12. Germany in International Politics, 1990–2006

In history there is nothing for free; the revisions of history are, according to a word of Bismarck, more accurate than the revisions of the Prussian Court of Audit. Or, as the Americans are wont to say: *There is no such thing as a free ride in history.*[1]

This also applies to the conditions under which the four victorious powers of World War II agreed to the reunification of Germany in the "Two-plus-Four Treaty" in 1990, 45 years after the unconditional surrender of the German Reich. Under this treaty, Germany is supposed to be incapable of ever again posing a military threat to its neighbors. Its armed forces were vastly reduced. Germany renounced the traditional attribute of a sovereign power, namely its own independent armed forces, and, of course, it renounced NBC weapons for all time. The victors ensured that a reunified Germany would pursue its national interests—if it was capable of articulating them—only peacefully, only

1 This only slightly updated lecture aims to offer some summarizing, thought-provoking reflections. For those who want a more detailed overview of the discussion on German foreign policy from 1990 to the present, the following publications are recommended reading: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, supplement to "Das Parlament" of March 8, 2004, with contributions by Werner Link, Gregor Schöllgen, Hanns W. Maull, Thomas Risse, Gunther Heilmann and Rolf Clement; Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, supplement to "Das Parlament" of August 8, 2005, with contributions by Gregor Schöllgen and Christian Hacke; Egon Bahr, Der deutsche Weg. Selbstverständlich und normal, Munich 2003; Stephan Böckenförde (ed.), Chancen der deutschen Außenpolitik. Analysen, Perspektiven, Empfehlungen, Dresden 2005; Joschka Fischer, The Return of History. Die Welt nach dem 11. September 2001 und die Erneuerung des Westens, Cologne 2005; Christian Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder, Frankfurt a. M. 2003; Helga Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung, Stuttgart 2001; Karl Kaiser / Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, vol. I–vol. IV, Munich 1994–1998; Werner Link, Neuordnung der Weltpolitik. Basic Problems of Global Politics on the Threshold of the 21st Century, Munich 1998; Lothar Rühl, Germany as a European Power. Nationale Interessen und internationale Verantwortung, Bonn 1996; Helmut Schmidt, Die Mächte der Zukunft. Winners and Losers in Tomorrow's World, Munich 2004; Gregor Schöllgen, Der Auftritt. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne, Munich 2003; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Republik ohne Kompass. Notes on German Foreign Policy, Berlin 2005.

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multilaterally, cooperatively, and within the framework of European and Atlantic institutions.

The reunification of Germany on Western terms in 1990 constituted almost the best of all possible Germanys, especially from the American point of view: a peaceful, democratic, medium-sized state in Europe, of some political weight and world economic influence, but without any vital clashes of interest with America; despite the increasing Europeanization of German foreign policy, one of the most important allies of the United States on the European continent, and, through the American bases in the Federal Republic, a kind of land-based aircraft carrier for U.S. operations on the Eurasian continent, especially in the Middle East.

This foreign policy ideal of a European and transatlantic "civil and peace power," which, drawn from their own insights, was shared by almost all Germans in 1990, is of course based on a negation of German history. After the experience of two world wars and after the experience of bloc politics in the Cold War, Germans know that Germany is too small for a policy of hegemony, or conquest, in Europe, and too big for its many neighbors to assert their interests unilaterally. In reunified Germany, there is no opposition to the preamble in the Basic Law, in which Germany declares its will "to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe"; nor to Article 26: "Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be criminalized."

These legal foundations bind every German foreign policy ex negativo: they prescribe how a united Germany cannot conduct foreign policy, not unilaterally and not by warlike means. In contrast, Article 24 of the Constitution authorizes the German government to transfer sovereign rights by law to intergovernmental institutions and to join a system of collective security in order to preserve peace. While often forgotten, these provisions of federal law are of enormous significance; without them, the entire basis of German foreign and alliance policy would not be possible.

The Constitution, on the other hand, does not, of course, say how German foreign policy in a dramatically changed world is to do what is normally expected of a state's foreign policy, namely, to promote the security, rights, and welfare of its citizens in and vis-à-vis the outside world. What Germany's "national interests" are in the face of new developments and dramatic decision-making situations, however, is not

written in large letters across the skies of Berlin, but must be decided in each individual case through a battle of opinions.

After 1990, decisions on national foreign policy interests have to be made in a fundamentally changed environment, which I can only outline in a few words. This environment demands so many decisions in so many different fields from the various actors and institutions of the Federal Republic that it is no longer at all clear to the ordinary citizen what German foreign policy actually is today. You too can take a test that I made in the run-up to this lecture with otherwise well-informed citizens: When I asked them to systematically tell me the basics of German foreign policy, they generally shrugged their shoulders. Somehow Europe, the fight against terrorism, President Bush and the war in Iraq, as well as Turkey's possible accession to the EU all played a role. In response to my suggestive questioning, most could agree with the assertion that foreign policy gave the impression of being a bogged-down and aimless mess.

In addition to the difficult environment, things are not made any easier by the media's presentation of foreign policy nor the numerous professional spin doctors in government, in the opposition, and in the other parties. Systematic discussion of German foreign policy takes place only in the smallest circles, and public debate occurs only sporadically, for example, when German soldiers, whose trade, like that of all soldiers, is war, are to be sent on a "peace mission" somewhere in the world.

Moreover, it has become impossible to overlook the fact that the weight of reunified Germany's foreign policy has been diminished by its inability to implement structural reforms at home, to cope with the huge debt of the federal, state, and local governments, to restructure its social systems, to trim back its sprawling bureaucracy, and to achieve qualified immigration, i.e., to stop unregulated immigration into the burdened welfare system. The Federal Republic does not want to and should not, if at all possible, use soldiers to pursue its interests; the country's economic power, unlike during the Cold War and reunification, is only available to a very limited extent as a means of foreign policy; the effectiveness of non-power-based persuasion and willingness to engage in dialogue is limited in the world as it is today. Only a state that has put its house in order can pursue a powerful foreign policy.

What are, in a long-term historical perspective, the new conditions of world history that German foreign policy can hardly influence at all, but to which it must react? I would like to summarize these in five problem areas.

First, the collapse of the Soviet empire. If the Soviet Union is also to be counted as part of Europe, its collapse has rightly been seen as the endpoint of a development in world history; namely, the end of the European colonial empires. This development had begun with the breakup of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, continued with the breakup of German's Third Reich and Italy's colonial empire in World War II, and ended after World War II with the painful dissolution of the empires of Great Britain and France. In addition, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands had to part with the remnants of their empires.

What we all experienced and interpreted as liberation from dictatorship in the years from 1989 to 1991 also allows another interpretation: Only because the European nations—with strong American support—were trimmed back to their core countries and thus marginalized in world history, were they able to start the project of the European Union in the West and, after 1990/91, to push it forward to Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Southeastern Europe, thus carrying out the simultaneous widening and deepening of the European Union. The eternal struggle of European nations for influence, status, and prestige is now mostly played out by peaceful means within the European Union, because no single European country has sufficient power for world politics anymore. This is not to say that the memory of past greatness cannot obscure the view of this new reality. Great Britain still wants to use the best of two worlds, the European and the Atlantic, for its own interests through a special relationship with the "only remaining superpower of the present," the United States; many French have not stopped dreaming of the "vocation européen é mondiale de la France" in the tradition of de Gaulle. Even in the field of international politics, the common saying that "all of life is an exercise to strive for self-importance" continues to apply.

Secondly, because of the decolonization and de-imperialization of Europe, the project of the peaceful enlargement and deepening of the European Union has become the determining factor of German foreign policy and a central component of German domestic policy since 1990, in keeping with the preamble to the Basic Law, "to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe." In the field of European policy, German foreign policy has supported secular decisions since 1990; in this field, it is trying to assert German interests in the European institutions and also bilaterally; but in this field, resentment and resistance are also growing among the German people, because the sum total of

European policy decisions is putting German society under pressure to adapt, spreading fear and insecurity. If you were to ask the German people today, they would reject the introduction of a new constitution for Europe, just like the French and the Dutch.

Let me remind you of some of these secular steps: In February 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht. This second, comprehensive reform of European Community law also set the date and conditions for a common European currency, which was finally introduced on January 1, 2002. Even before that, on May 1, 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the third reform of European Community law, came into force, intending to prepare it for enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. On May 1, 2004, the European Union was actually enlarged by 75 million people and ten states to 454 million Europeans and 25 states. If the ten new countries meet certain minimum economic requirements, the so-called convergence criteria, they are, unlike Denmark and Great Britain, in principle obliged to introduce the euro as well. Optimists reckon that this could be achieved by 2010; pessimists say we can wait until the cows come home.

Although the "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union" was solemnly proclaimed at the Nice Summit in December 2000 and Europe thus constituted itself legally as a community of values, the deepening of the Union is lagging far behind enlargement. No one knows exactly what the European Union actually is beyond the single market. Moreover, the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is, in every respect, one of the most explosive problems of European politics. Furthermore, the European project is a huge opportunity for Germany's world-interpreting classes and an enormous job creation program for philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, for lawyers, historians, linguists, journalists, and politicians. All are trying to invent, imagine, and construct a European identity. As Cavour, the first Prime Minister of Italy, famously stated after the unification of Italy: "We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians." We can observe something similar at present. After Europe was made, it is necessary to make Europeans. Those who want to be subsidized in their projects by the institutions of Europe must give them the impression that they are participating in the "identity business" of the new Europe.

The overdue reform of decision-making structures is making no progress, the draft of a European constitution has failed in two referenda, and there is no common foreign and security policy worthy of the name. Henry Kissinger's mischievous bon mot still holds true:

"Who do I call if I want to call Europe?". It is also related to this lack of deepening that German foreign policy is de facto going it alone on existential issues, such as war and peace or national debt. So far, by the way, these German go-it-alones have benefited neither the Federal Republic nor Europe.

Third: I would say again that the third change in world history over which German foreign policy has no influence, but whose consequences affect it existentially, is the rise of the USA as the "world's only remaining superpower." It is particularly the consequences for Europe and Germany that have resulted from the new definition of U.S. foreign policy interest as envisioned in the writings of the neoconservative revolutionaries in the 1990s and made national doctrine by the Bush administration in the wake of September 11.[2]

In the Cold War, the U.S. played the role of the "benevolent hegemon," i.e., within the framework of its leadership role, it took into account the interests of the dependent allies, it leveled out differences of interest through pragmatic compromises found through dialogue and, on this basis, won the voluntary allegiance of the Western Europeans. The basic prerequisite was, of course, the common enemy, communism,

2 From the literature on U.S. foreign policy after the inauguration of George W. Bush and especially since September 11, 2001, which is hard to survey even for specialists, I recommend the following books: Timothy Garton Ash, Freie Welt. Europa, Amerika und die Chance der Krise, Munich / Wien 2004; Peter Bender, Weltmacht Amerika. Das Neue Rom, Stuttgart 2003; Ivo H. Daalder / James M. Lindsey, America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Washington 2003; Niall Ferguson, Das verleugnete Imperium. Chancen und Risiken amerikanischer Macht, Berlin 2004; Stefan Halper / Jonathan Clarke. America Alone. The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, Cambridge 2004; Detlef Junker, Power and Mission. Was Amerika antreibt, Freiburg 2003; Robert Kagan, Macht und Ohnmacht. Amerika und Europa in der neuen Weltordnung, Berlin 2003; Werner Kremp / Jürgen Wilzewski (eds.), Die Bush-Administration und die US-Außenpolitik nach dem Angriff auf Amerika, Trier 2003; Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath. How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century, New York 2005; Ulrich Menzel, Paradoxien der neuen Weltordnung, Frankfurt a. M. 2004; Harald Müller, Amerika schlägt zurück. Die Weltordnung nach dem 11. September, Frankfurt a. M. 2003; Herfried Münkler, Die neuen Kriege, Hamburg 2002; Joseph S. Nye, Das Paradox der amerikanischen Macht, Hamburg 2003; Jeremy Rifkin, Der europäische Traum. Die Vision einer leisen Supermacht, Frankfurt a. M. 2004; Klaus Schwabe, Weltmacht und Weltordnung. Amerikanische Außenpolitik von 1898 bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn / Munich / Wien / Zürich 2006; Ulrich Speck / Natan Sznaider (eds.), Empire Amerika. Perspektiven einer neuen Ordnung, Munich 2003; Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power. The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, New York 2005.

and thus the common image of the enemy and the feeling of belonging to a common, transatlantic community of values.[3]

This pragmatic basis of American-European relations has changed radically since George W. Bush came to power and after September 11, 2001, because his foreign policy is fundamentally different from that of his father. I would give a lot to be able to be there when both of them discuss world politics at the family table.

The mission-minded president, a born-again Christian who also draws on the Christian right and his country's fourth revival movement, believes deeply in his historic mission to bring freedom to the world in general, and the Middle East in particular.

According to Bush, only the USA can really lead the world. For, from his perspective, the world has become definitively unipolar and America-centric, in intellectual and in military-strategic terms. The Pentagon has divided the world into five command areas. The U.S. has 170 bases in the world, and U.S. military power grows daily. With its destructive power, U.S. forces can pulverize any point on earth in 15 minutes. Since there is no world army under the command of the UN, NATO has become de facto irrelevant – in the case of a major conflict, only the US could stabilize the world in a pro-American and pro-Western sense. De facto, U.S. forces are the world's army. Allies would have to be sought as needed, depending on the state of one's interests. NATO's offer of cooperation after September 11 was coolly rejected.

These allies are expected, almost as a matter of course, to share the American perception of danger and the enemy; only then are they considered friends. This sole remaining hyperpower strictly refuses to limit national sovereignty by international treaties, whether it be nuclear policy, environmental policy, human rights policy, economic policy, or whatever field. Gulliver could not be bound by the shackles of the many dwarfs. The UN is a single nuisance to conservative Republicans; they do much to further discredit the already discredited world organization and Kofi Annan. What Presidents Wilson and

3 On U.S.-German relations during the Cold War, cf. a two-volume handbook in which 132 authors from both sides of the Atlantic have analyzed and bibliographically recorded the multifaceted interactions between these two countries in the fields of politics, security, economics, culture, and society in 146 contributions: Detlef Junker (ed.), Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges, vol. I, 1945–1968; vol. II, 1968–1990, Stuttgart / Munich 2001 (English translation 2004).

Roosevelt offered the world as a vision—first the League of Nations, then the UN as systems of collective security—has been a nuisance to George W. Bush, at least since Secretary of State Powell had to present a series of false statements to the UN General Assembly to justify the Iraq war, as we now know.

What is the goal of this global military power? It is exactly what the so-called neoconservatives envisioned in their publications and memoranda in the 1990s: The establishment of an unrivaled Pax Americana for the 21st century. This group does not want to establish American world domination, but world primacy, which will allow the USA to determine the structures of the world in a pro-American sense for an indefinite future. This also applies to the structures of Europe.

In essence, this attempt at world domination hopes, with the end of the Cold War, to achieve what neither the Post-First nor Second World War eras succeeded in doing: spreading the American model of democracy and free-market capitalism as far as possible throughout the world, while globalizing liberty and property.

Thus, embedded in the American missionary idea of freedom is, under President George W. Bush, the hard, power-political blueprint of U.S. world supremacy, the future of a state that, if necessary, acts alone, without regard for international law, "preemptively and preventively."

Herfried Münkler, in his important new book "*Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten*," characterizes this U.S. foreign policy as "imperial."[4] That is, of course, a wide field.

In the blueprint of this global world domination, Europe and Germany, apart from the economy, play only a marginal role. One should not be deceived by the president's trip to Europe after his re-election. It was amicability due to wanting money and soldiers to support his policy in Iraq. On the merits, Bush did not soften any of his positions. On the contrary, after his re-election, he speaks not only in the name of God, but also of the American people. And it is Bush who drives the Europeans before him with ever new actions and announcements; the Europeans can only react, often helplessly and without any guiding concept.

Even with regard to his current domestic and foreign policy positions, which are very tarnished, he has not yet programmatically

4 Herfried Münkler, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin 2005. Cf. also the references under note 2.

softened any of his positions. More European and German support for the U.S. outside Europe would be useful, but marginal given Europe's lack of economic and military resources.

Regardless of Europe's loss of importance from the American perspective, however, there are two concrete historical developments that are more important than the status of the Old World in the design of a unilateral Pax Americana. This relativization of Europe follows from what I would like to call the "double globalization" or "external and internal globalization" of the USA. On the subject of external globalization, anyone who has lived in Washington for any length of time will immediately experience the meaning of the commonplace notion that the United States has a global scope of foreign policy interests. The entire Muslim-Arab problem zone, Asia, especially the rising world power China, but also Japan, India and Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, developments in Russia and Central Asia, occasionally also developments in Latin America and Africa, the problems of terrorism, asymmetric warfare, weapons of mass destruction and the global drug trade occupy the foreign policy decision-making elite and the U.S. media far more than comparatively pacified Europe. In the corridors of power in Washington, D.C., the question is asked almost reflexively: What can and will Europe, especially Germany, contribute to solving these problems and to creating stability in these regions? This question is often coupled with the accusation that comparatively rich Europe is incapable of action, buries its head in the sand, and has set itself up as a free rider in world history.

Regarding "internal globalization," I would point to the growing proportion of the country's total population that is of non-European origin, especially from Latin America and Asia, which was brought about by the changes to immigration laws in the 1960s. Of the approximately 705,000 legal immigrants in 2003, for example, 102,000 came from Europe, 236,000 from Asia, 45,000 from Africa, 5,000 from Oceania, 252,000 from North America (according to official statistics, that is Canada, Mexico, and Greenland) 53,000 from Central America, and 54,000 from South America. This internal globalization also relativizes the nation's European heritage.

The attempt to introduce a new global curriculum in schools and colleges, a world history that takes into account the history of all continents, their interconnections and interdependencies, is exceedingly significant. This global curriculum is to replace the perspective of an American invention, the history course on "Western Civilization"

introduced after World War I; ironically referred to in student jargon as "Western Civ from Plato to NATO" and criticized by minorities and women as a course dealing only with "dead white European males."

Fourth: In regard to foreign policy, the reunified Federal Republic of Germany is a central player among 24 other players in Europe, but has hardly any influence on the only remaining superpower, the United States. Thus, there is a need for action within a third field that seems to be completely beyond the reach of nation-states, including the Federal Republic of Germany, although the consequences are having a massive impact on German citizens and often leave them with a feeling of terrified powerlessness; namely, the consequences of what we call "globalization. What is meant by "globalization" is the rapid increase, compression, and acceleration of cross-border interactions between social, non-national actors; what is meant is the interconnection of economies, companies, financial markets, knowledge, communication, transport and goods, but also the globalization of organized terror, organized crime, the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings, population migrations, illegal immigration, and all this under the heading of the Internet and cyberspace. The opponents of globalization have also become globalized, as their loud and televised protests at international conferences show.

The consequential problems of globalization create a need for action that can be satisfied neither by a nation state nor by international organizations such as the WTO or the UN. Political scientists therefore call for "global governance" beyond the real existing world in order to "close the gap between global problem development and collective, global capacity to act" (D. Nohlen). In principle, others want to keep the nation state out of these processes; they trust in the "creative destruction" (Schumpeter) of the market, which in sum would bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number. One of the central conflicts of the contemporary world in international relations, in transatlantic relations, and, indeed, in the last federal election campaign, can only be understood against the background of this globalization: What is to be negotiated and decided at the state level – at the levels of municipalities, cities, countries, nation-states – and associations of nation-states such as the EU, the WTO and NATO? What should be left to the market, to the initiative of individuals, to large corporations, and to interest groups? Everywhere there are conflicts and contradictions galore, but hardly any solutions. Here two examples will suffice. First, while the highly industrialized

countries, including Germany, have committed themselves in principle to free trade in the exchange of goods and services within the framework of the WTO and other agreements, the industrialized world subsidizes its agriculture to the tune of a billion dollars a day, thus denying developing countries the opportunity to acquire foreign currency to reduce their debts. Second, the intensified global competition, resulting in migration of industries to low-wage countries and the daily reduction of jobs subject to social security contributions within Germany, cannot be dealt with by the classical means of foreign policy, but it does increase domestic problems and the domestic pressure within our nation to cope with the social costs of globalization.

Here I would add a relevant personal anecdote: With the establishment of the Heidelberg Center for American Studies, we have entered the middle of a new global competition, "the brains business," the market-oriented competition of universities for the best, or at least for good students from all over the world. The first two cohorts of our Master in American Studies program, for which we charge 5,000 euros in tuition, come from Romania, Poland, China, Hong Kong, the United States, Slovakia, Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Turkey, Germany, Georgia, Canada, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Japan, Belarus, the Maldives, Korea, and Japan.

Fifth, it has been said that the primary goal of a nation-state's foreign policy is security; security from concrete or suspected dangers that might threaten the inviolability of its territory and the survival of its citizens. Domestic policy was therefore about the well-being of states, foreign policy about the existence of states. The security policy of reunified Germany, if it interests the citizens at all, can only be seen in a diffuse light determined by paradoxes. For example, on the one hand, since reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the eastward expansion of NATO, it is repeatedly stated that we are surrounded only by friends, and that virtually all Germans have, as already mentioned, internalized the norm of Article 26 of the Basic Law, which makes a war of aggression a punishable offense. On the other hand, the Social Democratic Minister of Defense, Peter Struck—Minister of Defense, nota bene—kept fluctuating between two assertions: "Germany will also be defended in the Hindu Kush" and "The Bundeswehr's operational area is the whole world." These two assertions earned the defense minister and his chancellor Gerhard Schröder the reproach, not only from pacifists, that these sentences testify to a new diffuse

"Wilhelminism" that wants to be everywhere in the world. A second paradox is that, if it is true that the Federal Republic's area of operations is the whole world, then the Bundeswehr is too small and hopelessly underfunded. At present, just over 6,000 German soldiers are doing humanitarian and peacekeeping work in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. By 2010, the goal is for the Bundeswehr to include 35,000 so-called intervention forces, 70,000 stabilization forces, and 145,000 state-of-the-art support forces. However, in light of the budget situation and the massive federal debt, no one knows where the money will come from. Defense Minister Struck has never publicly complained about the size of the defense budget for reasons of coalition and party loyalty; it will be interesting to see if and when the new Defense Minister Jung abandons this line.

The astonishing proposition that the Bundeswehr's area of operations is the whole world—meaning, of course, potentially the whole world—is justified by a radically changed security situation and security strategy compared to the Cold War. In this view, even outside NATO territory, i.e., "out of area," it is necessary in a preventive and stabilizing manner to inhibit endangered countries and states from being dominated by terrorist organizations that might also try to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Without being stated openly, this line of thought is based on a kind of domino theory, which was decisively shaped by the politicians of the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War: if the domino Afghanistan falls, other dominoes "closer to home" may also fall.

Incidentally, clarity has been achieved on the hotly disputed question of whether these "out of area" deployments are constitutional. They are, according to a ruling by the 2nd Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court, chaired by Jutta Limbach, on July 12, 1994. With this legal clarification behind it, Parliament has since approved "out of area" measures 35 times to date, involving 100,000 soldiers. Second, the Federal Constitutional Court ensured that the Bundeswehr is a "parliamentary army," meaning that before any deployment, the government must receive a majority vote of the Bundestag. In April 2005, 70 military observers were sent to the crisis regions of Dafur in Sudan for the first time under the new "Parliamentary Participation Act."

Ladies and gentlemen, so far I have described five structural preconditions and problem situations of German foreign policy: the end of

the European colonial empires, the enlargement and deepening of the European Union, the new U.S. foreign policy as the world's only remaining superpower, the problems and consequences of globalization for German foreign policy, and, finally, the new security situation after the end of the Cold War in view of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Now I would like to briefly remind you of the day-to-day business of German diplomacy, of what the Federal Foreign Office actually does with its headquarters in Berlin and its network of 226 missions abroad. According to information on the homepage of the Federal Foreign Office, reunified Germany maintains diplomatic relations with 191 states. In addition, many host countries also have German consulates general or consular missions. Furthermore, Germany maintains twelve delegations to intergovernmental and supranational organizations such as the UN in New York, Geneva, or Vienna or the European Union in Brussels. The delegations of the German federal states have also established themselves in Brussels, some of them very comfortably. In addition, there is a cultural foreign policy of Germany (treated somewhat like a stepmother), in which, apart from the Foreign Office, the Goethe Institutes and the German Historical Institutes in Paris, London, Rome, Washington, Warsaw and, more recently, in Moscow participate. During my five years in Washington as director of the German Historical Institute, I myself, of course, worked closely with the German Embassy and was able to observe its activities very carefully. However, I never had the privilege of being invited into that most hallowed place, the bug-proof sanctuary.

To the eternal chagrin of the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Office, however, it is by no means the case that the Foreign Office has a monopoly on defining and representing German interests abroad. Every federal state has its own "foreign department"; the state of Baden-Württemberg, for example, also pursues its own "foreign policy." Above all, every chancellor of the Federal Republic, before or after reunification, has discovered that he / she can make his / her mark much more easily in the field of foreign policy than in domestic policy. You all know that Chancellor Schröder owed his re-election in 2002 in part to the instrumentalization of anti-Americanism. The sometimes open, sometimes subtly concealed conflict between Schröder and Fischer as each tried to make his mark in foreign policy was an example of the institutionally anchored competitive relationship between the chancellor's office and the foreign ministry.

All these foreign missions claim to represent and safeguard the economic, cultural, and security interests of Germany, including the legal interests of its citizens. What these are, however, as I have tried to make clear, is more difficult to define than is generally thought.

These foreign missions are also a visible expression of the fact that, despite all the proclaimed multilateralism and integration, the foreign policy of Germany has retained a bilateral, occasionally unilateral basis. In the run-up to the Iraq war, Chancellor Schröder was, in this respect, flesh from the flesh of President Bush. While Bush declared to the world that whatever the UN decided, the U.S. was going into war, Schröder replied: whatever the UN decides, we are staying out. This devaluation of the UN, however, did not prevent the Federal Republic from trying to get one of four new seats on the Security Council. Critics see a new prestige-conscious Wilhelminism at play here too, because Germany is neither militarily nor economically prepared to shoulder new obligations.

German foreign policy, including media coverage, focuses on certain aspects of this bilateral policy: for example, on exports and imports from China, on exports to Russia and the contractual expansion of the supply of oil and gas from it; on problems of memorial policy with Poland or the Czech Republic; on the secure existence of Israel; on the granting of visas to Ukrainians; or on the Dutch image of Germany.

I will attempt a conclusion: In view of the enormous, partly global challenges and the complex, diffuse and paradox-ridden foreign policy of the Federal Republic since 1990, it is difficult to make summary statements about German foreign policy of that period, yet I would like to try to do so in one respect.

Whereas in 1990 the containment of a reunified Germany by the Two-plus-Four Treaty was born out of the fear of an overly strong Germany dominating Europe, today Europe and the United States are driven by the opposite concern: about a Germany that is weak in domestic politics and hardly capable of acting abroad. Indeed, in my view, German foreign policy has lost its ability to act since 1990, and with it the ability to represent and protect German interests in and vis-à-vis foreign countries. Economic stagnation and high debt, the underfunding of the Bundeswehr, the general lack of interest in a structured, long-term foreign policy, and the vague definition of national interest are detrimental to a sustainable foreign policy.

As the supposed central power of Europe, Germany does not currently have the strength to help bring about a common foreign and

security policy for the old world, and that includes a common immigration policy. The Federal Republic is almost helpless in the face of possible blackmail attempts by energy-supplying states such as Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria. Although the unilateral blueprint for a Pax Americana is beginning to fail due to reasons of foreign and domestic policy, and although the style and tone of U.S.-German relations are beginning to change—coinciding with the change of administrations in Berlin—Germany at present has little of substance to offer in order to move from its current position of marginalization back to the center of American policy. Germany's eternal shuttle diplomacy to the Middle East and its ability to engage in dialogue with all sides have, in the end, done nothing to solve any concrete problem in this region or to halt the ever-approaching "clash of civilizations."

As far as the fight against terrorism is concerned, the uninformed public can only trust that the German secret services are doing good work in secret and are not, like the American secret services, stumbling from one failure to the next. The Germans do not even have the privilege, like the Americans, of being allowed to learn about the results of parliamentary investigative committees. As for the German soldiers deployed in exposed locations in Afghanistan, one can only hope that, in an emergency, they will be protected by Americans or at least flown home. The Federal Republic is defenseless against what is probably the greatest threat in the world, including to Germany: the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and nuclear terror. As well-meaning representatives of a peaceful and civilian power, German politicians and diplomats are unarmed prophets.