4. Jacob Gould Schurman, Heidelberg University, and American-German Relations, 1878–1945

The sensational news took Rector Martin Dibelius by surprise. "It is January 4, 1928. The rector of Heidelberg University has remained alone in his office during the lunch break. A long-distance call comes through. 'This is the Berlin Achtuhrabendblatt, we wish to speak to the rector.' Speaking.' 'What do you say about the American foundation?' 'I have not heard anything about it.' 'We have just received a Wolff message about it.' 'Please read it to me.' He listens and jots down the initial figures: "At a dinner given by the Steuben Society [in New York] Ambassador Schurman announces that he has begun collecting donations with the goal of 400,000 dollars for the construction of a new building for lecture halls and classrooms at the University of Heidelberg." Rector Dibelius has barely hung up with Berlin when other calls start to pour in from the city: public authorities, newspapers, and colleagues—the radio had already spread the news."[1]

That sensational call from Berlin was the prelude to 1928, a year that, without exaggeration, could be called the "Schurman year" with regard to the history of Heidelberg University. At the end of January, a delegation led by the rector and Heidelberg's lord mayor, Ernst Walz, travelled to Berlin to convey their gratitude to the U.S. ambassador to Germany, Jacob Gould Schurman. The president of Heidelberg University's student body thanked his former classmate in writing. On May 5, members of the university, together with distinguished guests from the city, the state, and the German Reich, gathered in the large

1 Description of Dibelius in "Neue Badische-Landeszeitung," June 9, 1931. Heidelberg University Archives (hereafter cited inter alia), B-5135/7 (X, 2, no. 49). I would like to thank Elisabeth Hunerlach and Dr. Hermann Weisert for their kind assistance.

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hall of the New Collegiate building (where the New University building now stands) on Ludwigsplatz (today: University Square) to bestow honorary doctoral degrees on both Ambassador Schurman and German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann. The Department of Philosophy had already awarded Schurman an honorary Doctor of Philosophy degree on July 28, 1927. On December 17, at a ceremony in the great hall of the civic center that was organized by the city and the university, Schurman presented the sum of "more than half a million dollars for the construction of a new lecture hall." Lord Mayor Walz conveyed honorary citizenship on the American ambassador, while the Baden minister for culture and education, Otto Leers, showed the gratitude of the state by presenting Schurman with a facsimile edition of the Codex Manesse.

Professor Christoph Voll of Karlsruhe, who had been commissioned to produce a bust of Schurman, was given an appropriate seat in the hall "in order to observe the facial expressions of Mr. Ambassador during his speech."[2] That evening, the entire student body participated in a torchlight procession in his honor.

At seventy-three, Schurman accepted all these honors with surprising liveliness, an easy gracefulness, and an awareness that the funds he had collected on Wall Street would lay the foundation for an impressive building in the center of Heidelberg's historic district that "would survive the centuries."[3] Throughout his 1928 Heidelberg speeches and addresses, he stressed that his year as a student in Heidelberg in 1878 had been the source of his life-long engagement with German cultural and intellectual history. Heidelberg had been the first German university he attended, and it had remained his best loved.[4]

Who was Jacob Gould Schurman, this man who—according to the Frankfurter Zeitung—had bestowed this sudden bonanza upon the delighted men of the university "out of a blue American sky."[5] What motivated him to create this foundation? What did he think

2 On Voll, see U. A., B-5133/2 (IX, 13, no. 191) and Meinhold Lurz, Der plastische Schmuck der Neuen Universität, Heidelberg 1975, p. 4 (Kunsthistorisches Institut der Universität Heidelberg, Veröffentlichungen zur Heidelberger Altstadt, ed. by Peter Anselm Riedl, vol. 12).

3 Schurman used the phrase "which will last for centuries" in a letter from Bedford Hills, New York, addressed to the University on October 10, 1930, in connection with the proposed endowment plaque. Inter alia, B-5133/2 (IX, 13, no. 191).

4 Cf. speech of May 5, 1928. Inter alia, B- 1523/2b (Heidelberger Tageblatt of May 5, 1928).

5 Inter alia, B-5130 (IX, 13, no. 177), Morgenblatt, Feb. 2, 1928, no. 87.

about Heidelberg, Germany and the Germans, and American-German relations?

Looking back on his life, Schurman could say that through his own efforts, he himself had achieved the American Dream—the rise from the bottom to the top of the social ladder; the way out of poverty and lack of education to wealth, status, public influence. But first he had to become what his Dutch ancestors never would have wanted to be: an American.[6]

Schurman was born in 1854, the third of eight children, on Prince Edward Island in Canada. Loyalists to the British Crown, his ancestors had emigrated to Canada during the American revolution. While his parents toiled on their farm, he attended a primary school and became a member of their Baptist congregation. The hard physical labor that farming demanded drove the 13-year-old boy to leave his parents' house and find a job as a sales clerk in a country store where he worked for three years. At sixteen, he had saved up enough money to be able to pay a year's tuition at a high school out of his own pocket. A year later, the outstanding student won a state scholarship that allowed him to continue his education over the next years at two colleges close to his home.

According to Schurman, that first scholarship had a great impact on his life. It was the basis for other highly-competitive scholarships and awards that made it possible for him to study in England and Germany over a five-year period. At twenty-one, he left Nova Scotia for London and Edinburgh to get a three-year degree in what, at the time, amounted to general studies in the humanities. These years of travel and education were characterized by the leitmotiv of Schurman's studies, in which he tried to achieve his own understanding of the relationship between knowledge and religion. His Baptist faith was being challenged by Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, by Herbert Spencer's philosophy, as well as by empiricism, materialism, and agnosticism. Schurman searched for truth, for answers to the three classical

6 The following biographical sketch is the first scholarly publication on Schurman in German. It owes much to Maynard Moser's dissertation, Jacob Gould Schurman: Scholar, Political Activist, and Ambassador of Good Will, 1892–1942 (University of California, Santa Barbara, Ph.D. 1976), Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor. Cf. the obituary in "New York Times," Aug. 13, 1942, p. 19; Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Three 1941–1945, New York 1973, pp. 696–699. A monograph on Schurman as ambassador to Germany from 1925–1930 in general, on his relationship to Heidelberg in particular, based on the German and American sources, is a desideratum of research. Schurman's accessible estate is administered by Cornell University.

questions at the basis of modern philosophy: What can I know? What may I hope? What should I do? The quest for the foundations of his existence did not, however, hinder the unerring and successful completion of his studies in the United Kingdom. In Edinburgh, he finished his courses in metaphysics, logic, and ethics with the title of "Doctor of Science" (D.Sc.). His work in London on ethics, political philosophy, and political economy earned him a Master's degree. Rather than returning home, the young doctor used another scholarship to go to Germany for two years. Here he would learn the language, familiarize himself with German culture, and acquaint himself with the German university system, which enjoyed world-wide renown at the end of the nineteenth century and would become a model for the organization of graduate studies at elite universities in the United States. From 1878 to 1879, Schurman studied for a year in Heidelberg; from 1879 to 1880 he spent one semester at Berlin University, which, at the time, he considered "the best and most famous in the world,"[7] and then another semester in Göttingen.

His time at Heidelberg left lasting impressions on Schurman. Even after fifty years, he spoke gratefully and enthusiastically of the special symbiosis of intellectual and aesthetic attractions, of the attractiveness of the university, of the unique combination of city, river, and landscape. He became, like many Americans before and after him, an avid hiker. Two academic teachers particularly impressed him, the archaeologist Karl Bernhard Stark and the philosopher Kuno Fischer. Stark taught him to appreciate Dürer. His lectures on European art, with their broad visual material, structured and expanded Schurman's knowledge. Fischer, in whose house he was a frequent guest, was appreciated by the ambassador in retrospect as follows: "Kuno Fischer was not a creative mind, but his ability for empathetic understanding and appreciation and his gift of reproduction were amazing. He was the historian of philosophy, the interpreter of other men's systems . . . He was extremely logical, and the greatest academic orator. His field included the high art of poetry as well as philosophy. I had the privilege during two semesters of listening to his lectures on modern philosophy, including Kant and Fichte, as well as his lectures on Goethe's Faust and the life and works of Schiller. Of course, at the same time I intensely studied the writings of these masters."[8]

7 Moser, op. cit., p. 6.

8 Cf. note 4 and Schurman's speech at the inauguration of the "New University." New Mannheimer Zeitung v. 9.6.1931, inter alia, B-5135/7 (X, 2, no. 49).

In Berlin, Eduard Zeller instructed him in Greek philosophy and Theodor Mommsen in Roman history. In Göttingen, he began writing a book on "Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution," which he completed in the United States and published as his first scholarly work.

Already during his time as a student in England and Germany, Schurman had the ability to win over men of influence, standing, and wealth. With this talent, he flourished after his return to the new world. It was an important prerequisite for his meteoric academic career. In 1882, George Munro, a rich New York publisher, endowed a chair in English literature and rhetoric at Dalhousie University in Halifax and offered it to the twenty-eight-year-old Schurman. Two years later, Schurman moved to the newly created George Munro chair in metaphysics at the same university. Almost by the same act, Schurman married the publisher's daughter Barbara Forrest Munro. This marriage, which lasted forty-one years until the death of his wife in 1930, produced seven children and made Schurman affluent and financially independent.

In 1886, Schurman moved to the prestigious Cornell University as a professor for Christian ethics and philosophy of mind who soon received a chair in the philosophy department. The president of the university, Andrew D. White, played a decisive role in this process—a man with whom Schurman had already become friends in Berlin when the former had been accredited as the U.S. ambassador to Germany. Schurman immediately developed a reputation as the best speaker at Cornell. Besides students and colleagues, his captivating lectures attracted the attention of many local citizens.

His lectures in philosophy made an especially strong impression on Henry W. Sage, the head of the university's Board of Trustees and the owner of a lumber empire. In 1890, Sage endowed a small department at Cornell, the Linn Sage School of Philosophy. Schurman would become its dean. Finally, in a political power move, Sage imposed his will on the board, which at thirty-eight made Schurman president of Cornell University in 1892. Schurman held this position for twenty-eight years until he voluntarily resigned in 1920. He also became an American citizen, with Sage testifying to his good character.

This influential, prestigious, and costly presidency—by his own account, Schurman allocated more than $100,000 for representational responsibilities out of his own pocket during his tenure—became the institutional foundation for an active life that he continued for the next 50 years, until reaching the age of 88. Schurman became a

school-founding philosopher, educator, planner of educational institutions, opinionated member of the Republican Party, advisor to several presidents, sought-after speaker, envoy, and ambassador of his country to Greece, Montenegro, China and Germany, world traveler and "elder statesman" whose advice was, however, not solicited by the Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt.

For almost two decades of his life, he published philosophical essays and books in which he defended Aristotelian ethics against Kant's "formalism" on the one hand, and Darwin's and Spencer's "materialism" on the other,[9] and, within a climate of widespread agnosticism, held to a belief in the knowability of God and the immortality of the soul.[10] Beginning in 1898, he no longer wrote as a philosopher, and his publications became more concrete and political. He founded a philosophical school in America, the so-called school of "objective idealism." This had its headquarters, its founder, its philosophical interpreters, and a generation of more or less faithful disciples all at Cornell University.[11] Moreover, in 1892, Schurman became editor of the first scholarly journal of philosophy in the USA (Philosophical Review).

After Sage's death in 1897, Schurman began to dominate Cornell. Through a fortunate combination of liberality and strong-willed leadership, he was able to win the confidence of his academic colleagues. Breaking with the customs of his time, he saw to it that the departments could propose their own deans and that they would be represented in the central decision-making body of the university, the Board of Trustees—albeit without voting rights. When students protested

9 Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution (1881); The Ethical Import of Darwinism (1898).

10 Belief in God. Its Origins, Nature, and Basis (1890); Agnosticism and Religion (1896).

11 Cf. the characterization of Herbert W. Schneider, Geschichte der amerikanischen Philosophie, Hamburg 1957, p. 272. English translation: "The antithesis of personalism is objective idealism as it prevailed at Cornell University. There a philosophy of mind flourished which was indifferent to psychology and which considered complete only that empiricism which understood human experience in its historical course and in its institutional forms. The study of 'objective mind' as carried on at the Sage School of Philosophy of Cornell formed the American branch of that idealistic movement which in England as in Germany combined a critical analysis of the categories (the Kantian heritage) with a historical conception of the human mind (the Hegelian heritage). Critical logic and the philosophy of history were thus united to form a theory of experience for which experience in the individual is an organic whole. The first Head of the Sage School, later president of the university, was Jacob Gould Schurman."

against the right of their black classmates to live on campus, Schurman issued a sharp rebuke. But he was not able to persuade the Board of Trustees to appoint a woman to the faculty.

During Schurman's presidency, the number of enrolled students rose from 1,538 to 5,765 while the university campus expanded from 200 acres to over 1,400. In addition, more colleges were founded and the university that was originally dependent on patrons evolved into an institution that drew on both private and public funding. As the head administrator, Schurman demonstrated an astonishing tenacity and determination in achieving the goals he set and impressed others with his intellectual and physical vitality. Occasionally he "overwhelmed" his colleagues and employees with the speed and thoroughness with which he tackled both the large and small problems of his office. In admiration of Schurman, one such colleague wrote: "If, as Plato tells us, philosophers are the ideal rulers, the condition of Cornell University is blessed in having for its king a philosopher of highest repute."[12]

By the time he plunged into politics, Schurman's personal values and political philosophy were already firmly established. In looking for the central themes of his political world view, it is impossible not to notice those values and ideals that had made his own success story possible: freedom for individual fulfillment, a tireless dedication to one's profession, and a sense of responsibility to the community. In Europe he would have been considered a free-market liberal; in the United States, he chose the Republican Party as his political home. As a "self-made man," he was absolutely convinced of the creative capacities of the individual. Through a constitution guaranteeing freedom, the body politic must put as unlimited a space as possible at the disposal of this individual. The fundamental civil rights and liberties, including freedom of religion and private property rights, stood at the core of his political philosophy. According to Schurman, equal opportunity for all individuals had to be maintained, but, due to the different characteristics of individuals, equal opportunities led to unequal results. Success and wealth were the just and justifiable products of hard work.

In a very American way, Schurman's libertarianism was closely tied to the professional ethics and the moral precepts of what Max Weber described as "ascetic Protestantism." While his education in philosophy did allow him to overcome the narrowness of his Baptist upbringing, his daily schedule and behavior continued to be influenced

12 Moser, op. cit., p. 15.

by the expectations of a protestant way of life that was moral and pleasing to God. Schurman led a tireless and methodically disciplined professional life. He hated nothing more than people who led idle and "parasitic" lives.

In a weakened form, what Max Weber wrote about the professional ethics of those Puritan merchants who must renounce ecclesiastical-sacramental salvation applied to Schurman: "The exhortation of the apostle to make fast one's own call is here interpreted as a duty to attain certainty of one's own election and justification in the daily struggle of life. In the place of the humble sinners to whom Luther promises grace if they trust themselves to God in penitent faith are bred those self-confident saints whom we can rediscover in the hard Puritan merchants of the heroic age of capitalism and in isolated instances down to the present. On the other hand, in order to attain that self-confidence intense worldly activity is recommended as the most suitable means. It and it alone disperses religious doubts and gives the certainty of grace."[13]

Liberty, property, law and order, and justice all stood at the top of Schurman's scale of values. He felt that all forms of state intervention and socialism, but especially communism, represented ideologies that ran counter to human nature. The state should intervene in society as little as possible; the best form of governing was people governing themselves. Schurman was a strong adherent of a representative political system, and he despised direct democracy. As a "Tory Democrat" he had a natural sympathy for the values of the American business community. Like the renowned conservative Edmund Burke, he understood himself as both a guardian and a reformer: "A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve taken together, would be my standard of a statesman." Yet Schurman always distanced himself from the great reform effort of his time, the "progressive movement." He criticized all reform programs that relied on state intervention, like Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom" and Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" as well as the "New Nationalism" of his fellow Republican, Theodore Roosevelt. For Schurman, reforms had to start at the level of the individual and groups within society, not at the level of the government and bureaucracies.

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13 Max Weber, Die Protestantische Ethik I. Eine Aufsatzsammlung, ed. by Johannes Winkelmann, Gütersloh 1981, pp. 128 f. (GTB Siebenstern).

According to Schurman, the creation of the common good is a moral problem. Wealth is an obligation; it is a "trust for the benefit of humanity. Charity and philanthropy are the pillars of the common good; without them, society degenerates into a "herd of animals.[14]

This conviction also shows that Schurman stood in the tradition of ascetic Protestantism, according to which not the acquisition and possession of wealth, but the lazy resting on it and its uninhibited, in the worst case vicious, enjoyment were sinful. The rich man, according to Schurman, is bound in conscience to spend, even to give away, the property entrusted to him (by God) for morally irreproachable purposes. Heidelberg also owes its "New University" in no small measure to this spirit, the original foundation of the widespread American foundation system (before the invention of the tax deductibility of donations).

In addition to ambition and a desire for fame, the usually unacknowledged but classic motives of politicians, it was above all this deeply felt commitment to the community that drove Schurman to become active as a member of the conservative wing of the Republican Party beginning in 1898. Both in his home state of New York and at the federal level, he sought to influence the direction of the party. For this he had three means in particular at his disposal: his prestige as president of Cornell, public speaking tuned to a high moral and idealistic tone, and his proven talent for drawing attention from men of influence.

In the presidential elections of 1896 and 1900, he supported the victorious Republican McKinley, and from 1906 on several times the lawyer Charles E. Hughes, first in his successful attempts to become governor of the state of New York (1908, 1910), then in the latter's unsuccessful campaign against President Wilson in 1916. Schurman had come to appreciate Hughes as a colleague at Cornell University, while Schurman's brother became a partner in Hughes's New York law firm. In the presidential election of 1908 and in the sharp dispute leading to the split in the Republican Party before the 1912 election, Schurman vehemently supported President Taft against his rival Theodore Roosevelt. For their part, politicians showed their appreciation by entrusting Schurman with political tasks and offices. McKinley made him chairman of the first U.S. government commission to investigate conditions in the Philippines in 1898, although Schurman had clearly been among

14 Moser, op. cit., p. 21.

the opponents of annexation of the Philippines and belonged to the anti-imperialist camp at the height of the Spanish-American War in 1898. After some fluctuations of opinion motivated by party tactics, from 1902 onward Schurman publicly and continuously advocated for Philippine independence in the foreseeable future. Among the American public he established himself as a respected authority on the Philippines who represented an independent position on the issue.[15]

In the summer of 1912, President Taft, with whom Schurman also maintained close private ties, appointed the president of Cornell as American envoy to Greece and Montenegro. Schurman accepted the offer but, in his own words, only in order to take a one-year educational leave as a "sabbatical statesman" at the cradle of Western civilization. Contrary to his plans, he soon had to give his complete attention to politics, as, shortly after his arrival, the first Balkan War broke out, leading to the dissolution of almost all of the European part of Turkey. With his typical vigor, he worked his way into the problems of the Balkans, conferred with political leaders in Athens, Constantinople, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Sofia, and, after his return to the U.S. in August 1913, delivered a series of lectures on the Balkans at Princeton that were then published as a book and reprinted in three different editions.[16] He had spoken in German with the Bulgarian prime minister, a fellow student he knew from his time in Heidelberg.

Hughes had to wait until the era of Democratic President Wilson was over in order to pay his debt of gratitude to Schurman. When Hughes was appointed Secretary of State by President Harding in 1920, he recommended that Schurman be appointed envoy to China. Running from June 1921 to May 1925, these years in China were very challenging for Schurman. This was due to the fact that, in the midst of civil war-like conditions, he had to try to represent American rights and interests within the framework of the traditional "open door" policy while, at the same time, showing the appropriate regard for Chinese nationalism. In the opinion of the American government, he had performed his duties so well that, in the summer of 1925, he was, by the standards of the time, diplomatically "promoted" to the position of American ambassador to Berlin. This position had become vacant when the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Frank B. Kellogg, succeeded Hughes as Secretary of State and the Schurman family's

15 Jacob Gould Schurman, Philippine Affairs. A Retrospect and Outlook, New York 1902. (Scribner's).

16 Jacob Gould Schurman, The Balkan Wars, Princeton University Press 1913.

longtime friend from upstate New York, Alanson B. Houghton, left Berlin to become the Ambassador in London.

Schurman was so eager to get to Berlin that he assured Kellogg that he would pay the unusually high costs of the positions' representational responsibilities himself. For Schurman, this appointment had a special significance: with his last political appointment he would be returning to a country whose language he knew and whose culture he greatly appreciated. He wrote to Kellogg that he would use all his might to do his part "to restore the old relations of warm friendship between the American and German people."[17] Presumably, he also wanted to repair his personal relationship with Germany. This had been severely disrupted during World War I, when Schurman had let himself be carried away by the war fever in his country, drawing a hateful picture of Germany, albeit the "other," the "militaristic" Germany.

Schurman's relationship to the European war and his assessment of Germany from 1914 to 1918 differed only slightly from those of the Democratic President Wilson.[18] This was not by chance, because for the Presbyterian Wilson and the Baptist Schurman, international politics, especially the question of war and peace, was more than a sober and power-savvy representation of U.S. national interests. For both, foreign policy was also a matter of law and morality. With the announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare by the German Reich on January 31, 1917, Wilson and Schurman convinced themselves that Germany was violating universally valid norms. Both evolved into crusaders for whom the U.S. national interest coincided with America's mission in world history: to wage the battle for democracy, morality, and justice against the "outcast" Germany, which had excluded itself from the community of civilized nations. From 1914 to 1916, Schurman blamed both Great Britain and Germany for violating American rights and the principle of freedom of the seas. He tolerated a policy of "partisan

17 Moser, op. cit., p. 149.

18 On Schurman, see Moser, op. cit., p. 102 f.; on Wilson especially: Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War and Peace, Arlington Heights, IL. 1983; Norman G. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution, New York 1968; Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–18, New Haven/Conn. 1959; Ernest R. May, World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917, Cambridge 1959; Arthur Walworth, America's Moment: 1918. American Diplomacy at the End of World War I, New York 1977; Klaus Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden, Düsseldorf 1971. Further reading in Richard Dean Burns (ed.), Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700, Santa Barbara / Oxford 1983, ch. 19.

neutrality" in favor of Great Britain, as did Wilson until the presidential election of 1916. Then, beginning in April 1917, he defended the necessity of the American war against Germany and her allies with fanatical nationalism. In Schurman's speeches Germany now became a gangster and an "outlaw" who wanted to conquer the world. The peculiar dialectic of American world power politics in the 20th century—namely the global definition of one's own interest in connection with the enemy's supposed desire for world domination—also appeared in Schurman's war speeches.

Schurman felt that Germany had betrayed modern culture and abandoned the high level of civilization that the country of Kant, Goethe, and Schiller had embodied. Having run amok, the nation had to be whipped into submission since the "Huns" only understood the language of force. They would clearly have to be beaten and pay reparations after the war.

Schurman characterized Wilson's 14 Points from January 1918 as the "Magna Charta" of the rights of nations in the world. From June to September 1918, he was invited to Europe by the British and French governments to deliver speeches to American front-line soldiers. He was received by French Prime Minister Clemenceau and later awarded the Cross of the Legion of Honor.

After victory, armistice, and—in the view of U.S. public opinion—the disappointing results of the peace negotiations in Paris, a profound change of mood set in across the United States. Almost overnight, the nation had had enough of years of war propaganda, Wilson's missionary speeches, world politics, Europe, and potentially entangling alliances—the anathema of American foreign policy since the end of the first and only alliance with France in 1798. The campaign slogan of Warren G. Harding, the Republican who won the 1920 presidential election, captured the new mood perfectly: "Back to Normal."

Schurman, too, quickly became disillusioned with the results of the First World War. The millions of dead accelerated the return to his old fundamental conviction that world peace could be secured neither by force nor by the principle of the balance of power, but only by diplomatic compromise, by treaty, agreement, arbitration, and an international court. Therefore, in the passionate domestic political dispute over ratification of the League of Nations Statute incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles, he campaigned for U.S. accession. As a "mild reservationist," however, he attached conditions to this that were tantamount to squaring the circle. The U.S. was to join an effective

League of Nations but was not to relinquish sovereign rights. Schurman recommended deleting the controversial sanctions clause in Article X of the Statute and, in the event of conflict, relying on law, justice, and the enlightened public opinion of the world.[19]

But Schurman's public outreach and his discussions with Harding were unsuccessful. On March 19, 1920, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the League of Nations Statute and thus the Treaty of Versailles as negotiated by Wilson in Paris. Harding, after taking office, stated categorically that his administration would not propose joining the League of Nations under any circumstances.[20]

This decision, with its impact on world history, was the general premise for the content and limits of Schurman's diplomatic activities in China and in Germany.[21] The United States, which had finally become a world power—though not yet a world leader—as a result of World War I, refused to support the new order of Versailles and the League of Nations through collective action, even though, as the victor, it did in principle recognize the new status quo of the international system. As a result, the collapsed system of equilibrium among the European powers was not replaced by a new and better system of collective security, as Wilson had wanted. Rather, there was now an amputated League of Nations in which the Soviet Union, Germany, and the United States were absent and which, at least until 1925/26, primarily became an instrument of Franco-British policy.

Equally momentous for Germany, France, and Europe was the simultaneous refusal of the U.S. Senate to give its consent to a U.S.-French alliance treaty that Clemenceau had wrested from President Wilson in Paris in exchange for relinquishing the left bank of the Rhine. This also rendered the British pledge to France moot. The Cold War between France and Germany from 1919 to 1922, the relentless harshness of

19 Cf. Moser, op. cit., pp. 112–130.

20 On Wilson's defeat in the Senate and the change of mood in the United States, see the colorful sketch by Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, pp. 614–623; Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, New York 1945; John C. Vinson, Defeat of Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant, Athens, Ga., 1961.

21 The following interpretation of American foreign policy in the interwar period is based on Detlef Junker, Der unteilbare Weltmarkt. Das ökonomische Interesse in der Außenpolitik der USA, Stuttgart 1975, esp. pp. 16–42; Junker, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Power and Vision: President in Times of Crisis, Göttingen 1979, pp. 97–124; Junker, Die Außenpolitik der USA 1920–1941, in: Otmar Franz (ed.), Am Wendepunkt der europäischen Geschichte, Göttingen 1981, pp. 200–217.

French policy toward Germany, which uncompromisingly insisted on a so-called integral fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty, resorted to sanctions if necessary, and culminated in the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923, resulted in no small way from this weakness of the French security system. For, despite Versailles, the French felt threatened by the Germans in the long term and betrayed by the Anglo-Saxons—and especially the Americans.

The two Senate decisions were the prelude to the "non-alignment" policy maintained by the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations, as well as Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy of "non-alignment" with Europe and Asia in the interwar period. This meant several things: isolationism in alliance policy; no preemptive alliances that might tie the hands of the United States; no collective sanctions within the framework of the League of Nations; and no military interventions in Eurasia. Consistent with these positions, when the French began their occupation of the Ruhr, the United States withdrew its last troops from the Rhineland in January 1923.

The Americans also did not participate in the regional pact system of the Locarno Treaties of 1925, despite warmly welcoming it. However, the U.S. did sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed war because it contained no binding obligations or sanctions clauses. Similarly, the U.S. signed the Washington Treaties of 1922, in which the major Pacific powers sought to halt the maritime arms race in the region, to freeze the politico-military status quo in the Pacific, and to make the U.S. "open door" policy in China binding under international law.

The absence of the U.S. military and its lack of alliance-policy stood in stark contrast to the country's global economic weight, and its global economic policy, with which America was massively present in Europe and in Germany. The U.S. had become the world's dominant economic and trading power as a result of World War I, and it continued to expand this position in the 1920s. In the twenties, it increased its lead as a producer, becoming the largest exporter and the largest consumer of raw materials. Its share of world production of industrial goods grew from 35.8% in 1913 to 46% on average for the years from 1925 to 1929. Measured in dollars, U.S. national income was as high as that of the next 23 nations combined, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Canada. New York became the world's second financial center next to London, and the world economic center became bicentric, if not America-centric. Perhaps the most consequential factor for world trade and for the U.S.-European relationship was the

abrupt transformation of the United States from a debtor nation to a creditor nation. U.S. export surpluses and war bonds left foreign countries, especially England, France, and Italy, $12.5 billion in debt in 1919, and this debt continued to grow throughout the 1920s thanks to U.S. foreign trade policy. The result was the often-described latent dollar shortage of the 1920s, which basically was artificially bridged by U.S. long- and short-term loans.

The overriding goal of the Republican administrations of the 1920s, which were heavily influenced by "big business" and "big finance," was to try to use this economic position of the country to simultaneously maintain an open world market for exports, credit, and raw materials within the framework of a stable, liberal, and capitalist world order that would remain at peace. A telling principle of the Harding administration, which was fully consistent with Schurman's ideas, was "Less government in business and more business in government." The means considered appropriate included a renewal of the U.S. trade treaty system on the basis of the unconditional, most-favored-nation clause, encouragement of U.S. banks to lend money and promote currency stabilization, and, in general, the demand for equal legal treatment of the United States in foreign markets—otherwise known as the open-door policy. The U.S. had already indirectly granted itself unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in the separate peace with Germany of August 1921, and this clause was a central component of the trade treaty between the U.S. and Germany, which was signed at the end of 1923 but not approved by Congress until February 1925.

It is an irony of American-German relations in the Weimar Republic that the U.S.'s economic interest in Europe and Germany finally forced American politicians to use economic means to correct important consequences that had resulted from the absence of an alliance policy. The Ruhr conflict had devastating effects on Germany and France, and indeed on Europe as a whole. With drastic clarity, it demonstrated to the Harding government, as well as the Coolidge government beginning in August 1923, and especially to its two most important leaders, Secretary of State Hughes, and Secretary of Commerce Hoover, that vital U.S. interests were at stake, and that the reparations problem—the cause of the Ruhr occupation—could no longer be left to the Europeans alone. If necessary, economic pressure would need to be exerted on France to force it to depoliticize the reparations claim, i.e., to adapt it to Germany's verifiable and internationally controlled ability to pay. Nevertheless, America's fear of contact with Europe remained so great

that the U.S. government did not take direct action but tried to exert its influence through experts it had suggested, such as the banker and general Charles G. Dawes and the Chairman of the Board of General Electric, Owen D. Young. This merely informal, but nevertheless effective, influence was also related to the strict refusal of the U.S. to recognize a link between reparations and the repayment of Allied debts to the United States.

The concrete result of this American stabilization policy in Germany was the well-known Dawes Plan of 1924—in a sense the Marshall Plan of the 1920s—which was then modified in 1929 by the Young Plan. With the help of a large bond, whose issuing depended primarily on the American capital market, the Dawes Plan brought about a transitional arrangement for gradually increasing annual payments. On the one hand, it placed Germany under foreign control in terms of monetary and financial policy, with Seymour Parker Gilbert—the American general agent for reparations who was responsible for transfer protection—becoming a key figure in the German economy. On the other hand, it safeguarded Germany against future French military sanctions and against any reparations payments that would endanger stability.

The economic security provided by the Dawes Plan had several successful outcomes: the security treaty of Locarno, Germany's entry into the League of Nations, and France's withdrawal from the Rhineland. This American economic intervention was the beginning of the end of French political domination in Central Europe after World War I. Germany was thus able to emerge from its helplessness position of 1919 with American help.[22]

22 On European politics after World War I and on U.S.-European relations from 1919 to 1924, see: Keith Nelson, Victors Divided. America and the Allies in Germany. 1918–1923, Berkeley 1975; Walter A. McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy 1914–1924. The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe, Princeton 1978; Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe. The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan, Chapel Hill 1976; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest. America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security. Chapel Hill 1979; Marc Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Diplomacy, 1916–1923, New York 1980; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilson, the Republicans, and French Security after World War I, in Journal of American History 59 (1972/73), pp. 341–352; Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgois Europe. Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in Decade After World War I, Princeton 1975; Jacques Bariety, Les relations franco-allemandes après la première guerre mondiale, Paris 1977; Ludwig Zimmermann, Frankreichs Ruhrpolitik von Versailles bis zum Dawesplan, Göttingen 1971; Helmuth Rößler (ed.), Die Folgen von Versailles 1919–1924, Göttingen 1969; Werner Link, Die amerikanische

No one in Germany saw this outcome more clearly and wanted it more unambiguously than Gustav Stresemann, who was responsible for German foreign policy from 1923 to 1929 and the only German politician in the area of foreign affairs of stature in the Weimar Republic. It was only within the framework of Stresemann's overall concept that German attempts to re-engage the United States in Europe and in Germany led to any success. Since the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, German policy toward the Americas had always been part of its larger aims to revise the treaty—the sole theme of German foreign policy after 1919. It always had an anti-French edge and was accompanied from the outset by the hope that the United States, out of its own economic interest, would counter France's sanctions policy, which England tolerated only grudgingly but did not prevent.

Germany's futile attempts had begun in the tense weeks leading up to the London ultimatum. On April 20, 1921, Reich Chancellor Fehrenbach and Foreign Minister Simons, in agreement with Reich President Ebert, asked U.S. President Harding to mediate in the reparations question, assuring him that Germany would submit to his decision "without qualification or reservation."[23] This desperate move came at a time when Germany and the United States were still in a state of war under international law—the Separate Peace was not concluded until August 1921—and official U.S. foreign policy continued to assume German guilt in the outbreak of World War I as the moral and legal basis for reparations. In the press and the parliament, Germany's right wing accused the government of a lack of national dignity. It had

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Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–1932, Düsseldorf 1970; ed, Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA, in: Manfred Knapp et al, Die USA und Deutschland, 1918–1975, Munich 1978, pp. 62–106; Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, Amerikanischer Kapitalexport und Wiederaufbau der deutschen Wirtschaft 1919–1923 im Vergleich zu 1924–1929, in: VSWG, vol. 64 (1977), pp. 497–529; Dieter Bruno Gescher, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Reparationen 1920–1924, Bonn 1956; Eckhard Wandel, Die Bedeutung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika für das deutsche Reparationsproblem, 1924–1929, Tübingen 1971.

23 Cf. Akten der Reichskanzlei, Weimarer Republik, Das Kabinett Fehrenbach, Boppard am Rhein 1972, p. 651; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, vol. II pp. 40–45; Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1921, I, pp. 121–122; II, p. 297: "In so doing, we solemnly declare that the German Government is ready and willing, without any restrictions or reservations, to pay to the Allied Powers as reparations such sum as the President of the United States, after thorough examination and investigation, should deem just and equitable."

handed over Germany, bound hand and foot, to American benevolence. And, of course, Wilson's "betrayal" of his own principles and dashed hopes for America at Versailles were not forgotten. In the Wirth and Cuno cabinets, too, futile pleas for help went out to Washington through all diplomatic channels. It was only the Ruhr conflict that finally brought about the turning point.

Stresemann recognized the opportunities that this opened up for German revisionist policy. Until his death in 1929, he continuously tried to promote the parallels of economic interests between the U.S. and Germany and to use them for the benefit of German revisionist policy. Even if he was convinced, like the Americans, of the advantages of a free and open world economic system, his main focus was always the advancement of German revisionist policy. For Stresemann believed that the greater the U.S. economic interests in Germany, the greater would be its interest in peaceful change—the ultimate goal of which, in Stresemann's view, was the revision of the Treaty of Versailles and the restoration of Germany's position as a great power within Europe. This state of affairs has been aptly described: "The USA conducted world politics as world economic policy, and Germany wanted to return to world politics via the world economy."[24]

In a speech to the Central Executive Committee of the German People's Party in Berlin on November 22, 1925, Stresemann explained the importance of the economic component for the present phase of German foreign policy: "I believe that using world economic interconnections—using the only thing that still makes us a great power, our economic power—in order to make foreign policy is the task that every foreign minister needs to pursue today." About the foreign policy of the United States, he had previously remarked: ". . . and in the background [of Germany's relations with France and England] stands the great power of the United States, whose whole ideology is pacifist and always leads to a wonderful thing: that its idealism unites with the material interests of the country, so that a wonderful state religion can be formed out of it."[25]

24 Link, Die Beziehungen, p. 65. The useful work of Robert Gottwald, Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in der Ära Stresemann, Berlin 1965, lacks synthetic force.

25 Henry A. Turner Jr. (ed.), A Speech by Stresemann on his Locarno Policy, in: VfZG 15 (1967), Cf. also a speech by Stresemann in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag on October 7, 1926: "The whole question of the reconstruction of Europe cannot be solved without America, since the entire gold base of the large capitalist countries has oriented itself toward the United States and subordinated itself to it."

The parallelism of economic interests, the problems arising from the U.S. economic presence in Germany, and the common will to pursue a peaceful, nonbelligerent foreign policy formed the basis for American-German relations in the Stresemann era. They were the narrower framework of Schurman's diplomatic activities in Berlin. Schurman was primarily concerned with the consequences of the Dawes Plan for Germany, especially with the modalities and dangers of American lending policy. While he recommended direct investment for productive purposes in Germany, Schurman also warned of the dangers that might develop from the race for American funds among the public authorities in Germany, especially among the municipalities and states. In addition, he indulged in a public controversy with the American Agent General, Felix Gilbert, and incurred repeated rebukes from Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, after expressing personal opinions that he had not coordinated with the State Department. Schurman also attempted to diplomatically put the complaints of the American film industry and other U.S. companies about discrimination within the German market into perspective; was sympathetic to the increasing demand of Germany in 1928 for a revision of the Dawes Plan; estimated until 1928/29, with cautious optimism, that the first German democracy had a chance to survive; and worked closely with Stresemann to secure German support for the Kellogg-Briand pact.[26]

However, Schurman's greatest enthusiasm and ambition was not for his duty to represent the interests of his country in Berlin. His heart was set on the second assignment connected to his office: promoting understanding, friendship, and goodwill between the peoples of America and Germany. For this purpose, Schurman said, there were no better means than personal contacts and social activities. This understanding of his diplomatic role in Berlin allowed Schurman to fully develop his skill, proven over decades, at winning over others. Mrs. Stresemann, with whom Schurman maintained a personal relationship even after the death of the German foreign minister, later wrote that Schurman

In: Arnold Harttung (ed.), Gustav Stresemann. Schriften, Berlin 1976, p. 367. On the state of research on Stresemann's foreign policy, see Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Die Zeit der Weltkriege (Gebhardt = Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte), vol. 4, Stuttgart 1976, pp. 258–270; Wolfgang Michalka, Marshall M. Lee (eds.), Gustav Stresemann, Darmstadt 1982; Eberhard Kalb, Die Weimarer Republik, Munich/Vienna 1984, pp. 194–198; Kalb, Probleme einer modernen Stresemann-Biographie, in: Franz, Am Wendepunkt, pp. 107–134. A monograph on Stresemann and the U.S. is also a desideratum of research.

26 Moser, op. cit., pp. 159–206.

had taken Berlin by storm. She did not remember any ambassador who had made so many amicable contacts in such a short time.

The American Embassy on Wilhelmstrasse became a social center in Berlin. Prominent people from politics, business, art, and science met at this hospitable location, with Schurman allocating $50,000 a year out of his own pocket for such representational responsibilities. The Berlin press praised his understanding of German culture and language. One newspaper described him as "100 percent poise, 200 percent energy, 300 percent enthusiasm, and 500 percent charm." Schurman very quickly succeeded in establishing a trusting relationship with Reich President Hindenburg, Reich Chancellor Luther, Reich Bank President Schacht, and Reich Foreign Minister Stresemann.

Particularly close and friendly relations developed between Stresemann and Schurman. Even if one takes into account that friendships between active politicians are almost never based on guileless sympathy alone, one may assume that, here, two congenial characters and kindred spirits came together. Both were committed liberals who had achieved social advancement largely by their own efforts. Both possessed broad intellectual and cultural interests in addition to a passion for power and politics. Both revered Goethe and German classicism. Both were impressive orators. Stresemann and Schurman had overcome the aggressive chauvinism of World War I and adopted the conviction that war must be excluded as a means of national foreign policy. Stresemann *and* Schurman no longer wanted to see the aspirations for nationalism and internationalism as irreconcilable. This common ground could explain why the German foreign minister considered Schurman his "warmest personal friend" among diplomats and was proud to have been the only guest from outside the family circle invited to the wedding of Schurman's daughter.[27] This personal relationship was undoubtedly fostered by the extensive economic parallelism of interests between the United States and Germany.

Ambassador Schurman placed special emphasis on fostering the existing cultural relationships between the two countries. He worked tirelessly to solicit understanding for his nation among the intellectual and academic elite of Germany. As he explained to a professor in Berlin: "We members of universities all speak the same language and

27 Cf. Felix Hirsch, Stresemann. Ein Lebensbild, Göttingen 1978, p. 232; Wolfgang Stresemann, Mein Vater Gustav Stresemann, Munich 1979, p. 506; Moser, op. cit., pp. 148–153. Gustav Stresemann, Vermächtnis, ed. by H. Bernhard, vol. 3, Berlin 1933, includes a photograph of Schurman.

have substantially the same ideals. It devolves on us to work together for the realization of the highest ideals of human life and international intercourse.[28] Ambassador Schurman became a member of the Kant Society and an honorary member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science. He received a very special distinction when the Prussian Academy of Science voted to make him an honorary member. There he met Albert Einstein, who gave a powerful speech in 1932 honoring Schurman's life work.[29] But Schurman's most spectacular act with regard to academia, which made headlines for him in both the German and international press, was his initiative to build a new lecture hall in Heidelberg.

From the time he became ambassador in Berlin, Schurman had visited Heidelberg every year, even twice in 1927, and had developed a special relationship to Johannes Hoops, a professor of English. In 1927, he learned of the long-running and unsuccessful attempts by the university to build new lecture halls for the humanities. All plans and proposals from Heidelberg University and its Baden Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs had failed due to the poor financial situation of the state of Baden.[30]

Schurman recognized his opportunity to act and drew on his diplomatic skills for the initiative. He recalled the hundreds of American students who had been educated in Heidelberg since the first quarter of the 19th century. His countrymen, Schurman reasoned, might be happy to put up the money for a new lecture hall building as a token of American gratitude to the university. He had received a quote of 1.2 million Reichsmarks (about $300,000) from Heidelberg but, based on his own experience with costs for new buildings as a university president, he adjusted the estimate up to $400,000. During his vacation in the U.S. at the end of 1927, Schurman energetically but carefully promoted the idea of an endowment to his New York friends and acquaintances. On December 24, 1927, he received a commitment from one of America's greatest patrons, John D. Rockefeller Jr., to contribute $200,000 on the condition that the other half would be raised in the near future. On the same day, New York banker George F. Baker donated $50,000. By

28 Moser, op. cit., p. 155.

29 Ibid, pp. 156, 242

30 Cf. the well-documented work by Dieter Griesbach, Annette Krämer, Mechthild Maisant, Die Neue Universität in Heidelberg, Heidelberg 1984, pp. 7–10 (Kunsthistorisches Institut der Universität Heidelberg, Veröffentlichungen zur Heidelberger Altstadt, ed. by Peter Anselm Riedl, Heft 19).

the time Schurman returned to Berlin in early 1928, $280,000 had been raised. The Executive Committee of the Steuben Society in New York successfully took on the task of collecting the remaining $120,000 by July 1, 1928.

When, in the course of 1928, it appeared, on the basis of Heidelberg's plans, that even this sum would not be sufficient, the endowment was increased to $500,000.[31]

With a keen sense of potential threats to the project from nationalist criticism on both sides of the Atlantic, Schurman ensured, on the one hand, that the fundraising campaign in New York was started by Americans who were explicitly *not of* German descent or birth. Only in the final stages of the collection did Americans of German descent also participate. Schurman took into account the reverberation of the witch hunt against German-Americans during World War I that had led to the loss of identity for this group of "hyphenated Americans." It could still be dangerous for them to even be suspected of disloyalty to their new homeland. Schurman's public characterization of the three "generous American" citizens who had given the last $100,000 demonstrated a telling caution: "They have forbidden the disclosure of their names, but it will interest you to learn that, although they are good American citizens, their cradles were on the Rhine." On the other hand, Schurman countered possible political interpretations of the foundation with consideration for the national feelings of the Germans. Only in passing did he hint that the planned lecture hall building might prove to be "a new bond for uniting the students and teachers of both countries and both peoples." The leitmotif of all Schurman's speeches in Heidelberg from 1928 to 1931 was the gratitude of American citizens for the education of American students at a time when the United States itself did not yet have "universities."[32]

Schurman's caution was as wise as it was justified, for clear national resentment was evident in the deliberations of the Heidelberg university committees about the donation announcement. In a report of the smaller Senate of February 22, 1928, signed by Rector Dibelius, to the Baden Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, it was stated: "We strongly emphasize that the foundation springs from the desire of the

31 Schurman to Dibelius, Feb. 4, 1928. Inter alia, B-5130 (IX, 13, no. 173); Schurman's address, Dec. 17, 1928, ibid. (X, 2, no. 50a).

32 Ibid. and Heidelberger Tageblatt v. Feb. 25, 1928. Inter alia, B-5130 (IX, 13, no. 173). Frederick C. Luebcke, Bonds of Loyal Americans and World War I. DeKalb, Northern Illinois Press 1974.

Americans to express their gratitude for the new scientific impulses they received while in Heidelberg. Therefore, any gestures, comments, or formulations that could offend our national sensibilities have been carefully avoided. Neither do the donors have the slightest intention to interfere with any decisions the university makes concerning the execution of its construction plans." At the meeting of the full Senate on February 27 objections could also be heard concerning the fact that, after the tearing down of the existing lecture halls, the "American edifice" should be built on such a prominent site in Heidelberg's old town. Professor Hans von Schubert considered this a "national loss." According to his unrealistic assessment of the situation, it would be better for the university to petition the Reich for help. Professor Karl Heinsheimer also harbored such concerns, but he withdrew them, since the donors themselves had described the funding as an expression of "gratefulness." Had this not been the case, one would have had to reject the offer immediately.[33]

The rector's letter to the Baden Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs was, moreover, incorrect. Since February 1928, Schurman had made it clear that there was one stipulation tied to the donation. With the money, he wrote to his confidant, Professor Hoops, on February 10, 1928, a "university hall" had to be built that was paid for entirely from American funds. ". . . one thing is to me perfectly clear, namely, that the construction of the new Hall must be completed with the funds raised in America. It would produce a very bad impression upon our friends over there if the Hall were left unfinished and the Government of Baden or other parties had to be asked to supply funds for its completion."[34] The message was clear: the donors wanted to see their goodwill represented in a lecture hall building paid for entirely from American funds.

The university's leaders seems either not to have recognized this requirement at first or to have hoped to be able to realize other plans in the end. Perhaps they also misjudged Schurman's will to assert himself, which was hidden behind his friendly manners. For neither in the competition specifications sent out on July 12 nor in the design submitted by Professor Karl Gruber from Gdansk, which was awarded first prize by the jury in November 1928, was this stipulation taken into account. Therefore, when Schurman saw Gruber's design in early

33 Inter alia, B-5132 (IX, 13, no. 183).
34 Inter alia, B-5130 (IX, 13, no. 173).

December, he immediately insisted on a new basis for the planning. He officially communicated his concerns to the Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, the city, and the university the day before the announcement of the foundation on December 17 during the grand ceremony in the city hall. These were aimed especially at the basic idea of Gruber's design to create a new quadrangle by integrating existing buildings (Kollegiengebäude, Alte Post, Seminarienhaus) and "Auffüllbauten." Schurman rejected this idea, tying the handover of the donation to the construction of *a* single, representative new building.[35]

In his address the next day, the ambassador then made clear the donor's intention and the earmarking of the funds in a form that was binding but unambiguous in substance: "The purpose of all these donations is the creation of a new lecture hall building for the university. The gift is not subject to any conditions of any kind. The University is free to erect the building on any site it deems suitable, and to determine the architectural design and internal arrangement. The only restriction is that which arose from the description of the project to the donors, that is, that the purpose of the gift was the creation of a new teaching building for the University of Heidelberg."[36]

Doing his best to shield the Foundation from as political conflict as possible, Schurman request this subject not be mentioned on May 5, when 'the State Science Commission' of the Faculty of Law and Philosophy awarded an honorary doctorate to Foreign Minister Dr. Stresemann and the Faculty of Philosophy awarded one to Ambassador Dr. Schurman. In his welcoming address, Rector Dibelius simply said: "It is in accordance with your wish, Your Excellency, if I only hint at it in this hour and do not elaborate on it, with what joyful expectation, directed towards the future of our university, the hearts of all Heidelbergers are beating towards you. All Heidelberger citizens, and especially the academic youth!"[37]

In Heidelberg on May 5, 1928, there was a *dies academicus* and a *dies politicus* at the same time. That was how it was understood and commented on by all participants, including the German and international

35 Cf. Griesbach, Krämer, Maisant, Die Neue Universität, pp. 13–19. A report of the Baden Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs to the President of the Baden Parliament of July 9, 1929, on these events erroneously states that Schurman had agreed to the terms of the competition of summer 1928. Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, 235/3086.

36 Inter alia, B-5130 (X, 2, no. 50a).

37 Heidelberger Tageblatt v. 5.5.1928. U. A., B-1523/2b, p. 1. The following quotations ibid.

press. The leitmotif of all the speeches was the tension, deeply felt by contemporaries, between nationalism and internationalism, between the responsibility of politics (and science) for the people, the empire, and patriotic history on the one hand, and for understanding between peoples and supranationally binding legal ideals on the other. Both Rector Dibelius and the historian Willy Andreas, who in his capacity as chairman of the 'State Science Commission' granted the honorary doctorate of Stresemann, and in his role as dean of the philosophical faculty the honorary doctorate of Schurman, placed this relationship at the center of their speeches. According to the text of the honorary diploma, moreover, Stresemann was awarded the title and dignity of Doctor of Political Science "because, highly deserving of the consolidation of state and economy, imbued with Germany's right to life and liberty, he has courageously and in spite of all opposition and setbacks engaged himself as a pioneer of a policy of intellectual rapprochement and peaceful understanding between peoples, and has won respect and renown far beyond the borders of his fatherland." Stresemann was, Andreas said, the first minister of the Reich whom Heidelberg University honored in this way. He is thus henceforth associated with a university that "has always placed the idea of the Reich above all individual situations and has represented it in a pioneering way with brilliant scholarly personalities."

This remark was highly indicative of the basic tenor of the speeches that day. It dealt with the self-assertion of an empire, a people, a nation, and a fatherland in international politics, and the methods for doing so. Missing were ideas about a republic and democracy. Indeed, these terms were not even mentioned in the speeches of Dibelius and Andreas. At this Heidelberg *dies politicus*, they spelled out, as it were, only the first part of sentence 1, article 1, section 1 of the Weimar Constitution, which read "The German Reich is a Republic."

The tense relationship between nationalism and internationalism was also the theme of Stresemann's magnificent speech, in which the foreign minister justified the goal of his policy—the revision of the Treaty of Versailles under the guiding principle of Germany's "equal rights" within the framework of peaceful change—in far-reaching, historical, and systematic reflections. This speech is instructive for posterity because it reflects the state of historical research on the goals and methods of Stresemann's foreign policy, which has been succinctly summarized as follows: "In *terms of content,* Stresemann's overall concept was oriented toward the German Reich's claim to power before 1914; in *terms*

of method, his strategy was oriented toward the balance of power after 1918."[38] Thus, Stresemann did not pursue a policy of European integration, but rather national power politics by peaceful means.

In his Heidelberg speech, Stresemann did not promote the goal of his policy, "the securing of a free, equal Germany"—for which he was sure of approval—but his method of realizing this goal within the framework of a policy of peaceful understanding. Addressing the nationalist German right and the critics in his own party, he warned against the unfortunate misunderstanding of presenting the national and the international as opposites and of linking the concept of the international with the accusation of the non-national i.e., of treason against the fatherland. On the other hand, Stresemann considered it a grave error to regard the national only as a provisional form: "The greatest thinkers and poets, who had great and powerful things to say to all peoples, exerted the height of their powers only where they were rooted in their national soil. Shakespeare cannot be understood without England, Goethe without Germany, Dante without Italy, and all without the time in which they lived. Likewise, a world organization can never be built without the firm natural foundation which exists in the individual peoples united into national states. . . . Whoever wants to build the United States of Europe on some ideal of humanity which his theoretical thinking has conjured up misjudges the actual political development of things and repels those who are able to see progress in economic and political unity." Stresemann justified Germany's entry into the League of Nations and welcomed the American initiative for a pact to outlaw war, but left no doubt that these instruments of peaceful change would have to bring about German equality. Given the situation, this meant concretely both clearing the Rhineland of foreign troops and recognizing Germany's equal rights in the armaments question.

When expressing his gratitude for the honor, Schurman first spoke of the significance of his study abroad year at Heidelberg in 1878, made a declaration of love to the university, quoted Jean Paul—"Heidelberg, divine in surroundings and beautiful within"—recalled Scheffel's song "Alt-Heidelberg," and then surprised his audience with the announcement: "Asking pardon from the spirit of the author and the spirits of all the great poets, Goethe included, who have loved Heidelberg and sung of its beauties in verse and prose, I will now read you my translation.

38 Michael-Olaf Maxelon, Stresemann und Frankreich 1914–1929, Düsseldorf 1972, p. 297; Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, p. 195 f.; Michalka, Stresemann, p. XV.

Old-Heidelberg, dear city,
With honors crowned, and rare,
O'er Rhine and Neckar rising,
None can with thee compare.

City of merry fellows,
With wisdom lad'n and wine;
Clear flow the river wavelets,
Where blue eyes flash and shine.

When spring from Southlands milder
Comes over field and down,
She weaves for thee of blossoms
A shimmering bridal gown.

On my heart too thy image
Is graven like a bride,
In thy dear name the accents
Of youthful love abide.

And if with thorns I'm pierced
And all the world seems stale
I'll give my horse the spurs then
And ride to Neckar vale.[39]

Alt-Heidelberg, du feine,
Du Stadt an Ehren reich,
Am Neckar und am Rheine,
Kein' andre kommt dir gleich.

Stadt fröhlicher Gesellen,
An Weisheit schwer und Wein,
Klar ziehn des Stromes Wellen,
Blauäuglein blitzen drein.

Und kommt aus lindem Süden
Der Fühling übers Land,
So webt er dir aus Blüten
Ein schimmernd Brautgewand

Auch mir stehst du geschrieben
Ins Herz gleich einer Braut,
Es klingt wie junges Lieben
Dein Name mir so vertraut.

Und stechen mich die Dornen
Und wird mirs drauß zu kahl,
Geb ich dem Ross die Spornen
Und reit ins Neckartal.

39 German version added by the author.

In the political part of his speech, Schurman recalled the horrors of World War I, warned of the terrible devastation that war would now bring in the face of advancing technology, and thanked Stresemann for supporting the initiative of his Secretary of State, Kellogg, to conclude a general pact for the prevention of war. Schurman went on to say that, during the past three years, he had become increasingly cognizant of the similarity between the fundamental ideals held by the governments and peoples of these two nations: "And now the identity of their stand on the great question of outlawing war is another example and confirmation of this international comradeship. Germany and the United States are marching forward in a great and noble adventure for the cause of human culture."

These words, spoken by the ambassador, were at the center of the controversial response that the Heidelberg ceremony triggered in the German and international press.[40] While the German newspapers praised the honorary doctorates and speeches as a significant expression of renewed American-German friendship, and the Anglo-Saxon newspapers, such as the London *Times* or the *New York Times*, fulfilled their chronicler's duty in a value-neutral manner, part of the French press reacted in a decidedly hostile manner. They rejected Stresemann's assertion that Bismarck had been a forerunner of the policy of peaceful cooperation, seeing it as a historical fabrication. The Paris press reproached Schurman for not saying that the American people had not forgotten Germany's guilt for starting the war and the sinking of the Lusitania. On May 7th, the "Neue Mannheimer Zeitung" used this retort in France as an occasion for an anti-French commentary. The article pointed out the visual lesson from history that all participants of the Heidelberg honorary doctorate ceremony had right in front of them. "The ruins of Heidelberg Castle speak an unmistakable language. It was not German barbarians who so cruelly destroyed this magnificent masterpiece of the Renaissance, but the murdering hands of the generals of the "great and cultured nation."[41]

According to Secretary of State Kellogg and the State Department, Schurman had indeed gone too far out on a limb. His words were likely to jeopardize the precarious balance within American European policy, which always had to reckon with France and Germany simultaneously. Kellogg was irritated by the sharp reaction from France; after all,

40 The press coverage is well documented in: inter alia, B-1523/2b-e.

41 Inter alia, B-1523/2c.

what would later be called the Kellogg-Briand Pact had not yet been signed and sealed. In response to inquiries from foreign diplomats in Washington as to whether Schurman had correctly stated the American position, Kellogg replied that his speech had not been submitted to the State Department before publication.[42]

The diplomatic squabbles in Washington did nothing to change Schurman's popularity in Heidelberg, which probably reached its peak on December 17, 1928, when the ambassador presented the endowment. The five-column lead story in the Heidelberger Tageblatt announced: "Heidelberg's Schurman Day."[43] With flags flying over the Ruperto Carola, lectures and classes were canceled for the day. At 11:00 a.m., the festivities sponsored by the university and the city began in the great hall of the civic center. While Lord Mayor Walz, the new rector, Professor Heinsheimer, Professor Hoops, and the AStA-chairman went to pick up Schurman and his family—wife, daughter, and sons—at the hotel "Europäischer Hof," the members of the city council, faculty members, and the leaders of the student fraternities gathered together with the guests of honor for the procession into the hall. These included Paul Löbe, President of the German Reichstag; Josef Schmitt, the president of the state of Baden and minister of finance; Franz Honold, Baden's envoy to Berlin; and Otto Leers, Baden's minister for education. Then, to the sounds of a fanfare, the guests entered the festively decorated hall. The university's banner, donated in 1886 for the 500-year anniversary of its founding, hung from the organ balcony, flanked by the American and German flags. In front of the speaker's platform, the "Head Beadle" placed the academic scepter.

After the rector's welcome address, Schurman gave his speech. As its highpoint, he concluded by reading the dedication of the endowment, whereupon "spontaneous roaring applause" broke out. The text read: "To the University of Heidelberg, which for a century has been visited and invariably loved by American students whom it always greeted with a friendly welcome and generously trained in scholarship and research, Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, the American ambassador to Germany, hereby presents, in the name of a number of its sympathetic American friends in thankful recognition of the high-quality and helpful service it provided, this endowment of over half a million dollars for the construction of a new lecture hall. Christmas, 1928."

42 Moser, op. cit., p. 166 f. Cf. Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany. A Diplomatic History, Ithaca/London 1984, pp. 189 f.

43 Inter alia, B-5130 (IX, 8, no. 234). The following quotations ibid.

In his acceptance speech, Rector Heinsheimer was able to announce the Senate's decision to build the new lecture hall building on "Universitätsplatz"[44] in place of the *Kollegienhaus* opposite the Old University and to name it the "New University." It should be wide open to the "disciples of science from all over the world" and to increase the fame of the university for long centuries to come. Inside the building, the idea of the foundation and the names of the doners would be inscribed on a plaque of honor, next to a bust of Schurman, through which his image would be "immortalized" for the future students and teachers of the Ruperto Carola.

Incidentally, Heinsheimer's speech was also characterized by the tension between a German national identity that had been badly damaged by the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, and hopes for a new international understanding and recognition of Germany. It was no coincidence that he dedicated the New University to a double task: "Let it be guided for all time by the German spirit and shone upon by the soul of humanity!"[45]

While the Minister of Education and Culture Affairs, Johann von Leers, presented a reproduction of the Codex Manesse of Middle High German minnesingers in the name of the Baden government and the German people, the AStA representative, Rieß, unabashedly gave the foundation precisely the political interpretation that Schurman had tried to avoid. With a nationalist emphasis, the student spoke of the great injustice done to the German people by World War I and of the oppressive burdens of the "Dictate of Versailles." Schurman's initiative, which the AStA representative warmly welcomed, appeared as a kind of reparation for Versailles. If, when hearing these words, Schurman thought of his own role in World War I, he must have had highly mixed feelings.

In gratitude, the Heidelberg student body offered their "hundredth semester" a "quite powerful thundering toast." Finally, the assembly

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44 In November 1928, the Heidelberg City Council had decided to rename the "Ludwigsplatz" to "Universitätsplatz." Griesbach, Krämer, Maisant, Die Neue Universität, p. 118 f.

45 In a reply letter of December 15, 1928, to an embittered assistant of the Surgical University Hospital, Dr. Gerhard Rose, who on behalf of many colleagues refused to take part in the celebration because he considered the building a "monument to the forgetting of honor," Heinsheimer had stated that the celebration had a non-political purpose. Inter alia, B-5130 (IX, 8, no. 234). Cf. Meinhold Lurz, Der Bau der Neuen Universität im Brennpunkt gegensätzlicher Interessen, in: Ruperto Carola 55/56 (1975), pp. 39–45.

once again joined in enthusiastic shouts of "Bravo!" and gave the ambassador a lively ovation when Mayor Walz awarded Schurman honorary citizenship from the city of Heidelberg.

From the handover of the endowment to the inauguration of the "New University" on June 9, 1931—the cornerstone was laid on January 16, 1930—the realization of the lecture building was in the hands of the architect Professor Karl Gruber (Gdansk), and the responsible authorities. The public was very attentive and judged—how could it be otherwise in Heidelberg—the design presented by Gruber to be highly controversial. Gruber himself welcomed the main consequence stemming from the clarification of the doner's explicit insistence on a unitary building financed entirely from American funds: namely, the demolition of the "*Neuen Kollegien*" building on the south side of the University Square and the erection of the new building in its place. He was pleased to have "rendered harmless" the only "unpleasant structure" within the group of buildings foreseen by his new design.[46]

Heidelberg University received Schurman's approval for these new plans. At the end of March 1929, Gruber traveled to Berlin with his design. Schurman considered it "very successful," but expressed concern that the top floor of the main building with the auditorium might present too much wall surface and be "out of proportion to the number and size of the windows which breaks its continuity." The design appeared to him to be successful from every point of view—light, room layout, and access possibilities.[47] Then, in Heidelberg, on July 16, 1929, Prorector Dibelius presented the ambassador with the building plan of the "New University" which had been approved by all the appropriate authorities and entities involved. Schurman was very pleased with the clear and practical design of the ground plan, praised many of its practical details, and noted that the facade gave a clear picture of the interior design and did not pretend anything.[48]

Schurman did not participate in the extended Heidelberg discussions about the facade decoration above the main entrance (suggestions: Imperial Eagle, Baden Griffin, Palatine Lion, Pallas Athena) and the inscription (suggestions: Truth and Light, Through Knowledge

46 Gruber to the Ministry of Culture, 18.1.1929. Inter alia, B-1533/1 (IX, 13, no. 184). On the discussion in Heidelberg, see Griesbach, Krämer, Maisant, Die Neue Universität, pp. 120–134.

47 Schurman to Heinsheimer v. 3.4.1929. Inter alia, B-5130 (IX, 13, no. 171).

48 Memorandum Dibelius. Inter alia, B-5133/3 (IX, 13, no. 170a), also in B-5130 (IX, 13, no. 171).

to Freedom, To German Science, To the Living Spirit).[49] But, writing from Redford Hills on October 10, 1930, he did ask for corrections to the draft text for the donor plaque inside the building that had been sent to him. He called the rector's attention to the fact that his country was called "The United States of America," not "North America." He said the inscription, which would last for centuries, should not name a sum of money. Behind his name he wished to see inserted the time of his studies in Heidelberg: October 1878 to August 1879.[50]

Schurman's wishes were fulfilled, and this ended his concrete influence on the building history of the "New University." He had made the construction possible through his philanthropic initiative, determined the format by clarifying the doner's intentions, and finally approved the new plans. However, he was not responsible for the location, architectural design, and internal arrangement of the New University. That was the task of the architect Karl Gruber, the project's jury, and the German authorities. On several occasions, Schurman had made it clear that he would accept any solution that adequately took into account the founder's intentions.

When Schurman returned to Heidelberg from the U.S. in mid-1931 to attend the dedication ceremony of the main building and the west wing on June 9—the south wing was completed in 1933—the economic, political, and intellectual situation in Germany had changed dramatically. In October 1929, the initial shock of the New York stock market crash had triggered the greatest crisis in the world economy since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Since then, a worldwide process of actions and reactions had caused the situation to spiral downward. There were devastating consequences for Germany as well: Drastically reduced trade, price collapses, a credit crisis, decreased production, a shrunken national income, mass unemployment, hardship, hunger, hopelessness, a growing political radicalization, and a turn to violence. Temporally parallel and causally related to the world economic crisis, Germany first experienced a governmental crisis, then a constitutional crisis, and finally a state crisis. The economic and political crises continued to drive each other forward. The economic crisis, in March 1930, brought about the breakup of the last parliamentary government of the "Grand Coalition" that had included parties ranging from the SPD to the German People's Party of which Stresemann had been a founding chairman—his death

49 Cf. Lurz, Der plastische Schmuck, pp. 2–4.
50 Inter alia, B-5133/2 (IX, 13, no. 191).

in October 1929 being a fateful event for German politics. This led to the installation of the presidential government of Heinrich Brüning by Reich President Hindenburg, and finally to the sensational electoral success of the National Socialists in the Reichstag elections of September 1930. This, in turn, triggered a crisis of confidence abroad and the first major wave of cash withdrawals from Germany. The second great wave of capital withdrawals, especially by American investors, was underway just as the inauguration of the New University was being celebrated. Indeed, in the summer of 1931, the world was in the midst of an international financial crisis that would lead to the downfall of the global monetary system.

In Central Europe, the situation had dramatically worsened with the collapse of the Austrian Kreditanstalt bank on May 11, 1931. It was feared that German banks would soon have to declare their insolvency as well (on July 14 and 15, the counters of all German credit institutions were indeed closed for two days). Moreover, four days before the Heidelberg celebration, Reich President von Hindenburg had issued a new emergency decree that literally mandated hardship. To balance the Reich budget, salaries were cut and the modest benefits of unemployment assistance, welfare support, and social insurance were further reduced. The loss of confidence in the government and the parties loyal to the constitution—indeed the loss of confidence in the republic—was as obvious as the growing appeal of the NSDAP, which benefited most from the general mood of protest. Had not Hitler always said that the whole "system" was rotten, and that Germany's misfortunes had emanated from the "Dictate of Shame from Versailles"? It was precisely this instrumentalization of a wounded national pride—the longing for the lost greatness of the Reich and the Fatherland—that became one of the most important levers of National Socialist propaganda used to make inroads with the conservative, national, and bourgeois camps.

The changed Zeitgeist could also be felt in Heidelberg and threatened the dignified protocols of the dedication ceremony. Despite Rector Karl Meister's long negotiations with them, over half of the fraternities and the majority of the color-carrying student organizations demonstratively boycotted the event. As the ceremonial procession made its way from the Old Lecture Hall to the hall of the New University, calls of "Germany wake up!" rang out. This happened on the way back as well. In addition, stink bombs were thrown at the feet the of the guests.[51] For the dedication of the New University, the NSDAP faction

51 Inter alia, B-5135/7 (X, 2, no. 49), report of the "Volkszeitung" of June 10, 1931.

of the Heidelberg city council published their own "Festschrift" entitled "The Jews Bring the Living Spirit." The caricature on the title page showed a Jew who had one hand stuck in a bag labeled "Reparations" while throwing money down onto the roof of the New University with the other. The publication was an antisemitic and anti-American pamphlet. Only Schurman himself was spared criticism. There were even declarations about the sincerity of his motives and his devotion to the university due to his time as a student at Heidelberg. According to the NSDAP faction of the city council, after the German spirit of the university had been systematically undermined, now features of foreign races were being carved into its face. The tasteless white box, a Jewish "Zwing-Uri" in the heart of the old city, would always be a badge of shame—a reminder of the period when Germany was dominated by foreign spirits; when foreign gold ruled; the period of Germany's deepest humiliation.[52]

Although this pamphlet was still confiscated by the police in 1931, it was a harbinger of what was to come.

Apart from the aforementioned phenomena, the celebration went off without disruption and with great public attention. Among the many guests of honor who entered the main portal under the seated Pallas Athena and the inscription "To the living spirit" was Reich Minister of the Interior Joseph Wirth. Rector Meister, architect Gruber, Baden State President Wittemann, and Heidelberg's Lord Mayor Neinhaus gave speeches, and Wolfgang Fortner had written a cantata on Goethe's "Limits of Mankind" to celebrate the occasion. Wittemann awarded Schurman the Baden State Medal made of Gold, and Neinhaus announced the city council's decision to name a street in Heidelberg leading from the Friedrichsbrücke along the valley "Schurman-Straße."

Compared to 1928, Schurman himself must have sensed something of the changed atmosphere. It seems no accident that the only new element in his speech that day was calculated to cultivate feelings of German national pride. In addition to his renewed assurance that the New University was a "monument of American gratitude" to pay off a "debt of gratitude" owed by America to Heidelberg University, he now revealed the names of those three Rhineland-born Americans who had donated the last $100,000: Ferdinand Thun, Henry Janssen, and Gustav Oberländer; all residing in Reading, Pennsylvania. These three men, he said, had also established a "Carl Schurz Foundation for

52 A copy of the manuscript in: inter alia, 513517 (X, 2, no. 49).

the promotion of cultural relations between the German and American peoples." Gustav Oberländer, moreover, had donated a fund of one million dollars to make it possible for leading Americans from all walks of life to temporarily reside in Germany. Schurman concluded his address with an appeal to the students: "We call this a dedication ceremony. But in the highest sense of the word, we cannot dedicate nor consecrate this building; it will be dedicated and consecrated by its use. The consecration of this building announced today will be the task of this and future generations of students. Fellow students: We place it in your hands with the utmost confidence!"[53]

The day ended with a garden party in Heidelberg's castle garden and a technical premiere. For the first time in the history of radio, Heidelberg was directly connected to America, to New York. A half-hour program on the occasion of the inauguration was transmitted by cable to Berlin, and from there to New York via the Königswusterhausen shortwave transmitter. In addition to Schurman and the Anglist Hoops, a female German student, Johanna Hanser, spoke on behalf of the Heidelberg student body, and a male American student, Royce West, on behalf of the American students in Heidelberg. Schurman was delighted by the young woman's address. He told reporters, "Look! She, this young student, with her few, short, clear sentences, she was understood in America. That is the way one has to speak to America, to our people over there, in order to really connect with us. I would have to know my countrymen very poorly if this German student were not invited to America very quickly." Schurman indeed knew his countrymen well: Ms. Hanser received a whole batch of invitations.[54]

Even for the very old, the future is always open and hardly predictable. In 1931, the 76-year-old Schurman would probably have declared as crazy anyone who predicted that he would witness the start of a second world war and a second war between Germany and the USA during his lifetime. He himself considered this unlikely until the mid-1930s.

After his return to the United States, Schurman was regarded as an expert on conditions within Germany and a sympathetic interpreter of German foreign policy—even after Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933, and the process through which the

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53 Inter alia, B-5135/7 (X, 2, no. 49), "Neue Mannheimer Zeitung," June 9, 1931.

54 Cf. the amusing article in the "Süddeutsche Sonntagspost" of June 28, 1931, under the headline: "What Herr Curtius [the German Foreign Minister] can learn from Fräulein Hanser. A Heidelberg Student as German Ambassador." Inter alia, B-5135/7 (X, 2, no. 49).

National Socialists consolidated their power. This was also related to a change of heart that was crucial for Schurman. Influenced by new documents and new research findings from historians, he became a "revisionist" in the early 1930s, revising his judgment of Germany's sole guilt in the outbreak of World War I.[55] At the same time, he saw the Treaty of Versailles in an increasingly negative light. He began to speak of the "Paris dictators" and to blame the treaty for many political and economic evils in Europe and the United States. He was therefore predestined, like the majority of Germans and countless prominent Western politicians, to initially be fooled by Hitler's "strategy of grandiose self-effacement"[56] and to take at face value his assurances, repeated again and again until 1938, that he only wanted to revise the disgrace of Versailles. Schurman, of course, did not become an admirer of the National Socialist dictatorship, but he did show understanding for Hitler's supposed policy of revising Versailles. For example, Schurman explicitly welcomed Hitler's decision of March 16, 1935, to repeal the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and to reintroduce universal conscription in Germany. He also approved of Hitler's March 7, 1936, coup to reoccupy the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

In the first years of the National Socialist regime, the world traveler Schurman often stopped over in Germany. In August 1936, he was even received by Hitler. On this occasion, Hitler skillfully played on the keyboard of Schurman's prejudices. The *Führer* explained to his American guest what he told all Western visitors around the time of the Olympic Games: the goal of his foreign policy during the last three years had been to achieve Germany's equality with the other nations.[57]

During his travels in Germany, Schurman kept his distance from the National Socialist Party. He did not accept an invitation to the Reich Party Congress in Nuremberg in 1936. Similarly, he declined to be a guest of honor at the University of Heidelberg's 550th anniversary celebration that year, which was strongly influenced by National Socialism—a decision interpreted by the American press as a boycott of this event and kept quiet by the German press.[58]

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55 On the school of revisionist historians after World War I, see Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I, Chicago 1967.

56 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik 1933–1938, Frankfurt/Main 1968, p. 328.

57 Moser, op. cit., pp. 214–217.

58 Moser, op. cit., p. 218; cf. Meinhold Lurz, Die 550-Jahrfeier der Universität als nationalsozialistische Selbstdarstellung von Reich und Universität, in: 57 (1976),

It was not until 1938 that Schurman's eyes were fully opened. The Munich Agreement and Japan's almost simultaneously voiced claim to a "new order" in East Asia convinced him that the Axis powers and Japan posed a threat to world peace and the future security of the United States. In July 1941, a year before his death, the eighty-seven-year-old Schurman testified before a senate committee hearing on military affairs, describing Hitler as the biggest apostle of violence in the world. Citing Hitler's proposition from Mein Kampf that "Germany will either be a world power, or it will not be at all," Schurman explained that the Tripartite Pact signed between Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1940 was evidence that Hitler's dream of world domination was aimed at America.[59]

By this time, the former ambassador and celebrated benefactor had long since been declared a persona non grata by Heidelberg University. Schurman was probably aware that the New University's inscription "The Living Spirit" had been changed to "The German Spirit" and that the Pallas Athena had been replaced with the Imperial Eagle. However, we do not know whether he lived to learn "his" beloved university had taken down the plaque commemorating his endowment and replaced the bronze bust of him with one of Hitler. Using the letterhead "The Rector of the University," Vice Rector Johannes Stein wrote to the minister of education in Karlsruhe on October 21, 1938: "In the New University building there is a plaque listing the names of American donors. Among them are a number of Jews that clearly belong to those currently agitating against Germany. Today, even Schurman's name is no longer worth special commemoration. Therefore, I am urgently requesting that you grant permission to remove the plaque and charge the county building authority to do so. Suggestions for replacing the aforementioned plaque will be submitted later." On November 9, the ministry approved the request and stated in pure bureaucratic German: "The costs of 145 Reichsmark are to be drawn from the budget of the university's remaining construction funds."[60] On July 4, 1939, Rector Paul Schmitthenner thanked Ms. Geheimrat Hoffman, an honorary member of the university, for donating a bust of Hitler made by Arno Breker in Berlin that would replace Schurman's bust. From November 1940, Breker's bust stood in the lecture hall of the New University,

pp. 35–41; Eike Wolgast, Kleine Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg 1983, pp. 103 f.

59 Moser, op. cit., p. 222.

60 Inter alia, B-5138/1.

replacing a smaller bust of Hitler, which was then exhibited outside the faculty room in the vestibule of the New University.[61]

But the times changed again. When American troops entered Heidelberg, which had been spared destruction, and liberated the city from the reign of National Socialism, Schurman was once again worthy of special commemoration. His long-time confidant in Heidelberg, the nearly 80-year-old professor of English, Johannes Hoops, served as vice-rector of the university until early August 1945. On August 17, 1945, the University Senate voted to return the commemorative plaque to its original location.[62] The architect Karl Gruber also spoke up again to inquire about the plight of the plaque since he had dedicated much effort to its design: It had been made from Veronese marble and hopefully had not been broken.[63] In addition, Schurman's name and deed provided useful arguments for the leadership of Heidelberg University during the year-long confrontation over the gradual return of the New University, which had been confiscated by the Americans occupation authorities. In a memorandum written to the military administration on February 7, 1947, Rector Hans von Campenhausen and the senate pointed out that the building was a "gift by notable and well-respected friends and benefactors . . . from the United States." It had been "placed at the free disposal of the university," and, according to the intentions of the donors, dedicated to the purposes of teaching young students.[64]

Since then, the appreciation for Schurman in Heidelberg seems to be unbroken—if one disregards an intermezzo in the early 1970s, when Schurman's bust was torn from its pedestal. The German-American Institute in Heidelberg has been supported by the "Schurman Society" since 1962. The last major celebration in his honor took place on November 29, 1978, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the conferral of an honorary doctorate, in the large Rathaus hall of Heidelberg's town hall. U.S. Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Lord Mayor Reinhold Zundel, Rector Hubert Niederländer, and the author of this article paid tribute to the importance of Jacob Gould Schurman for Heidelberg University and American-German relations. Whether this is the end of his impact in Heidelberg, no one can say. For the future is, as has been said, always open and hardly predictable.

61 ET AL, B-5139/3.
62 ET AL, B-5138/2.
63 ibid., letter from November 29, 1945.
64 Inter alia, B-5139/3.

The deep ruptures and transformations in the relationship between Schurman and the University of Heidelberg reflect quite accurately the changeable fate of American-German relations since the founding of the Reich. Schurman studied in Heidelberg at a time when the German Reich in general, and German universities in particular, enjoyed great prestige in the United States. He was a contemporary of the deteriorating relations between the two dynamic "Nouveau riche" of the international system on the eve of the First World War. He witnessed how the United States and Germany fought each other as enemies in the two world wars of that century and how state-sponsored images of the enemy bred unbridled hatred in both countries. Beginning in 1925, he was actively involved in the American attempt to stabilize the first democratic republic on German soil and to integrate it into a liberal-capitalist and peaceful order for Europe and the world. As an admirer of the "other," the "spiritual" Germany, he strove with conviction to reestablish not only the political and economic, but especially the cultural ties between the two countries. Heidelberg's New University is a sign of this spirit.