9. Politics, Security, Economics, Culture, and Society. Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations during the Cold War, 1945–1990

When historians attempt to describe and explain the significance of American-German relations in the second half of the twentieth century, they are forced to look at the entire century. This is because the relationship between the two states, societies, and cultures in the era of the Cold War was shaped by history in a twofold manner: by the objective consequences of American intervention in both world wars and, second, by the lessons learned from these historical experiences on both sides of the Atlantic.

When we look at the entire century from an American perspective, we might venture to say that no country in the world has contributed as much to the ascent of the United States to superpower status and to the globalization of its interests as Germany, Europe's central power.[1] The United States had kept its distance from the Eurasian continent in the nineteenth century, particularly in terms of military engagement or alliance politics. It was the triple challenge posed by the German problem in World War I, World War II, and the Cold "World" War that finally established the United States as a military, economic, and cultural power on that continent.[2]

1 On American-German relations in the twentieth century, see Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship"?* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980); Manfred Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., *America and Germany: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1985), vol. 2; Carl C. Hodge and Cathal J. Nolan, eds., *Shepherd of Democracy: America and Germany in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, Conn., 1992); Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppelland, eds., *Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen* (Darmstadt, 1997).

2 Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Robert H. Ferrell, and David Trask, *American Diplomacy Since 1900* (Boston, 1975); Akira Iriye, *The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945*

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Germany was America's chief adversary in World War I, and the United States waged two wars against it: a military one in Europe and a cultural one against German-Americans at home. The American political and military elite viewed Germany as its most pressing enemy in World War II, even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After 1945, the American-Soviet conflict became the major structural principle of international relations, and the German question was to a large extent a dependent variable in the relationship between those two superpowers. Nonetheless, Germany remained America's central problem in Europe. The power vacuum created in Europe by the unconditional surrender of the German Reich can be viewed as the most important cause of the emergence of Soviet-American antagonism after 1945. The establishment of NATO and the permanent stationing of American troops on German soil—both revolutions in American foreign policy—were direct results of the fact that the major victors of World War II could not agree on a system of domestic order for Germany or on its proper place in Europe. The Berlin Crises of 1948–49 and 1958–62 were among the gravest Cold War threats to world peace. The second crisis, closely related to the Cuban Missile Crisis,[3] and the erection of the Berlin Wall sharply exposed the dilemma of the Americans, who wanted neither to die for Berlin and the Germans in an atomic war nor to endanger their prestige and position as a European hegemonic power in Europe by withdrawing from West Berlin.

National Socialism shadowed American foreign policy after 1945. The overriding goal of containing the Soviet Union was linked with the major lesson that a whole generation of American politicians had learned from the failure of democracy in the 1930s. Never again should

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(Cambridge, Mass., 1993); Warren I. Cohen, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993); Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, 3d ed. (Oxford, 1994); Lloyd C. Gardner, *A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan* (New York, 1984); Detlef Junker, *Von der Weltmacht zur Supermacht: Amerikanische Außenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Mannheim, 1995); Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago, 1999); Michael J. Hogan, ed., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).

3 John C. Ausland, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin–Cuba Crisis, 1961–1964* (Oslo, 1996); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York, 1997); Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York, 2000).

a policy of appeasement be pursued toward dictators; there must be no second Munich, neither in Europe nor in Asia. This experience also gave rise to the domino theory, which was used in the United States during the Cold War as an all-purpose political weapon for justifying alliances, military interventions, and economic aid to Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and that ultimately drew the Americans into the Vietnam War.

From a geostrategic perspective, containing the power of the German nation-state in the center of Europe had been a leitmotif of American policy in Europe since the age of imperialism, when Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany and an imperial America outgrew their status as regional powers and became competing world powers. Yet, Germany did not become a problem for the United States until it threatened to rise to the level of hegemonic power or an oppressor of Europe. Unlike Germany's European neighbors, the distant United States feared not the German nation-state created in 1871 but rather its potential as a rival world power. That is why the United States not only fought the German Empire and the Third Reich in world wars but also sought to contain and stabilize the Weimar Republic through economic integration, just as it attempted to contain and stabilize the Federal Republic through economic, military, and diplomatic integration beginning in 1949. European stability and German containment were among the chief strategic objectives of American foreign policy in the twentieth century, from Woodrow Wilson to George H. Walker Bush.

In the first half of the century, the Germans not only served twice as the enemy but also twice provided America with the paramount image of an enemy. The American civil religion—that unmistakable mixture of Christian republicanism and democratic faith[4]—certainly facilitated the propagandistic transformation of the German Empire of Kaiser Wilhelm II into the evil empire. It was this Manichaean pattern of distinguishing between good and evil with religious fervor that permitted the Wilson administration to win the battle for the soul of

4 Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston, 1997); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn., 1987); Knud Krakau, *Missionsbewusstsein and Völkerrechtsdoktrin in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Kurt R. Spillmann, *Amerikas Ideologie des Friedens: Ursprunge, Formwandlungen und geschichtliche Auswirkungen des amerikanischen Glaubens an den Mythos einer friedlichen Weltordnung* (Bern, 1984).

the American people, who were not eager to go to war in 1917.[5] From 1937 to 1941, the general outline of this process was repeated: The major difference was that Nazi Germany, unlike Wilhelm's empire, really was an evil empire.

The Germans also played a central role in bringing about the positive aspect of this Manichaean pattern in American politics: the mission of bringing freedom and democracy to the world. In this respect, too, the "American century" is difficult to imagine without the Germans.[6] It was the German challenge that forced President Wilson to broaden and globalize America's mission beyond the passive idea of turning America into a new Jerusalem that would serve as a beacon for the world by virtue of its example to the active responsibility of raising to the American level those peoples who were less free, less civilized, and who had been left behind.[7] Wilson's call to make the *world* safe for democracy was the ideological climax of the declaration that he used to justify his country's entry into the war against Germany in April 1917. Segments of the American political elite interpreted the failure of this mission in Germany during the period between the wars partly as a failure of their own country, which withdrew from Europe in its military and alliance policy after the Treaty of Versailles and remained in Europe only in an economic and cultural role.

After 1945, therefore, the pacification and democratization of Germany (and Japan) were among the central goals of American foreign policy. Never before or since have the Americans expended so many resources to remake two foreign and occupied nations in their own political, social, and cultural image. Under the influence of the Cold War, the United States incorporated the western part of Germany into an Atlantic community—of security, values, production, consumption, information, leisure, travel, and entertainment—under American hegemony. Berlin, which had been the headquarters of evil from 1933 to 1945, became not only a symbol of the Cold War and a divided world but also an outpost of freedom, the "city upon the hill" on which the

5 Detlef Junker, *The Manichaean Trap: American Perceptions of the German Empire, 1871–1945*, German Historical Institute, Occasional Paper 12 (Washington, D.C., 1995). See chapter 2 in this book.

6 Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982).

7 H. W. Brands, *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1998).

eyes of the world were focused.[8] Nothing was a more obvious symbol of the victory of freedom over communism and dictatorship for the Americans than the fall of the Berlin Wall, and they reacted almost more enthusiastically than many surprised and disconcerted West Germans.

At the outset of the new millennium, ten years after German reunification and the fall of the Soviet empire, these two fundamental experiences of Germany—as evil empire and as democratic ally in a transatlantic community—are united and yet separate in a curious melange in the American collective consciousness and memory industry. It is not the Cold War but World War II that appears to be the axis of twentieth-century American identity. The morally ambiguous Cold War could easily have ended in nuclear catastrophe[9] and was accompanied by a series of disturbingly opaque and inhuman wars on the periphery, most conspicuously the American debacle in Vietnam. By contrast, the war against the Axis powers is considered the most important event of the century and, at the same time, America's great, noble, and just war.[10] In this war, however, it was Nazism and not communism that was the paramount foe.

World War II has special significance for America's identity and its culture of remembrance, not only because it objectively marks a qualitative transition from major power to superpower or because,

8 See the chapter by Diethelm Prowe, vol. 1, Politics.

9 Some scholars of the Cold War think this was only a remote possibility, given the transformed international system after 1945. See John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford, 1987); John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York, 1989).

10 A 1999 survey asked Americans to name the most important event of the twentieth century and an important, but not most important event. The results were: World War II (71 percent responded most important; 21 percent important but not most important); the granting of the vote to American women in 1920 (66 percent; 22 percent); the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (66 percent; 20 percent); the Holocaust (65 percent; 20 percent); the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (58 percent; 26 percent). In sixth to eighth place were: World War I, the 1969 moon landing, and the assassination of President Kennedy. It is striking that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ranked ninth, ahead of the Great Depression of the 1930s (10), the end of the Soviet Union (11), and the Vietnam War (12). According to this survey, Americans considered World War II to be not only the most important event of the century but also the most just war that the United States has ever waged: *Gallup Poll Releases*, Dec. 6, 1999. Among American Jews, 24 percent consider remembrance of the Holocaust to be "extremely important," 54 percent "very important," 20 percent "somewhat important," and only 2 percent "not important." See also Studs Terkel, *The Good War: An Oral History of World War II* (New York, 1984).

along with the American Civil War, it is particularly well suited for a patriotic and heroic view of history in the American mass media. More importantly, the Holocaust, embodying pure evil, overshadows all other crimes of the century in the American consciousness. Since the 1960s, historians, politicians, artists, and theologians in the United States and elsewhere have devoted increasing attention to the genocide committed against the Jews in Europe. The universalization, commercialization, trivialization, and functionalization of this discussion by the media and politicians have led to a debate on the "Americanization of the Holocaust."[11] This process is related to the growing importance of Holocaust remembrance for Jewish communities in the United States, Israel, and other parts of the world;[12] to the relationship of American Jews to Israel; to their fear of losing their identity without the Holocaust; and to the successful institutionalization and broadening of research on and remembrance of the Holocaust.[13]

At the beginning of the new millennium it is difficult to predict what significance the Americanization of the Holocaust will have for the American image of Germany, the German image of the United States, and American-German relations in the coming decades. However, for historians, the shadow of the Holocaust cannot obscure the fundamental fact that, from not only a German but also an American perspective, American-German relations after 1945 have been a success story unprecedented in the history of international relations.[14]

The solution of the German problem is among the greatest American foreign policy successes of the twentieth century. No one could have foreseen this success in 1945, when World War II ended and images of the liberation of the concentration camps at Buchenwald and Dachau evoked an elemental revulsion in the United States. For almost forty years, Germany was an integral component of the dual

11 Hilene Flanzbaum, ed., *The Americanization of the Holocaust* (Baltimore, 1999); Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston, 1999); Jeffrey Shandler, *While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust* (New York, 1999); Tim Cole, *Selling the Holocaust: From Auschwitz to Schindler. How History Is Bought, Packaged, and Sold* (New York, 1999); Norman G. Finkelstein, *Holocaust Industry: Reflection on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering* (London, 2000). See chapter 13.

12 David S. Wyman, ed., *The World Reacts to the Holocaust* (Baltimore, 1996).

13 Shlomo Shafir, *Ambiguous Relations: The American Jewish Community and Germany Since 1945* (Detroit, 1999). See the chapters by Shlomo Shafir, vols. 1 and 2, Society, Alan E. Steinweis, vol. 1, Culture, and Jeffrey Peck, vol. 2, Culture.

14 See Fritz Stern, "Die zweite Chance? Deutschland am Anfang und am Ende des Jahrhunderts," in: Fritz Stern, *Verspielte Größe: Essays zur deutschen Geschichte* (Munich, 1996), 11–36.

containment policy of the United States in continental Europe: namely, containment of the Soviet and German threats. This policy went hand in hand with the desire to satisfy the French need for protection against Germany and the Soviet Union, while preventing France from ascending to the level of a hegemonic power capable of competing with the United States. The unification of Germany under Western conditions produced nearly the best possible Germany from the American perspective: a medium-sized democratic country in Europe with political influence and international economic significance. Germany lacks any vital conflicts of interest with the United States, is integrated into and contained by European and Atlantic institutions, and—given the Two-Plus-Four Treaty on reunification and its political culture—remains incapable of and uninterested in threatening its European neighbors militarily. Finally, despite the increasing Europeanization of German foreign policy, it remains the most important ally of the United States on the European continent.

From the German perspective, no country in the world had as great an influence on the fate of the Germans in the twentieth century as the United States. Its military and political resistance twice foiled attempts by the German Reich to move beyond a semi hegemonic position in Central Europe and become a world power among world powers. At the same time, these two "battles for world power" also represented the conflict between two opposing worldviews. America, as embodied by American President Woodrow Wilson, emerged in World War I as the primary ideological opponent of the antiliberal, authoritarian camp in Germany. Behind the German debate over *Siegfrieden* and unlimited submarine warfare were differing views concerning not only strategy and war objectives but also the internal structure of the German Reich.[15] Images of the enemy established during World War I dominated the German image of America until well into World War II. Even in the years after 1939, two antagonistic ideologies confronted one another. The Americans saw National Socialism as the mortal enemy of democracy; Hitler and many Germans saw democracy as the mortal enemy of National Socialism. Held together by anti-Semitism as its overall ideological framework, Nazi propaganda characterized "Americanism" as a scourge of humanity equal to or even greater than Bolshevism, not least because the United States was becoming the most

15 Ernst Fraenkel, "Das deutsche Wilson-Bild," *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 5 (1960): 66–120; Torsten Oppelland, *Reichstag und Außenpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg: Die deutschen Parteien und die Politik der USA 1914–18* (Duesseldorf, 1995).

serious threat to the German domination of Europe as the war went on. Images of America generated by the Nazis built on traditional stereotypes, but beginning in 1938–9 they were increasingly dominated by the racist, anti-Semitic anti-Americanism of extreme right-wing Germans. Again, it was an American president who personified this ideological enmity toward America. According to Nazi propaganda, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the "main warmonger" and an agent of the world's Jews and the international Jewish Bolshevist conspiracy, had driven the American people into war with the Third Reich.[16] Occasionally, echoes of this radical, National Socialist criticism of America are still heard from right-wing anti-American elements in the Federal Republic today.[17]

A democratic Germany twice turned to the dominant Western power, the United States, following the end of hostilities. American democratization policies after 1945 thus had their roots in the period between the wars, when the growing economic influence of the United States in Germany was accompanied by the first timorous attempts to create a transatlantic "alliance of ideas."[18]

It is largely because of the United States that the citizens of the "old" Federal Republic enjoyed freedom, democracy, prosperity, consumption, modernity, and mobility like no other generation of Germans before them. On an even more existential level, security or destruction—the physical survival of the Germans or their potential extermination in a nuclear holocaust—depended on the decisions of American presidents. Ultimately, *all* Germans owe their unity, on the one hand, to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and, on the other, to the determined and consistent support of the United States. It was the superpowers who divided and united Germany. Its European neighbors played a considerable role in both processes, but not a decisive one.

The enormous influence of the United States on the security, politics, economics, culture, and society of the Federal Republic during the Cold War can essentially be attributed to seven factors. The first

16 Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung 1933–1945* (Stuttgart, 1997); Detlef Junker, "The Continuity of Ambivalence: German Views of America, 1933–1945," in: David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, eds., *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America Since 1776* (New York, 1997), 243–63.

17 See the chapters by Philipp Gassert, vol. 1, Society, and Thomas Grumke, vol. 2, Society.

18 Ernst Jäckh, *Amerika und wir: Deutsch-amerikanisches Ideenbündnis, 1929–1959* (Stuttgart, 1959).

was the overwhelming political, military, economic, cultural, and technological status of the American superpower after 1945. Second, the foreign policy decision-making elite in the era of President Harry S. Truman from 1945 to 1952 possessed a determination and vision the likes of which the United States had not seen since the time of the Founding Fathers. This elite drew its lessons from history and was determined to do everything in its power to prevent the Germans from ever again posing a threat to the peace of Europe or the world. The third factor was the dramatic transition from the wartime coalition to the Cold War and anticommunism. Fourth, Americans' images of the enemy in Europe gradually shifted from a focus on the Germans to a focus on the Russians.[19] Closely related to this was the fifth factor, the fear Germans and Americans shared of Soviet aggression and expansion. Sixth, out of necessity, insight, enlightened self-interest, and a turning away from the past, the West Germans became willing to open themselves up to the West and to see the United States for the most part as the guarantor of their own security and prosperity. The seventh and final factor was the increasing willingness of the West Germans after the construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, to submit to the inevitability of detente by paying the price for the Western alliance: the de facto division of Germany. From that point in time, the postponement of Germany's reunification steadily became less of a burden on American-German relations.

The influence of the American superpower on the western part of Germany was certainly greatest during the era of the Allied Control Council (1945–49) and under the reign of the Allied High Commission (1949–55). Nonetheless, after West Germany joined NATO (without ever becoming completely sovereign either politically or under international law) and after the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the four victorious powers collapsed in Geneva in 1955, Germany still depended on America's hegemonic power, its nuclear umbrella, and the presence of American troops west of the Iron Curtain to guarantee its existence. The Federal Republic's economic recovery and its integration into the

19 The American image of Germany was not, however, as bad after 1941 or as good before 1955 as has long been assumed. See Thomas Reuther, *Die ambivalente Normalisierung: Deutschlanddiskurs und Deutschlandbilder in den USA 1941–1955* (Stuttgart, 2000). See also Astrid M. Eckert, *Feindbilder im Wandel: Ein Vergleich des Deutschland- und des Japanbildes in den USA 1945 und 1946* (Munster, 1999), and, from the older literature, Christine M. Totten, *Deutschland – Soll und Haben: Amerikas Deutschlandbild* (Munich, 1964).

world market were possible only in the context of a liberal, capitalist international economic system guaranteed by the economic weight of the United States and by American dominance of crucial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the tariff reduction rounds. American influence in other regions of the world guaranteed a supply of raw materials, particularly oil, to Europe and Germany. The West Germans' internal turn toward the West, their eventual arrival in the West, and the incremental transformation of the values, mentality, society, and culture of the Federal Republic also cannot be explained without the considerable role of American influence.

The Presence of the Past

In the beginning were Hitler and National Socialism, not Stalin and communism. German-American relations from 1947 on came under the spell of the ultimately global confrontation that formed political blocs in East and West. However, the overriding point of departure for American policy on Germany was the attempt of the German Reich to force the racist domination of National Socialism upon Europe. Never again, according to the great lesson of history, would the Germans be allowed to pose a threat to the security and welfare of Europe and the world. This starting point dominated America's plans for Germany during World War II. And it influenced American occupation policy through 1949, the formation of the West German state that year, the actions of the High Commission, the release of Germany into a state of limited sovereignty, and its entrance into NATO in 1955. It continued to have an effect during the period of detente and arms control, was partially responsible for the American refusal to grant Germany access to nuclear weapons, and was a leitmotif in the integration of the German economy into a liberal international economic system. Even the American attempt to transform and democratize German society and culture was born of this principle. The legacy of the Third Reich was the raison d'être for inclusion of Germany within European and transatlantic organizations—indeed, even for American policy during German reunification and for the conditions of the Two Plus-Four Treaty. One glimpse into the abyss of a Europe ruled by the National Socialists was enough to nourish the dominant motive for containing Germany through integration until 1990.

Despite a shared anticommunism, despite the Atlantic community's avowals of shared values that have become almost a ritual, and despite the unrelenting declarations of German gratitude for American aid, the fact that the German past refuses to die in America has irritated generations of German politicians, citizens, and visitors to America. Over the course of contemporary decision making, it has fostered mistrust and even downright crises in German-American relations.

The legacy of the Third Reich can probably be seen most plainly in the forty-five years of American security policy toward Germany. "Program to Prevent Germany from Starting World War III"[20] was the title of one version of the notorious plan by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., calling for the dismemberment, demilitarization, deindustrialization, and long-term occupation of Germany's fragmented territory by its European neighbors to ensure that the country in the heart of Europe would be forever incapable of waging war. Although Morgenthau's recommendations had been weakened and diluted by the time they found their way into the principles of American occupation policy issued on May 10, 1945 (JCS 1067/8),[21] even Morgenthau's most vehement domestic critics agreed with his ultimate goal. The German people had to be disarmed, denazified, and reeducated. National Socialist organizations had to be dissolved and the war criminals brought to justice. And the possibility of renewed German aggression had to be prevented for all time.

The resolve to use all available means to prevent a repetition of the past remained a constant in American security policy during the decisive decade from 1945 to 1955. Beginning in 1946, however, it became increasingly clear that it was not possible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union over the principles of external disarmament (e.g., long-term military disarmament and future foreign trade policy) and internal disarmament (e.g., denazification, reeducation, reparations, dismantling of industry, and decartelization of the German economy). Like Great Britain and France, the United States was not willing—even

20 U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C., 1985), 269–72. See Wilfried Mausbach, *Zwischen Morgenthau und Marshall: Das wirtschaftspolitische Deutschlandkonzept der USA 1944–1947* (Düsseldorf, 1996); Bernd Greiner, *Die Morgenthau-Legende: Zur Geschichte eines umstrittenen Plans* (Hamburg, 1995); Warren F. Kimball, *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943–1946* (Philadelphia, 1976).

21 See the chapter by Steven L. Rearden, vol. 1, Security; see also the chapter by Wilfried Mausbach, vol. 1, Economics.

after the founding of the Federal Republic—to give up control over German security policy. Despite the developing Western integration of West Germany, a deepseated skepticism about the German capacity for democracy and peace remained.[22]

The Germans had an overwhelming need for and interest in shaking off the burden of the past on their long road back to sovereignty and "normality," on the path to becoming a full member of the world community politically, economically, and morally. They would deal with their past in a very selective manner, particularly during the 1940s and 1950s.[23] Nevertheless, the Allies in general and the United States in particular continued to draw their motivation for new actions from the lessons and experiences of the Third Reich.

With the onset of the Cold War, securing the Western occupation zones and Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression increasingly became a major problem for American, British, and French military planners. Nevertheless, until the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration found it impossible to get the American public used to the idea of West Germany contributing militarily to the defense of the West. In light of this deep-seated skepticism, the Americans considered it necessary to cast a safety net of controls and provisos over the West German state founded just four years after the demise of the Third Reich.[24] Security policy, foreign policy, and foreign trade policy were taken out of German hands, and deep incursions into the domestic policies of the Federal Republic were considered necessary until such time as the Federal Republic proved itself to be a democratic and peaceful state.

22 See the chapters by Thomas A. Schwartz, vol. 1, Politics, and Thomas Reuther, vol. 1, Society.

23 They saw themselves primarily as victims of war, imprisonment, displacement, and the terror of Allied bombing. Omer Bartov, "Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust," American Historical Review 103 (1998): 771–816; Elizabeth D. Heinemann, "The Hour of the Women: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," American Historical Review 101 (1996): 354– 95; Robert G. Moeller, "War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany," American Historical Review 101 (1996): 1008–48; Eike Wolgast, "Vergangenheitsbewältigung in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit," in: Ruperto Carola: Forschungsmagazin der Universität Heidelberg 3 (1997): 30–39.

24 See the chapters by Frank Schumacher and Richard Wiggers, vol. 1, Politics, Steven L. Rearden, vol. 1, Security, and Regina Ursula Gramer, vol. 1, Economics. See also Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Der besetzte Verbündete: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1955* (Opladen, 1991), 34–40.

This test might have lasted some time had not the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 sent shock waves around the world and revolutionized American foreign and security policy. The effect of the Korean War on American policy and on the overall course of the Cold War can hardly be exaggerated. The only other events of comparable significance were the Chinese revolution, the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb, and the American assumption that the Soviets had developed long-range bombers and missiles capable of crossing the ocean and threatening the security of the continental United States. After the Korean War, the American superpower decided for the first time in its history that it needed more than just potential resources to wage war and promote its own interests. For the first time, the United States began to build a massive fighting force on land, at sea, and in the air. A military-industrial complex developed that put food on the table for millions of people and offered a simple, dualistic worldview on which to fall back. This complex was composed of military forces, government departments and bureaucracies, congressional representatives, senators and lobbyists, think tanks, universities, research and production facilities, intelligence services, nuclear strategists, and Kremlinologists, all producing constantly new images of an enemy, scenarios, missile gaps, and "windows of vulnerability," both real and imagined.[25]

This revolution in American foreign policy necessitated what had previously been unthinkable: the rearming of the (West) Germans. The West's collective experience with the Third Reich and German militarism, the deep-seated fear of an armed Germany, collided with the fear of Soviet aggression. This collision produced incongruities that can only be explained by the German past: the desire for German weapons that could only be fired toward the East; the desire for German soldiers who would not have their own general staff or high command, but who would unleash into combat a power at least as great as that of the Nazi Wehrmacht in a war against the Soviet Union, the East bloc, and the Germans in the GDR;[26] the desire to use German manpower

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25 For the Truman administration's interpretation of the Korean War, which was deeply influenced by the domino theory and the "lessons of Munich," see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif., 1992), 369–74; Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State* (New York, 1998).

26 See the chapter by David Clay Large, vol. 1, Security.

without setting up a German army;[27] and the desire to defend Europe against Germany while defending Germany and Europe against the Soviet Union.

It speaks for the realism of the Federal Republic's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, that he immediately recognized the historic opportunity that this crisis presented to the occupied Federal Republic: The offer of German rearmament could be used to secure an end to the controls, a new sovereignty, and an equal status in the Western alliance. Adenauer and the German government only partially achieved their objective in the complicated negotiations with the Western Allies over Adenauer's bargain (a German defense contribution and sovereignty in exchange for the annulment of the Occupation Statute and the dissolution of the Allied High Commission). The West Germans' failure to gain full sovereignty in either a legal or political sense was due less to the new international constellation of the Cold War (defense of Western Europe and West Germany) than to the legacy of the past (defense against Germany). In the October 23, 1954, Paris Agreements, Adenauer pushed through the following laconic wording: "The Federal Republic shall accordingly [after termination of the occupation regime] have the full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs."[28] If this was intended as a statement of fact, it must be conceded that it was partly fiction and, if interpreted as wishful thinking, it was a promise that went unfulfilled until 1990. The Allies maintained their rights and responsibilities regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole, particularly the responsibility for future reunification and a future peace treaty. These provisos were safeguards and veto clauses of great political significance. Their application by the Western powers played a significant role, for example, in the second major Berlin crisis of 1958–62, during the political battle over the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and the entry of the two German states into the United Nations between 1970 and 1973, and during the reunification process in

27 See the chapter by Erhard Forndran, vol. 1, Security.

28 Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, as Amended by Schedule I of the Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in Germany, signed at Paris, Oct. 23, 1954, in U.S. Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985* (Washington, D.C., 1985), 425; see Helga Haftendorn and Henry Riecke, eds., *"... Die volle Macht eines souveränen Staates ...": Die Alliierten Vorbehaltsrechte als Rahmenbedingung westdeutscher Außenpolitik 1949/1950* (Baden-Baden, 1996); Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952–1967* (Stuttgart, 1991), 153–4; See also the chapters by Richard Wiggers, vols. 1 and 2, Politics.

1989–90. Although these developments transformed Western troops on German soil into allied protective forces, negotiations over their continued stationing in Germany made it clear that the Western powers were not giving up their original rights as occupying powers (*occupatio bellica*). Rather, they reserved their indirect right to station troops in Germany. Even after 1955, the ally could legally become a vanquished enemy again.[29]

Just as significant in the long view was the system of arms control, arms limitation, and arms renunciation that permitted the controlled participation of the Federal Republic in the Western military alliance from the time it joined NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) in 1955 until reunification.[30] Under no circumstances would an independent German army be permitted. The Americans were in agreement on that point with the British, French, and all of Germany's other European neighbors. In addition, Adenauer was forced to "voluntarily" renounce on behalf of the Federal Republic the right to manufacture nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and to agree to additional arms limitations. Adenauer did not, however, completely renounce all German participation in the control of nuclear weapons, because the nuclear arms race between the superpowers and the shifting nuclear strategies of the United States—from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response"—had existential consequences for the Federal Republic. Its geography as a front-line state in the Cold War posed an insoluble dilemma. The strategy of deterrence was based on nuclear weapons, so the failure of deterrence would mean the nuclear annihilation of German territory. For this reason, the Federal Republic attempted to participate in some way in the nuclear arena, either within a multilateral NATO nuclear force or through European options. This attempt failed due to French and British resistance, and the Federal Republic's hope for nuclear participation collapsed when the common American and Soviet interest in a nuclear duopoly (with Great Britain as a junior partner) finally forced the Federal Republic to renounce the manufacture, possession, and use of nuclear weapons by putting its signature on

29 Daniel Hofmann, *Truppenstationierung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Die Vertragsverhandlungen mit den Westmächten 1951–1959* (Munich, 1997); Sebastian Fries, "Zwischen Sicherheit und Souveränität: Amerikanische Truppenstationierung und außenpolitischer Handlungsspielraum der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in: Haftendorn and Riecke, eds., *Die volle Macht*, 125–57.

30 See the chapters by Wolfgang Krieger and Erhard Forndran, vol. 1, Security, and Wolfgang Krieger and Matthias Dembinski, vol. 2, Security.

the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969. This treaty primarily represented an attempt by the two superpowers to protect their dominance, prevent an uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear powers, and thereby keep the system of deterrence manageable. But it was also the experience with the German past that made the German signature so important for America and, especially, the Soviet Union.

It was these fears fed by the past that in the end made continued military control of Germany a central component of international diplomacy concerning the external conditions of German reunification. Containing Germany through integration was again the overriding objective of American foreign policy. Indeed, it was the prerequisite for America's approval of German unification. The country had to remain part of NATO and an overall Atlantic-European structure. On their own, the land-, air-, and sea-based armed forces of the Federal Republic are capable of neither offensive nor defensive action. Unified Germany is still bound by the rights and obligations arising from the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. Germany's self-containment through renunciation of nuclear weapons was the factor that made German unity tolerable to its neighbors.[31]

The Americans dictated the framework not only for the security of the West Germans (and West Europeans) but also for their prosperity. In this area, too, lessons from the past were the overriding motivation at first. As the Federal Republic attained the status of a major Western economic power in the early 1960s, however, this motivation disappeared. The social market economy (established with considerable assistance from the United States), its successful integration into the world economy, and the associated dependence of German foreign trade on open markets and raw materials convinced the world that there would be no revival of National Socialist economic policies.

The primary objective of both American wartime planning and American economic policy after 1945 had been to use economic and security policy to prevent any possible recurrence of the Nazi regime's protectionist, highly centralized, armament-oriented economy that had freed itself, through autarkic policies and bilateral barter trade, from dependency on the world economy and had ruthlessly exploited subjugated peoples. As early as the late 1930s, American politicians—especially Secretary of State Cordell Hull—considered the economic

31 See the chapters by Stephen F. Szabo, vol. 2, Politics, and by Karl Kaiser, vol. 2, Security.

policy of the Third Reich to be one of the major causes of German aggression.[32] In the 1940s, this perception of National Socialism would combine with a generally negative view of the world economy in the period between the wars. According to this widely held view, the system of international trade that had been arduously and incompletely rebuilt after World War I was devastated by the Great Depression. The international economic crisis undermined the world monetary system. Taking the position of "every man for himself," virtually all countries resorted to protectionist and interventionist measures. The result was an atrophied and fragmented system of international trade that exacerbated worldwide misery and fostered the development of dictatorships and fascist political systems.

This dominant view of the past necessarily led to several conclusions. Only a new international economy based on liberal principles and anchored in international institutions could prevent a repetition of the past. Only the complete elimination of all forms and causes of National Socialist economic policy could make Europe as a whole a productive partner in a new international economic order. Only the United States, the only major power that grew richer in the course of World War II, had the resources to establish this new international economic system. In 1945, the United States held two-thirds of the world's gold reserves. Its share of more than 50 percent of the world's production of industrial goods even exceeded its share in the period from 1925 to 1929. An undamaged economy of extraordinary productivity and great competitive advantage stood in stark contrast to an impoverished and divided Eurasian continent.[33] The Americans dominated the conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944, where 1,500 delegates from forty-four countries established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the central pillars of a liberal international economic order.[34]

According to the Bretton Woods principles and liberal theory, it would have been logical to cleanse the German economy of National Socialist structures and integrate it as quickly as possible into an international system of free trade, but that did not happen right away. The onset of the Cold War very soon divided the German economy, and East Germany disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. The economic policies

32 Detlef Junker, *Der unteilbare Weltmarkt: Das ökonomische Interesse in der Außenpolitik der USA 1933–1941* (Stuttgart, 1975).

33 Detlef Junker, *Von der Weltmacht zur Supermacht*, 71.

34 Harold James, *International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods* (New York, 1996).

of the Western occupying powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—differed considerably. The United States faced several constraints. In the short term, it had to bring down the high mortality rates in its occupation zone. In the medium and long terms, industrial disarmament measures motivated by security considerations and fueled by the spirit of the Morgenthau Plan ran the risk of destroying the basis for German and European economic recovery. These measures included reparations, the dismantling of production units, restrictions on German industrial production, the expropriation of German foreign holdings, and a ban on foreign trade. The ghosts of the past thus paved the winding road by which the West German economy was reintegrated into the international marketplace. A clear direction was found only through the Marshall Plan, the currency reform, the introduction of the social market economy, the U.S.-backed establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, and Germany's ultimate reintegration into a multilateral system of international trade.[35]

Once the German *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) began in the 1950s and Germany again rose to the position of Europe's most significant economic and trading power, the legacy of the past no longer played a role in economic policy relations between the two countries.[36] The United States and the Federal Republic became the two largest trading nations in the world. In a mixture of cooperation, competition, and conflict, the two nations sought to adapt to the crises in the economic system of the Western capitalist world that were triggered by the slow-down in the growth of the world economy after 1965, by the oil shocks, and by the Nixon shock when the United States abandoned the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and thereby forced the industrial nations to convert to a system of floating exchange rates. Although the United States still periodically exerted pressure on the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Federal Republic in transatlantic economic conflicts, the weight of West Germany in American-German economic relations continued to grow. There were essentially four reasons. The primary reason was the Federal Republic's growing economic power and its significant contribution to the growth of the world economy. Second, beginning in 1957, the EEC developed into a zone in which the

35 See the chapters by Christoph Buchheim, Wilfried Mausbach, Jörg Fisch, Regina Ursula Gramer, Werner Plumpe, Gerd Hardach, and Werner Bührer, vol. 1, Economics.

36 See the chapter by Welf Werner, vol. 2, Economics. This is why the chapters in the Economics section of vol. 2 no longer address the presence of the past.

Federal Republic could exert economic influence and find economic protection. The EEC brought about a broadening and deepening of trade within Europe, reduced dependency on the United States, and faced the Americans as a bloc in trade conflicts. Third, beginning in the early 1980s, the Federal Republic was less and less willing to do what it had been required to do for two decades due to its dependency on the United States in matters of security: to pay not only the costs for its own armed forces but also a share of the cost of stationing American forces in Germany by such means as offset payments and purchases of American armaments.[37] Fourth, despite conflicts with its transatlantic ally, the Federal Republic turned out to be, by and large, an economic power that adhered to the fundamental principles of liberalism and an open world market. It always took a very cooperative stance toward the United States in the various tariff reduction rounds of the postwar period and at the international economic summits beginning in the 1970s. Above all, it always attempted to mediate the more serious conflicts between the Americans and the French. Bridging economic and other differences between the United States and France was a standard exercise in West German foreign policy.

It is very probable that nothing contributed more to the democratic stabilization of the Federal Republic than the German *Wirtschaftswunder* of the 1950s, which enabled the Federal Republic to bear the heavy burden of occupation, reconstruction, integration, and reparations costs. The unprecedented growth of the world economy between 1945 and 1965, as well as the liberalization of international trade and the explosive growth in trade between industrialized nations, proved to be a windfall for the Federal Republic. Therefore, to the extent that it determined the framework for the social market economy and the growth of the world economy, the United States was responsible for laying an economic foundation for democratic development in the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is much more difficult to determine the impact of American denazification and democratization policies on the democratic development of the second German republic.[38] The only certainty is that the attempt to change German society and political culture in a

37 See the chapter by Hubert Zimmermann, vol. 1, Economics.

38 See the chapters by Barbara Fait, Cornelia Rauh-Kühne, and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, vol. 1, Politics; by Rebecca Boehling, James F. Tent, Jessica C. E. Gienow Hecht, and Karl-Heinz Füssl, vol. 1, Culture; and by Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Petra Gödde, Claus-Dieter Krohn, and Raimund Lammersdorf, vol. 1, Society.

fundamental way was again motivated decisively by the lessons of the past. The "crusade in Europe" (so Eisenhower) must not end with the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich. Rather, all Americans who had been involved in planning for postwar Germany during the war were convinced that the crusade must lead to a radical transformation of German society and, indeed, the German national character.[39] Thus, the packs of the GIs who were shipped across the Atlantic to Europe contained not only weapons and ammunition, but also fifteen million books.[40] The books symbolized the superpower's belief in its 1945 mission of not only defeating Germany, but also transforming the politics, constitution, culture, and mentality of the Germans—of taking up the "fight for the soul of Faust."[41] The lessons of the past could be summed up as follows: never again National Socialism, never again dictatorship, never again racism, never again German subservience to authoritarianism. On account of the Nazi past and their interpretation of German history, leery Americans in 1945 considered the Germans incapable of returning to democracy on their own. They first had to be denazified, reeducated, and led to democracy in measured steps, a process that the Americans controlled very tightly in their zone. This was necessary because the American government, Congress, and public opinion regarded developments in Germany with skepticism. As late as 1949, 55 percent of Americans still did not believe that the Germans were capable of governing themselves in a democratic manner.[42]

Leaving aside the trials against the major war criminals in Nuremberg, which were conducted jointly by the Allied powers, it is difficult to determine the immediate and long-term effects of denazification, reeducation, democratization, and other punitive measures that the United States carried out in the regional states of its occupation zone—Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, Greater Hesse, and

39 Günter Moltmann, *Amerikas Deutschlandpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Kriegs- und Friedensziele 1941–1945* (Heidelberg, 1958); Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in: Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (Birmingham, AL, 1963), 311–464; Anthony J. Nicholls, "American Views of Germany's Future During World War II," in: Lothar Kettenacker, ed., *Das "andere Deutschland" im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Emigration und Widerstand in internationaler Perspektive* (Stuttgart, 1977), 77– 87; Uta Gerhardt, "Reeducation als Demokratisierung der Gesellschaft Deutschlands durch das amerikanische Besatzungsregime: Ein historischer Bericht," in: *Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft* 27 (1999): 355–85; Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung*.

40 See the chapter by Martin Meyer, vol. 1, Culture.

41 See the chapter by Thomas A. Schwartz, vol. 1, Politics.

42 See the chapter by Thomas Reuther, vol. 1, Society.

Bremen—either alone or, beginning in 1949, together with Great Britain and France within the framework of the High Commission. There are several reasons for this. These measures were aimed at a "society in ruins"[43] that lacked the characteristics of a normal, structured society. The means and the ends of a prescribed, licensed "democracy from above" were locked into an irreconcilable conflict. Rule by command or decree demands that people obey orders; the essence of democracy is self-determination. The mass denazification and related punitive measures in the American zone confronted a population that used nearly all its energy in the battle for survival, food, heat, shelter, and caring for family members. It was a population that suppressed as much as possible any mention of the Third Reich, the war, and the genocide of the Jews, and that saw itself predominantly as victims rather than perpetrators. Moreover, the advent of the Cold War added a new dimension to democratization and "reorientation" policies. Anti-Nazism turned into Anti-Totalitarianism that tended to equate Nazism and communism, thus retroactively legitimated the anticommunist propaganda of the Nazis. And it diverted the spiritual and emotional energies of the West Germans away from dealing with the past, turning them instead toward the new front: the free West against the totalitarian communists.

It is difficult in the end to distinguish what part of the incremental development of democratic structures was due to coercion and understanding by decree, what part to the prior existence of German democratic traditions, and what part to insights freely acquired by the Germans living under occupation. Three hypotheses, however, have a high degree of plausibility. Without the trials against war criminals and without forced denazification, the "cleansing" of German society might have been even less extensive than it actually was. Without the American decision to begin a process of controlled democratization in its zone in early 1946, it would have been much more difficult to establish a representative democracy in West Germany. Without a democratic, constitutional tradition in Germany, the "prescribed democracy"[44] would not have become a natural, freely accepted part of West German political culture. The most important domestic policy

43 Christoph Klessmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1955*, 5th ed. (Göttingen, 1991), chap. 3; Theodor Eschenburg, *Jahre der Besatzung 1945– 1949* (Stuttgart, 1983).

44 Theo Pirker, *Die verordnete Demokratie: Grundlagen und Erscheinungen der "Restauration"* (Berlin, 1977).

foundations of the Federal Republic—the introduction of the social market economy, the currency reform and abolition of price-fixing, and the promulgation of the Basic Law—are excellent illustrations of the complex relationship between American and Allied influence, on the one hand, and, on the other, Germany's traditions and desire for self-assertion.[45]

Between 1949 and 1955, after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the intensification of the East-West conflict following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Allied High Commission and its American representative, John J. McCloy, gradually lost control over Germany's policy on its past because they wished to retain control over the present—namely, over West Germany's rearmament and integration into the West. Sometimes reluctantly and sometimes with resignation, the Allies had to recognize that—if they expected to keep their new ally in the Western camp—they had to tolerate the overwhelming longing of most West Germans to put their past behind them. Time and again, the U.S. High Commissioner pointed out to the State Department and the administration in Washington that the fundamental conflict between the United States' role as victor, occupier, and enforcer of Allied justice and its role as ally and friend of Germany was becoming sharper and that this conflict was causing ever clearer damage to American policy toward Germany.[46]

45 See the chapters by Christoph Buchheim and Werner Plumpe, vol. 1, Economics, and by Hermann Josef Rupieper, vol. 1, Politics. For a discussion of American influence on the Basic Law, see the report on the literature in Adolf M. Birke, *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Verfassung, Parlament und Parteien* (Munich, 1997), 64–70; Eberhard Pickart, "Auf dem Weg zum Grundgesetz," in: Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds., *Die zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland – eine Bilanz* (Stuttgart, 1974), 149–76; Erich J. C. Hahn, "The Occupying Powers and the Constitutional Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1949," *Cornerstone of Democracy: The West German Grundgesetz 1949–1989*, German Historical Institute, Occasional Paper 13 (Washington, D.C., 1995), 7–36; Karlheinz Niclauss, *Der Weg zum Grundgesetz: Demokratiegründung in Westdeutschland 1945–1949* (Paderborn, 1998); Edmund Spevack, "Amerikanische Einflüsse auf das Grundgesetz: Die Mitglieder des Parlamentarischen Rates und ihre Beziehungen zu den USA," in: Heinz Bude and Bernd Greiner, eds., *Westbindungen: Amerika in der Bundesrepublik* (Hamburg, 1999), 55–71.

46 Thomas A. Schwartz, "John McCloy and the Landsberg Cases," in: Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, eds., *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955* (New York, 1993), 433–54; Ulrich Brochhagen, *Nach Nürnberg: Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer* (Hamburg, 1994); Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit:* (Munich, 1996); Jeffrey Herf,

The end of the occupation regime and the establishment of a partially autonomous Federal Republic in 1955 were important turning points for the presence of the past in postwar American-German relations. The American government lost its legal right to intervene in Germany's policies touching upon the past. This did not eradicate the legacy of National Socialism from American-German relations. But from that point until the fall of the Berlin Wall, it seldom provoked confrontation in the official foreign policy of the allied states. The most famous exception was the thoroughly unsuccessful attempt of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1985 to force a reconciliation over the past with President Ronald Reagan over the graves at Bitburg. Commenting on the incident, Secretary of State George P. Shultz told Arthur Burns, U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic, "Hitler is laughing in hell right now."[47]

Relations between the two nations up to the point of reunification and beyond were generally characterized by careful efforts on both sides to ensure that American-German relations were not adversely affected by the increasing attention accorded the Holocaust inside and outside academia beginning in the 1960s, or by its growing importance in both German and American consciousness. German politicians and diplomats, the party-linked foundations, and American-German organizations such as the Atlantik-Brücke attempted to expand their dialogue with Jewish organizations and leading Jewish personalities in the United States. On the German side, this meant not denying the past but promoting the new, democratic Germany. Although the majority of American Jews were and are still distrustful of the democratic Germany, many Jewish organizations have attempted, even after Bitburg, to keep this dialogue going.[48]

Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit, Geschichtsversessenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945* (Stuttgart, 1999).

47 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York, 1993), 550. Shultz's sharp criticism of Kohl stands in contrast to the position taken by Reagan, who continued to defend his decision to visit the German military cemetery. See Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York, 1990), 376–84. See also David B. Morris, "Bitburg Revisited: Germany's Search for Normalcy," *German Politics and Society* 13 (1995): 92–109, and the chapter by Jeffrey Peck, vol. 2, Culture.

48 See Shafir, *Ambiguous Relations.*

Dual Containment

The prevailing interpretive model of American policy toward Europe beginning in 1947–1948—namely, the concept of double or dual containment—is also impossible to understand without considering the presence of the past. The Soviet Union was to be contained by building up an opposing force in Western Europe while the Federal Republic would *simultaneously* be contained by integration in the Western alliance and the liberal international economy. Political scientist Wolfram F. Hanrieder has written about the significance of this concept. Although he did not coin the term, he has contributed more astutely than anyone else to its diffusion:

> "Every major event in the postwar history of Europe follows from this: the rearmament and reconstruction of the Federal Republic within the restraints of international organizations, the development of NATO from a loosely organized mutual assistance pact into an integrated military alliance, American support for West European integration, and the solidification of the division of Germany and Europe. So long as the two components of America's double containment were mutually reinforcing, America's European diplomacy was on a sure footing. In later years, when tensions and contradictions developed between the two components, American-German relations became increasingly strained."[49]
>
> The concept of "dual containment" has been criticized because the nature and scope, the origin and immediacy of the German and Soviet threats to the United States were fundamentally different. An analysis of the situation in Europe after 1945 purely in terms of power politics would need to reject the idea that American policy toward Germany and the Soviet Union could be construed as comparable even on only a conceptual level and would, therefore,

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49 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn., 1989), 6. See also Wilfried Loth, "Die doppelte Eindämmung: Überlegungen zur Genesis des Kalten Krieges 1945–1947," *Historische Zeitschrift* 238 (1984): 611–31; Thomas A. Schwartz, "Dual Containment: John J. McCloy, The American High Commission, and European Integration," in: Francis Heller and John R. Gillingham, eds., *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe* (New York, 1992): 131–212; Rolf Steininger et al., eds., *Die doppelte Eindämmung: Europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage in den Fünfzigern* (Munich, 1993); as well as the chapters by Thomas A. Schwartz, Michael Wala, Ruud van Dijk, Frank Schumacher, and Frank Ninkovich, vol. 1, Politics; Steven L. Rearden, vol. 1, Security; and Klaus Schwabe, Gottfried Niedhart, and H. W. Brands, vol. 2, Politics.

> also reject the concept of "dual containment."[50] But such a view of the Cold War geopolitical constellation ignores the cultural and mental dispositions that arise during the collective interpretation of historical experiences. For example, the notion of a catastrophic German tradition from Luther to Hitler, popularized by William Shirer's bestseller in the 1960s,[51] demonstrates that the Americans did not see their military victory over National Socialism as a definitive answer to the German problem. German authoritarianism, Prussian militarism, and National Socialist fantasies of destruction could become virulent again—if not today, then tomorrow; if not in the same form, then in a new form. Skepticism about the German national character linked the past and the future of American policy, which actually sought to "contain" the latent danger of such excesses.

Herein lies the qualitative difference from the kind of hegemonic control that the United States sought to exert over Britain or France. The Western superpower never acknowledged France's *vocation mondiale et européenne*, its claim to the role of a major international power and a hegemonic position within Europe. For decades, American politicians were bent on preventing France from using European integration to push the United States out of Europe and free the Federal Republic from its dependence on the transatlantic colossus by making it France's junior partner in Europe. The United States wanted—and wants—to remain the decisive balancer and pacifier in Europe.[52] Unlike the Federal Republic, France never accepted this claim.

French President Charles de Gaulle, the self-appointed embodiment of "eternal" France, always envisioned a French-led Europe that would achieve parity with the two superpowers.[53] Anglo-Saxon resistance foiled de Gaulle's plans to be accepted into a nuclear directorate consisting

50 See the chapter by Wolfgang Krieger, vol. 1, Security, and the concluding essay by Hans-Peter Schwarz, vol. 2.

51 Rohan O'Butler, *The Roots of National Socialism* (London, 1941); William Montgomery McGovern, *From Luther to Hitler: The History of Nazi-Fascist Philosophy* (London, 1946); William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York, 1960).

52 Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II* (New York, 1992); Klaus Schwabe, "Atlantic Partnership and European Integration: American-European Policies and the German Problem, 1947–1966," in: Geir Lundestad, ed., *No End to Alliance. The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future* (New York, 1998), 37–80; Pierre Melandri, "The Troubled Partnership: France and the United States, 1945–1989," ibid., 112–33.

53 Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-strategiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996* (Paris,1996), 131; Robert Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds., *De Gaulle and the United States. A Centennial Reappraisal* (Oxford, 1994).

of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. In response, France took the liberty of denying Great Britain access to the EEC (1963). It also shocked the United States and NATO allies with its decision to withdraw French forces from NATO's integrated military command (1966), called for the withdrawal of all-American troops from French soil, undermined the American dominated monetary system of Bretton Woods, and made a vain but daring attempt to forge a bilateral alliance with the Federal Republic in the Franco-German Treaty of 1963.[54]

Politicians in the Federal Republic dared not even dream of such latitude in dealing with the Western hegemonic power. That was due in part to the greater, indeed, existential dependence of the Federal Republic on the United States in the area of security policy. It was also because the legacy of National Socialism made an independent German claim to power untenable. The United States would not have tolerated it. The American policy of containing Germany through integration was geared precisely toward withholding from the Federal Republic the military, political, or social basis for such a power play. German politicians understood this well and chose multilateral routes for pursuing their interests.

Unlike Germany, France had not forfeited its right to conduct unilateral power politics. De Gaulle's hegemonic plans for Europe may have been inconvenient and annoying, but they could not shake a French-American trust rooted in a two-hundred-year-old shared tradition. The two nations perceived and continue to perceive themselves as standard-bearers of the universal mission of freedom, which began its victory march through the world with the American and French Revolutions. A veiled battle over the birthright of this mission is part of the tradition of French-American rivalry. Despite or perhaps because of this shared tradition, French national pride, born of the consciousness of French greatness and sovereignty, has chafed for several decades against American hegemonic policies in Europe, while the Federal Republic has viewed these policies primarily as protection and assistance toward the goal of integration. This wounded pride was the underlying reason for the series of French-American conflicts, all of which had repercussions for American-German and Franco-German relations and that forced the Germans into continual diplomatic gymnastics between the United States and France.[55]

54 Klaus Hildebrand, *Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition 1963–1969* (Stuttgart, 1984), 99–111.

55 See the chapter by Eckhart Conze, vol. 2, Politics.

International Economic Crises, Multipolarity, and the Second Cold War

The Federal Republic did play a more significant role in bilateral relations with the United States beginning in the second half of the 1960s. But military protection by the United States and NATO remained vital to German survival until reunification and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the price for this protection was the military containment of the Federal Republic and the division of Germany. In the economic sphere as well, neither the Federal Republic nor the European Community (EC) became a truly equal partner in terms of power or rights. This state of affairs is well concealed by the fact that the EC and the Federal Republic were engaged in nearly continuous negotiations with the United States within numerous multilateral organizations for the purpose of resolving economic crises.

The *relative* increase in significance of the Federal Republic in the economic realm was also related to diminishing American hegemony over the world economy. The entanglement of the United States in the Vietnam War and, in particular, the year 1968, in many ways a decisive turning point in the Cold War,[56] played a significant role in this process. The United States appeared to be falling prey to the fate of all great world empires. Its resources were no longer adequate to meet global requirements. America was at risk of losing its dominant position because of imperial overstretch. President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–69) had hoped to be able to wage two wars at once: the war on poverty at home and the war on communism in Southeast Asia. Congress, however, refused to fill the growing hole in the budget with a tax increase. Loans from the international capital markets—that is, from the European and Asian allies (primarily Germany and Japan)—therefore, had to cover mounting deficits. The consequences—a weak dollar, chronic American balance-of-trade and balance-of-payments deficits, and rising prices at home—began to undermine the stability of the international monetary system of Bretton Woods that had served to institutionalize American domination of the world economy since World War II.[57] Although the currency exchange mechanism

56 See the first attempt to interpret 1968 as a global turning point for domestic and foreign policy: Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds., *1968: The World Transformed* (New York, 1998).

57 Diane B. Kunz, *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy* (New York, 1997).

was temporarily restored during the gold crisis of March 1968,[58] that year was the beginning of the end of an era of unparalleled economic growth. During the half-decade from 1968 to 1973–4, political decisions and developments contributed to a slowing of international economic growth. The political reaction of the oil-producing countries to the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967 led to the first oil-price shocks of 1973 and 1974.[59]

In the face of international economic crises and its own weakened position, the United States attempted to do the same thing that the British had done after 1763 and drove the American colonists into the Revolutionary War: to externalize the costs of its own empire in part and recover them from a dependent clientele. The United States was still strong enough to force primarily the Europeans and Japanese—although not itself—to adapt actively to the new international economic problems, to thwart the largely multilateral economic crisis management with unilateral measures if necessary (much to the aggravation of the Europeans), and to threaten the Federal Republic in particular with the withdrawal of American troops in order to obtain economic concessions. The American colonists had been free to rebel in part because their external enemies, the French and the American Indians, had been conquered with the very effective help of the British in the global war of 1756–63. The West Germans, however, lived in fear of the Warsaw Pact's military potential. President Johnson instructed his staff to demand from the Germans what Congress would not give him: "What you have to do is put great pressure to get the Germans; I want to use all the influence I can to hold the Alliance together and get the Germans to pay the bill; but they don't want to do it, and if they can't do it, I can't do it by myself."[60]

The 1970s and 1980s, which were marked by monetary and trade conflicts between the United States and Europe, began with a unilateral

58 Robert M. Collins, "The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the 'American Century,'" *American Historical Review* 101 (1996): 396–422.

59 See Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York, 1991); Jens Hohensee, *Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973/74: Die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen der arabischen Erdölpolitik auf die Bundesrepublik und Westeuropa* (Stuttgart, 1996).

60 Memorandum for the Record, Subject: President's Conversation with John McCloy Concerning U.S. Position in Trilateral Negotiations, 10:45–11:40 A.M., Wed., Mar. 1, 1967, Francis Bator papers, box 17, folder: Trilateral-McCloy Meeting, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Tex. I am grateful to Philipp Gassert for pointing out this document.

termination of the principles of the Bretton Woods system by the Nixon administration in 1971, the Nixon shock. The United States freed itself of the obligation to exchange dollars for gold at any time. When the major trading nations switched to floating exchange rates in 1973, the United States was able to use the dollar as a political weapon even against its own allies. To respond to what it deemed "unfair" trade practices of other countries, the United States acquired further foreign trade policy tools in 1974 and 1988; these enabled it to respond with retaliatory measures to actual or perceived protectionist practices of other nations.[61] Foreign trade policy had been a collective task of the EC since 1974. National economic policies had been multilateralized through international institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the GATT, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Finally, the World Economic Summit of heads of state had been created in 1974 at the initiative of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and communications were increasing between finance ministers and central-bank presidents of the major industrial nations. These developments notwithstanding, however, multilateralism remained only a means—albeit one that kept conflicts within limits—by which the nations involved could pursue their own national interests as defined by their political leaders.

The United States remained the most significant power in terms of pursuing its national interests. It secured its access to oil and other raw materials. Despite the various crises, the dollar remained the most important currency. And the enormous American domestic market remained relatively invulnerable to retaliatory measures; the United States remained much less dependent on exports than the Federal Republic and Japan, for example. Neither the Federal Republic nor the EC could change these facts despite improved Franco-German and intra-European cooperation. The unilateral latitude enjoyed by the United States in economic matters became even more visible in the 1980s when President Ronald Reagan terminated the policy of detente in his first term (1981–85), initiated a massive (reactive) arms buildup, and let Japan and the Europeans foot a significant part of the bill.

The American arms buildup had, of course, severe economic consequences. From 1980 to 1984, military expenditures in the United States

61 See the lead essay and chapter by Harold James and the chapters by Monika Medick-Krakau, Andreas Falke, and Bernhard May, vol. 2, Economics.

climbed 40 percent at the same time that Congress was passing tax cuts. The two measures together led to a spiraling budget deficit and an immense foreign debt for the United States. In 1985, the country became a debtor nation for the first time since World War I. Whereas the United States still had a positive net external asset position of $106.2 billion in 1980, by the end of the Reagan administration in 1988 it had a negative net external asset position of $532.5 billion.[62] The national debt grew from $914 billion in 1980 to $1.823 trillion in 1985; by 1991, it was approaching the $4 trillion mark.[63] The Americans have been living on credit since the Reagan administration, particularly capital transfers from Europe and Japan. President George H. Walker Bush's administration could not provide Mikhail Gorbachev—the great mover and shaker, failed reformer, and sorcerer's apprentice—with the massive economic aid he desired. Given the attitude of Congress, the administration would have had to borrow the money on capital markets. In the 1990–91 Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, the Americans may have been militarily dominant, but they let Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Germany bear most of the costs.

Although the international economic crises and the loss of American economic hegemony presented a challenge mainly to those nations, international organizations, and "summit meetings" that sought to influence the rules of the international "free" market, the loss of American nuclear superiority improved the position of its paramount Cold War enemy, the communist, totalitarian Soviet Union. The atomic stalemate between the superpowers and its political and military consequences were the overriding structural problem of security policy in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The problems resulting from this strategic situation for Europe and its "frontline" state, the Federal Republic, could in principle only be handled within the triangle consisting of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Western Europe. In security policy, these decades can be seen as a continual attempt by the Europeans to influence the nuclear policies of the Western superpower as the United States simultaneously attempted to reach bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union while making only as many concessions to its

62 Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, *Wirtschaft USA: Strukturen, Institutionen und Prozesse* (Munich, 1991), 369.

63 Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987), 527; Paul M. Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York, 1993).

NATO allies as was necessary to preserve the alliance.[64] Much was at stake for the Federal Republic: namely, its security and its hope for reunification.[65]

The nuclear stalemate, reflected in the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), offered compelling motivation for arms control, cooperation, and limited detente between the United States and the USSR in order to prevent the worst possible disaster, a nuclear holocaust. The arms race, driven by competing risk scenarios and the interests of the military-industrial complex on both sides, had long since entered the realm of the absurd. By 1972, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed enough nuclear weapons to explode fifteen tons of radioactive TNT over every man, woman, and child on earth.[66] After the shocks of the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers had signed several treaties aimed at slowing the arms race and reducing the risk of a nuclear surprise attack. In 1962, the two powers agreed to the joint, peaceful use of outer space in several areas. In 1963, a direct teletype connection, the "hot line," was installed between the Kremlin and the White House. In 1967, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain signed a treaty on the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. On July 1, 1968, these nations attempted, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, both to preserve the nuclear powers' monopoly and to prevent an uncontrolled increase in the number of nuclear powers. All three nations had an overriding interest in keeping the Federal Republic of Germany from gaining access to nuclear weapons. The first round of negotiations on strategic arms limitations (SALT I), which had begun in 1970, was brought to a close with President Richard M. Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972. The goal was to limit offensive delivery systems by establishing limits on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles

64 On the problem of cooperation in the hegemonic alliance structure beginning in 1945, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies* (Princeton, N.J., 1995); Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945–1997* (Oxford, 1998); Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, 1987). An excellent illustration from the German perspective are the memoirs of Helmut Schmidt, *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective* (New York, 1989), 119– 284.

65 See the chapters by Klaus Schwabe, Gottfried Niedhart, Klaus Larres, Werner Link, H. W. Brands, Steven Brady, and Christian Hacke, vol. 2, Politics; and by Wolfgang Krieger, Kori Schake, Michael Broer, and Matthias Dembinski, vol. 2, Security.

66 Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750* (London, 1985), 615.

and submarine-launched ballistic missiles that each side could have. At the same time, the two sides agreed to allow each country to build no more than two antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, which were theoretically capable of removing the other side's second-strike capacity and would, therefore, have destroyed the balance of terror.

The policies of arms control and detente on both sides rested on political assumptions and expectations. Soviet objectives included nuclear parity with the United States, recognition as an equal superpower and competitor in all regions of the world, the preservation of the political status quo in Europe (i.e., the division of Europe and Germany), and finally, actual acceptance of a communist bloc under Soviet leadership. For its part, the United States was prepared to enter into arms-control negotiations and—as established by the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975—to cement into place the foreign policy status quo in Europe (i.e., renunciation of the use of force, the inviolability of borders). This made a principle—not necessarily binding under international law—out of the pattern of response that the United States had demonstrated at the time of the uprisings of the East Germans in 1953 and the Hungarians in 1956, the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops in 1968: the pattern of not intervening militarily in the communist sphere of influence. However, the United States never recognized the Soviet Union as a politically or morally equal superpower. For the Americans, communism remained an inhumane system with no regard for the right to freedom. In Helsinki, therefore, the Soviet Union reluctantly had to declare its acceptance of the right of peoples to self-determination and its respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the citizen (Basket III). It did so knowing full well that the actual implementation of these freedoms would be the downfall of the communist regimes in the Eastern bloc. The Helsinki Final Act, like the Federal Republic's Moscow and Warsaw treaties, was thus an instrument for both maintaining and overcoming the status quo.[67]

Even after the end of the Vietnam War, the basic antagonistic structure of the Cold War remained in place until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The global competition between the superpowers continued even at the height of the period of limited detente from 1970 to 1975. Midway through Jimmy Carter's presidency, the policy of limited detente began to lose its domestic political support. Americans reached the conclusion

67 See the chapter by Michael Lucas, vol. 2, Politics.

that the Soviet Union was attempting to establish itself as the dominant superpower worldwide through its military interventions in the Third World and a dangerous arms buildup that included new intercontinental missiles, new nuclear-powered submarines, the buildup of six deep-sea fleets, and the deployment of new medium-range missiles that were particularly threatening to Europe. President Reagan ended the policy of detente in his first term and led the United States into an ice-cold war with the Soviet Union. Anticommunism and an arms buildup were the pillars of his program. Reagan surprised and shocked the world the most with his announcement in March 1983 that he intended to develop an impenetrable barrier in space—the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—that would protect the United States from nuclear surprise attack by the Soviet Union. Such a barrier promised to return to Americans the unassailable security of the nineteenth century. At the same time, it threatened to decouple Europe from the United States and to destroy not only the logic of mutual deterrence but NATO as well.[68] The message of Reagan's first term was clear: The United States would find its security not through detente and arms control but through more armaments and technological advances.

Both the policies of arms control and detente and the second Cold War had severe consequences for American-German relations. As in the early phase of the Cold War, this bilateral relationship was a dependent variable of American policy toward the Soviet Union and Western Europe.[69] The policy of detente deferred the prospect of German reunification to the indefinite future. Adenauer's promise that a policy of strength would lead to reunification was exposed as an illusion by the Berlin Wall. The politics of arms control made the Germans fully aware for the first time of the dilemmas of their security situation in the nuclear age. It was, therefore, no accident that Kennedy's new security policy led to serious conflict with the Adenauer government; that the joint Franco-German reaction to that policy, the 1963 Elysee Treaty, contributed to Adenauer's departure

68 The resuscitation of such plans by the U.S. Congress and the Clinton administration at the end of the millennium has aroused similar European fears. See William Drozdiak, "Possible U.S. Missile Shield Alarms Europe," *Washington Post*, Nov. 6, 1999, A1; "Ausbau der amerikanischen Raketenabwehr: Fischer kritisiert US-Pläne," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Nov. 5, 1999, 8.

69 See the chapters by Manfred Görtemaker, Frank Ninkovich, Diethelm Prowe, and Manfred Knapp, vol. 1, Politics; by Wolfgang Krieger, Kori Schake, and Erhard Forndran, vol. 1, Security; and the chapters in vol. 2, Politics and Security.

from office; that Johnson's security policy brought about the downfall of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard; that Carter's and Reagan's policies played their part in undermining Helmut Schmidt's position within his own party; and that Chancellor Helmut Kohl had to play the political strongman to push through the NATO double-track decision against the wishes of a formidable German peace movement.

From its founding, the Federal Republic had no alternative to its total dependence on the United States for a credible nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union. This deterrent could not be permitted to fail; the worst-case scenario—an attack by the Warsaw Pact—could not be permitted to occur. If it did, the Federal Republic, nearly incapable of resisting, would either have been immediately overrun, which would at least have ensured the physical survival of the West Germans ("better red than dead"), or it would have become a battlefield where conventional, nuclear, and possibly chemical and biological weapons would be used. For the Germans, the nightmarish aspect of the decades of bilateral and NATO planning for this worst-case scenario was that the Federal Republic had a say only about the form of its annihilation.[70] Even the "flexible-response" strategy, which was pushed through NATO with difficulty in the 1960s, did not alter the dilemma in which the Federal Republic found itself. Although it provided for a "pause" between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in the event of an attack from the East, this strategy gave the American president alone the time to negotiate before triggering an intercontinental nuclear holocaust. "A 'limited conflict' from the U.S. standpoint would be a total war for the Federal Republic and would extinguish its national existence."[71] It was, therefore, logical under the circumstances that dissonance and conflict characterized the American-German security relationship. This was so from the time the Bundeswehr was established until shortly before reunification, even if the United States did occasionally accommodate German and European concerns, as with the NATO double-track decision in December 1979, in order to keep the NATO alliance together. Other notable examples of this accommodation included the flexible-response strategy; the poorly developed plan for a sea-based, multilateral nuclear force in Europe that the United States conceived as a placebo for the Germans; the exclusion of

70 This was apparent from the time of the first nuclear planning games in the mid-1950s. See the chapters by Kori Schake and Frederick Zilian Jr., vol. 1, Security.

71 Helga Haftendorn, *Security and Detente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy* (New York, 1985), 105.

the constrained ally from possession of nuclear weapons; the NATO double-track decision; the stationing of short- and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe; the neutron bomb; and the American SDI program.[72]

The nuclear stalemate and the military, economic, political, spiritual, and emotional strain of the Vietnam War forced the United States into political detente in Europe and the West Germans into the largest change of course in their foreign policy since 1955: namely, the de facto but not de jure recognition of the division of Germany in the Moscow and Warsaw treaties of 1970 and 1973. With this "active adjustment to American detente policy,"[73] many Germans had to give up the illusion of the 1950s that European detente could be made dependent on progress toward German reunification. The great disillusionment occurred when construction of the Berlin Wall began on August 13, 1961, and the West accepted the barricading of the Eastern sector. The highest circulation German newspaper, *Bild*, was enraged on August 16: "The West is doing NOTHING! U.S. President Kennedy is silent...MacMillan has gone hunting...and Adenauer is cursing Brandt!"[74] While the arms-control policies of the superpowers were a brutally clear reminder to the Germans of their (in)security dilemma, the Wall symbolized a dead end in Western reunification policy.

The Federal Republic clearly had to adapt twice to new American policies between the time the Wall was built and the revolution in international relations initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s. Until the middle of Carter's presidency, Germans had to adapt to the American policy of detente and thereafter to Reagan's second Cold War. Again, the dog was wagging the tail and not vice versa. The reason that the second adaptation became so difficult was that the majority of West Germans had made their peace with detente after the Moscow and Warsaw treaties were signed and had put off any hope of reunification. The Germans had serious problems with the Woodrow Wilson of the nuclear age, Ronald Reagan. They considered his arms buildup and Manichaean worldview dangerous. The "fear of our friends" (Oskar Lafontaine) grew and added fuel to the protest movement against the stationing of American Pershing and cruise missiles

72 See the chapters in vols. 1 and 2, Security.

73 See the chapter by Werner Link, as well as the chapters by Klaus Schwabe, Gottfried Niedhart, Richard Wiggers, and Christian Hacke, vol. 2, Politics.

74 Quoted in Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer: Epochenwechsel 1957–1963* (Stuttgart, 1983), 146.

in Europe. Adapting left a deep, painful imprint on American-German relations, German society, and the German political parties.[75] Not until the process of German reunification began did we again see, as in the 1950s, a fundamental parallelism in values *and* interests between the Americans and Germans.[76]

Arrival in the West: American Influence on Society and Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany

When we as historians look back from the perspective of German reunification at the history of American-German relations in the era of the Cold War, we may venture to say that the United States had a greater influence on society and culture in the Federal Republic than any other state or society in the world. As with foreign, security, and economic policy, virtually no area of German society and culture lacked an American dimension.

The Germans experienced the new Western superpower as an "exogenous revolutionary" after 1945, "as prosecutor, judge, and reeducator attempting to radically change the German government, society, and economy,"[77] and attempting to Westernize, democratize, and transform the political culture of the Germans with a targeted "Americanization from above." The decade from 1955 to 1965 may be viewed as an incubation period for "Americanization from below," which subsequently encompassed West German society as a whole.[78] This Americanization from below was not the result primarily of U.S. governmental policies, as had been the case from 1945 into the early 1950s, but rather of the influence of nongovernmental American players.

As plausible as these generalizations may sound, it must be conceded that historical research on the Americanization of Germany and the development of a civil society—particularly in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—is in its infancy. In addition, researchers have a great deal of difficulty objectively recording and conceptually defining this influence.

75 See the chapter by Matthias Zimmer, vol. 2, Politics.

76 See the chapters by Stephen F. Szabo, vol. 2, Politics and Karl Kaiser, vol. 2, Security.

77 See the chapter by Knud Krakau, vol. 1, Society.

78 See the chapter by Axel Schildt, vol. 1, Society. See also Axel Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999).

The academic discussion of this influence on the mentality, society, and culture of West Germans—and to some extent even on East Germans behind the Iron Curtain—is centered around a few terms ("Americanization," "democratization," "Westernization," "modernization," and "technologization") that are often used synonymously, but entail competing or overlapping meanings.[79] It is all the more difficult to clarify their meaning because they were not invented by historians but appeared in sources of the time as normative and often pejorative terms as, for instance, in the vocabulary of rigid anti-Americanism.[80]

Moreover, it is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact breadth and depth of American influence and the chronological and substantive fluctuations in the relation of American influence versus German tradition, of imitation versus rejection, of active assimilation versus cultural self-assertion, of American mission versus German democratic disposition, of pro-Americanism versus anti-Americanism. A growing number of historians are wondering whether a one-way street can even exist in "intercultural transfer

79 See the chapters by Frank Trommler, vol. 1, Culture; Volker Berghahn, Axel Schildt, and Raimund Lammersdorf, vol. 1, Society; Frank Trommler and Klaus Milich, vol. 2, Culture; and Lily Gardner-Feldman and Stephen Kalberg, vol. 2, Society. See also Michael Ermarth, ed., *America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945–1955* (Providence, R.I., 1993); Konrad H. Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, eds., *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1955–1970* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997); Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek, and Adelheid von Saldern, eds., *Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1996); Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1999); Reiner Pommerin, ed., *The American Impact on Postwar Germany* (Providence, R.I., 1995); Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn, 1998); Manfred Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 1999), 199–270; "The American Occupation of Germany in Cultural Perspective: A Roundtable," *Diplomatic History* 23 (1999): 1–77; as well as the instructive bibliographies of Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "Dimensionen von Amerikanisierung in der deutschen Gesellschaft," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 35 (1995): 1–34; Bernd Greiner, "‚Test the West': Über die ‚Amerikanisierung' der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Mittelweg* 36 (1997): 4–40; Philipp Gassert, "Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus, Amerikanisierung: Neue Literatur zur Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des amerikanischen Einflusses in Deutschland und Europa," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39 (1999): 531–61.

80 See the chapters by Knud Krakau and Philipp Gassert, vol. 1, Society; and by Claus Leggewie, David B. Morris, Rainer Schnoor, and Philipp Gassert, vol. 2, Society.

processes."[81] Even a superpower like the United States is not capable of exerting direct and unmediated influence and power in the cultural arena, if we understand cultural power to mean the capacity to force one's own spirit (*Geist*), language, and lifestyle onto another. Intersocietal and intercultural transfer cannot be forced into such binary subject-object categories. Cultural appropriation always means a transformation and a merging into one's own tradition. In the relationship between Germany and the United States, the "westernization," "democratization," and "modernization" of the Federal Republic should thus be interpreted not as "Americanization" but rather as a cultural and social synthesis that has both accepted and resisted American influence.[82]

Finally, we must remember that the discussion of American influence on the society and culture of the Federal Republic is part of a larger debate in Europe and other regions of the planet over the "Americanization" of the world. The ascent of the United States to the position of global superpower in the twentieth century was accompanied by an equally global history of perceptions on the part of those nations and regions, societies and political systems affected by the American model and influence, by American hegemony and control in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and—to a lesser extent— Africa.[83]

In Germany, too, the discussion about Americanization and modernization began before 1945. American influence on German society and culture had existed in the first half of the century.[84] Not until after

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81 Johannes Paulmann, "Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts," *Historische Zeitschrift* 267 (1998): 649–85.

82 For similar conclusions, see Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York, 1997). See also Berndt Ostendorf, "The Final Banal Idiocy of the Reversed Baseball Cap: Transatlantische Widersprüche in der Amerikanisierungsdebatte," *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 44 (1999): 25–47.

83 Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the American Century* (New York, 1999), provides an excellent introduction to this problem. See also Peter Duignan and Lewis H. Gann, *The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945–1958*, 2d ed. (Lanham, Md., 1996); Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana, Ill., 1996); Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*, 2d ed. (Berkeley, Calif., 1996).

84 See Alexander Schmidt, *Reisen in die Moderne: Der Amerika-Diskurs des deutschen Bürgertums vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg im europäischen Vergleich* (Berlin, 1997); Egbert Klautke, "Amerika im Widerstreit: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur Auseinandersetzung mit den Vereinigten Staaten in Deutschland und Frankreich während der ‚Klassischen Moderne', 1900–1933," Ph.D. diss., University of

1945, however, did West Germany become part of a "Euroamerican" Western civilization in a social and cultural sense, a civilization under the umbrella of American hegemony and under the influence of the Cold War and unprecedented economic growth among the industrial nations on both sides of the Atlantic.

With some justification, the two decades from the early 1950s to the early 1970s have been called the "golden age" of the twentieth century.[85] In contrast to the period before 1945, a tight web of highly diverse German American interactions developed during the half century after the war. There was an expansion of American influence on mass consumption and mass culture—on popular culture, if popular culture is understood, as in the United States, as the forms and products of the entertainment and leisure industries. This influence rested on the triumphant ideology of the social market-capitalist system, which sought to solve the problem of poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth through economic growth, and on the mass prosperity the *Wirtschaftswunder* brought West Germany in the 1950s.[86] The web of interactions was created by intensified transatlantic trade, increased reciprocal investment activity,[87] improved communications networks and communications technologies (film, radio, press, television), and the revolution in transatlantic travel and tourism brought about by the airplane. Increased professional collaboration of Americans and Germans in many areas reinforced these trends, as did the international communications of nongovernmental organizations such as churches,[88] business organizations,[89] unions,[90] sports clubs, universities, scientific

Heidelberg, 1999; Detlev J. K. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity* (New York, 1992); Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (Oxford, 1994); Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich; Junker,* "Continuity of Ambivalence"*; Frank Trommler,* "The Rise and Fall of Americanism in Germany," in: Trommler and McVeigh, eds., *America and the Germans, 333–42.*

85 Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York, 1994), 225–402.

86 Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American Economic Policy After World War II," *International Organization* 31 (1977): 607–33.

87 See the chapters by Hans-Eckart Scharrer and Kerstin Müller-Neuhof, vol. 1, Economics, and by Hans-Eckart Scharrer and Christine Borrmann, vol. 2, Economics.

88 See the chapters by Mark E. Ruff, vol. 1, Society, and Robert Goeckel, vol. 2, Society.

89 See the chapter by Jonathan Wiesen, vol. 1, Society.

90 See the chapters by Michael Fichter, vol. 1 and vol. 2, Society.

organizations, and professional societies;[91] of social movements such as the 1968 activists[92] and the women's,[93] peace, and environmental movements;[94] of intelligence services;[95] of political foundations,[96] transatlantic elites, and institutions in general;[97] and even of right-wing extremists.[98]

The history of the assimilation and rejection of America by the West German political, military, social, and cultural elite during the Cold War has yet to be written. Nevertheless, several building blocks are available for such a history. They touch upon the transfer, assimilation, or rejection of American ideas, mentality, institutions, and behavior patterns—the "American way of life"—by these elites, many of whom had made extended stays in the United States. Although attempts by the Americans to influence the German educational system in their occupation zone were largely unsuccessful,[99] the Amerika-Häuser (American cultural and information centers) and the American exchange programs of the early 1950s contributed significantly to the Westernization of a segment of West Germany's budding elite. In 1954, approximately half of all Germans had heard of the Amerika-Häuser, and of those familiar with them, 84 percent knew their programs well. Media sources such as publishers, newspapers, magazines, and radio stations, which the United States licensed and controlled, were to play a significant role in convincing Germans to open their minds toward the West.[100]

While downplaying the negative sides of the United States—crime, poverty, racism, and the apartheid system in the American South—the Americans promoted the liberal and capitalist values of their polity, such as freedom, tolerance, independent initiative, individualism, the free market, and consumption. From 1950 to 1956, the United States developed an exchange program with West Germany more extensive

91 See the chapters by Mitchell G. Ash, vol. 1, Culture, and by Willi Paul Adams and John McCarthy, vol. 2, Culture.
92 See the chapter by Claus Leggewie, vol. 2, Society.
93 See the chapters by Hanna Schissler, vol. 1 and vol. 2, Society.
94 See the chapter by Carl Lankowski, vol. 2, Society.
95 See the chapters by Wesley Wark, vol. 1, Security, and by Loch Johnson and Annette Freyberg, vol. 2, Security.
96 See the chapter by Ann Phillips, vol. 2, Society.
97 See the chapters by Lily Gardner Feldman and Felix Philipp Lutz, vol. 2, Society.
98 See the chapter by Thomas Grumke, vol. 2, Society.
99 See the chapter by James F. Tent, vol. 1, Culture.
100 See the chapter by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, vol. 1, Culture.

than any other similar program with another country. By 1956, 14,000 West Germans had visited the United States. The target group consisted of members of the younger generation who were expected to belong to the future elite of the Federal Republic. The fact that the U.S. State Department conducted fourteen studies between 1950 and 1960 to determine the effects of these programs on German participants illustrates how seriously the United States took this exchange program. In 1952, one extrapolation concluded that between 900,000 and 1.6 million Germans "had been exposed to the multiplier effect of the exchange program."[101]

When the U.S. government programs ended in the mid-1950s, the reestablished German exchange organizations and private organizations on both sides of the Atlantic stepped into the breach and managed to provide a firm foundation for the exchange of German and American elites up to the end of the Cold War—and beyond.

Alongside these governmental measures, other U.S.-inspired—and, in some cases, CIA funded—networks developed. They influenced the noncommunist Left in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the Federal Republic. The objective of these networks was to offer an anticommunist and antitotalitarian ideology on a high intellectual level. This ideology has often been described as "consensus liberalism." It combined such classical American values as freedom, justice, property, and the "pursuit of happiness" with the American lesson of the 1930s (the New Deal) that the active state as an agent of reform is a necessary part of the free enterprise system. Business and labor unions, as entirely legitimate elements of this system, would negotiate collective bargaining agreements with each other without state intervention. The economic goal of consensus liberalism was neither class warfare nor unrestrained capitalist competition, but rather an increase in mass buying power through productivity and growth. Recent research has shown how strongly German elites were influenced by *Der Monat*, a periodical for intellectuals, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (*Kongress fur kulturelle Freiheit*), a network of intellectuals. The list of persons influenced by this network reads like a "Who's Who" of the early Federal Republic: Willy Brandt, Max Brauer, Adolf Grimme, Eugen Kogon, Siegfried Lenz, Golo Mann, Alexander Mitscherlich, Richard Loewenthal, Marcel Reich-Ranicki, Ernst Reuter, Karl Schiller, Carlo Schmid, Theo Sommer, Dolf Sternberger, Otto Suhr,

101 See the chapter by Karl-Heinz Füssl, vol. 1, Culture.

and many others. Westernization also influenced the West German Protestants associated with the Kronberg circle as well as the most influential publishing house in the early Federal Republic, the Axel Springer Verlag.[102]

These consensus-liberal elites were among the first to be attacked by the New Left and the 1968 movement as representatives of a bourgeois class society. One of the ironic twists in the Westernization of the Federal Republic is the fact that even the New Left critical of America drew some of its intellectual ammunition, primarily protest slogans and lifestyle models, from the United States.[103] No detailed studies have been done yet on American influence on German elites during the 1970s and 1980s. Given the intensified transatlantic communication in all spheres of life, however, American influence on governmental and nongovernmental figures in the Federal Republic probably increased during that period.

Another possible approach to the question of influence on German elites and German society in general consists of sectoral analyses that attempt to assess American influence on, for example, the German media,[104] sciences,[105] American studies,[106] German literature and German readers,[107] West German theater,[108] the German art scene,[109] architecture,[110] urban and transportation planning,[111] and economic thought.[112] Here, too, influence was a matter of reciprocal interactions and processes of assimilation, but the dominant direction of influence ran from West to East. American influence on West German mass culture

102 Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen* (Munich, 1998); Thomas Sauer, *Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus? Vorstellungen und Tätigkeit des Kronberger Kreises* (Munich, 1998); Gudrun Kruip, *Das "Welt"-"Bild" des Axel Springer Verlags: Journalismus zwischen westlichen Werten und deutschen Denktraditionen* (Munich, 1998); Axel Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre* (Munich, 1999).

103 See the chapters by Claus Leggewie and Philipp Gassert, vol. 2, Society.

104 See the chapter by David Posner, vol. 1, Society.

105 See the chapter by Mitchell G. Ash, vol. 1, Culture.

106 See the chapter by Willi Paul Adams, vol. 2, Culture.

107 See the chapters by Martin Meyer, vol. 1 and vol. 2, Culture.

108 See the chapter by Andreas Hofele, vol. 1, Culture.

109 See the chapters by Sigrid Ruby, vol. 1, Culture; David Bathrick, vol. 2, Culture; and Stefan Germer and Julia Bernard, vol. 2, Culture.

110 See the chapters by Werner Durth, vol. 1 and vol. 2, Culture.

111 See the chapter by Jeffry M. Diefendorf, vol. 1, Society; see also the chapter by Brian Ladd, vol. 2, Society.

112 See the chapter by Harald Hagemann, vol. 2, Economics.

and consumer society is another growing and still developing field of research. The monographic studies published so far have been limited in focus to the 1940s and 1950s or the protest movement of 1968.[113] One thing that appears to be certain is that the initial resistance of traditional German elites to this influence and fears of a possible cultural collapse caused by rock 'n' roll, boogie-woogie, rowdies, hippies, jazz, and jeans had dwindled by the late 1950s. The products of the American leisure, entertainment, and consumer industries had largely become accepted parts of German society. Neither the 1968 movement—with its critical stance against the United States—nor the peace and protest movement against the NATO double-track decision in the early 1980s, nor the periodic jeremiads of German cultural critics have changed this long-term trend, a trend that continues unabated even after the end of the Cold War and that has become a fixture in the cultural "globalization" of the present.

Perhaps nothing illustrates the extent to which the Federal Republic had become part of the American-dominated West by the end of the Cold War as impressively as the Americanization of the German language, which has rightly been described as a "postwar variant of a growing Anglicization of the German language beginning in the eighteenth century."[114] Beginning with a conscious political and thus also linguistic orientation toward the United States in the early postwar period, the Americanization of the German language expanded to nearly all areas of life and nearly all segments of West German society. By the end of the Cold War, it had become a commonplace that American English was the lingua franca of the Western world and that the West Germans were taking part in this globalization by virtue of both their English language skills and the Americanization of their language.

Ironically, it appears in retrospect that the influence of American popular culture on the second German state, the German Democratic Republic, during the Cold War was in many ways the most threatening and least controllable aspect of the otherwise marginal East German-American relationship.[115] From the time the GDR was founded in 1949

113 See note 80 and the chapters by Uta G. Poiger, vol. 1, Culture, and Michael Ermarth, vol. 2, Culture.

114 See the chapter by Heidrun Kämper, vol. 2, Culture.

115 See the chapters by Christian Ostermann, vol. 1 and vol. 2, Politics; Uta G. Poiger, vol. 1, Culture; Rainer Schnoor, vol. 1 and vol. 2, Society; and Heinrich Bortfeldt, vol. 2, Culture.

until the belated establishment of diplomatic relations a quarter century later, the United States pursued a strict policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet satellite. Even once recognition was granted, it largely remained a formality, with no political or economic and almost no cultural substance. The American embassy in East Berlin was merely an embassy "to the German Democratic Republic." Neither trade nor cultural agreements were signed. The dependence of the GDR on the Soviet Union—its raison d'être—placed severe restrictions on foreign policy action undertaken by the East German state. Until the end of the Cold War and reunification, the focus of the United States was on the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. Before the erection of the Berlin Wall, the United States undertook a few half-hearted attempts to destabilize the GDR as part of a poorly conceived "rollback" policy.[116] Although possible recognition of the GDR became a central problem during the Berlin crisis of 1958–62, the United States held firm to its existing policy. When the Wall was built, the GDR became a symbol of a system with no respect for human rights. At the same time, however, the second German state, which had no domestic lobby in the United States, essentially disappeared behind the Wall as far as the American public was concerned.

The cultural contacts between the two states were sporadic before diplomatic recognition, and this did not change fundamentally after 1974 despite a few initiatives by individuals and organizations. The only exception, as indicated previously, was the boundary-breaking attraction of American popular culture and the products of American mass consumption, which the citizens of the GDR could examine themselves in West Berlin before the Wall went up and which the media, especially television, drummed into their consciousness after the erection of the Wall. For several decades, the governing Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, or SED) and East German authorities fought against these products and expressions of the "American way of life." They attempted to disparage consumption of American pop culture—boogie-woogie, jazz, rock and pop, jeans and cowboy hats, Elvis, and *Dallas*—as cultural barbarism, as targeted infiltration and a threat to the stability of the farmers' and workers' state. Beginning in the 1970s, the SED took a new line. Instead of doing direct battle with the influence of American mass culture, the party attempted to neutralize it, harness it, and use it to

116 See the chapter by Bernd Stöver, vol.1, Politics.

stabilize the communist system. Nothing helped; the seductive power of American popular culture could not be stopped at the border with the Federal Republic. There was no remedy on either side of the Wall for the "global, American-style mass cultural ecumenical movements."[117] In this respect, even the East arrived in the West long before reunification.

117 See the chapter by Rainer Schnoor, vol. 2, Society.