choice allows to overcome all possible confusion between "near" and "far" types of retention, while preserving the sense of retention for the continuous temporal modification of the living present into the just-past. Secondly, it allows to clearly preserve Husserl's own difficulties regarding the extent of the retentional pro-

The horizon of the distant past presents a serious problem for the idea of temporal continuity of consciousness because it presumes the extension of the retentional process beyond the point where this process itself is finished. On the one hand, the distant past is constantly present "since the 'distance' is there precisely as a horizon in the present at all times" (Husserl 2001a, 533), but on the other hand, it is the unconscious as sedimented history which goes beyond temporal modifications: "The past is finished time (*erledigte Zeit*), the finished duration [...]" (Husserl 2001a, 520). Husserl asserts that the retentional process ceases and sinks into the atemporal unconscious.[129]

How can one then make sense of this horizon of the empty past and the unconscious which became temporally atemporal? An important aspect of Husserl's solution to this issue consists in considering this remote past-horizon not exclusively in terms of its temporal constitution but as an "affective horizon,"—that is as constituted essentially through modifications of the affective vivacity of consciousness. As already argued in § 8.4, retention is not only a matter of temporal modification but designates equally the loss of affective vivacity. Thus, the constitution of the affective past-horizon is above all a function of affective modification in retention. The past-horizon is therefore a horizon of affective gradations, which extends from its peak in the impresssional present to the less and less affective retentional past until it reaches the point of ineffectiveness.

> Accordingly, the end is completely undifferentiated; its lack of differentiation arises from complete powerlessness of affection. By every retentional procession losing its affective force in the process of change

cess. For him, retention presupposes, in the first place, a "connection to the immediate realm of the present" (Ibid, 416), whereas the distant "submerged" past exceeds the process of retentional modification. Husserl underlines that the retentional process stops at some point and gets transformed into the sphere of sedimented unconscious. This sedimented distant past constitutes the core of the past-horizon. Finally, the use of the term "past-horizon" instead of "far retention" allows to overcome the merely temporal aspects of the constitution of the past. The term "past-horizon," therefore, is conceptually more suggestive and allows accounting for not merely temporal, but also "unconscious" and affective aspects of the distant past, as well as underlying its horizontal connectedness with the present.

[129]"Earlier I thought that this retentional streaming and the constitution of the past would continue to go on incessantly even within complete obscurity. But now it seems to me that one can dispense with this hypothesis. The process itself ceases. [...] this retentional modification leads further and further into the one nil" (Husserl 2001a, 226).

> it itself becomes dead, it can no longer progress by fusing under prominence; for positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life in dynamic connection and differentiation; if it is decreased to zero, its life ceases, precisely in its vivacity (Husserl 2001a, 219).

The retentional modification, as Husserl underlines repeatedly, is a transformation of consciousness itself, consisting of changing modes of temporal appearances as well as in the affective depleting of the original impressions. However, the retentional process is not only depleting and "clouding over," but it is equally a process of identification, inasmuch as it is the conservation of noematic senses of objects. "And when there is no affection coming from the diverse objects, then these diverse objects have slipped into sheer nightfall, in a special sense, they have slipped into the unconscious" (Husserl 2001a, 221). This "nightfall," however, is not nothing: all noematic senses are preserved there, but in such a peculiar and undifferentiated manner that prevents them from reaching conscious awareness.

Husserl underlines that "what is given to consciousness is continuously the same, but it is pushed back further and further into the past" (Husserl 2001a, 217). Thus, on the one hand, the retentional process is a process of identification securing the sameness of objective senses. On the other hand, it is a process of affective depleting and temporal modification. It means that an objective sense's temporal mode changes, loses its affective impact on the impressional present and yet the sense itself is not altered in these transformations. A song heard yesterday is still the same song, even if it no longer belongs to one's actual field of experience. "In the fading away, the tone itself thus does not lose anything that it originally was; if it is given at the end as completely empty of differences with respect to content, then this concerns its mode of givenness, not it itself" (Husserl 2001a, 220). Such a transformation of the mode of givenness consists in a shift "from an explicit sense to an implicit sense" (Husserl 2001a, 223). Moreover, empty presentations themselves cannot be described in terms of representational or explicit intentionality. The object-directedness in the past is therefore grasped as "implicit intentionality" (Husserl 2001a, 222), which can be reawakened and brought back to intuitive presentification, but which as such is in no way an actual objectifying intention.

Now, a self-imposing question needs to be answered on how this affectively depleted and temporally distant past can be reawakened again. Husserl claims that the unconscious past-horizon is a necessary condi-

tion for affective awakening and the latter is a prerequisite for remembering: "Awakening is possible because the constituted sense is actually implied in background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness" (Husserl 2001a, 228). In the process of awakening of the distant past, an affectively discharged, sedimented sense "emerges" from out of the "fog" and "what is implicit becomes explicit once more" (Husserl 2001a, 223–224). Such an awakening is a product of affective communication[130] and therefore a product of associative synthesis.

Affective awakening of the past and remembering are two closely related phenomena, which, however, should not be identified. While the first is essentially a phenomenon of affective nature, by means of which a past sense regains its affective force, the latter is an act of intuitive presentification, in which a sense becomes the object of an explicit intention. "The affective awakening,"—as Husserl remarks—"does not bring the uniform sense to intuition [...], but does indeed effect an un-uncovering" (Husserl 2001a, 225). Not all affectively awakened senses become actual intuitions or recollections, most of them never reach this level. In this sense, remembering is the transition of an awakened empty presentation in reproductive intuition. Without this awakening no remembering would be ever possible.

Thus, remembering is a modification of the mode of givenness of an objective sense and thereby of consciousness itself, and so is the retention: the latter changes the impressional consciousness into an undifferentiated past-horizon, the former transforms it into reproductive consciousness of the past. As one might remember, Bernet claims that such a reproductive consciousness itself can be understood as unconscious representation. However, in Husserl, the unconscious does not correspond to reproduction, but rather to this undifferentiated consciousness of the past-horizon. Moreover, I think it is consistent to claim that this consciousness is by no means a representational or an intentional one, but is an affective consciousness of the indistinct horizon of the past, which Husserl also calls background-consciousness.

> One may well say that within the zero-stage, all special affections have passed over into a general indifferentiated affection; all special consciousnesses have passed over into one, general, persistently *available*

[130] "Affective communication would mean that every contribution of affective force by any 'member' of something connected in distance through homogeneity and prominence augments the force of all its 'comrades'" (Husserl 2001a, 224).

> *background-consciousness of our past*, the consciousness of the completely unarticulated, completely indistinct horizon of the past, which brings to a close the living, moving retentional past (my emphasis – A. K.) (Husserl 2001a, 220).

In this sense, the past and all its content is preserved as a "horizon," temporally and affectively relative to the impressional consciousness. This past, therefore, is not anywhere (as some kind of container or trace): it is at the same time now and not-now: "…it is the past given to consciousness as empty of content, a past of something that is still in the process of the constitutive becoming in its ever new present" (Husserl 2001a, 219).

> […] every accomplishment of the living presence, that is, every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented in the realm of the dead, or rather, dormant horizontal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the head, the living process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis becomes steadily sedimented (Husserl 2001a, 227).

Accordingly, the preliminary conclusion can be drawn that there are two main modes of our relation to the past: the remembered past, in which it becomes an object of explicit recollection, and the affective past, which is present as an affective horizon and as a sphere of sedimentation and forgetfulness. In this latter perspective, the past has no other reality which could be attributed to it besides affective reality, relative to one's impressional present. In the *Analyses* as well as in later manuscripts, Husserl clarifies it as a sphere of unconscious sedimentation (*Sedimentierung*), whose affective status is always dependent on the actual impressional experience.

> Man darf sich da nicht einen festen Vergangenheitshorizont vorstellen, einfach bestimmt durch eine gewisse subjektive Entfernung von der impressionalen Gegenwart. Es ist dabei zu bedenken, dass, wie gesagt, das Impressionale, die Wahrnehmungsgegenwart als solche nicht allzeit gleiche Kraft haben kann und nicht alles darin impressional Abgehobene notwendig affektiv sein muss (Husserl 2014, 40).

The idea of the unconscious as the past-horizon constituted through affective and temporal modifications is closely linked to the idea of its ineffectiveness. If, as Husserl insists, "positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life" (Husserl 2001a, 219), and if the affective

vivacity of the unconscious is close to zero, then its affective impact must be fully dependent on the conditions of the present subjective experience. And indeed, this seems to be exactly what Husserl implies claiming that the affective reinforcement for the awakening of past senses must always come from the living present, as well as from dispositions and motivations inherent to it.

Although this position is arguably justified as it comes to the general conditions of affectivity (if the living present is completely empty and lifeless no communication with the past is possible), it nevertheless causes some trouble regarding the affective status of the past itself. Moreover, the reality of our subjective experience may cast some doubts on Husserl's view. The riddle of the past asserts its importance not because it has lost its impact on our present life but precisely because it has not. There are past experiences, which however temporally distant remain constantly affectively present to us, even if their influence as such remains unnoticed. Also the distinction between the sedimented, as characteristic of the distant past, and the totality of non-sedimented, as characteristic of the living present (Husserl 2014, 37), might appear contradictory. There is indeed a level of implicit and sedimented experience which by no means can be called unconscious as ineffective and dead for us. In what follows, I shall investigate the possibility to account for this issue within Husserl's own approach. Notably, his deliberations concerning repression and affective conflict come in handy and thereby allow me to draw some more explicit connections between the psychoanalytical and phenomenological approaches to the unconscious.

11.3. Affective conflict and the unconscious as repressed

One of the radical differences between Freud's and Husserl's theories of the unconscious concerns the affective status of the past and its capacity to affect the present. While for Husserl the unconscious corresponds to the zero level of affective intensity, it is the affective capacity of the unconscious which plays the major role for Freud. The main reason for taking the unconscious as ineffective and incapable of exercising any influence on the present consciousness lies in the very idea which specifies the unconscious as a frontier and the final point of modification and vitality.

However, Husserl also outlined other directions of enquiry concerning the affective status of the remote past and the sphere of forgetfulness. Already in the Appendix 19 to the *Analyses,* he questions the possible development of affections as "progressing" or "rousing from the unconscious" (Husserl 2001a, 518–519). In order to understand this line of thought, it is fruitful to address Husserl's take on the issue of affective suppression.

First of all, in the *Analyses*, Husserl approaches suppression of affective tendencies as a function of contrast. In general, contrast delineates the affective relation between opposite or antagonistic tendencies. The highest form of contrast is affective conflict: "Contrast is the affective unification of opposites [...] Rivalry, conflict, is the dissension of opposite things" (Husserl 2001a, 514). The applications of the principle of contrast are quite broad. On the one hand, association of contrast can lead to the increase of affective intensity of affectively unified opposite terms. Husserl's examples include the augmentation of the vivacity of the whole (a string of lights, a melody) by means of contrast between parts, so that a louder tone makes a softer one more noticeable, or a sudden change in brightness of a particular light influences the noticeability of the whole string. On the other hand, contrast in the form of affective conflict can lead to the suppression of concurrent affections, especially if they are not integrally cohesive (Husserl 2001a, 514). Interestingly, such suppression can equally result in an increase of affective vivacity which in this case is confined to the unconscious:

> In this case, a special repression takes place, a repression of elements, which were previously in conflict, into the 'unconscious,' but not into the integrally cohesive sphere of the distant past; by contrast, in the living conflict, repression takes place as a suppression, as a suppression into non-intuitiveness, but not into non-vivacity—on the contrary, the vivacity gets augmented in the conflict, as analogous to other contrasts (Husserl 2001a, 514–515).

To a certain extent, the concurrence of affective tendencies which Husserl describes as pertaining to the affective relief of the living present is already a case of suppression and affective conflict: stronger affective tendencies win over their weaker counterparts and suppress them into the background. Moreover, any retentional modification also presupposes suppression of other affections which gradually lose their affective impact. However, as it can be seen in the above cited quote, Husserl also

has something more specific in mind. Affective conflict suppresses the affective tendencies in the unconscious, but in such a way that the affective vivacity of these tendencies increase instead of diminish. In this case, affection which is "winning out does not annihilate the other ones, but suppresses them" (Husserl 2001a, 518) and this suppression has a reverse effect on vivacity of contrasted affections. In this passage, Husserl underlines that repressed elements sink into the unconscious. However, this is not the unconscious in the sense of cohesive, undifferentiated past that has lost its affective impact. Husserl's version of the "repressed" unconscious is alive and has its own affectivity which even imply that affections can evolve or progress from it.

Whether Husserl ultimately meant to separate these two versions of the unconscious—as undifferentiated past-horizon and as repressed—cannot be elucidated on the basis of his texts. Nevertheless, the fact that he was aware of the challenge that repression presents to the phenomenological theory of the unconscious is clear. Not accidental in this sense is the way he approaches it, seeing the repressed unconscious more as an open question than a solution:

> Affections can play to each other's advantage here, but they can also disturb one another. An affection, like that of extreme contrast ('unbearable pain') can suppress all other affections, or most of them [...]—this can mean to reduce to an affective zero—but is there not also a suppression of the affection in which the affection is repressed or covered over, but is still present, and is that not constantly in question here?" (Husserl 2001a, 518).[131]

It was clear to Husserl that repressed affections do not lose their affective vivacity and can even evolve from the unconscious. Not accidentally, he sees the question of repressed affects as one closely related to Freud's psychoanalysis.[132] In Husserl's opinion, the phenomenological clarification of instinctual drives and repressed affections can contribute

[131] A similar line of thought returns in the later manuscripts (1934), in which Husserl comes to thematize another kind of affective conflict—the one that belongs to the sphere of drives (*Triebe*) and affects (*Affekte*). In the Appendix XIV entitled "*Eingeklemmter Affekt,*" he notes that the intensity of desire is increased not only in an actual turning of one's attention towards the object of such desire but also in the opposite case, when one's desire is ignored and repressed (Husserl 2014, 112).

[132] When he claims, for instance: "Alles Verdeckte, jede verdeckte Geltung fungiert mit assoziativer und apperzeptiver Tiefe, was die Freud'sche Methode ermöglicht und voraussetzt" (Husserl 2014, 113).

to the eidetic (as opposed to merely subjective) analyses of the unconscious which were first brought to light by the psychoanalytic approach (Husserl 2014, 126).

Bégout, who first linked these fragments from Husserl's later manuscripts to the question of affective efficacy of the past, believes that this might prove that Husserl's view on the affectivity of the past is not uniform. He writes in this regard:

> In fact, Husserl develops the decisive idea according to which the repressed affections do not loose, contrary to what one might have thought, their affective validity and effectiveness. Indeed, repression of an affection by another affection privileged by the self, does not nullify its affective force (my translation – A. K.) (Bégout 2000, 187–188).

Bégout suggests distinguishing between on the one hand the retentional process, which corresponds to the constitution of the distant past as devoid of affective force, and on the other hand the process of repression, which also leads to non-intuitivity of the past but maintains affective vivacity of the repressed tendencies (Bégout 2000, 216). In a similar vein, when Nicholas Smith addresses the topic of the repressed unconscious in Husserl's work, he also underlines this double destiny of affective modification in retention. Notably, he shows how Husserl's analysis of the perseverance of sedimented experiences, especially in the sphere of drives and feelings, contributes to understanding the repressed unconscious through the lens of genetic phenomenology (N. Smith 2010, 228-241).

The phenomenon of repression illustrates that the past cannot be reduced only to temporally modified and obscure experience. Quite the contrary, seeing the past from the perspective opened up by analyses of affectivity allows accounting for essential differences in the way that it maintains connections to the living present. In this sense, it is plausible to accept the zero-affectivity of the past-horizon and repressed affectivity as *two main types of affective modification*, both of which contribute to the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious.

To summarize, there are several important points clarifying conception of the unconscious that emerges from Husserl analyses of passive synthesis. First, Husserl approaches the unconscious not in terms of cognitive or intentional structure, but as a phenomenon belonging to the affective order of subjective constitution. Husserl's idea of affectivity as constitutive dimension of subjectivity paves the way to seeing consciousness and the unconscious not as mutually

exclusive phenomena but as different levels on the scale of affective intensity. Secondly, Husserl develops his understanding of the affective unconscious as the sphere of sedimented past, horizontally connected to the living present. Concept of the affective past-horizon designates a particular mode of givenness of the past and intends to account for the connectedness between the present and the past life of consciousness which exists beyond the level of explicit memory and underlies the possibility of retroactive affective awakening. Finally, Husserl's inquiries into the topic of affective conflict and the issue of repression allow enriching his idea of affective modification and thereby contribute to a phenomenological clarification of the affective vivacity of the past.

As previously shown, all three discussed phenomenological accounts of the unconscious explicitly link this issue to the problem of memory. In Bernet, the unconscious mode of presentation is approached via the analyses of phantasy and reproductive consciousness. In Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs, it is the idea of non-representational past experience and the phenomenon of body memory which play a crucial role. And in Husserl, the topics of the affective past-horizon and of the affective conflict come prominently to the fore of phenomenological analyses. The discussion on memory, especially as portrayed in these last two accounts, clearly shows that this phenomenon cannot be limited to its representational or explicit form and demands a different understanding of past experience—an understanding that connects the past and the present life of consciousness on the implicit, immanent level, and allows to grasp the affective, non-representational presence of the past. In what follows, I am going to explore this implicit dimension of memory by inquiring into psychological and phenomenological approaches to the phenomenon. This new turn means leaving the purely phenomenological scene for a moment and looking at the same problem from a different angle.

12. Affective memory: A phenomenological account of implicit memory

Implicit memory is a topic of great importance in both psychological and philosophical investigations and one attracting increasing interest in contemporary research. It is important to note that the term "implicit memory" refers to not just one but different phenomena. The distinctive mark which allows describing memory as implicit presupposes two related moments: the detectable influence of past experiences, and the absence of explicit recollection of these experiences. For example, one of the most prominent researchers in this field, Daniel Schacter claims that the term implicit memory is applied "when people are influenced by a past experience without any awareness that they are remembering" (Schacter 1996, 161). Unsurprisingly, such a broad definition allows the inclusion of different types of unconscious memory in the equation. It is not an exaggeration to say that most of our everyday life is influenced by what we have learned, seen or heard before, while only a relatively small part of our past reaches the level of explicit remembering. In this perspective, explicit conscious recollection appears to be rather a rare and energy consuming activity, which can only partially account for the way our lives are defined and influenced by memory.

Despite the distinctively broad range of phenomena which appear to belong to implicit cognition, it is still a difficult task to come up with a convincing conceptualization and categorization which would be valuable both on the descriptive and explanatory levels. One of the reasons for this has something to do with the "negative" element in the definition of implicit memory, which has always been explored by contrast to "normal," i.e. explicit, cognition. Similarly to mind and subjectivity, memory has been tackled as a predominantly cognitive phenomenon, open to internal observation and eventually even quantifiable by suitable research approaches. Implicit memory, in this perspective, is an elusive phenomenon by definition: if one is not aware of remembering, then one cannot be said to remember at all.

The history of philosophical thought, clinical observations, and experimental research on the topic shows that theories of implicit memory have been developed by consistently separating it from memory as self-knowledge and by including different phenomena in the equation on an *ad hoc* basis. For instance, the first approaches to what is now clarified as

implicit memory concerned the area where the rational and self-reflective mind have no say—namely the body's own workings and organization. In this perspective, implicit memory was conceived primarily as body memory (*mémoire corporelle*), preserved in our *physical* body (Summa 2014b, 296). One of the first references to this kind of implicit memory can be found in Descartes, who in a letter to Mersenne mentions that memory can be preserved in body's muscles and nerves, as in a lute player who "has a part of memory in his hands" (Casey 1987, 146). The idea of body memory receives an important elaboration in both Maine de Biran (Maine de Biran 1954) and Bergson's (Bergson 1946) philosophical endeavors. Both thinkers greatly contribute to the understanding of habitual memory, which they isolated from representational forms of remembering. This direction is crucial in the philosophical explorations of implicit memory, and lays the ground for the phenomenological theories of body memory, inspired by Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 2012) and developed by Thomas Fuchs (Fuchs 2012a, 2000, 2012b), Edward Casey (Casey 1984, 1987), and Michela Summa (Summa 2011, 2014b).

Thus, up to a certain point, there was only one particular type of implicit memory which attracted the attention of philosophers, namely memory enacted through physical body and bodily habits. This type of memory is best exemplified by the performance of bodily skills involved in any kind of habitual bodily movements: walking, riding a bicycle, swimming and so on. According to the psychological research, this type of memory is usually referred to as procedural memory, or "knowing how," as opposed to "knowing that." Despite the importance of procedural memory for the psychological account and of habitual body memory for the philosophical approach to implicit memory, it should be made clear that the true breakthrough in the studies on implicit memory occurred in relation to somewhat different phenomena. Within phenomenological philosophy, a significant development was achieved by the elaboration of the very idea of the lived body, which allowed to considerably widen the scope of body memory and to include situational, intercorporeal, and traumatic memory (Fuchs 2012b). Similarly, research on implicit memory in cognitive psychology has shown that its influence extends beyond mere bodily or perceptual experience and includes feelings, behavior, conceptual thinking, and the interaction with other people. It is precisely this perspective that justifies the position of implicit memory as a constitutive dimension of the pre-reflective self-experience, and thereby puts it in the center of the current research.

12.1. Implicit memory in psychological research

Most the empirical research on implicit memory comes from studies on and observations of amnesic patients. One of the first documented cases of implicit memory was recorded in 1889 by Russian psychiatrist, Sergei Korsakoff, in his paper *Étude médico-psychologique sur une forme des maladies de la mémoire* (Korsakoff 1889). Already in this short article, Korsakoff distinguishes several fascinating features of memory preservation in patients with severe anterograde amnesia induced by alcoholic intoxication. Apart from the already mentioned procedural or bodily memory preservation, there are two other phenomena that attract Korsakoff's attention and that subsequently become of great importance for the experimental research on implicit memory and for the very conceptualization of it. The first concerns the patient's capacity to correctly guess information in absence of any explicit recall:

> What first strikes us is the fact that, even though the patient has no memory of traces of the impressions that he receives, these traces persist and probably influence, in some way, his unconscious intellectual activity. This seems the only way that we can explain the knowledge he exhibits in some cases. Two patients who had not met me before their condition always guessed that I was a doctor even though, every time they saw me, they categorically insisted that it was the very first time. Here is another case: I was giving a patient electroshocks with Spamer's machine. Every time I asked him what I would do to him he remained perplexed and answered that he did not know. I would urge him to look at the table where the case that enclosed the machine was placed. Then he told me that I was probably here to give him electroshocks. I know that he had only encountered this machine during his illness. Consequently, if he had not retained some trace of memory of the case containing the machine, he could not have guessed so quickly. Then it so happens sometimes that we enter a patient's room for the first time, he extends his hand, and says hello. When we leave the room for two or three minutes and then reenter, the patient does not say hello again. And if we ask him if he has met us before, he denies it. Meanwhile, we can observe in his behavior certain traces of past encounters in his soul and their effect on his intellectual activity (Korsakoff 1996, 9).

In the above quoted examples, one can notice that the influence of unconscious memories extends beyond the mere performance of body skills and includes conceptual thinking, attitudes, and behavior towards other people. Another feature which attracts Korsakoff's attention concerns the retention of feelings for forgotten events:

> Often, a rather interesting phenomenon occurs, when it seems all external perceptions and intellectual processes that took place in the brain have disappeared, some of the patients nevertheless seem to remember feelings that were evoked. When we observe how a patient conceives of a given object, we realize that the image of the object has disappeared from memory and that seeing the object does not remind the patient that he has seen it before. Instead the patient experiences an echo of the feeling first aroused by the object. This phenomenon also takes place with patients' treatment of people encountered during their illness. They do not recognize them and always think that they are meeting them for the first time; nevertheless, some people always seem to be sympathetic, and others not. The same thing applies to objects; one patient hated "electrolysis" sessions, and as soon as he saw an electrical machine, he was momentarily in a bad mood, even though he insisted that it was the first time that I was to treat him with it. I think that the only way to explain this phenomenon is to say that the memory of emotions lasts much longer than that of images (Korsakoff 1996, 9-10).

Similar observations were made by French psychiatrist Edouard Claparède about twenty years later in a 1911 paper "Recognition and Selfhood" (Claparède 1995, 1911), in which he describes the famous case of an amnesic woman diagnosed with Korsakoff syndrome. Similarly to Korsakoff himself, Claparède comments on the dissociations between explicit and implicit memory and illustrates his views with a now famous "experiment" he conducted on the patient: while shaking hands he stuck her with a pin hidden between his fingers. Even though she forgot the incident almost instantly, the patient refused to shake hands with doctor Claparède anymore reasoning on that occasion that "sometimes pins are hidden in people's hands" (Claparède 1995).

Subsequent researches not only confirmed Korsakoff's and Claparède's observations, but significantly widened the evidence supporting the existence of implicit memory. Interestingly, the groups of phenomena stayed almost exactly the same, but the body of research and conceptual definitions evolved significantly. For instance, Korsakoff's first observation about correct guesses in absence of explicit remembering was overwhelmingly studied in several experiments with both amnesic and normal subjects and has now received the prominent name of "priming."[133] In tests on word-fragment identification and word-stem completion (cued recall[134]), which were designed as word guessing games, it was shown

[133] For review see: (Schacter et al. 1993; Schacter 1987; Roediger 1990; Shimamura 1986).

[134] Note that "cued recall" is an implicit memory test, whereas "recognition" and "free recall" are considered to be explicit memory tests.

that amnesic patients performed not only above chance level but also as good as control subjects (Weiskrantz and Warrington 1970). The basic hypothesis consists in stating that the so-called *priming effect* occurs independently of explicit memory tasks (such as recognition and free recall) and therefore constitutes the basis for independent memory processes. Priming means that the "performance can be facilitated or biased by recently encountered information" (Shimamura 1986, 94). It is presumed that this information needs not be consciously available for a person. Thus, in amnesic patients, the priming effect seems to be preserved despite the decline in explicit memory functions. The priming effect and its dissociation from explicit memory have also been observed in normal subjects confirming the researchers' differentiation between implicit and explicit memory systems (Graf and Schacter 1985).

Priming effects on memory belong to the most experimentally studied part of implicit memory. However, as Schacter points out, priming is not restricted only to perceptual priming of words and objects, but can be extended to include conceptual priming, which has important consequences for the understanding of such topics as the formation of attitudes, gender and racial biases (Schacter 1996, 187-190). For instance, interpreting ambiguous behavior can be influenced by prior exposure to hostile concepts without subjects being aware of these effects taking place (Srull and Wyer 1979). Drawing from these type of experiments, Smith and Branscombe claimed that the phenomenon of category accessibility in social cognition can be seen as priming in person perception and hence as a form of implicit memory (E. R. Smith and Branscombe 1988).

A second important direction in the studies on implicit memory concerned the phenomenon of *implicit learning*, especially learning of new perceptual and motor skills, also known under the term of procedural memory, or "knowing how." For example, in Milner's and Corkin's studies on the famous H. M. patient, it was shown that despite profound amnesia, the patient's learning and retaining of motor skills were comparable to that of normal subjects (Corkin 1968; Milner et al. 1968). Cohen and Squire's experiments confirm similar results for the learning of perceptual skills, such as learning how to read mirror-image versions of words (Cohen and Squire 1980). Although priming is sometimes seen as a part of procedural memory (Roediger 1990), Schacter underlines that implicit skill learning seems to be independent from priming and related to a different brain system (Schacter 1996). In this sense, it is more convenient to see priming and procedural skill learning as different types of implicit memory.

The third group of phenomena involved in studying implicit memory concerns the *memory of emotions.*[135] Both Claparède's and Korsakoff's patients revealed something interesting in this regard. A long series of observational and experimental studies confirmed that amnesic patients preserve their attitudes and affections towards other people even if they have no explicit recollections of ever encountering them. For instance, the dissociation between implicitly preserved emotional preferences and explicit memory is shown in the case of the so-called Boswell patient (Damasio 1989). In the experiment, three researchers behave towards the patient in "good," "bad," or "neutral" ways. Consequently, when presented with their pictures paired with pictures of unfamiliar people, the patient consistently chose the "good guy" over the "bad" one and over unfamiliar people. Similarly, in a study by Johnson and colleagues, amnesic patients presented with fictional biographical information portraying one person as a "good guy" and the other as a "bad guy," developed affective preferences that were preserved over the twenty days retention interval even if they could not remember explicitly any reason for holding such preferences (Johnson et al. 1985).

Another important line of research contributing to the understanding of the emotional component of implicit memory comes from the research on dementia. In several studies, it has been shown that people with Alzheimer's disease can form emotional memories and show signs of their influence beyond any explicit recollection (Blessing et al. 2006; Guzmán-Vélez et al. 2014). These and similar findings have an important impact on the understanding of personal identity and selfhood in dementia and other amnesias as they show to what extent one's dispositions, emotions, and personal history are preserved despite the apparent decline in declarative memory functions.[136]

From this short review of the psychological research on implicit memory, it can be concluded that priming and learning of skills constitute the core of this approach to the phenomenon. Emotional memory follows but stands somewhat apart. An ambiguous status of this type of implicit memory is probably due to the difficulties of a clear-cut differentiation: not all of emotional memory is necessarily implicit, but part of the implicit memory clearly relates to the retention of affections and feelings.

Thus, three groups of phenomena that have been proven to belong to implicit memory can be distinguished: (1) procedural memory ("know-

[135] More on this topic: (Kihlstrom et al. 2000).
[136] More on this topic: (Sabat 2001; Summa 2014a; Summa and Fuchs 2015).

ing how") related to the preservation of bodily skills and implicit learning; (2) priming, which corresponds to the facilitation of memory performance based on previous experience in the absence of explicit recall; and (3) emotional memory without recall. All three are shown to be relatively independent from each other and related to different brain functions. What unites them is a definition. Some additional conceptual work can be clearly helpful in this area of psychological research.

12.2. Definitions: outlines of the phenomenological approach

For the purposes of the present work, I propose first of all to distinguish how exactly implicit memory is defined in cognitive psychology and phenomenological philosophy respectively. Such definitions should not only clarify how the phenomenon is understood, but more importantly provide the means for the classification of particular cases, that is to say to determine what group of phenomena can be subsumed by this term and potentially explained on the basis of each theory.

In both disciplines, the definition of implicit memory is dependent on the definition of explicit memory. Allegedly, it is generally agreed that explicit memory corresponds to the recollection or active remembering of a past event. It is assumed that a subject is aware of such recollection. In cognitive psychology, explicit remembering is further clarified as a form of autobiographical, declarative memory, or episodic memory. In phenomenology, especially in Husserl, explicit remembering belongs to the class of the so-called reproductive presentifications, that is to intuitions in which absent (i.e. past) objects are presentified, as opposed to intuitive presentations (such as perceptions) which designate intentions of present objects.

As previously outlined, in cognitive psychology, the definition of implicit memory and its distinction from explicit memory usually calls upon conscious awareness. For example, in Schacter, we find the following definition: "Explicit memory is roughly equivalent to 'memory with consciousness' or 'memory with awareness.' Implicit memory, on the other hand, refers to situations in which previous experiences facilitate performance on tests that do not require intentional or deliberate remembering" (Schacter 1989, 356). In other words, implicit memory designates such situations "when people are influenced by a past experience without any awareness that they are remembering" (Schacter 1996, 161).

An operational definition of the phenomenon is then reduced to a presence of retention or response in absence and/or independent of explicit recollection. In experimental conditions, this means that implicit recall is shown to be independent from the explicit memory performance. This general definition allows including in the group of implicit memory such phenomena as: procedural memory of bodily skills, priming on both perceptual and conceptual levels, and emotional memory without recall. Simple recognition is excluded from the category of implicit memory, as it cannot be shown to be independent from explicit recollection. For the same reason, other phenomena—such as emotional and traumatic memory—fall into the grey area between implicit and explicit cognition.

From the phenomenological point of view, "remembering without awareness" is an ambiguous definition. First, it suggests that a subject remembers, but just does not show any sign of awareness. This can mean that conceptually implicit memory is just the same type of remembering as explicit recollection except that it is unconscious. Such an idea brings back the issue of unconscious representations already encountered in the discussion on the unconscious in Brentano and introduces the riddle of a "memory that does not remember."

Phenomenology as a philosophical approach relies above all on conceptual (eidetic) and not empirical analyses, and hence must put into question the basic structure of experience which corresponds to the phenomenon/phenomena of implicit memory. According to the philosophical approach, in general, implicit memory is defined as non-representational form of memory as opposed to the representational or reproductive form of explicit memory. Already Bergson, describing the *mémoire habitude,* pointed out that this type of memory "no longer *represents* our past to us, it *acts* it, and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment" (Bergson 1991, 82).[137]

[137] Similarly, Freud distinguishes between repetition and remembering as two types of our relation with the past. While remembering refers to the reproduction of past events as accomplished and far gone, repetition is a form of present activity, in which the past is not reproduced but acted out: "[…] the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it. For instance, the patient does not say that he remembers that he used to be defiant and critical towards his parents' authority; instead, he behaves in that way to the doctor. He does not remember how he came to a helpless and hopeless deadlock in his infantile sexual researches; but he

In the previous section, it has been argued that the non-representational relation to the past lies at the core of some phenomenological approaches to the unconscious. Merleau-Ponty seeks to overcome the representational idea of memory as oscillating between "preservation" and "construction," and to disclose another type of subjective relation with the past which exercises its influence on the present "in the mode of oblivion." He holds that the explorations of these types of past relations must be made in the realm of bodily dispositions (Merleau-Ponty 2010). This very direction has been elaborated in the contemporary phenomenology of the lived body which specifies this non-representational form of past-relation as essentially bodily.[138] In this case, body memory is not taken to be just a form of implicit memory but its "most concrete determination":

> Body memory coincides with implicit memory insofar as the latter is lived through by a bodily subject. Body memory, thus, embraces the totality of our subjective perceptual and behavioral dispositions, as they are mediated by the body. [...] rather than being a re-presenting or presentifying act of recollection, body memory designates the pre-thematic impact of preceding bodily experiences on the meaningful, and yet, implicit, configuration of our actual experience (Summa et al. 2012, 418).

In this perspective, body memory is in no way restricted to procedural memory and bodily skill learning. It "extends to the spaces and situations in which we find ourselves" (Fuchs 2012b, 13). Understanding implicit body memory as situational and spatial implies that this memory contributes to how we inhabit our life-space, how we interpret given—and often ambiguous—situations, and which types of behavior we favor without being aware of them. Situational memory is also what underlies the so-called expert intuition which relies on implicit knowledge accu-

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produces a mass of confused dreams and associations, complains that he cannot succeed in anything and asserts that he is fated never to carry through what he undertakes. He does not remember having been intensely ashamed of certain sexual activities and afraid of their being found out; but he makes it clear that he is ashamed of the treatment on which he is now embarked and tries to keep it secret from everybody" (Freud 1914).

[138] Note that the lived body should be distinguished from the physical body, as it was first elaborated by Husserl (as distinction between "Leib" and "Körper") and further developed by Merleau-Ponty: "If, following Merleau-Ponty, we regard the body not as the visible, touchable, and moving physical body, but first and foremost as our capacity to see, touch, move, etc., then body memory denotes the totality of these bodily capacities, habits, and dispositions as they have developed in the course of one's life" (Fuchs 2012b, 10).

mulated in the course of someone's professional experience. Such intuitive knowledge facilitates the recognition of relevant patterns in an observed situation—patterns which would not be available to just a regular observer (Kahneman and Klein 2009). Fuchs gives the example of an experienced psychiatrist, whose diagnostic skills rely not only on the particular symptoms and the history of a disease but equally on the impression she receives from the patient's behavior and life situation (Fuchs 2012b). In Klein's research on the topic, one can find many examples of expert intuition in highly skillful chess players, firefighters, nurses, and army officers (G. A. Klein 1999).

Another important dimension of body memory is designated by Fuchs as "intercorporeal memory," that is implicit memory which underlies and facilitates the tacit level of intersubjective interactions. In the developmental perspective, intercorporeal memory is involved in the acquisition of motor, emotional, and social skills through the interaction with caregivers. In the course of development, these "early interactions turn into implicit relational styles that form one's personality" (Fuchs 2012b, 15).

Part of the emotional body memory can be exemplified as traumatic memory. As it has already occurred to Freud, repressed and particularly destructive experiences, even if they cannot reach the level of explicit recollections, often find the way through repetitive actions and attitudes (Freud 1914). In the phenomenological perspective, this does not mean that such traumatic experiences are preserved somehow unconsciously and exercise their influence "behind the back" of one's consciousness, but rather that such experiences change one's implicit dispositions towards the world and other people. After a traumatic event, the same situations, which appeared before as harmless, can become a source of despair and anxiety. This also affects the intercorporeal level of implicit memory and finds its expression in the undermined trust in safety of interactions with other people.[139] Undoubtedly, according to this approach, body memory encompasses much more than just bodily skills and habits, as it rather touches upon the foundation of personal identity and can be seen as part of the personality structure:

[139] "Most of all, the intercorporeal memory of the traumatized person has changed deeply: He or she retains a sense of being defenseless, always exposed to a possible assault. The felt memory of an alien intrusion into the body has irreversibly shaken the primary trust into the world. Every person is turned into a potential threat" (Fuchs 2012b, 18).

> All our interactions are based on such integrated bodily, emotional, and behavioral dispositions, which have become second nature, like walking or writing. […] Our basic attitudes, our typical reactions, and relational patterns—in one word—our entire personality is based on the memory of the body (Fuchs 2012b, 15).

I have mentioned here only a few basic forms of body memory in the phenomenological approach. Based on Thomas Fuchs' classification, body memory can be studied in the following forms: procedural, situational, intercorporeal, incorporative, pain, and traumatic memory (Fuchs 2012b). Edward Casey distinguishes, instead, three types of body memory: habitual, traumatic, and erotic (Casey 1987). Concerning implicit memory, Michela Summa also draws attention to the issue of recognition and of involuntary associative memory. Based on Husserl's research on associations and passive constitution, Summa describes the "associative and affective emerging of occurring memories [*einfallende Erinnerungen*]" (Summa 2014b, 299) as a form of implicit memory, differentiating it thereby from explicit recollection. In the same vein, the phenomenon of recognition as it occurs in the most common everyday experience can be distinguished from explicit recognition. Implicit recognition accounts for the sense of familiarity with certain things, and is ensured by identification syntheses "between the perceptual appearance and the obscure appearance in memory" (Summa 2014b, 302).

Thus, to emphasize the point of this section once again, in both phenomenology and psychology, implicit memory encompasses several types of pre-reflective or pre-thematic memory functions. Whereas in psychology these main functions are bodily skill learning, different kinds of priming, and emotional memory without recall, in phenomenology, implicit memory is clarified as encompassing habitual bodily skills, situational memory, traumatic and intercorporeal memory, as well as involuntary memories and pre-thematic recognitions. As I have argued, what phenomena can be actually subsumed under the term of implicit memory is highly dependent on the conceptual definition behind the categorization itself. In cognitive psychology, the definition of implicit memory relies, first, on the presumed unconscious character of implicit remembering and, second, on the test-conditions in which implicit memory is differentiated from explicit recall. Besides the conceptual contradiction involved in the definition of implicit memory as remembering without awareness, this explanation also limits the categorization of the relevant phenomena. By making implicit memory dependent on the test-conditions and by designating it as "facilitation in per-

formance" without deliberate recall, implicit memory is inevitably restricted only to such phenomena that can be shown to be independent from explicit recall in experimental conditions. However necessary and justified within the psychological approach, these restrictions make it difficult to understand phenomena that fall into the gray area between explicit and implicit cognition, such as: the variety of recognition, involuntary memory, emotional and traumatic memory, among others.

In phenomenology, the definition of implicit memory is derived from the experiential structure which appears to be common to this kind of past-relations. In several phenomenological approaches, this structure is seen as a non-representational, pre-thematic relation to the past, as opposed to the representational structure of explicit recollection. In the phenomenology of the lived body, this non-representational relation is further understood as essentially bodily. On this ground, implicit memory is clarified as body memory and includes different types of memory which could not be ascribed to it based on the psychological definition of implicit memory. It has been argued that Husserl's investigations on affectivity and his conception of the unconscious can be taken as another possible explication of this non-representational past-relation. In the following and final section of this chapter, I will outline a phenomenological approach to implicit memory directly ensuing from these ideas.

12.3. Phenomenology of affective memory

Husserl devoted a significant part of his work to the phenomenological analysis of memory.[140] These investigations, as most of Husserl's theories, can be seen only in development. Within such development, I suggest distinguishing three main stages.[141] The first stage corresponds to Husserl's theory of cognition, presented in his Göttingen lecture course

[140] The majority of it is assembled in the volume X of Husserliana dedicated to time-consciousness (Husserl 1991, 1966b) and volume XXIII about phantasy, image consciousness, and memory (Husserl 1980, 2006a). Several important texts on memory in its relation to *Fremderfahrung* can be found in the volumes dedicated to the analyses of intersubjectivity (Husserl 1973c, 1973b). The affective dimension of memory is mainly explored in the *Analyses concerning passive synthesis* (Husserl 1966a, 2001a).

[141] Rudolf Bernet's work on acts of phantasy, memory, and reproductive consciousness in Husserl (Bernet 2004) provides the theoretical basis to outline the distinction of the first two stages.

in the winter semester 1904/1905.[142] At this stage, he elaborates a decisive definition of remembering in terms of intuitive presentificantion (*anschauliche Vergegenwärtigung*) and assigns it to the same class of phenomena as acts of phantasy, image-consciousness, and empathy. All these experiences are clarified as representing absent objects in the present consciousness. Thus, the focus of the first stage is the *intentionality* of recollection.

At the second stage, which corresponds to Husserl's turn to the analyses of temporality and inner time-consciousness, the riddle of memory becomes the riddle of the consciousness of the past. To this stage belong all the most decisive ideas concerning the distinction between primary and secondary memory, retentional modification, and reproductive consciousness, which have been discussed several times in the course of this enquiry. As Bernet argues, the crucial transformation in Husserl's theory of presentifying consciousness is due to the introduction of temporality, which implies that "each consciousness of an absent is only made possible by the temporal nature of consciousness itself" (Bernet 2004, 93).[143] The focus of the second stage is, therefore, the constitutive *temporality* of the reproductive consciousness of the past.

The third stage should not be seen as overcoming or rewriting the achievements of the previous stages, but rather as complementing them and opening the way to a new understanding of the phenomenon of memory from the phenomenological perspective. This new way is outlined by Husserl's thematization of the affective dimension of consciousness in general and of memory in particular. In the previous and in the current chapter, it has already been explained how the phenomenological enquiries on affectivity and associative connections shift the meaning of many familiar phenomenological concepts (e.g. synthesis and retentional modification) or how they open the way to the phenomenological clarification of phenomena which were previously inaccessible to the eidetic analyses of consciousness (e.g. the unconscious). I believe that the complementing of the phenomenological explorations of temporality with the investigation of affectivity is precisely what first allows Husserl to account not only for the possibility of remembering and the constitution of the temporal past-horizon, but also for other phenomena which belong to the realm of memory. Moreover, my claim

[142] The third part of this course on phantasy and image-consciousness is published in Husserliana XXIII (Husserl 1980, 2006a).
[143] My translation of: "toute conscience d'une absence n'est rendue possible que par la nature temporelle de la conscience elle-même."

is that Husserl's approach to affectivity provides all means to conceive of implicit memory as affective memory, provided that Husserl's view on affectivity is taken into account. The focus of the third stage is, accordingly, the *affective dimension* of memory.

Concerning the whole development, three main phenomenological categories come to the fore, that define the understanding of memory in Husserl's approach, namely: intentionality, temporality, and affectivity.[144] The application of these three fundamental categories of subjective experience to the investigation of memory implies that phenomenology aims to account for their three constitutive phenomena, namely: retention, recollection, and the constitution of the past. *Retention* designates a temporal modification of consciousness which allows for the continuity of experience and for the preservation of the elapsed moments in the present consciousness.[145] At first, Husserl calls retention "primary memory" and distinguished it from remembering as "secondary memory." This latter one, or *recollection*, refers to the explicit intention, which brings past experiences to present awareness. The term *constitution of the past* specifies the horizontal structure of consciousness which ensures that the past (both close and distant) is constantly connected to the living present in the non-representational way, so that it can be brought back to awareness explicitly (in recollection) or implicitly (in affective awakening).[146] Such a three-fold structure of memory presupposes that not one of these phenomena can be sufficient by itself and that all three should be accounted for in order to achieve an integrated theory of memory.

When applied to the phenomenon of implicit memory, this suggests that three constitutive phenomena should be accounted for: (1) the affective modification in retention, (2) the affective awakening of the past, and (3) the constitution of the affective past-horizon. The affective modi-

[144] One could also add corporeality (*Leiblichkeit*) as the fourth category, but such an approach is more characteristic of Merleau-Ponty and the contemporary phenomenology of the lived body than of Husserl's investigations on memory.

[145] By retention I mean the most common meaning of the term inside Husserl's approach, referring to the "near retention."

[146] The distinction between the retention and the constitution of the past is both terminological and conceptual. The terms "past-horizon" or "constitution of the past" focus on the totality of the past experience. While retention designates the modification of consciousness and specific past-intentionalities, the past-horizon or constitution of the past implies the totality of the undifferentiated past as horizontally connected to the present. Compared to retention, past-horizon has a wider conceptual meaning: it includes the totality of the sedimented past and the unconscious.

fication in retention has already been investigated in § 8.4, and Husserl's idea of the unconscious as past-horizon has been the topic of § 11.2. In what follows, I will focus on the "affective awakening of the past" as a phenomenon designating implicit remembering. I will also consider anew Husserl's idea of the affective past-horizon, now more specifically in the perspective of implicit memory.

I hold, therefore, that while the intentional analyses of remembering and the temporal analyses of reproductive consciousness belong to the realm of explicit memory, the investigations of the "affective awakening of the past" and of the "affective past-horizon" contribute to the phenomenological exploration of implicit memory.[147] It should be noted that in spite of the privileged status of affectivity, two other dimensions (intentionality and temporality) also play their role in the phenomenological analyses of implicit memory. Thus, the phenomenon of "affective awakening" belongs to implicit intentionality, and the constitution of the past-horizon is due not only to affectivity but equally to the temporality of consciousness. Let us now consider how exactly implicit memory can be clarified based on these two ideas.

a) "Affective awakening of the past" as implicit remembering

I consider the phenomenon of affective awakening of the past[148] presented by Husserl in his *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* to be a form of implicit memory in what concerns the intentional component of this latter. This means that the affective awakening of the past designates a particular type of intentionality which should be distinguished from the explicit intentionality of recollection. While the latter corresponds to the reproductive intuition which brings a past experience to awareness, the former is, above all, a passive occurrence in which a particular past experience regains its affective force by means of associative connection with the present. Such an awakening does not mean that the subject has an actual memory of the awakened event, or, in Husserl's own words: "this awakening does not imply an explicit process of bringing to intuition; what is awakened can be entirely or partially obscure" (Husserl 2001a, 405-406).

[147] What follows is my interpretation and elaboration of Husserl's account of memory and affectivity. It cannot be found in his work exactly in this form.
[148] In what follows, I will use the terms "affective awakening of the past" and "retroactive awakening" (*Rückstrahlende Weckung*) interchangeably.

Husserl describes awakening of the past as an essentially affective phenomenon, which allows us to understand this mode of implicit memory as affective memory. Quite generally, retroactive awakening occurs when a prominent term from the present awakens something similar from the past. In other words, a reproductive association of similarity takes place.[149] Husserl understands such associative awakening as a product of "affective communication," or "a special mode of synthesis" (Husserl 2001a, 533) of what is actually intuitive with what has become a part of a past-horizon: "affective communication would mean that every contribution of affective force by any 'member' of something connected in distance through homogeneity and prominence augments the force of all its 'comrades'" (Husserl 2001a, 224).

Thus, while the synthesis of similarity is conceived of in terms of association, an actual "genetic phenomenon" of awakening occurs as transference of affective force from one prominent member from the living present to a hidden, implicit sense from the past. Husserl claims that "waking up sedimented sense can initially mean that it will become affective once more" (Husserl 2001a, 227). While retention is a process of identifying synthesis in continuous "clouding over" and affective depleting, retroactive awakening is a reverse process of *Ent-sedimentierung*. It also consists in an identifying synthesis, in which—contrary to retention—what is awakened regains its affective vivacity.

Interestingly, all affective awakenings (impressional and retroactive) consist in affective communication and the consequent affective reinforcing of associated terms, but the specificity of the awakening from the past lies in its capacity to reach into the sphere of the unconscious and bring back to life affectively dead objective senses. This implies that the affective communication is possible even if one of the associated terms lost all of its affective vivacity.

When Husserl writes about the "radiating back of affective force into the empty consciousness" (Husserl 2001a, 222), he sees it as a tendency coming from the living present and dependent upon the affective conditions proper to it. As is well known, Husserl features the living present in terms of the affective relief and the differences in

[149] In order to understand, how exactly Husserl approaches this phenomenon, we have to take a step back and return to the analyses of reproductive association in § 7.5 and of association as affective awakening in § 8.2. Here, both these aspects come to a unity, namely: affective awakening of the past (retroactive awakening) and reproductive association as designating different aspects of the same phenomenon.

affective intensities characteristic of prominent objects, affective interests and so on. Thus, for him, the interconnectivity with the past relies on the affective organization of the living present under two main aspects. The first is related to the principle of similarity. Husserl calls the associative principle of similarity the fundamental condition of awakening: "one color can awaken a concealed color, a pronounced sound, a sound that has become masked" (Husserl 2001a, 229). In the same context, he also remarks that the associative awakening can transgress sense-fields, so that, for instance, the rhythm of sounds can awaken similar rhythms in lights.

The second aspect which determines the possibility of retroactive awakening consists of affective preferences and motivations. Generally speaking, this suggests that affective communication is throughout determined by one's dispositions, attitudes, moods and interests. Not only one series of sounds can recall another similar one, but one's hunger at the moment could facilitate memories of the food, or a melancholic mood could create the conditions for the awakening of particularly sad memories.[150] As Husserl writes: "The motives [for awakening] must lie in the living present where perhaps the most efficacious of such motives [...] are 'interests' in the broad, customary sense, original or already acquired valuations of the heart, instinctive or even higher drives, etc." (Husserl 2001a, 227–228).

Now, after the description of the phenomenon, it is important to clarify why exactly the affective awakening of the past should be considered as a type of implicit memory. The first argument consists in pointing out its essential differentiation from explicit remembering. The two phenomena are closely related, but should be strictly distinguished from one another. Retroactive awakening means that the past regains its affective impact on the present, but does not yet reach the level of presentifying intuition. The intentionality of affective awakening belongs, in my view, to the so-called non-objectifying intentionality.[151] As for the manifestation of such implicit intentionality, it is above all not represen-

[150] In empirical research, this idea received confirmation in the studies by Gordon Bower on the relation between memory and emotion (Bower 1981). For a review on the research on state- dependent and mood-congruent memory, see: (Blaney 1986).

[151] According to Bernet, other types of non-objectifying intentionality are those involved in the kinaestetic and retentional self-consciousness. The non-objectifying intentionality also corresponds to the notion of operative intentionality, employed by Merleau-Ponty (Bernet 1994, 244).

tational, but it rather concerns the way the past influences the present experience. Relevant phenomena for this type of implicit memory are, according to Summa, associative involuntary memory ("occurring memories"), implicit recognition, and the "implicit experience of familiarity" (Summa 2014b, 304). Affective awakening further contributes to what can be called the background atmosphere of one's experience, the formation of affective attitudes and unconscious inferences.

Secondly, retroactive awakening is implicit not only in the sense that it is not yet a presentifying intuition, but also because it takes place "in the domain of passivity without any participation of the ego" (Husserl 1973a, 179). According to this point, such awakenings can indeed be called involuntary as they happen to us and are not brought about by some conscious effort. This fact however, does not necessarily imply that retroactive affective awakening designates only a particular type of involuntary associative memory. In my view, the phenomenon of affective awakening in Husserl cannot be restricted only to this specific memory performance of awakening of occurring memories, but rather constitutes the basis for any pre-thematic memory, and can, moreover, be regarded as a necessary condition for any explicit recollection. Husserl makes this point clear in *Experience and Judgment*: "*active remembering* is possible only *on the basis of the associative awakening which has already taken place*; the awakening itself is an event which always occurs passively" (Husserl 1973a, 179). Furthermore, in the *Analyses*, he claims: "In any case, the law holds that rememberings can only arise through the awakening of empty presentations" (Husserl 2001a, 231). Clearly, not all awakenings reach the level of actual memories, but all rememberings start as affective awakenings, and these latter can be seen as tendencies towards reproductive intuitions. As Bernet argues, objectifying (representational) and non-objectifying intentionalities are not independent from one another and actually complement each other. Accordingly, for Husserl, the retroactive affective awakening and the reproductive intuition are two different types of remembering which, however, both contribute to the constitution of this phenomenon.

The transition of awakened empty presentations into reproductive intuitions or actual recollections is by itself of particular interest. On the one hand, the conditions here are similar to that of impressional awakenings: tendencies have to be strong enough, form unities with other prominent elements, be favored by relevant affective interests and, after all, call for the ego's attention. On the other hand, it should be noted

that affections only call for such attention, but whether the ego would actually respond to them depends on its own particular "decisions" and on the limits of its attentive scope.[152] Beside the lack of attention on the part of the ego, there are also other obstacles to the transition of affective awakenings into reproductive intuitions: some affective tendencies can be suppressed into the background as a consequence of the concurrence with other, stronger tendencies, or in case of affective conflicts. Thus, a significant part of tendencies never comes to a relief and lingers in obscurity, thereby contributing to the general affective background of one's experience. The opposite can also occur to those past elements that maintain especially strong connections with the present and are continuously reinforced by cues from the environment as well as from strong "interests" on the side of the self. Such affections can exercise an impact that by far surpasses even the actual, impressional, sources of affectivity. It is no surprise that the past can be more alive for us sometimes than actual reality, even to the extent that the present itself can be removed to the background.

In my view, this distinction between remembering and the affective awakening of the past can fruitfully contribute to the understanding of memory performances in amnesia. In cognitive psychology, implicit memory is defined as remembering without awareness, wherein the nature of this remembering is left undetermined. I believe that this kind of remembering can be clarified phenomenologically not in terms of unconscious representations but in terms of implicit or non-objectifying intentionality of affective awakening. As the affective conditions of retroactive awakening precede those of active recollections, they can be preserved even when the explicit memory functions decline. As a consequence of this interpretation, the phenomenon of implicit memory can be credited with a conceptually very interesting role: implicit retroactive awakening can be seen not as essentially different from explicit memory, but as underlying it. In this perspective, any explicit remembering relies on implicit awakenings.[153] And if the first is damaged (as it is the case of

[152] Bernet makes this point particularly clear: "While Husserl increasingly conceded that the activity of intentionality initiated by the subject is most often preceded by the passivity of an experience undergone, he never abandoned the idea that the true life of the subject consists in responding in full lucidity to the solicitations of affect, in examining them from a critical viewpoint in order to decide whether there is reason or not to follow them" (Bernet 1994, 237).

[153] Another interesting feature of remembering which follows from its origins in the awakening of empty presentations consists in its intrinsically obscure character. In this perspective, all intuitive presentifications can be viewed as a mix-

amnesia), the latter may well be functioning. Past experiences continue influencing one's present through affective awakenings which simply never reach the level of intuitive recollection.

b) Affective past-horizon as implicit dimension of subjectivity

As the retroactive affective awakening is a necessary condition of remembering, similarly the background past-horizon is a necessary condition of retroactive awakening. It has been argued that this kind of awakening consists mainly in the affective reinforcement of something which is already there (Husserl 1973a, 179). It is genuinely possible only because "the constituted sense is actually implied in background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness" (Husserl 2001a, 228). This introduces the second aspect of the affective memory in the present interpretation of Husserl's account, namely the idea of the affective past-horizon and the sphere of the sedimented unconscious background. In the suggested three-fold structure of the memory phenomenon, this aspect refers not to the intentional component of implicit memory but to its horizontal part.

Husserl uses several kindred terms to describe this sedimented past. Most of the time, he speaks about it in terms of "empty horizon," but one can also encounter such expressions as "affective zero-horizon" (Husserl 2001a, 216), "horizon of forgetfulness" (Ibid, 530) or even a "dormant horizontal sphere" (Ibid, 227). I prefer the notion of "affective past-horizon"[154] as it emphasizes the three most important components of this phenomenon, namely that it describes the mode of givenness of the past (and not its existence for itself), that this mode of givennes is

ture of intuition with obscurity: "Now the past present is reproduced in the vivacity of the noetic-noematic flux with all accomplishments—with all accomplishments of remembering, which in the ideal case, are completely intuitive, while in truth remembering wavers in clarity and distinctness, thus, mixed with empty moments, a middle stage between pure, complete intuition and empty presentation" (Husserl 2001a, 232).

[154] It should be noted that Husserl employs this notion in §33 of the *Analyses* (Husserl 2001a, 204) and does not otherwise employ it very often. Generally, it can be seen as one of the many synonyms he uses to describe the sphere of the near and especially of the remote past in its horizontal connection with the living present. I think the notion itself is very telling as it underlines the affective component of the past constitution, which is favored in my interpretation of Husserl's work. Therefore, it is given here a much more prominent role than it has in Husserl's own vocabulary.

horizontal and that this past-horizon is constituted through affective modifications and is characterized in affective terms.[155]

It has been already discussed that Husserl describes the unconscious in terms of sedimented senses which lost all their affective vivacity. However, he also talks about the possibility to conceive of the unconscious in terms of repressed affections which maintain their vivacity in the sphere of obscurity. Moreover, the very connectivity between the past and the present is based on the possibility of affective communication between the two, which presupposes that this past is constituted affectively and is affective—not in the same degree of intensity as the living present but precisely as horizon relative to this present. Even if distinct "empty presentations" might have lost their affective force and become a part of the undifferentiated background, affectivity of the past-horizon as a whole cannot be equal to zero, at least as long as the affectivity of the living present is still functioning.

Thus, it is consistent to claim that affectivity designates the main medium of connectivity between the present and the past in the sphere of passivity. This applies not only to affective awakenings but equally to the horizontal directedness or openness towards the past. Moreover, affectivity contributes to the understanding of the particular mode of consciousness which the idea of the past-horizon implies. It is important to constantly be reminded that, in the phenomenological perspective, the notions of retention, empty horizon, and recollection designate above all different modes of consciousness of the past. And the mode of consciousness identifying the past-horizon is the most paradoxical one as it presupposes such a givenness that has become absolutely non-intuitable. This is what the unconscious means for Husserl: such a consciousness of the past that is not phenomenally accessible to experience. And this is why the unconscious becomes indeed an ultimate *Grenzphänomen* for the phenomenology of consciousness, which unveils its own limits (Merleau-Ponty 1993).

Although I strongly believe that this line of thought is productive, I must concede that understanding the past and the unconscious as given

[155] Thus, I take what can be here called the *affective past* as different from the other two available notions of the past, namely the transcendent past given in recollection and the temporal past, which is also a "horizontal" notion, but one based on the idea of continuity and temporal modification. The temporal constitution of the past presupposes a distance between it and the present and, along with recollection, grounds the transcendence of the past. The affective past, then, can be thought of as belonging to subjectivity in its immanence.

in the mode of "affective past-horizon" is far from being an ultimate answer to the question of how subjectivity maintains its unity with its past life. There are theoretical limits here that belong to the phenomenon itself. Merleau-Ponty in *Institution and Passivity* clearly underlined this fundamental ambiguity: we have to be able to think of the past beyond representation, that is, beyond the past as construction or as preservation (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 208). There must be, as he says, another way we relate to our past and yet such another way is constantly missing, most likely because this dimension of the past inevitably escapes the objective thought:

> Existence always takes up its past, either by accepting or by refusing it. We are, as Proust said, perched upon a pyramid of the past, and if we fail to see it, that is because we are obsessed with objective thought. We believe that our past, for ourselves, reduces to the explicit memories that we can contemplate. We cut our existence off from the past itself, and we only allow our existence to seize upon the present traces of this past. But how would these traces be recognized as traces of the past if we did not otherwise have a direct opening upon this past? (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 413).

However, when it comes to Husserl's approach to the unconscious, it should be noted that representational phenomena regarding the past are by no means dismissed by him. As we have seen, he attributes to the unconscious a peculiar form of "empty presentation," devoid of affective vitality. Distinct from non-objectifying intentionality of awakened affections, as well as from explicit intentionality of recollections, "empty presentations" must be yet another kind of implicit intention. In these, Husserl asserts, the identical senses must be preserved in an implicit form without any actual intention taking place. As Bruce Bégout shows, such an idea raises many questions which might even undermine Husserl's fundamental definition of intentionality in terms of noetic-noematic structure. He asks, namely, how can an objective sense be conceived beyond his mode of givenness and how, consequently, is it possible that a noematic sense can be preserved beyond any affective or active intention? (Bégout 2000, 204).[156]

[156] "Comment concevoir dès lors un sens objectal en dehors de son mode de donation, c'est-à-dire comment penser l'objet qui est visé (son *was*) séparément de l'objet tel qu'il est visé (son *als was*) [...] Comment un sens noématique peut-il être conservé hors de toute relation intentionnelle affective ou active?" (Bégout 2000, 204).

In Merleau-Ponty's terms, one could say that the idea of the past as preservation of memory "traces" is not completely alien to Husserl's thought. There is still some vagueness in Husserl's idea of the past: On the one hand, he conceives of it as horizontal and constituted through temporal and affective modifications while remaining connected to the present and containing the intrinsic possibility of awakening. On the other hand, the status of empty presentations, in which objective senses are preserved in the unconscious, is far from clear. I believe that at this point Merleau-Ponty's critique of representational intentionality of the unconscious is justified and should complement Husserl's idea of the affective past-constitution. If our present is directed towards the past in the horizontal manner,[157] this should not imply that the past is preserved in the form of unconscious, empty presentations. Merleau-Ponty's idea is that the unconscious and the past should be thought of not as sedimented in any representational way but rather as sedimented in the very structure of one's personality and behavior, in the way one perceives and interprets the world.

In order to better understand the idea of the affective past-horizon and especially why it should be considered as a part of implicit memory, it can be useful to read Husserl's idea of "horizon of forgetfulness" through the lenses of Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the past as existing in the mode of oblivion. In Husserl, forgetting is seen as a function of affective modification in retention. What is forgotten does not disappear but becomes a part of the implicit background of subjective experience. This past is not presentified nor given to any consciousness. Its mode of givenness is that of an indistinct horizon, a "dimension of escape and absence" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 436). Inspired by Proust,[158] Merleau-

[157] The horizontal structure of subjective experience is not limited to the so-called "horizontal intentionalities," which contribute to the adumbrational givenness of perceptual objects. Horizontality equally applies to expectations and to past-experience, meaning that the living present is always open towards not only its future but also its past.

[158] See, for example, the passage from Proust's *Within a Budding Grove,* which can be found among Merleau-Ponty's notes on memory published in *Institution and Passivity*: "And as Habit weakens every impression, what a person recalls to us most vividly is precisely what we had forgotten, because it was of no importance, and had therefore left in full possession of its strength. That is why the better part of our memory exists outside ourselves, in a blatter of rain, in the smell of an unaired room or of the first crackling brushwood fire in a cold grate: wherever, in short, we happen upon what our mind, having no use for it, had rejected, the last treasure that the past has in store, the richest, that which when all our flow of tears seems to have dried at the source can make us weep again.

Ponty was looking to grasp this elusive givenness of the past "in the mode of oblivion," therefore claiming that: "[…] explicit recollection and forgetting are two modes of our oblique relation with a past that is present to us only through the determinate emptiness that it leaves in us" (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 209).

From this viewpoint, it becomes evident that an important part of memory actually belongs not solely to what emerges on the surface of our affective consciousness but equally to what stays in the background. A person who once fell in love, learned how to read, heard a lion's roar, understood Bayes' theorem, or experienced a car accident will always remain affected by these experiences even if they are not constantly reactualized in his or her memory. Clearly, not all of these events will necessarily have an equal impact on that person's life: some will become fundamental and define his or her personality, others will become acquired skills or habits, some will be reawakened only when similar situations are encountered, and a significant portion of them will probably simply sink into the undifferentiated background. The past remains: not as hidden senses or traces in some deep repository of the mind, but rather in the way these events shape and change one's experience and thereby prefigure the totality of one's attitudes towards the present and the future. Similar to the horizontal structure of perception, in which an object is always approached from different sides while still maintaining a quasi-complete way of appearing, the unconscious past-horizon is what enables the present itself to be experienced in a way that has a meaning within, and is coherent with, the whole of one's experience.

To conclude this part on implicit memory, I would like to retrace my steps so far. First, I stated that in both philosophical and psychological approaches to this topic, implicit memory encompasses far more than just procedural or habitual body memory, but equally includes the wider scope of implicit cognition. In cognitive psychology, the three main groups of phenomena relevant for implicit memory are: procedural memory, priming, and emotional memory without recall. Within the phenomenology of

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Outside ourselves, did I say; rather within ourselves, but hidden from our eyes in an oblivion more or less prolonged. It is thanks to this oblivion alone that we can from time to time recover the creature that we were, range ourselves face to face with past events as that creature had to face them, suffer afresh because we are no longer ourselves but he, and because he loved what leaves us now indifferent. In the broad daylight of our ordinary memory the images of the past turn gradually pale and fade out of sight, nothing remains of them, we shall never find them again" (Proust 1924).

the lived body, implicit memory is clarified as the non-representational relation to the past and includes different types of body memory (situational, traumatic, intercorporeal, among others).

In the last section of this chapter, I argued that Husserl's notions of the "affective awakening of the past" and of the "affective past-horizon" can offer further contribution to the phenomenological exploration of implicit memory. The basic presupposition is here the same, namely that implicit memory must be clarified phenomenologically in essentially non-representational terms. In addition, focusing on the affective dimension of memory allows to specify this non-representational way of remembering in terms of implicit non-objectifying intentionality of affective awakenings. I argued that retroactive affective awakening can be seen as implicit remembering which should be distinguished from explicit recollection. While the latter corresponds to an objectifying intuition, in which objects of past experiences come to present awareness, the former describes a passive occurrence in which a particular past experience regains its affective force by means of an associative connection to the present. This aspect of implicit memory answers the question of how the past stays present in the life of consciousness and exercises some influence on the ongoing experience beyond the scope of awareness.

Another important aspect concerns the "pastness" of the past. In this perspective, the past is neither reduced to its appearance, nor to its unconscious influences in the living present, nor to some kind of reservoir of memory traces or unconscious representations. Here, Husserl's theory of the affective past-horizon and Merleau-Ponty's idea of the past existing in the mode of oblivion proved to be particularly relevant. The concept of the affective past-horizon designates a particular mode of givenness of the past and intends to account for the connectedness between the present and the past life of consciousness which exists beyond the level of explicit memory and underpins the possibility of implicit awakening.

In what concerns an interdisciplinary perspective, the above presented account can offer a conceptual framework and provide important conceptual distinctions for theoretical explorations of implicit memory. While empirical research operates on the level of particular phenomena and is limited to the test-conditions, phenomenology can offer a conceptual structure supporting the differentiations presented in psychological accounts. For instance, the idea of "affective awakening of the past" allows to overcome the theoretical difficulties involved in the concept of unconscious remembering and unconscious representations. It is equally able to

account for all distinct types of implicit awakenings without limiting their scope neither to emotional nor behavioral aspects. Further, the distinction between explicit recollection and implicit retroactive awakening allows situating implicit memory at the foundation of reproductive consciousness. It thus represents not a distinct and largely mysterious phenomenon, but it can rather be seen as a precondition of any possible remembering.

Finally, within phenomenology, this approach complements the existing accounts on body memory by extending the discussion to the realm of affectivity. It contributes, therefore, to the understanding of the pre-reflective level of subjective experience in its totality, and not as restricted to an abstract present moment. Connectivity between the past and present life of consciousness, enabled by the horizontal and affective structure of subjective experience, further contributes to the issue of personal identity. Affective identity accounts for the unity of subjective experience beyond the functions enabled by explicit memory. It actually underlies the narrative identity in the same way as implicit experience of the past underlies the explicit intentionality of remembering.

Conclusion: Summary and perspectives

The idea of subjectivity to be investigated at the intersection of its different dimensions was the starting point of this work. While retracing the development of the phenomenological views on the self, I drew attention to the fact that even the basic, pre-reflective level of subjective experience is not organized uniformly but it is rather constituted as embodied, temporal, affective, and intersubjective. The aim of this work was to explore the affective level of subjective experience and to see how affectivity contributes to the understanding of the unity of consciousness, of perceptual organization, memory, and the unconscious. The three chapters of this book covered three topics: (1) the unity of consciousness; (2) associative syntheses and affectivity; (3) affective memory and the unconscious. In what follows, I will, first, summarize the main points of each chapter. Secondly, I will point to several directions for further enquiry ensuing from this work, which fruitfully address, in my view, a series of questions worth asking and perspectives worth opening.

Synopsis of the first chapter: "Subjectivity and the unity of consciousness: A phenomenological approach"

I started the first chapter by addressing one of the main challenges of contemporary phenomenology which in my view consists in a clear need for a reassessment of its basic notion of subjectivity in order to be able to account for the essential unity and heterogeneity of subjective experience. I argued that there are two different ways of approaching subjectivity in contemporary philosophy. In its narrowest definition, subjectivity concerns the so-called phenomenal quality of experiences, which presupposes that mental phenomena, along with being defined as such or such (thoughts, memories, feelings, and so on), have an additional quality experienced by their owner, accessible to him or her from the unique first-

person perspective—namely, the "what it is like" character of experience, which cannot be shared with anybody else. This narrow meaning, common among analytic philosophers, does not necessarily imply that subjectivity or phenomenality is central in understandings of the human mind but rather is just one characteristic among others. The broader meaning of subjectivity, belonging almost exclusively to the continental, especially phenomenological, tradition, does not refer to a specific quality but rather describes the totality of human mental life as an open unity of subjective experience. The principle of unity, in this regard, is crucial to the very idea of subjectivity and subjective experience.

In order to explore the phenomenological approach to the unity of consciousness, I addressed the development of this issue in the tradition of transcendental philosophy (§ 2). I distinguished three main steps in the elaboration of the transcendental approach to subjectivity that shaped what I call the synthesis-based model of consciousness. The three main figures who most significantly contributed to this issue are: David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Edmund Husserl.

I argued that Hume can be seen as the first to formulate the problem of the connections between different mind states, and thus to give a new direction to the problem of personal identity. Hume's aporia of the identity of the self, which is at the same time his greatest difficulty and greatest contribution to the problem, consists of the following dilemma: on the one hand, we have a bundle or a whole of distinct perceptions, and none among them would give us an idea of an identical self, but all the distinct perceptions constitute a certain unity, or we should, at least, perceive them as such a unity. On the other hand, we have no means of explaining how these different perceptions are connected to each other or to the whole, or, in Hume's words, "*the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.*" Thus, Hume's most important step, which influenced no less than the subsequent tradition of transcendental philosophy, is an attempt to account for the connection between different perceptions, the *connection which, even in the absence of a self-principle, brings distinct pieces of our mind together.*

As Hume formulated the problem of connections, Kant made the most remarkable contribution, namely he suggested that combination is an essential feature of consciousness. Combination, which Kant also calls *synthesis*, is defined as an act of understanding prior to any experience, and as what allows the presentation of the manifold in the first place. However, Kant does not content himself with the simple indica-

tion that the combination of experiences is due to the *a priori* spontaneity of understanding. His crucial point consists in revealing that such a combination is possible only because of what he calls the "synthetic unity of apperception" or "the transcendental unity of self-consciousness" (B132), or, simply, thanks to an identical subject of experience to whom all multiple presentations belong.

In order to better understand what exactly "unity of consciousness" means for Kant, I suggested distinguishing between (1) the original unity of apperception, i.e. unity as it concerns the pure form of understanding; (2) unity as it concerns the synthesis of the manifold of subjective experience (understanding combined with intuition); and, (3) unity as it concerns the identity of a person. This distinction does not mean that there are different kinds of unity, but rather that there are different implications of the first principle of the synthetic unity of consciousness on separate levels of inquiry (respectively: on the level of pure thought; on the level of thought as combined with the manifold of intuition, that is of experience as possible *a priori*; and on the level of psychological inquiry about a subject's persistence over time). In § 2.2 devoted to the synthetic unity of consciousness in Kant's philosophy, I discussed the first two moments on the basis of the *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, and further extended the discussion to the issue of personal identity in the *Paralogisms of Pure Reason*. In conclusion of this part, it was shown that even if Kant argues in favor of an original and *a priori* principle of unity, making the whole of experience possible, he nevertheless restricts this principle to be responsible only for a certain kind of subjective identity (that of the self-consciousness), from which the numerical identity of a person does not follow.

Moreover, Kant's approach assumes that the principle of connection cannot be found in the experience itself, but rather on the side of the synthetic activity of the transcendental self-consciousness. I argued that this idea eventually leads to a separation between abstract and pure subject of thoughts and the experiencing subjectivity, which is left outside of any possible transcendental explication. One of the main challenges Husserl encounters in his philosophy is precisely the question of how to conceive of subjectivity as not being separate from its experience, but, essentially, as being constituted in and through its inner temporality.

In his phenomenological philosophy, Husserl develops the synthetic principle of unity applying it to experiential consciousness and claiming

that the form of time can be seen as a principle of subjective connection. In § 2.3, I suggested distinguishing two steps in Husserl's approach to temporality as contributing to the issue of unity of consciousness. The first attempt to account for subjective unity features time as real (*reell*) connection, and can be found in Husserl's early work *Logical Investigations*. The second step opposes the idea that the temporal form belongs to the real part of experiences, and instead features temporal connection as a universal structure of consciousness.

The idea of synthesis in its application to consciousness finds its confirmation and further development in the *Cartesian Meditations*, where Husserl claims synthesis to be "the primal form belonging to consciousness" (Husserl 1960, 39). Consistently with his previous theory, he designates time as the fundamental form of synthesis responsible for "a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness" (Husserl 1960, 41). A new aspect of this theory belongs to the genetic phenomenology which explores affectivity and associative syntheses.

In the last part of the chapter (§ 3), I suggested that this phenomenological approach to synthetic consciousness represents a constructive alternative to the one currently prominent in philosophy of mind, which conceives of consciousness in terms of "qualia." Even if qualitative feelings, or "qualia," are often seen as phenomenological features, one should not confuse them with the phenomenological conception of consciousness. I proceeded by questioning the thesis that consciousness is essentially qualitative—i.e. that explaining consciousness *is* explaining qualia, or "what it is like"—as well as the implication of this view that the unity of consciousness can be understood in purely qualitative terms. My claim was that being aware of a mental state and all its qualities is not necessarily qualitative by nature.

By contrast, Husserl's approach presupposes that consciousness is not a higher-order, objectifying act, nor is it a quality added to experience; consciousness can be instead understood through its synthetic function which enables experience to be unified and congruent. The phenomenological explication of the unity of consciousness in terms of synthesis implies therefore that, besides formal unity ensured by temporal connectivity, there is another conceivable type of unity, namely, the unity of subjective experience established through concrete, content-based connections. Constitution of this latter kind of unity was the topic of the second chapter.

Synopsis of the second chapter: "Associative Syntheses, affectivity, and pre-reflective connections in subjective experience"

In the first part of this work, I have pointed out that the phenomenological theory of consciousness[159] relies essentially on its synthetic function. In the second chapter, I have investigated the topics of associative syntheses and affectivity inasmuch as they provide some principles for the content-based connectivity of consciousness.

As the notion of association was given various misleading connotations in the history of philosophy and psychology, I considered it to be important to clarify the general philosophical context of the topic and to highlight the idea that association was originally expected to explore "the inherent lawfulness of mental life" and the principles of its organization. Already in the tradition of empiricist philosophy, especially in Hume, the principles of association were employed to describe mental connectivity on the pre-cognitive level rather than on the level of logical reasoning and high-order cognition. An original intuition behind an attempt to systematize the rules of associative connectivity consisted in seeing them as distinct from logical categories and yet as having universal validity. Somewhat similarly, in the contemporary psychological research on reasoning and decision-making, associations belong to the rules of the so-called automatic, intuitive thinking (as opposed to deliberate and rational reasoning). In the phenomenological perspective, the topic of association and of associative syntheses is instead taken to designate universal principles of consciousness determining the inner, implicit organization of the subjective experience (as opposed to explicit, predicative, narrative level of self-experience).

This task and the possibility of its phenomenological undertaking rely on the particular methodology of phenomenology itself, which differ significantly from the common methods of psychological research. Even though both scientific psychology and phenomenological philosophy intend to uncover regularities and essential rules pertaining to mental organization, they achieve this very differently. In order to make these methodological differences clear, I distinguished three types of regularities, namely *intuitive* (typical of everyday experience and commonsensi-

[159] The reference here is only to Husserl's phenomenology, since, obviously, phenomenological philosophy today can hardly be called uniform in what concerns both its main principles and methodology.

cal knowledge), *statistical* (based on analyses of categories and ensembles of data in the scientific research), and *eidetic* (based on the phenomenological method of "eidetic variation" and aiming to uncover essential structures of mental phenomena).

Another important point in delineating the phenomenological notion of association concerns its relation to associationists and Gestalt psychologies and to the dispute between the two concerning the primacy of holistic or atomistic views on mental organization. From the phenomenological perspective, both positions are unsatisfactory in what concerns their resulting or implicit views on consciousness. Husserl insists that the phenomenological approach to association can be developed only as part of the transcendental approach to consciousness, and association itself can be conceived of as a particular type of synthesis of consciousness. In accordance with the main idea of the first chapter, this confirms that Husserl's view on consciousness and on associations belongs not to the empirical exploration of association, but rather to the tradition of transcendental philosophy and its idea of synthetic consciousness.

After having considered these general questions, I turned to Husserl's transcendental doctrine of passive syntheses and discussed the topics of association and affection and their meaning for the phenomenological theory of synthetic consciousness and genesis of subjectivity. In an attempt to present a systematization of Husserl's account of associative syntheses in the *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis*, I suggested to distinguish between three main types of associative connections: (1) reproductive association; (2) anticipatory association; and (3) primordial association (*Urassoziation*); and then consequently to describe the principles of syntheses and unity-formations pertaining to primordial and reproductive association. While the topic of primordial association can be seen as a foundation of the phenomenological approach to perceptual integration and organization, the topic of reproductive association provides an insight on the phenomenological theory of memory and on the genesis of subjectivity as conscious of its entire life, with its past and future-horizons. An important concept here is the so-called "associative awakening of the past," which might be seen as a genetic precondition of remembering.

The topic of association and the originality of its phenomenological elucidation become clearer when Husserl links it to the phenomenon of affection. The description of the basic principles of experiential organization appears to be incomplete as long as the affective dimension of the

subjective experience is not taken into account. The main reason for this is that the principles of association and the formation of unities alone are not sufficient to explain the conditions of prominence of particular experiences. In Husserl's words, the actual connectivity of consciousness and the formations of unities necessarily presuppose affective vivacity. In § 8 of the second chapter, I presented Husserl's account of affectivity of consciousness by inquiring into the notion of affection and the corresponding concepts of affective intensity, affective relief and affective awakening. The role of affectivity acquires special original meaning when applied to such issues as the affective constitution of the pre-reflective selfhood; the formation of affective unities; and the clarification of the affective dimension of memory-related phenomena (namely, retentional modification, recollection and constitution of the past). Moreover, in the larger perspective, it amounts to a new approach to consciousness, the unconscious, and subjectivity itself.

An important conclusion of this second chapter states the possibility to reconsider the very idea of consciousness and of the unity of subjective experience through the lenses of associative and affective connectivity. First, the thematization of affectivity and of affective vivacity brings about such a concept of consciousness and correlatively of the unconscious, which presents an interesting alternative to representational accounts; consciousness and the unconscious thus can be seen not as opposite and mutually exclusive notions, but as different levels on the scale of affective intensity. Secondly, the distinction between temporal and associative-affective syntheses allows the differentiation of several types of identities. While temporality is responsible for the experiential continuity and *formal identity* between the present, future, and past life of the subject, affectivity and associative connectivity is what makes its concrete, *affective identity* and meaningful coherence possible. This view suggests that the totality of the subjective experience can be seen not only as a continuity of conscious becoming, but also as a throughout interrelated affective nexus. Accordingly, subjectivity can be understood not as a singular subject for itself, but as a concrete unity of affectively interrelated experiences.

Synopsis of the third chapter: "Affective memory and the unconscious"

In conclusion of the second chapter, I stated that Husserl's account of affectivity and associative connectivity of consciousness contributes to the explication of the pre-reflective organization of subjective experience. Moreover, I claimed that it represents an alternative to the representationalist views on consciousness and allows the overcoming of any strict separation between consciousness and the unconscious. In the third chapter, I pursued the direction opened by this idea and expanded the remarks on affective connectivity in order to account for the pre-reflective unity between the present and the past life of consciousness.

In this chapter, I covered several topics and mentioned different phenomenological and psychological approaches to the phenomena of memory and the unconscious. One main direction, however, remained consistent throughout these deliberations, namely the distinction between the two modes of subjective past-experience. The first corresponds to explicit remembering and designates such an experience in which the past appears as an intentional object. The second amounts to the way one's past influences the present without itself becoming an explicit object of remembering. This latter type of past-relation corresponds to implicit memory and the constitution of the unconscious background of subjective experience. The distinction between explicit and implicit dimensions of past-experience was introduced in § 9 and was further elaborated at each stage of the present work.

The chapter is divided into two thematic blocks: the first explores the phenomenological approaches to the unconscious (§§ 10&11) and the second deals with the topic of implicit memory (§ 12). The narrative structures of these two parts are to a certain extent identical: I start by presenting the problem and the way it has been approached in phenomenological or psychological theories, then I turn to Husserl's account of passive syntheses and discuss some possible approaches to the phenomena of the unconscious and implicit memory from the perspective of his studies on affectivity. It should be noted, that even if Husserl's *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* are the main source of this chapter, Merleau-Ponty is its true inspiration. Many valuable ideas, which I have tried to lay out here belong to or ensue from his thoughts on these two related topics.

I introduced the part entitled "Phenomenological accounts of the unconscious" by inquiring into how phenomenology comes to the problem of the unconscious inside its own approach, or, in other words: how the problem of the unconscious arises from the investigations of consciousness itself. The starting point, which largely defined what Fink called the "implicit theory of consciousness," can be found in Brentano's view. For Brentano, the understanding of the problem of consciousness and correlatively of the unconscious revolves around the representational nature of conscious phenomena. In this perspective, consciousness is defined as a mental phenomenon accompanied by pre-reflective internal representation (*innere Vorstellung*). The unconscious, on its turn, becomes equal to internally unperceived representational consciousness. Within Brentano's view, the thus defined unconscious turns out to be a contradictory phenomenon, essentially similar to the "unseen seeing" or "thinking that does not think." The development of the phenomenological approach to consciousness in Husserl's works and in other phenomenological theories opened instead new ways of thinking about the unconscious. I suggested distinguishing two main directions in the phenomenological understanding of this issue: the one exploring the intentional theory of the unconscious, and the other inquiring into the non-representationalist way of approaching consciousness and the unconscious respectively.

An example of the first account can be found in Bernet's analysis of the unconscious representations in phantasy. His approach underlines a particular aspect of the issue, namely the manifestation of unconscious representations in the reproductive inner consciousness. According to Bernet's interpretation, the unconscious can be clarified phenomenologically not as "amputated, unperceived consciousness" (Bernet 2002, 330) but as another type of self-consciousness. Such self-consciousness is defined in respect of what appears (the absent, the alien) and how it appears in consciousness (reproductively as opposed to impressionally), but not in terms of this appearance being itself devoid of a certain "conscious" quality or accompanying representation.

Another direction is pursued by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception as well as by Thomas Fuchs' phenomenology of body memory. Unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty finds himself confronted with a challenge similar to the psychoanalytic endeavor, that is to say a view on consciousness as intrinsically intransparent for itself. Merleau-Ponty believes that the idea of representation obscures the understanding of both consciousness and the unconscious. He, therefore, rejects the view

on the latter as another "I think," storing repressed thoughts and feelings behind the back of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty seeks to understand the unconscious as a "sedimented practical schema" of subjective being in the world, which contributes to the way we implicitly interpret reality, fill in the gaps of uncertainty, and invest meaning in our interactions with people. He also applies his critique of representationalism to the phenomenon of memory and suggests that the subject's relation to the past is mediated as much by forgetting as by remembering. Fuchs develops this line of research even further in his theory of body memory. In his phenomenology of the lived body, the unconscious is understood not in terms of representations or hidden intentionalities but as a sum of bodily dispositions which tacitly define one's personality, individual relation to the world and to other people. While Bernet claims that the unconscious is the presence of the absent, appearance of the non-appearing, Fuchs develops Merleau-Ponty's view that the unconscious is "absence in presence, the unperceived in the perceived" (Fuchs 2012a, 101). This absence, however, is not the concealed or isolated reverse side of consciousness, but its own way of being—the sum of incorporated predispositions, habits and alike which themselves do not appear in any graspable way, but instead constitute a background against which we relate to the world.

Another non-representational approach to the unconscious can be found in Husserl's analyses of association and affectivity. In my view, his idea of affectivity as constitutive dimension of subjectivity paves the way to an approach to consciousness and the unconscious not as mutually exclusive phenomena but as different levels on the scale of affective intensity. In my interpretation of Husserl's view on the affective unconscious, I suggested approaching this phenomenon from three main angles. The first concerns a formal definition of the unconscious as *Grenzphänomen*, which designates it as the zero-level of affective vivacity and features it as relative to the graduality of consciousness. The second corresponds to the idea of the affective past-horizon and the unconscious as "sedimented." The third explores the topic of the affective conflict and Husserl's take on the issue of repression.

In the second part of this chapter, I expanded the discussion on the phenomenological unconscious in order to account for the problem of implicit memory. As this topic received attention in both psychological and philosophical investigations, I believe it was important to start with a short review of the psychological approach to implicit memory in

order to, consequently, compare it with the phenomenological view on the same phenomenon. Interestingly, the development of research on this topic in both disciplines shows that the scope of implicit memory encompasses far more than just procedural or habitual body memory. I have shown that in cognitive psychology implicit memory refers to three phenomena: (1) procedural memory ("knowing how") related to preservation of bodily skills and implicit learning; (2) priming, which corresponds to facilitation of memory performance based on previous experience in the absence of explicit recall; and (3) emotional memory without recall. In phenomenology, implicit memory is clarified as encompassing habitual bodily skills, situational memory, traumatic and intercorporeal memory, as well as involuntary memories and pre-thematic recognition. I argued that the conceptual definitions common to these two respective theories directly determine the categorization of phenomena that can be subsumed under the term of implicit memory. In cognitive psychology, such definition relies, first, on the presumption that implicit remembering is unconscious and, second, on the test-conditions in which implicit memory can be differentiated from explicit recall. In phenomenology, the definition of implicit memory is instead derived from the experiential structure which appears to be common to this kind of past-relation. In several phenomenological approaches, this structure is seen as non-representational, or as a pre-thematic relation to the past as opposed to the representational structure of explicit recollection. In the phenomenology of the lived body, this non-representational relation is further understood as essentially bodily. On this ground, implicit memory is clarified as body memory and includes different types of memory, which could not be ascribed to it on the basis of the psychological definition of the same phenomenon.

I further presented Husserl's account of affective memory and suggested that it can contribute to the phenomenological clarification of implicit memory. In the development of Husserl's work, the investigations on the affective dimension of memory can be seen as the later stage complementing his analyses of intentionality and temporality. The application of these three fundamental categories of subjective experience (intentionality, temporality, and affectivity) to the investigation of memory implies that phenomenology aims to account for its three constitutive phenomena, namely: retention, recollection, and the constitution of the past. I hold that while intentional analyses of remembering and temporal analyses of reproductive consciousness belong to the realm of explicit memory, the

investigations of the "affective awakening of the past" and of the "affective past-horizon" contribute to the phenomenological exploration of implicit memory.

I argued that retroactive affective awakening can be seen as implicit remembering which should be distinguished from explicit recollection. While the latter corresponds to an objectifying intuition, in which objects of past experiences come to present awareness, the former describes a passive occurrence in which a particular past experience regains its affective force by means of associative connection with the present. The intentionality of retroactive awakenings is in principle non-objectifying and its manifestation is not representational, as it rather concerns the way the past tacitly influences the present experience. In my view, this distinction between remembering and the affective awakening of the past can contribute to the understanding of memory performances in amnesia. For instance, it can be seen as a phenomenological clarification of "remembering without awareness," which otherwise risks to fall into the obscure category of unconscious representations.

Another aspect of the phenomenological understanding of implicit memory deals with the constitution of the affective past-horizon. This topic brings together both parts of this chapter, due to the fact that, in Husserl, background consciousness of the past coincides with his understanding of the unconscious. The concept of affective past-horizon designates a particular mode of givenness of the past and intends to account for the connectedness between the present and the past life of consciousness which exists beyond the level of explicit memory and underlies the possibility of implicit remembering. This idea is also in accord with Merleau-Ponty's intuition, according to which we relate to our past not only in the mode of recollection but also "in the mode of oblivion." What is forgotten does not disappear but contributes to the tacit background of one's life, which can be seen not as a hidden reservoir of memory-traces but rather as a horizon which constantly shapes the way we perceive and interpret reality.

I concluded this chapter with the brief indication that affective connectivity of subjective experience, which enables its pre-reflective unity, can also contribute to the issue of personal identity. As explicit and autobiographical memory serves as a foundation for the narrative identity, similarly implicit memory in the above mentioned sense allows the description of the "affective identity" of a subject.

Perspectives for future research

I would now like to outline three main directions for further research ensuing from the ideas developed in this text. The first line of enquiry links the synthetic function of consciousness to the preference for coherence inherent to subjective experience. The second explores how the phenomenological understanding of the inadequate character of intuitive experience can contribute to the issue of uncertainty. And the third further specifies some distinctive features of the phenomenological approach to personal identity.

In the first chapter, I argued that besides being heterogeneous, subjective experience shows almost ubiquitous and remarkable *preference for coherence* and is unified. The coherent organization of subjective experience can be observed on many levels: the unification and multisensory integration of the perceptual and bodily experience; the continuity of experience in its temporal extension; the preference for congruity in the construction of life-narratives, our relation to the past and to the possible future; the strong consistency bias in our behavior and decision making. In general terms, our conscious experience in the variety of its forms can hardly stand "blind spots," and it shows a strong inclination towards coherence.

In my view, in order to account for this ubiquitous strive for coherence, it is fruitful to look into the issue of the unity of consciousness and the way connectivity of subjective experience is constituted. In the phenomenological perspective, the most consistent and sustainable claim consists in linking the unity of consciousness to self-awareness, stating thereby that it is the implicit, pre-reflective "mineness" of experience which accounts for its unified character. Importantly, this self is not conceived of as a substance or independent transcendental entity, but rather, in Zahavi's words, as "experiential dimension" (Zahavi 2011). In this work, I argued that there is another phenomenologically consistent way to explain the unity of consciousness, which can complement the self-centered unity theory. According to this alternative perspective, the unity and coherence of subjective experience are enabled by the synthetic function of consciousness. I referred to the resulting view on consciousness as to the synthesis-based model of consciousness.

The idea of synthetic consciousness, as I see it, is particularly well suited to account for the coherence of subjective experience as it clarifies precisely how the connectivity of consciousness enables different kinds of

experiential organization. For instance, temporal connectivity makes continuity possible, as well as all forms of experience depending on it (such as perception of temporal objects, tacit temporal continuity of one's life, and formation of extended personal narratives). Associative connectivity, on the other hand, accounts for the perceptual organization in the living present, for the content-based connectivity with the past, and, as I argued, for implicit memory. Future research should clarify this connection between the unity of consciousness and experiential coherence more in detail and also explore all possible links between phenomenological, psychopathological, and psychological levels of inquiry.

The implications of the preference for coherence on the psychological level are of particular interest. Research on the attribution of causality shows that people tend to always interpret neutral data in the most coherent way ascribing goals and meanings to observed situations (Heider and Simmel 1944; Michotte 1963). Psychologists underline that people feel more confident when they can link (casually, systematically or otherwise) events or facts and construct a coherent interpretation which would make sense of partially available information. Moreover, the lack of information does not impede but rather facilitates the coherence of the resulting story. As Kahneman remarks, "The confidence that people experience is determined by the coherence of the story they manage to construct from available information. It is the consistency of the information that matters for a good story, not its completeness. Indeed, you will often find that knowing little makes it easier to fit everything you know into a coherent pattern" (Kahneman 2011, 87).

This last remark already shows that the unified and coherent character of subjective experience cannot be separated from its inherent incompleteness and inadequateness. In the *Analyses concerning Passive synthesis*, Husserl mainly discusses it on the example of external perception, pointing out that inadequateness belongs to it intrinsically. He famously claims that perception is a "constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish" (Husserl 2001a, 39). Perception, as Husserl sees it, is a mixture of what is actually intuitively given (a particular side or aspect of an object) and what is intended as a whole object of perception. This latter is never and can never be fully given in intuition, its perception is intrinsically linked to the "intentional horizon" of possible appearances. The same applies to remembering, which even while allowing us some access to the past, can never fully exhaust it. Encountering other people and understanding

what is on their minds is the most striking example of all: while we have an immediate experience and contact with other persons, we possess neither direct access to their minds nor sufficient information. Not much different is our experience of our own past and future selves: we find ourselves only in the here and now, while the stretches of our past and future may remain obscure and foreign to us.

Within a larger perspective, this means that any intuitive experience[160] is in principle insufficient, uncertain, and incomplete and can never be considered a source of adequate knowledge.[161] But, if this is the case, does it mean that our intuitive experience constantly fail us? Paraphrasing Husserl, we could ask: is our whole experience just *a pretension to accomplish something that cannot be accomplished*?

Husserl further adds that this incompleteness is at odds with the way we feel about our experience as indeed it *appears* perfectly adequate.[162] In my view, these two aspects must be seen as interrelated: on the one hand, our experience in its different forms is intrinsically characterized by incompleteness and limited fulfillment, while, on the other hand, it shows ubiquitous preference for coherence and consistency. Consistency is not the opposite of uncertainty, it is its counterpart. Generally speaking, reality might be chaotic and disorganized but we, as conscious beings, always tend to see meanings and connections between things, often despite or even due to the fact that our knowledge is radically inadequate.

This particularity of the experiential organization can serve as a foundation for the phenomenological approach to *uncertainty*. Uncertainty can designate many things. In psychology, it mostly describes the

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[160] The term "intuitive" here does not imply any reference to the so-called "gut feelings," but rather means a group of intentional experiences, which Husserl called "intuitions"—intentional acts which rely on fulfillment and givenness of their objects. Intuitive presentations include perception, phantasy, pictorial consciousness, recollection, and intersubjective experience. Intuitive acts are distinguished from conceptual presentations, in which objects are never given but merely signified (Bernet et al. 1993, 141).

[161] Underlining this particularity of perceptual experience, Husserl was developing some ideas about the possibility of apodictic knowledge in the acts of so-called "eidetic intuition" (see § 6).

[162] "*No matter how completely we may perceive a thing*, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once. [...] And to our mind it is not just a mere statement of fact: It is inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in a self-contained perception" (Husserl 2001a, 39-40) – my emphasis.

conditions under which decisions have to be made in absence of sufficient information. In general terms, uncertainty is everywhere, not as a property of the world but as the way we relate to it.[163] Our perception, our relation to the past, to the future and to other people are in principle uncertain and we rarely possess enough knowledge to make correct predictions and calculate all possible outcomes, let alone to make purely rational decisions.

Uncertainty, as Dennis Lindley points out, is essentially a modern phenomenon, which became of interest to science only in the last century (Lindley 2014). Husserl, following the Cartesian ideal of rigorous science and apodictic knowledge, sees uncertainty as a lack of perfection and completeness in our cognition. (Husserl 1960). He describes the latter as a constant process of fulfillment and a quest for evidence, and he features the concrete intuitive experience as fragmentary and unfolding in a constant process of approximation. One could say that for Husserl, certainty represents an ideal of science, while uncertainty is taken as integral part of subjective experience. Contemporary science, however, develops not only in the realm of absolute truths or empirical facts, but also tries to account for the rules of chance and probability. The phenomenological approach to uncertainty must inquire, therefore, not only into the way we experience uncertainty, but also into how it constitutes an integral part of subjective cognition and, moreover, how it challenges the scientific ideal of perfect evidence.

Another topic which lies at the intersection between unity and incompleteness concerns the issue of *personal identity*. On the one hand, it is clear that any self-experience at any given moment cannot be a reflection of one's whole personality. On the other hand, the totality of one's experience and self-identity are presumed in any single experience. Personal identity relies on the sameness of the subject in time, while any attempt to encompass the totality of one's life inevitably misses out on this task. Even the most coherent and complete narrative can never exhaust the complexity of subjective experience. Moreover, the coherence of one's personal narrative, like the coherence of any story, not merely allows for incompleteness and limited perspective, but necessarily presupposes them.

As I pointed out at the beginning of the third chapter, our subjective experience is defined by this fundamental ambiguity and is found at the intersection between self-familiarity and self-foreignness. Encountering one's past self and not being able to fully identify with it, dealing with

[163] More on this, see: Lindley, Dennis: Understanding uncertainty (Lindley 2014).

the consequences of one's past actions, or making decisions for one's future without knowing what kind of person one is going to be, are just few examples of the ambivalence characteristics of subjective experience. These phenomena make clear that, in the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "it is neither true that my existence possesses itself, nor that it is foreign to itself" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 401). In the same vein, many phenomenologists pointed out that self-conscious and the temporal character of subjective experience not only enable its identity but equally testify to "an internal fracture" between the possibility of reflection and remembering, on the one hand, and the totality of one's subjectivity, on the other hand. As Gallagher and Zahavi remark, there always remains "something about ourselves that we cannot fully capture in self-conscious reflection" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2015). A possible phenomenological approach to personal identity must not only take this ambiguous character of our self-identity seriously, but also explore what constitutes this identity beyond the formal conditions of temporality and self-reflection. This latter perspective could allow the effective investigation of the affective and embodied identity of the subject in the world, in addition to providing a constructive alternative to both minimalist and narrative approaches to the self.

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In recent times, it has become clear that subjectivity can no longer be regarded as a uniform kind of being, defined as merely cognitive, conscious, or mental, and that it cannot be understood as detached from its embodied and affective dimensions, its interaction with the world and other living beings. Given these changes, how can we understand what constitutes unity of subjective experience beyond the level of explicit cognition and self-reflection? What is it that makes up the unity of one's life beyond narratives and autobiographical memory? In order to answer these questions, this book takes a phenomenological approach to the pre-reflective level of subjective experience and its connectivity.

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ISBN 978-3-946531-42-5
9 783946 531425