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Migration as a historic normality: Europe in global migration processes

Migration has been a central element of social change since the beginning of human existence. This is why it is a myth to think that movements of populations – also over great distances – only came about with the modern period, or even in present times. Neither are global migrations of massive dimension only observable in connection with the development of our modern means of mass transportation. People of the pre-modern period were essentially no more sedentary, than those of the modern era. Another myth is the notion that past migrations were a linear process – with the permanent exodus from one space leading to permanent immigration in another: Local, regional and global migration patterns have been characterized by remigrations, forms of circularity and fluctuations in the past, as they are in the present. Migrants neither went to a completely unknown, alien world in former times, nor do they do so today, as relocation within networks is a key element of migrations' past and present. Their basic conditions and forms hardly changed over the centuries (see Oltmer 2016).

Global migration to a greater extent is only visible since the beginning of Europe's political, territorial, economic and cultural expansion around the world in the 15th century. Although the number of Europeans who emigrated to other territories remained moderate from the 16th to the early 19th century, it still wrought far-reaching changes in the constitution of populations. This was most notable in the Americas and the South Pacific region, but also in parts of Africa and Asia, in the early 20th century. The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, as the high point of European emigration, also marked the beginning of Europe's history as destination for immigrants.

The following outline concerns the conditions, forms and consequences of population movements originating in Europe since the 16th century. It also explores the background of Europe's transformation into a destination for immigrants. The contribution is, thus, intended to highlight Europe's importance for the global migration processes of modern times, while it also shows that extensive and long-distance migrations have been common throughout history.

Foundations: migration as a historical phenomenon

The term migration refers to the geographical movement of people. It indicates patterns of regional mobility that had far-reaching consequences for the life trajectories of the migrants and led to changes in social institutions. Migration can refer to the crossing of political or territorial borders with the consequence of being excluded from one polity and / or included in another. But geographical relocations within a political or territorial formation can be understood as migrations, too. They require migrants to deal with (markedly) different economic givens and arrangements, cultural patterns, social standards and structures while gaining or accomplishing inclusion in the various functional areas of society. The geographical movements attending urbanization, for example, particularly since the late 18th century, mostly concerned relocations within a territory or

Fig. 1 The apprentice's farewell (journeyman's journey); lithography by August von Wille, 1853 | bpk

state. But they led to far-reaching challenges for the migrants concerning their integration in other economic segments and sectors (industrial or service sector instead of farming), and also served to change their lifestyles (urban instead of rural), attitudes and orientations. ▶ Fig. 1

Migration could mean unidirectional movement from one location to another, but frequently also involved intermediate destinations or stages that often served to generate the means to continue on one's way. Since the migration

process was essentially open-ended, permanent settlement someplace else was only one of the possible outcomes of migration movements: In the Federal Republic of Germany, the amount of labour force immigrating from abroad grew from 550,000 in 1961 to around 2.6 million in 1973, when the recruitment of "Guest workers" was stopped. A considerable migration volume was involved: Between the end of the 1950s and 1973, roughly 14 million foreign workers came to Germany, while circa 11 million, i.e. nearly 80 percent, returned back home again (see Münz et al. 1997, 35–42).

Migrants often strove to improve their income, housing or educational options by settling somewhere else, temporarily or forever, or to benefit from new opportunities. In such cases, geographical movement was meant to further their agency. Migration was very frequently linked to biographical or career-related turning points and landmark decisions such as choosing a partner or starting a family, entry into a profession or selection of a job, training position or place to study, with adolescents and/or young adults consequently making up the overwhelming majority of migrants. This migratory grasping of opportunities was conditioned by specific, socially relevant characteristics, attributes and resources of the individuals and/or members of collectives (families, households, groups, populations) involved: most of all their gender, age and position in the family cycle, their habitus, qualifications and skills, social (estate, class) and occupational standing, as well as their attribution to "ethnic groups", "castes", "races" or "nationalities", not uncommonly linked with privileges and (birth) rights.

Given their diverse endowment with economic, cultural, social, juridical and symbolic capital, the extent of the autonomy enjoyed by migrants as individuals or in networks and collectives tended to vary. Realized migration projects were often the result of a negotiation process within families, family economies, households or networks that was marked by conflict or cooperation. The agency of those who actually migrated could be quite limited as relocations motivated by a desire to benefit from or enjoy opportunities were by no means always aimed at stabilizing or improving the life situation of the migrants themselves. Families or other native collectives often sent out members to consolidate or improve their own economic or social situation by means of "remittances" or other forms of money transfer from afar. A central condition for these translocal economic strategies to function is the maintenance of social ties over partly long periods and great distances.

If, and to what extent, migration, be it temporary, circular or aimed at a longer stay in another location, would be understood as an individual or collective opportunity was essentially determined by the knowledge available about migration destinations, routes and options. Continuous and reliable information about the destination area was necessary for labour-, training- and settlement-related migrations to reach a certain scope and permanence. A central element was the verbal or written communication of knowledge about employment, training

or settlement opportunities, or the prospects of getting married, by previously emigrated (pioneering) migrants whose messages were accorded high informational value because of family ties or acquaintanceships. They established migration chains through which migrants would follow relatives or acquaintances that had already left.

The places migrants came from and went to were, hence, usually linked by networks, i.e. communication systems that were kept together by kinship, acquaintanceships and communities of origin. Loyalty and trust were the central binding forces of such networks. The importance of the information transfer by way of family- or acquaintance-based networks cannot be overestimated: At least 100 million private letters were sent by emigrants from the USA to Germany between 1820 and 1914, and then circulated amongst relatives and acquaintances in their areas of origin (see Helbich et al. 1991).

Potential migrants were often only able to draw on enough trustworthy information for making and realizing a migration decision with respect to a single destination, individual, locally limited settlement opportunities or specific areas of employment, so that realistic choices between different destinations were ruled out. While this, on the one hand, served to restrict the migratory agency of the individual, the destination area featured extensive kinship- or acquaintance-based networks that would minimize risks and offer opportunities, on the other: 94 percent of all Europeans arriving in North America around 1900, for example, first of all stayed with relatives and acquaintances (see Hoerder et al. 2011, XX), thus reducing their vulnerability and bolstering their agency there.

On the one hand, migrant networks offered translocal knowledge about the risks and opportunities of emigrating and / or immigrating, about safe travel routes and the psychological, physical and financial challenges of the journey. And on the other, they guaranteed protection and orientation in the alien environment of the destination, helped to find jobs and accommodation there, but also assisted in contacts with authorities, governmental and municipal institutions. The more extensive these networks were, and the more intensive the social relationships within them, the greater were the economic and social opportunities they could provide – the attractiveness of a migration destination was determined by the size of the network that migrants could rely upon at the destination, and by the intensity of the social relationships maintained within this kinship- or acquaintance-based network. Migrant networks, thus, not only increased the likelihood of further migration, but also constituted migration traditions, affecting the durability of migration movements that could persist for long periods of time, and partly over generations.

These migrant networks were not only maintained by communication and a reciprocal exchange of services, but also especially propagated by marriage (not uncommonly arranged between locations and even continents), by the establishment of societies and associations, by a specific culture of sociability, but also by joint economic activities. The protection and opportunities afforded by

migrant networks were invariably also tied to social dictates and obligations for the individual. Maintaining the network, which could be of existential importance in a migration context, called for loyalty and the acceptance of collective responsibility where one good turn deserves another. Migrants were obliged to share specific standards, rationales and objectives while a network's members would be under intensive social surveillance, even over a distance of thousands of kilometres, because of the close-knit nature of the family ties or acquaintance-based relationships. Trust was enforced, and there was a manner of potential sanctions with many nuances: The loss of face caused by compromised trustworthiness, a withdrawal of services, social isolation and exclusion, all of which would considerably sharpen the social vulnerability and risks in a migration context, and minimize the grasping of opportunities by geographical movement.

In a secondment context as a specific form of migration, the kinship- or acquaintance-based network was replaced by the framework of the organization or institution (for example retail branches or multinational companies, the diplomatic service, armed forces) that initiated the relocation, organized it, and offered inclusion at the destination. Secondments were usually restricted to stays of a limited duration at another location for employment in company branches, subsidiaries or outside companies. They were an expression of long-term corporate strategies aimed at the constant presence of specialists at various company locations, and framed the stay at the new location with specific infrastructures they established or at least supported (schools, clubs, associations, societies). While the agency of the individual in realizing a migration project was very high in such a context, the same held much less true for other constellations because migration was also a possible response to crisis situations, for example where emigration was the consequence of environmental destruction or acute economic and social hardship. In addition to this, the regulatory and control efforts of institutional (governmental) actors were also able to restrict the agency of individuals or collectives, and hence their liberty and freedom of movement, to such an extent that forms of violent and forced migration (flight, expulsion, deportation) overshadowed their mobility. Violent and forced migration was caused by coercion to emigrate that left no realistic alternatives. It could concern an escape from violence that directly or expectably threatened life and liberty, mostly on political, ethnic, nationalist, racist or religious grounds. But forced migration could also mean violent expulsion, deportation or resettlement, often extending to entire population groups.

European expansion and global migration from the 16th to the 19th century

The Spanish and Portuguese conquest of the Americas since the late 15th / early 16th century initially only involved the relocation of a relatively small number of Europeans. The Portuguese and Spanish rulers did not regard their new territo-

ries as areas to settle in, but as colonies for economic exploitation. One prerequisite for the "valorisation" thus necessitated in the overseas territories by prospecting for and mining natural resources, or by producing agricultural goods, was a great number of labourers. These were in short supply, however, because the conquests had led to an immense decline in native populations. The high mortality rates in the battles between natives and conquistadores were one reason for this. But the impact of another factor was much more important: Africa, Asia and Europe had maintained their links, also epidemiologically, over the millennia by way of peregrinations, the flow of trade and travel, but not so Australia and the Americas, so that their indigenous populations were decimated by epidemics upon the Europeans' arrival in the "New World". Many bacteria and viruses that the conquerors brought along and were immune to had a deadly effect on the natives. It is estimated that Spanish South and Central America's total pre-Columbian population of perhaps 40 million had declined to around nine million by 1570, and to no more than four million by 1620.

The context only roughly sketched out here formed a central background for global migration movements from the late 15th through to the early 19th century. Rough calculations have established that circa 10 million people relocated to the Americas in the more than three centuries between Columbus' arrival in the Caribbean in 1492 and the year 1820. Approximately 2 million of them came from Europe, and around 8 million from Africa as slaves (see Boogaart / Emmer 1986, 3). Besides the soldiers and civil servants that were required to establish and maintain governance, those to leave Europe also included a great number of missionaries. Merchants, plantation owners and plantation operators were European, too, along with urban tradesmen, farmers and perhaps a third of the labourers to have come to the double continent as serfs. Although Europeans maintained approximately 500 to 600 trading posts, administrations and military bases outside the Americas in Africa, Oceania and Asia (outside Siberia) around 1800, these only included four long-term settlements of more than 2,000 Europeans each: Portuguese Goa at the west coast of the Indian subcontinent, Spanish Manila on Luzon, the main island of the Philippines, the Dutch settlement of Batavia (now Jakarta) on the Indonesian island of Java, and Cape Town at the southern tip of Africa (see Schmitt 2009, 19f.).

Labour and settlement migrations in the accelerated globalization of the late 19th and early 20th century

The number of people turning their backs on Europe grew rapidly from the early 19th century. A high point was then reached in the phase of accelerated colonial expansion around the world and economic globalization over the last thirty or forty years leading up to the First World War. The smaller part of the European intercontinental migrants took land routes and primarily settled in the Asian territories of the Tsarist Empire. A majority crossed the maritime borders of the

continent: Of the 55 to 60 million Europeans moving overseas between 1815 and 1930, more than two thirds went to North America, where the USA clearly pre-dominated over Canada with six times the number of immigrants. Roughly a fifth emigrated to South America, around seven percent reached Australia and New Zealand. As European settlement areas, North America, Australia, New Zealand, southern South America and Siberia were turned into "Neo-Europe" (data source here and below: see Bade 2003, 81–117).

The settlement of these "Neo Europe" meant displacing native populations into peripheral territories, and was not uncommon to show genocidal tendencies. It led to a far-reaching marginalization, or even complete elimination, of traditional economic and social systems, power structures and cultural patterns. The cen-tral impetus for the growing immigration of Europeans during the 19th century was unfailingly provided by the accelerated inclusion of their settlement areas in the world market. The European demand for resources and victuals, as well as the investment drive triggered by the capital exported from Europe, created a high demand for labour in some parts of the world, thus providing new migra-tion destinations for Europeans. Their immigration, in turn, led to the establish-ment of mass markets for finished European goods there, which further intensi-fied the economic interdependencies. One important prerequisite for the rise in European emigration overseas were the migratory networks already in existence between Europe and the overseas destinations for decades or centuries: Pio-neering migrants provided information about the opportunities, routes and risks of emigrating overseas. Long-distance migration was also eased by a consider-able improvement of the transport situation within Europe, to overseas territo-ries and at the destination areas in the wake of industrialization – space was densified. This not only reduced the time required for a journey. The costs also came down considerably.

A drastic rise in European immigration to the USA had already set in during the 1820s, when around 152,000 Europeans reached the United States, growing to circa 600,000 by the 1830s already. The period from the 1840s to the 1880s then saw a peak phase of immigration with around 15 million Europeans overall, most of whom came from the continent's western, northern and central areas: Over four million Germans, three million Irish, three million English, Scottish and Welsh people as well as over a million Scandinavians reached the USA, whose popula-tion grew from 17 million to 63 in the course of these 50 years. ▶ **Fig. 2**

Despite the strong and increasing influx and great population growth, North America was not beset by the discrepancy between growing populations and employment opportunities that marked the situation in Europe, as described above – quite the contrary: The demand for labour continued to grow. This was based on an agricultural and industrial boom. The economic growth was closely correlated with the permanent territorial expansion over and beyond the origi-nal thirteen states of the USA, whose territory quintupled in the space of just a few decades. In 1820, nearly three quarters of the USA's total population still lived

Fig.2 Global labour and settlement migrations in the "long" 19th century (political-territorial situation of the year 2000) | Christoph Reichel, Institut für Geographie, Universität Osnabrück (model: Segal 1993, 17, 23)

in the states along the East Coast, and only a quarter west of the Appalachian Mountains. By 1860, intercontinental immigration and interregional migration within the USA had already ensured that half the US-American population was to be found west of them. This westward migration of millions of people of European origin into the newly accessible spaces of North America can be subsumed under the concept of "settler colonialism". This came to an end in the last two decades of the 19th century, leading over into a phase of expansionist policy in the overseas colonization by the United States.

The colonial expansion of the USA, Japan and most of all the European nations reached its peak during the era of New Imperialism in the three to four decades before the First World War. The informal political, economic and military control over Asian, Pacific, African or Latin American territories mostly preferred by the large European empires gave rise to a situation marked by increasing imperialist competition in the progressive densification of formal colonial rule. This phase of intensified colonial expansion was simultaneously also a period of accelerated international economic networking that wrought far-reaching economic transformations. The transport and communication revolution of the "long" 19th century already mentioned earlier led to a further and considerable reduction of conveyance costs, especially at the turn of the 20th century. More and more people and goods bridged ever greater distances. Communication links were quickly expanded (regular postal traffic, telegraphy, telephone from 1878). Newspapers developed into a cheap source of news for everybody as their numbers and print runs rapidly grew. This also multiplied the information options about settlement or employment opportunities elsewhere. In addition to this, the accelerated development of transport and communication links also eased the formation of markets in the area of migration itself: To fill their steamships with migrants, globally engaged and competing shipping companies from Europe and North America opened up ever more regions for outward migration with the aid of cutting-edge advertising methods and a highly sophisticated system of agents. ▸ Fig. 3

The phase of accelerated worldwide colonial expansion and economic globalization in the last thirty to forty years before the outbreak of the Great War was the high point of global long-distance migration by Europeans in the "long" 19th century. At the beginning of the 19th century, every year had seen 50,000 people leave Europe by sea, on average. The 1840s brought a turning point: From 1846 to 1850, the average annual number of transatlantic migrants had already grown to 250,000, 80 percent of whom went to the USA, and 16 percent to Canada. This figure then rose to 340,000 between 1851 and 1855, i.e. seven times the annual average in the 19th century's first decades. The USA still continued to dominate as the most important destination with 77 percent, while nine percent turned to Canada and four percent to Brazil. Although the immigration of Europeans to the USA markedly declined during the global economic crisis of the late 1850s and American Civil War in 1861–1865, it immediately exceeded the levels of the early 1850s again, once the latter had ended, only to ebb away

Fig. 3 Advertisement by British shipping company Cunard, active in the emigration business, poster by Odin Rosenvinge, 1920 | bpk / Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Kunstbibliothek / Knud Petersen

once more in the global economic crisis of the 1870s. The high points of European overseas migration then followed from the 1880s. In the second half of that decade, European overseas migration embraced almost 800,000 people a year, on average, the greater part of whom still went to the USA. It reached its peak volumes in the one-and-a-half decades before the outbreak of the First World War, when over 1.3 million Europeans left the "Old World" on average every year. It is often overlooked that the transatlantic migration of Europeans was never a one-way street: The more the long-dominant migration of families for agricultural settlement declined in importance in the 19th century and the individual labour migration for industrial employment grew, the greater would the remigration become. Four million people returned to Europe from the USA between 1880 and 1930, with huge differences between individual groups: Only 5 percent of the Jewish transatlantic migrants returned, but 89 percent of the Bulgarians and Serbians. The average for Central, North and West Europeans was 22 percent. Most of all the outward migration by sea from Eastern, East-Central and Southern Europe which had dominated since the turn of the 20th century would ever more rarely involve an emigration for good, and ever more often mean return and circular migration. Half the Italians reaching North and South American shores between 1905 and 1915, for example, returned to Italy.

Other "Neo-Europes" gained importance besides North America, most of all including Australia, Brazil and Argentina, but also New Zealand, Uruguay or Chile. Before 1850, the USA welcomed circa four fifths of all European migrants, in the second half of the 19th century around three quarters, and only around half after the turn of the century. The growing importance of destinations outside North America largely resulted from the availability of expansive new settlement zones for European farmers and the discovery of mineral resources whose exploitation required many labourers.

The settlement of Europeans in colonial territories concurred with the diverse and extensive migrations undertaken by Africans and Asians, in particular, as a direct or indirect result of Europe's political and territorial expansion around the globe and the economic globalization emanating from it: As escapes, expulsions and resettlements, they were a consequence of the establishment and assertion of colonial rule. As deportations, they resulted from the enforced cultivation of market-oriented produce practiced in many colonial territories, or from the extensive establishment of plantation economies that would continue to depend on a great number of (forced) labourers for the longer term. As labour migrations, they were the result of changed economic structures, particularly the exploration and rapid exploitation of important natural resources for the industrialization of Europe, the agricultural switch to commercial crops, the growth of urban economies, or the infrastructural developments (railroads, canal and harbour construction). And as agricultural settlement migrations, they finally arose from the expansion into new settlement zones, for example by way of cultivation activities, or by the provision of new settlement areas through conquest or acquisition. ▶ **Fig. 4**

Fig. 4 Asian overseas emigration from the 1830s to World War I | Christoph Reichel, Institut für Geographie, Universität Osnabrück (model: Hoerder 2002, 368)

Legend:
- Indians
- Chinese
- Japanese
- Pacific Islanders
- Chinese diaspora

Europe as an immigration destination
since the late 19th century

The European transatlantic migration that had characterized the global migration situation of the "long" 19th century would die away as a mass phenomenon in the second third of the 20th century. In the 1920s, European migration overseas had reached no more than half the average annual figures of the pre-war decade. The figures declined even further in the 1930s in view of the global economic crisis: Only a mere 1.2 million overseas migrants were still registered throughout Europe between 1931 and 1940. The average of 120,000 people a year formed the lowest value of the entire preceding century. The start of the Second World War then put a complete stop to transatlantic migration.

Although the 1950s witnessed an upswing in European transatlantic migration after the war, it would no longer even reach the scope of the 1920s, much less the peak levels of the late 19th and early 20th century: States that had long been important countries of origin for outward migration from Europe, like Great Britain, the Netherlands or (West) Germany, now mostly registered higher immigration than emigration figures. And the migration flows from other countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal or Greece that had formerly fuelled transatlantic migration were now largely directed at the expanding labour markets of industrialized nations in Northern, Western and Central Europe.

As the main colonial expansionist and main exporter of people to America, Africa, Asia and the South Pacific region, Europe itself had only rarely been the destination of intercontinental migration for a long time. Great Britain, the centre of the world's largest empire, had indeed witnessed an increase in the number of residents of African and Asian origin in the course of its expansion from the 17th to the 19th century. But this remained relatively small. 10,000 people from the sub-Saharan region have been documented in Great Britain for 1770, for example, half of them in London. Considerably fewer immigrants from outside the continent used to live in other European locations. This slowly changed in the last two decades before the First World War, when the population of non-European origin showed a stronger growth in numbers. In contrast to what is often assumed, this involved by no means only members of the colonialized lower orders.

A central gate of entry for pioneering migrants to Europe was instead provided by the acquisition of academic qualifications within the context of colonialism: The workings of colonial rule depended on an extensive apparatus of native administrators, an army of collaborators that had drastically grown with the former's increasing densification since the late 19th century. In the interwar period, more and more native civil servants and officers who had not infrequently received their education in a European metropolis reached top positions in the colonial administrations. And not nearly all education migrants from the colonies went back to their countries of origin, by a wide margin.

The decolonisation after the Second World War did anything but bring an end to these movements in space motivated by education policy: Many former colo-

nial powers regarded the education-related migration from the now formally independent states as an opportunity for tying future leading cadres to the former colonial power and continuing to influence the politics, economy, society and culture of the new states with their aid. The education of colonial collaborators thus not only provided a central gate of entry to Europe; instead specific education-related migration patterns developed around the world that continue to have an effect to this day, and that led to permanent stays in Europe again and again. In 1949/50, for example, France had 2,000 students from the sub-Saharan colonies, whose numbers doubled three years later, and then doubled again to circa 8,000 by the end of the decade. Around a tenth of all higher education students from these regions are said to have continued the education in France in the 1950s. In a continuation of this tradition, French universities counted around 30,000 students from sub-Saharan Africa alone in the 2000/2001 academic year, making up roughly a fifth of all foreign students.

Apart from this, seafaring provided another early gate of entry for immigration from outside Europe. The European merchant navies experienced rapid growth in the course of globalisation and, starting from the end of the 19th century, increasingly tended to recruit Asian and African men for the physically taxing and health-damaging work below deck. These reached the European ports, where initial small settlement nuclei of Africans and Asians developed before and after the First World War (see Amenda 2009). Seamen from the West African ethnic group of the Kru, for example, became part of the populations of Liverpool, London or Cardiff since the late 19th century, and retained their links with seafaring right through to the 1970s. The merchant navy had been recruiting stokers in British India since the 1880s, several hundred of whom soon worked in British ports or earned a living in the low-wage sectors of the textile industry. Chinese seamen came to London, Hamburg or Rotterdam and continued to work in the transport sector there, or established the first Chinese bars and restaurants. Another and hence third group of Asians, Africans or West Indians from which pioneering migrants to Europe were to emerge was provided by the soldiers recruited by the colonial powers for the European battlefields of the First and Second World War, several thousand of whom stayed on in Europe after the end of the hostilities (see Koller 2008). ▸ **Fig. 5**

True mass immigration to the European continent only set in after the end of the Second World War, however, and was most of all driven by the process of decolonisation: The dissolution of the European colonial empires after the Second World War led to a massive remigration of European settlers back to Europe. Added to them were colonial collaborators who had supported colonial rule as administration officials, soldiers or police, or those who were regarded by the natives as symbols of the extreme (political) inequity in colonial societies, and permitted to immigrate to the former mother countries in the decolonisation process. Especially the demise of the global empires of the Netherlands (in the late 1940s), France (in the 1950s and early 60s) and Portugal (beginning of the

Fig. 5 Seamen on land: Chinese stokers in Hamburg, 1912 | bpk / Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin

1970s) was attended by extensive movements of refugees and displaced persons. 5 to 7 million Europeans appear to have come to the European continent from (former) colonial territories in a decolonisation context between the end of the Second World War and 1980, including many who had been neither born in Europe nor ever lived there (for this and the following, see the contributions in: Smith 2003).

After the end of colonial rule in Indonesia and the start of the Algerian War of Independence in 1954, France, for example, absorbed 1.8 million people within a decade who had been uprooted in the wake of decolonisation conflicts. The immigration attending the decolonisation process for Portugal turned out to be even more extensive in relation to the mother country's population: Starting from autumn 1973, almost half a million retornados arrived from the former Portuguese domains in Africa (Mozambique, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe) over the space of just one year. Angola dominated as a country of origin. By the mid-70s, retornados accounted for no less than just below 6 percent of the Portuguese population. The extensive migration attending the dissolution of European colonial dominions gave rise to a paradox in the history of European expansion: Europe's colonial empires were never more present in its metropolitan centres than during and after their decolonisation.

What emerged in addition to this was an extensive post-colonial immigration of the formerly colonised to Europe, where a partial continuation of the close links established between the former colonial powers and newly independent states

Fig. 6 Global migration at the end of the 20th / beginning of the 21st century

| Christoph Reichel, Institut für Geographie, Universität Osnabrück (model: Segal 1993, 17, 23)

provided for privileged gates of entry. Amongst the European countries experiencing major immigration, this was particularly true for France and Great Britain, but also the Netherlands and Belgium: Ever since the 1948 British Nationality Act, Great Britain offered all residents of the colonies and / or Commonwealth equal citizenship, as well as free entry to and commencement of work in her realm. This liberal regulation was only rescinded incrementally from the 1960s (see Schönwälder 2001, 367-495).

In the economically leading European nations, the number of immigrants from other parts of Europe had already sharply increased in the era of high industrialisation and agricultural modernisation during the late 19th and early 20th century. With its high economic growth rates and drastically expanding labour markets, the period of economic reconstruction during the first three decades to follow World War II again witnessed cross-border fluctuations of labour, and to a much greater extent, within the framework of a specific migration regime. Western, Central and Northern Europe served as the destinations of immigrants who mostly came from the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. ▶ Fig. 6

Conclusion

As a densifier of social interactions and networks between people, societies, economies and cultural systems, globalisation has fundamentally transformed the world over the last 500 years. What emerges is that spaces, in which particularly dynamic global networking processes are discernible, can very often also be described as centres of pronounced immigration; as an element and hallmark of the densification of social interactions, migration is a prerequisite and integral part of the networking between individuals and collectives. Over and beyond that, migrations contribute to the transformation processes arising from globalisation—they have changed the compositions of populations, modified economic and social structures, religious practices, or the forms of artistic expression. Migration has been and remains a central element of globalisation in centuries past, present and future, expectably.

The notion that most of all particularly poor and needy people usually turned to migration in past centuries is a myth. Financial resources have actually not only become an essential requirement for developing individual migration projects in our times: Departure and entry formalities were also chargeable in the past, considerable travel and transport costs came on top of this, agents or mediators generally demanded (expensive) payment. One could moreover never be certain that the arrival in the destination country would be immediately attended by the commencement of gainful employment, initial investments would partly turn out to be necessary, savings were spent, and money had to be borrowed. For the poorest of the poor, the realisation of such a migration project has always been illusory. Countless studies confirm: Poverty also used to drastically restrict mobility in the past.

It is often said that the volume of global migration movements has grown significantly in recent years and decades against a background of accelerated globalisation – and will continue to do so in future. This assumption cannot be confirmed. As the Vienna Institute of Demography found out in an elaborate study of individual immigration and emigration rates in 196 countries around the world, no significant volume changes are observable in the global migration movements over the last five decades and even further back: The share of migrants in the global population has remained relatively stable at 0.6 percent, as measured in five-year intervals since 1960. Just to quote one example in absolute figures for the period from 2005 to 2010: 41.5 million cross-border migrations against a global population of around 7 billion. Only in the period from 1990 to 1995 did the share of migrants reach a slightly higher value with 0.75 percent, largely explicable by the migratory consequences of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the far-reaching transformations entailed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and other political systems, most of all in Eastern Europe.

What is striking about these figures is not only the relatively low level of interstate migration and their pronounced stability over decades. They also show that the overwhelming majority of these movements take place in world regions such as West Africa, South America or East Asia, while migration across the borders of continents are of hardly any consequence. Even a country like the Federal Republic of Germany, which has been witnessing strong inward and outward fluctuations since 2010, has mostly registered movements from Europe and that by a wide margin: Three quarters of the immigrants in recent years came from other European countries. It can also be noted that the immigration flow from the poorer southern parts of the world to the richer North has been small in recent decades and is also not set to significantly increase in the coming years, according to forecasts by the United Nations – a finding completely at odds with the idea of a putative threat posed to "western" societies by mass immigration from less developed regions of the world. In 2014, for example, only around 75,000 immigrants reached the Federal Republic of Germany from African countries (including many Germans who had lived in Africa temporarily), while 27,000 emigrated to Africa.

Three aspects are largely responsible for the relatively low level of global south-to-north migration: poverty, a lack of networks, and restrictive migration policies. As mentioned earlier, financial resources are an essential requirement for realising individual migration projects. It is also for this reason that a large part of the – partly irregular – immigrants currently reaching Europe from Africa come from a comparably prosperous financial background, have enjoyed solid training and / or attained a relatively high level of education.

Financial resources are not the only thing lacking, however. Given the relatively low level of global south-to-north migration in recent years, the number of pioneering migrants, extent of intercontinental family- or acquaintance-based networks, and reliable knowledge about the potential options available in the

developed nations all tend to be very small amongst the majority of the world's poorer populations. These factors also keep the numbers of south-to-north migrants down.

The borders of the developed nations are essentially only (relatively) open for skilled and / or highly qualified persons who mostly come from other developed countries. The ongoing debates about the future of ageing societies in the prosperous North make clear that this orientation towards qualified or highly qualified immigrants cannot be expected to change much in the coming years and decades: Neither the challenges besetting ageing societies in the shape of a declining economic productivity and power to innovate, nor the recruitment of nurses and medical personnel for populations whose average age is continually on the rise and wherein age-related illnesses will inexorably escalate can be tackled by the immigration of unqualified or low-skilled workers.

If one disregards the displacements within the continent in connection with the breakup of the "Eastern Bloc" and in particular the migratory consequences of the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s, European nations have only rarely served as a destination in the last quarter century when it comes to refugee movements. This is the result of specific patterns in the flight from violence across the world's various war and crisis zones: Larger distances are rare because the required financial resources are lacking and because transit and / or destination countries thwart migration. Most refugees furthermore want to remigrate as quickly as possible. It is for these two reasons that they are generally found near their regions of origin, most of them in the global South. 95 percent of all refugees from Afghanistan (2015: 2.6 million) now live in the neighbouring states of Pakistan and Iran. The situation is similar with Syria, where a civil war has been raging since 2011: The majority of the refugees from there, around 4.8 million, have come to the neighbouring countries of Turkey (2016: 2.7 million), Jordan (640,000), Iraq (246,000) and Lebanon (1.1 million). Even greater than this is the number of people who have fled within Syria, the internally displaced, at 7.6 million. It is therefore not that surprising to discover that the states of the global South accommodated no less than 86 percent of all refugees registered around the world in 2015 – in a trend that has evidently been growing for years in comparison with the global North, given that the share of the world's poorer countries only amounted to 70 percent in 2003. It is therefore the global South, especially, that has been affected by the growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons since the beginning of this decade. Even if the number of people seeking refuge in Europe from the violence in the world's war and crisis zones has also increased, the European contribution to dealing with global "refugee issues" turns out to be rather small.

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