

CHAPTER III

AFFECTIVE MEMORY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

I can live more things than I can represent to myself, my being is not reduced to what of myself explicitly appears to me (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 310).

What we call reality is a relation between those sensations and those memories which simultaneously encircle us (Proust 1931).

9. Explicit and implicit dimensions of past-experience

I have started this work by pointing out that, within the phenomenological tradition, subjectivity has been understood as a notion describing the totality of the subject's experience—totality which not only extends in time over one's life but also encompasses its different dimensions. As previously argued, the unity of experience proved to be much more than just a unity of cognition, and the self proved to be much more than just an abstract subject of thought. The unity of experience is rather constituted by the multiplicity of temporal and affective connections which are constantly at work on the pre-reflective, passive level of experience. In this perspective, not only any particular perception becomes an infinite task, but the whole experience of one's life turns out to be an open-ended dynamic whole and a process of never completed synthesis. One of the consequences of this unity, which characterizes subjective experience, is that it can never be fully given to us as a totality at given moments, nor can it be exhausted by any representational or narrative construction. There is an essential inadequacy of any particular experience and of our knowledge thereof regarding this experience as a whole. Hence, on the one hand, we do relate to our life as a totality or a unity in time, but on the other hand, we never possess it in its fullness.

The paradoxical character of this experiential condition is especially clear when the phenomenon of memory is taken into account. Notably, memory shows that subjectivity can relate to its past life and is essentially defined by this relation, although the contact with the past can never be fully exhausted through remembering alone. In order to fully investigate this idea, I suggest distinguishing two perspectives on memory and past-experience, mirroring the distinction between the cognitive and affective (or reflective and pre-reflective) levels of subjectivity.¹⁰¹

According to the first perspective, memory is related to the reflective capacity of a subject to represent his or her past objectively, to construct narratives and to integrate different events and experiences within the meaningful connection of a life-story. The main role here is played by explicit remembering, as it constitutes the basis for any further memory constructions. The thus represented past is experienced as an intentional object of explicit remembering, or as a transcendent past. According to Husserl, “memory places an absent reality before our eyes, not indeed as present itself, but certainly as reality” (Husserl 2006a, 4). However, this past reality is, in the words of Fernando Pessoa, “a reality of nothing.”¹⁰² For the subject, it means that its own past self becomes alienated and experienced as foreign to itself. As Anna Akhmatova writes, this past can “become almost as foreign to us as to our neighbor in the next apartment.”¹⁰³ Similarly, in his later works on

¹⁰¹ This brings us back to one of the most remarkable questions which arises from the discussion about the distinction between the minimal and the narrative self. The question concerns the status of memory and whether it can be regarded as belonging only to a higher, reflexive level of subjective experience. If, as it is the case in some interpretations (Damasio 1999; Gallagher 2000), the whole dimension of the past is left within the domain of the narrative subject, then the pre-reflective subjectivity risks to be reduced to the ineffable moment of presence without any connection to what is lost. In the same vein, the unity of subjective experience on its basic level may come to rely merely on the synchronic unity of simultaneously occurring events without taking into account the multiplicity of connections which constitute the totality of one’s experience. As it has been argued in the previous chapters, such an idea would simply contradict the view of pre-reflective subjectivity featuring it as the interconnected unity of experience. Moreover, it would leave unexplained the affective impact of the past which extends beyond our explicit recollections and manifests itself through phenomena belonging to the area of implicit memory and the unconscious.

¹⁰² “Vivo sempre no presente. O futuro, não o conheço. O passado, já o não tenho. Pesa-me um como a possibilidade de tudo, o outro como a realidade de nada” (Pessoa 1982, 186).

¹⁰³ From Anna Akhmatova’s poem *Memories have three epochs* (1945).

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intersubjectivity, Husserl compares this past-experience to *Fremderfahrung*, and the unity with oneself to the unity with the others.¹⁰⁴ From this separation between the present experience and the transcendent past arises the problem of personal identity, which should instead reconcile past, present, and future selves.

Despite the fundamental role that explicit remembering plays for the phenomena of memory and personal identity, it is still not sufficient to describe how subjectivity relates to its past life. Even if, “the horizon of the past is disclosed by remembering” (Husserl 2001a, 529), as Fink remarks, it can never be exhausted by remembering.¹⁰⁵ Thus, the second perspective, which intends to conceive of memory on the level of the pre-reflective experience, must face the question of how in the affective life of consciousness a connection between the present and the past is established, namely before the institution of any representational relation to the past in remembering. In what concerns the issue of personal identity, this line of inquiry introduces the idea of the affective identity of a subject–identity that is constituted not based on temporality or reflective self-consciousness but on the basis of affective connectivity between the present and the past experience.

The central point of this chapter is to address this second perspective to subjective past-relations by exploring the phenomenological approach to the phenomena of implicit memory and of the unconscious. These two topics are so closely related that it is impossible to address one without approaching the other. What brings them together is first of all the fact that the past has the ability to be affectively present despite its temporal distance and to have a strong impact on the ongoing experience. Such a presence is not necessarily bound to recollections or any objectively graspable “possession” of what is lost. It is not represented but incorporated in our way of being and relation to other people.

Different disciplines approach this problem from different angles. In cognitive psychology, with its clear orientation towards experimental research methods, this topic is explored under the rubric of implicit memory. In the psychoanalytic tradition, which draws its insights from therapeutic practice, this tacit influence of the past on subjective experi-

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Text Nr. 24 “Personale (ichliche) Gemeinschaft mit mir selbst als Parallele zur Gemeinschaft mit Anderen” (Husserl 1973b).

¹⁰⁵ “[...] keineswegs ist es möglich, erinnerungsmäßig je die Ganze der transzendenten Vergangenheit auszuschöpfen. [...] Die Endlosigkeit der Vergangenheit ist wesensmäßig ein aller möglichen Wiedererinnerung vorausliegendes Dunkel” (Fink 1966, 38).

ence has acquired the prominent name of the unconscious. In phenomenological philosophy, both these topics are reunited, as they equally challenge the representational idea of consciousness and demand a reformulation of the notion of subjectivity accounting for its unity with the past beyond the explicit intentionality of remembering.

The problem of the unconscious, as brought to light by the psychoanalytic exploration of the human mind, has been understood not merely as the riddle of consciousness, but more precisely as the riddle of the *consciousness of the past*. Similarly, in the psychological explorations of implicit memory, this phenomenon is defined in terms of influences of past experiences without any awareness of remembering (Schacter 1996, 161). In other words: as the phenomenon of memory cannot be exhausted by the phenomenon of recollection, in the same vein, the problem of the unconscious is much more than the problem of its appearance/representation.

In the previous chapter, I have already outlined how Husserl's idea of affectivity and associative syntheses may lead to the reconsideration of the very idea of consciousness and its unity. In this chapter, I will continue exploring this direction by presenting Husserl's approach to the unconscious (§ 11) and by positioning it within other phenomenological approaches to the same issue (§ 10). In the last section of this chapter, I will address the psychological research on implicit memory and present a phenomenological approach to the issue based on Husserl's exploration of affectivity (§ 12). It is my firm belief that implicit memory and the unconscious are two related phenomena which are best suited to account for the pre-reflective level of subjective experience in what concerns our pre-thematic relations with the past. Clarifications of these relations through phenomenological analyses of the unconscious and implicit memory can also contribute to the understanding of personal identity—namely such an identity which is grounded not on the level of narrative constructions and explicit autobiographical memory, but rather on the implicit dimension of subjectivity.

10. Phenomenological accounts of the unconscious

The above defined task of this chapter belongs to the area where phenomenology enters into dialog with the psychoanalytic tradition, on the one hand, and with cognitive psychology, on the other hand. I have already reviewed the methodological differences between phenomenology and psychology in the second chapter (§ 6). As for phenomenology and psychoanalysis, their respective relations have been the subject of numerous investigations¹⁰⁶ and have changed significantly over time. Whereas in Freud's and Husserl's time the dialog would have been rather conflictual, the development of both phenomenological and psychoanalytic investigations of subjectivity in the last century testifies that they can productively challenge each other. In the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty:

The accord of phenomenology and of psychoanalysis should not be understood to consist in phenomenology's saying clearly what psychoanalysis had said obscurely. On the contrary, it is by what phenomenology implies or unveils as its limits—by its *latent content* or its *unconscious*—that it is in consonance with psychoanalysis (Merleau-Ponty 1993, 71).

In accordance with this idea, in what follows I will attempt to delineate how exactly phenomenology tackles the problem of the unconscious and which are the main approaches to this issue inside the phenomenological tradition.

10.1. Brentano-Freud-Husserl: The riddle of the unconscious as the riddle of consciousness

In Husserl's and Freud's time, it would still have been right to claim that, given its clear orientation towards the exploration of subjectivity mainly in terms of consciousness, phenomenology had nothing to say about the psychoanalytical notion of the unconscious. Both thinkers, even despite

¹⁰⁶ See, for instance, the volume *Founding Psychoanalysis Phenomenologically*, edited by Dieter Lohmar and Jagna Brudzinska and featuring different approaches to this topic (Lohmar and Brudzinska 2012), as well as a collection of essays *Approches phénoménologiques de l'inconscient* co-edited by Maria Gyemant and Délia Popa (Gyemant and Popa 2015). Other relevant recent contributions to the topic, such as those by Rudolf Bernet, Aaron Mishara, Dan Zahavi, Thomas Fuchs, Bruce Bégout, Jagna Brudzinska, Nicolas De Warren, and Nicholas Smith, are all to a larger or lesser extent discussed in the present chapter.

sharing a common psychological background¹⁰⁷ and working in the same historical context, clearly chose to pursue different paths in their explorations of the human mind. The difference is especially clear regarding the apparent inconsistency between the phenomenological and the psychoanalytic views on the nature of consciousness and on the respective place of the unconscious. While Freud is never tired of expressing his skepticism towards theoretical abstractions, and is rather unconvinced that philosophy could possibly solve the challenge of the unconscious, Husserl, for his part, is known for criticizing the naivety and narrowness of psychological approaches to consciousness. He sees no genuine challenge in the idea of the unconscious, the real challenge lying, according to him, in the possible understanding and theoretical grasp of a new idea of consciousness and of its constitutive function for subjective experience. Despite these differences, both thinkers agree at least on one issue, namely, that the problem of the unconscious is the problem of consciousness itself and cannot be solved without changing the way we understand their respective relations.

This agreement nevertheless has never been enough to find a solution suitable for both theories. Freud is convinced that the notion of consciousness has strict boundaries and that it makes no sense to expand it so that it could somehow include in itself all the complexity of the unconscious. Thus, in *A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis*, he claims that not only the form of presentation, but also “the laws of unconscious activity differ widely from those of the conscious” (Freud 2008, 39) and that “we have no right to extend the meaning of this word [i.e. conscious] so far as to make it include a consciousness of which its owner himself is not aware” (Freud 2008, 36).

Husserl, on the other hand—especially at the early stages of his thought—agrees with Brentano that the idea of the unconscious as opposite to consciousness, and yet influencing it without subject’s awareness, bears on a serious contradiction. Along these lines, in *Logical Investigations*, he dismisses the task to account for “obscure, hypothetical events in the soul’s unconscious depths” (Husserl 1970b, 105). In the Appendix IX to his lectures on time-consciousness, Husserl refutes the idea that there can be any “unconscious” content that subsequently becomes conscious in retention and insists that “consciousness is necessarily *consciousness* in

¹⁰⁷ According to Aaron Mishara, both Freud and Husserl were developing their theories in the common theoretical context and were influenced by the same psychologists. He specifically mentions Herbart, Brentano, Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt and Mach (Mishara 1990).

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each of its phases” (Husserl 1991, 123). For Husserl, consciousness encompasses both the sphere of explicit wakeful awareness and the obscure background of conscious life. In this spirit, in the *Ideas II*, he points out that the sphere of self-consciousness cannot be restricted only to the narrow scope of attentive or alert awareness, but must include in itself equally all “background,” obscure conscious experiences (Husserl 1989, 115).

In the Appendix to *Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, written by Eugen Fink, the phenomenological stance regarding the problem of the unconscious finds a somewhat different elaboration. Instead of dismissing the significance of the challenge altogether, Fink states that the problem of the unconscious relies on “a naïve and dogmatic *implicit theory about consciousness*” that requires systematic reconsideration. This suggests that a phenomenological idea of the unconscious is possible, but should be necessarily based on “an *explicit analysis of consciousness*” that employs the methodical means of phenomenological philosophy in general and of the intentional analysis in particular:

As long as the exposition of the problem of the unconscious is determined by such an implicit theory of consciousness, it is in principle philosophically naïve. Only *after* an *explicit analysis of consciousness* can the problem of the unconscious be posed at all. But only in the working mastery of this problem will it be revealed whether or not the “unconscious” can be treated according to the methodical means of the intentional analysis (Husserl 1970a, 387).

Fink’s proposal clearly goes in the direction of *the intentional theory of the unconscious* and supports Husserl’s brief remarks in the same text concerning “unconscious” intentionalities (Husserl 1970a, 237). The above-mentioned appendix was written by Fink in 1936 and is consistent with the general attitude of Husserl’s phenomenology towards “depth psychology” and especially towards the critical position the latter assumes in relation to the “consciousness-idealism of phenomenology.” It shows that disagreement exists on the level of the basic theoretical presuppositions of the two disciplines and mainly concerns the understanding of consciousness. What is meant here by the supposedly naïve “implicit theory of consciousness” deserves closer consideration.

In his seminal paper *Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud*, Rudolf Bernet points out that both thinkers initially shared the same psychological idea of consciousness originating from Franz Brentano’s work (Bernet 2002). Brentano famously argues against possibility of

unconscious representations claiming that it amounts to the idea of an unconscious consciousness which in turn bears on a serious contradiction. This contradiction, however, is not a contradiction in terms: the idea of an unconscious consciousness, as he puts it, is not the same as a non-red redness (Brentano 1973, 79). The contradiction is rather a contradiction in essence: something analogous to an unconscious representation would be “an unseen seeing,” that is such a seeing that does not see. Maurice Merleau-Ponty brings this line of thought even further when he writes that “an unconscious thought would be a thought that does not think” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 396).

This argument, developed in Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Brentano 1874), is directly related to his view on consciousness as *inner representation* (*innere Vorstellung*)¹⁰⁸ which accompanies mental acts, but in such “a peculiarly intimate way” that would not lead to an objectifying, reflexive relation, nor to infinite regress.¹⁰⁹ As he points out, the term “consciousness” refers to the mental phenomenon insofar as this phenomenon has certain content and can therefore be conceived of as a representation of this content accompanied by the representation of the mental phenomenon itself. This implies that, for Brentano, the inconceivability of an unconscious consciousness ensues from the inconceivability of an internally unperceived representation. It also suggests that only mental phenomena with representational content are necessarily accompanied by inner consciousness. For Brentano, of course, this encompasses the totality of mental states since they all are defined by intrinsic intentionality, i.e. directedness towards their primary objects.

Thus, the central point in understanding the problem of consciousness and correlatively of the unconscious, in this perspective, revolves around the representational nature of conscious phenomena. This perspective has

¹⁰⁸ *Vorstellung* is often translated as either “presentation” or “representation.” The latter appears to be more common and adequate and will be preferred here as well. The main reason for this is that the use of the term in its current philosophical meaning was established in Kant’s philosophy, who employed it as a German version of the Latin term *representatio* (Cassin and Rendall 2014, 891). Note, however, that in the English translation of Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* the term is translated as “presentation.”

¹⁰⁹ In this spirit, he claims: “The presentation (*Vorstellung*) of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon; it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations” (Brentano 1973, 98).

been implicitly adopted in both Freud's and most of Husserl's writings on the matter and shaped the way they approached the issue.

Unlike Brentano, Freud is not threatened by the conceptual contradiction involved in the idea of unconscious representations and instead advocates the possibility of non-conscious mental states which can influence one's conscious life and behavior. As Bernet points out, Freud's aim is to understand "the way in which unconscious representations appear in consciousness without negating their origin in the unconscious" (Bernet 2002, 329). In this sense, Freud, in his attempts to clarify the unconscious, still largely relies on the possibility to conceive of the unconscious representations or, more generally, of the unconscious way of appearing and manifestation.

As for Husserl, it is important to understand that he transforms Brentano's idea of inner consciousness into the absolute inner time-consciousness and therefore deals with a different conception of consciousness altogether. Such an understanding, as Bernet argues, is not at odds with the idea of the unconscious and paves the way to the possible detecting of the "unconscious mode of appearance" in acts of presentification (*Vergegenwärtigung*). In this regard, consciousness and the unconscious are understood as two different types of representations. Such a position is generally consistent with Fink's indication in the mentioned *Appendix* that phenomenological analysis of consciousness might contribute to the intentional theory of the unconscious.

This direction in the phenomenological exploration of the unconscious still relies on the theory of the representational structure of consciousness, even if with significant differences from the one advocated by Brentano and implicitly accepted by Freud. However, this is not the only possible way of exploring consciousness and the unconscious phenomenologically. Another way would be to approach this issue in non-representational terms and to question not merely the mode of appearance of the unconscious, but rather its intrinsic immanence to consciousness and subjective experience. This latter perspective explores the complexity of the unconscious that cannot be easily reduced only to a question of manifestation and representation. The most elaborate version of this approach is pursued in the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Thomas Fuchs. Another non-representational approach to the unconscious can be found in Husserl's later works related to genetic phenomenology and passive constitution of subjective experience.

Thus, I assume that there are two main directions in the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious: one exploring the intentional theory of the unconscious and the other inquiring into a non-representational way of approaching consciousness and the unconscious respectively.¹¹⁰ In what follows I will look into two major examples of both accounts, namely Rudolf Bernet's investigation of the unconscious representations in phantasy and then Maurice Merleau-Ponty's and Thomas Fuchs' proposal for an approach to the unconscious as "a horizontal dimension of the lived body, lived space, and intercorporeality" (Fuchs 2012a). Afterwards, I will return to Husserl's idea of affective consciousness and examine another possible non-representational phenomenological account of the unconscious.¹¹¹

10.2. Bernet's intentional theory of the unconscious: the unconscious way of appearing in phantasy

It has already been made clear by many authors, and by Freud himself, that his notion of the unconscious is not a univocal one. According to Freud, in such texts as *A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis* (1912) and *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1933), there are at least three possible meanings of the term, namely: the unconscious in the descriptive, the dynamic, and the systematic (topographic) sense. The unconscious in the descriptive sense refers to the static understanding of it in terms of mental representations which are not accessible to awareness.¹¹² It is the unconscious as latent and pre-conscious. The

¹¹⁰ Fink's proposal that the phenomenological theory of the unconscious should follow the direction opened by the intentional analytics of consciousness is not necessarily misleading, as Aaron Mishara suggests (Mishara 1990, 54). Indeed, Husserl's own most consistent attempt to provide an account of the unconscious is founded on the level of pre-predicative experience and passive constitution, and not on the level of intentional analyses. However, it is still phenomenologically consistent to explore both directions.

¹¹¹ The systematic presentation of this argument can also be found in my paper: "Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty" (Kozyreva 2016).

¹¹² "The oldest and best meaning of the word 'unconscious' is the descriptive one; we call a psychical process unconscious whose existence we are obliged to assume—for some such reason as that we infer it from its effects—, but of which we know nothing. In that case we have the same relation to it as we have to a psychical process in another person, except that it is in fact one of our own. If we want to be still more correct, we shall modify our assertion by saying that we call a process unconscious if we are obliged to assume that it is

dynamic sense designates the unconscious as repressed: what is kept apart from consciousness and cannot reach it despite its intensity. The systematic or topographic sense refers to the unconscious as a particular system of the mental apparatus (the Id). In the psychoanalytic literature, it is also common to distinguish a fourth—“economic”—sense of the unconscious, designating it in terms of instinctual energy and its transformations.¹¹³ In this sense, the unconscious can refer to the connection of primal drives, instincts, and their representations (*Triebrepräsentanz*).

The topographic sense is highly speculative and relies on Freud’s metapsychological model of the mental apparatus and is mostly seen as implausible in the phenomenological perspective (Bernet 2002, 348). Bernet’s enquiry on the unconscious mode of appearance concerns mainly the descriptive sense of the unconscious. He then suggests possible ways to phenomenologically ground the “dynamic” and the “economic” unconscious. As both proposed directions are clearly dependent on the phenomenological clarification of the descriptive unconscious, as developed in the main part of the paper *Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud*, this will be the main focus of my account of Bernet’s approach.

For Brentano, understanding the unconscious was equal to accounting for the possibility of internally unperceived representational consciousness—what has ceased to be conscious, but that could be reawakened and brought back to awareness. Bernet suggests that the phenom-

being activated at the moment, though at the moment we know nothing about it. This qualification makes us reflect that the majority of conscious processes are conscious only for a short time; very soon they become latent, but can easily become conscious again. We might also say that they had become unconscious, if it were at all certain that in the condition of latency they are still something psychical” (Freud 1977).

¹¹³ In Freud, “economic” designates a particular point of view on the psychic processes. As Laplanche and Pontalis point out: “Freud defines metapsychology as the synthesis of three standpoints—the topographical, the dynamic and the economic” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988, 127). In this sense, another possible classification of the unconscious may just distinguish two standpoints on the unconscious: the descriptive and the systematic/topographic. The latter would then include the dynamic, economic, and topographic meanings. This classification can be found in Laplanche & Pontalis’ *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988) and, in the phenomenological literature, in Jagna Brudzinska’s dissertation *Assoziation, Imaginäres, Trieb. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Subjektivitätsgenesis bei Husserl und Freud* (Brudzinska 2004). The distinction between the four mentioned meanings of the unconscious is also employed by Bernet in his paper on *Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud* (Bernet 2002). Since his interpretation is central for this part of my work, I have chosen to start by introducing this version.

enological approach to this issue necessarily implies the critique of this explanation of the unconscious and relies on the revised idea of inner consciousness. According to Bernet's interpretation, descriptive unconscious can be clarified phenomenologically not as "amputated, unperceived consciousness," but as another type of self-consciousness—such a type which allows for the "the presence of the non-present" (Bernet 2002, 331), or, in Jagna Brudzinska's terms, for the appearance of the not-appearing (*Erscheinen des Nicht-Erscheinens*) and the manifestation of the absence (Brudzinska 2004, 220).

This type of self-consciousness is characteristic of particular act-intentionalities, which Husserl designated as intuitive presentifications (*anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen*) and which include experiences of recollection, phantasy, pictorial consciousness (*Bildbewusstsein*), and empathy. Such acts are distinguished from the acts of presentation (a paradigm example of which is perception) because they do not present directly what is given, but rather *bring to present awareness* objects which are not there. For instance, recollection is a present experience whose intentional object as such is absent and can only appear as past. The same goes for phantasy, which is an even more radical example of the "presence of the not-present," since it does not need to refer to any kind of perceived reality, but implies a certain coexistence of two orders of reality—present and imagined—within one experience. Such coexistence however does not imply any real connection between intentional objects of imagination and perception: according to Husserl, they have no connection and "no temporal position in relation to one another" (Husserl 1973a, 168).¹¹⁴

An important step in Bernet's interpretation relies on the analogy drawn between such acts of presentification and the descriptive unconscious—an analogy mainly based on the similarity between the intentionality of phantasy and recollection, on the one hand, and the intentionality of the unconscious representations, on the other hand. Justifying this analogy, Bernet claims that:

Freud's "*descriptive*" concept of the Unconscious corresponds exactly to Husserl's determination of the appearance of the presentified: in both cases it is a matter of something alien that belongs to the self but

¹¹⁴ "The centaur which I now imagine, and a hippopotamus which I previously imagined, and, in addition, the table I am perceiving even now have no connection among themselves, i.e., they have *no temporal position in relation to one another* [...] the centaur is neither earlier nor later than the hippopotamus or than the table which I now perceive" (Husserl 1973a, 168).

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which the self cannot immediately lay claim to as real presence (Bernet 2002, 341).

In this perspective, the unconscious is understood as *another* modus of appearance and representation—in Brudzinska’s words, not as absence or “anti-phenomenon,” but as another kind of presence (*eine andere Anwesenheit*), found not in the sphere of the impressional, but rather in reproductive consciousness (Brudzinska 2004, 221). The unconscious is thus defined in respect of what appears (the absent, the alien) and how it appears in consciousness (reproductively as opposed to impressionally), and not in terms of this appearance being itself devoid of a certain “conscious” quality or accompanying representation. This suggests that one possible way to phenomenologically ground Freud’s concept of the unconscious lies, according to Bernet, in Husserl’s understanding of the unconscious intentionality and of the particular function of inner time-consciousness which makes such intentionality possible. More precisely, this way leads to understanding the unconscious on the basis of Husserl’s theory of reproductive inner consciousness, manifesting itself in phantasy and related phenomena. Bernet sees a decisive contribution of phenomenology to the understanding of the unconscious in the account of reproductive consciousness, since it presents a case of a “doubling” of consciousness (Bernet 2002, 336). Such a “doubling” implies that the presentification of an absent (e.g. past) object is possible not due to the replication of an original perception, but rather due to the reproduction of an original impressional consciousness of this perception.¹¹⁵

The alleged affinity between reproductive consciousness and the unconscious is based on the essential possibility inherent to consciousness to take distance from itself within its own experience and on the corresponding view on subjectivity as capable of living “in two different worlds (a real and an unreal one)” (Bernet 2002, 333). Among other things, this implies that intuitive presentifications—such as memory and phantasy—are best suited to serve as conscious presentations of unconscious desires and to fulfill the ego’s tendency to establish an ambiguous relation to affectively charged objects. In this perspective, unconscious representations

¹¹⁵ “The inner consciousness of a memory is therefore not an impressional consciousness of a perception but a reproductive consciousness which bears within itself the earlier perception in the manner of an intentional implication (and not as a real (reell) component)” (Bernet 2002, 337). I am not going into the details of the Husserl’s idea of reproductive consciousness and Bernet’s take on it, since it has already been discussed in the first chapter, § 2.3.b.

overcome an immediate, impressional relation to objects, as characteristic of instinctual drives, and represent them in the form of phantasies, dreams or other kinds of reproductive consciousness (Bernet 2002, 341).

Bernet's account of the unconscious deals with a particular aspect of the issue, namely with the manifestation of the unconscious presentations in the reproductive inner consciousness. This latter is understood as another form of consciousness—distanced and more self-alienated, as opposed to the immediate, affective, and sometimes even traumatic impressional inner consciousness. Bernet himself acknowledges that reproductive consciousness can account only for a particular type of unconscious intentionality and that there is a form of unconscious representation inherent to the impressional consciousness itself. The latter is related to the "impressional immediate affection" and grounds a second concept of the unconscious realized in the impressional consciousness (Bernet 2002, 343). Such an unconscious however also takes on a form of representation—it appears as affective representation in the feeling of *Angst*.

Arguably, this approach to the unconscious still handles the issue by taking the intentional representation as a fundamental form of consciousness, and looks for a solution in what Fink called the intentional theory of the unconscious. Hence, the problem of the unconscious in its relation to consciousness is grasped under a question of "how consciousness can appear to itself as something alien" (Bernet 2002, 349). Bernet's approach presupposes that, in his own words, "nothing unconscious remains without appearance in consciousness, instead, there is a double—both representational and affective—form of conscious representation of the unconscious" (Bernet 2002, 343).

However, the complexity of the unconscious cannot be easily reduced only to a question of manifestation and representation. Similarly, the interconnectivity of subjective experience, its constant interweaving with the past cannot be exhausted by the phenomenon of recollection. The question at stake here concerns the possibility to conceive of both our relation to the past and the unconscious in non-representational terms. This aspect of the unconscious has been elaborated by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and by Thomas Fuchs' phenomenology of body memory, on which I will focus in the following section of this work.

10.3. Non-representationalist accounts of the unconscious: Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs on the unconscious and body memory

The critique of the representationalist approach to consciousness and correspondingly to the unconscious is characteristic of several post-Husserlian phenomenological projects.¹¹⁶ Arguably the most fruitful account of non-representational consciousness inside the phenomenological tradition is given by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who emphasizes the role of embodiment, being in the world, and of intersubjectivity as fundamental constitutive dimensions of subjectivity. He asserts that “there is no private sphere of consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 395) and that consciousness is entirely transcendence, “the simultaneous contact with my being and with the being of the world” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 396). For him, this implies the reevaluation of the very idea of transcendence and of intentionality, which accordingly can be understood not as a cognitive relation to an object by positing it mentally in one’s mind, but rather as a concrete embodied and situated directedness towards the world.

In his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl’s notion of “operative” intentionality (*fungierende Intentionalität*) and interprets it as a pre-reflective directedness which establishes a natural, pre-predicative unity of our being in the world (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxxii). Contrary to act-intentionality, which describes the relation to objects on the level of judgments and reasoning, and thereby constitutes the basis for objective knowledge, operative intentionality can be understood as “the body-subject’s concrete, spatial and pre-reflective directedness towards the living world” (Reuter 1999, 72). While bringing the subject’s embodiment and the practical nature of bodily directedness to

¹¹⁶ For example, Bernet underlines that “the development of the analysis of intentionality by Heidegger, Aron Gurwitsch, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry has been basically nothing other than a putting into question of the representationalist objectivism and the egological subjectivism progressively installed by Husserl at the beginning of this century” (Bernet 1994, 231). In the framework of contemporary phenomenology, the importance of non-representational approaches to the unconscious has been emphasized by Dan Zahavi in his book *Self-Awareness and Alterity*. Notably, he claims that when “phenomenology moves beyond an investigation of object-manifestation and act-intentionality, it enters a realm that has traditionally been called the unconscious” (Zahavi 1999, 207). By drawing attention to Husserl’s analyses of affectivity and passivity, Zahavi proposes that we see the phenomenological unconscious as a fundamentally altered form of consciousness and a “depth-structure of subjectivity” (Zahavi 1999, 206).

the foreground of the constitutional issue, Merleau-Ponty points to an apparent insufficiency of representational accounts. Such accounts, so his argument goes, fail to make sense of a particular intentionality involved in the performance of movements¹¹⁷ and all essentially bodily phenomena. Furthermore, they lead to an altogether false image of subjectivity, featuring it as consisting of distinct representations which are either available or unavailable to conscious awareness.

Merleau-Ponty highlights two main problems in understanding consciousness and the unconscious in representational terms. The first problem, which he ascribes to the philosophies of consciousness, consists in the impossibility to conceive of any content of experience beyond the “manifest content spread out in distinct representations” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 171). The second problem, belonging to the theories of the unconscious, “is to double this manifest content with a latent content, also made up of representation” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 171). He uses an example of sexuality to make a point that featuring it in terms of either conscious or unconscious representations does not come any closer to understanding its continuous presence “in human life as an atmosphere” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 171).

Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the approach to consciousness and the unconscious as consisting of representations is directly related to his idea that subjective experience cannot be made transparent to itself, but is instead intrinsically characterized by its self-opacity and fundamental ambiguity. In this case, Merleau-Ponty clearly diverges from Cartesian as well as Husserlian ideal of certainty and their belief that self-consciousness provides us with a perfect vantage point towards inner workings of our minds. Instead, he draws on the idea of bodily structure of perception, where the body is both what perceives and what stays invisible for itself: “it [the body] is neither tangible nor visible insofar as it is what sees and touches” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 94). The ambiguity of bodily experience and the non-representational character of bodily awareness and perception lie at the foundation of Merleau-Ponty’s view of subjectivity and inspire his descriptions of various phenomena. Con-

¹¹⁷ “This [accomplishment of a movement] is only possible if consciousness is not defined as the explicit positing of its objects, but rather more generally as a reference to an object that is practical as much as theoretical. That is, if consciousness is defined as being in the world, and if the body in turn is defined not as one object among others, but as the vehicle of being in the world. So long as consciousness is defined through representation, the only possible operation for it is of forming representations” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 525).

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trary to representational approaches that feature contents of conscious experience through what appears to the subject, Merleau-Ponty believes that what we acquire through experience is not represented in our minds in either conscious or unconscious way.¹¹⁸ He claims that we can live more things than we can represent to ourselves and that our experience is by no means restricted to the content of intentional representations (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 310).

The idea of a consciousness that would be transparent for itself and whose existence would amount to the consciousness that it has of existing is not so different from the notion of the unconsciousness. In both cases we have the same retrospective illusion: everything that I will later learn about myself is introduced into me as an explicit object (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 400).

Thus Merleau-Ponty makes a radical suggestion for the phenomenological theory of the unconscious—to avoid talking about conscious vs. unconscious representations altogether, and rather understand the unconscious as a “sedimented practical schema” (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 191) and as our own self-opacity. In a similar vein, in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, he gives examples of situated feelings and actions, which are defined as much by their directedness to objects as by their ambiguity and obscurity regarding their own contextuality:

We would be equally wrong by making sexuality crystallize in “unconscious representations” or by setting up in the depths of the dreamer a consciousness that can identify sexuality by name. Similarly, love cannot be given a name by the lover who lives it. It is not a thing that one could outline and designate, it is not the same love spoken of in books and newspapers, because it is rather the way the lover establishes his relations with the world; it is an existential signification. The criminal does not see his crime, nor the traitor his betrayal, but not because these exist deep within him as unconscious representations or tendencies, but rather because these crimes or betrayals are so many relatively closed worlds and so many situations. If we are situated, then we are surrounded and cannot be transparent to ourselves, and thus our contact with ourselves must only be accomplished in ambiguity (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 401).

Here we can see that such ambiguity and self-opacity refer not merely to impossibility of complete self-knowledge but rather to what Merleau-

¹¹⁸ On the non-representational account of learning and skill acquisition see Hubert Dreyfus’ paper *Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation* (Dreyfus 2002).

Ponty calls “situatedness” of subjective experience. In other words, we are intransparent to ourselves because our experience is not restricted to representational content and thereby cannot be made an explicit object of observation.

Along the same lines, in his lecture courses on *Institution and Passivity* and *Visible and Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty presents the unconscious as “perceptual consciousness,”¹¹⁹ drifting not that far from the definition of the unconscious in terms of the intrinsic self-opacity of conscious experience. Already in Husserl, perception is described as an unending process, in which objects appear only to a certain degree of approximation and never in fullness (Husserl 2001a). For Merleau-Ponty, it means that perceptual consciousness relies on unconscious syntheses which complete our otherwise fragmentary view of reality by means of particular subjective predispositions and a sedimented history. The unconscious can be therefore understood as a background against which we see objects, not as something that can be grasped in our representations of these objects:

This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our “consciousness,” but in front of us, as articulations of our field. It is “unconscious” by the fact that it is not an object, but it is that through which objects are possible, it is the constellation wherein our future is read—It is between them as the interval of the trees between the trees, or as their common level. It is the *Urgemeinschaft* of our intentional life, the *Ineinander* of the others in us and of us in them” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 180).

The description of the unconscious as the “interval between the trees” appears to be quite a precise analogy: the unconscious is literally taken to be the way we fill in the gaps of uncertainty in objects’ perception—and what is more—a way which determines how exactly we will relate to them. Different people will fill up the gaps between these metaphorical trees quite differently: depending on their background and individual history, someone might see a situation as threatening, while someone else might see an equivalent situation as promising and exciting. It is an interesting feature of our experience that when a certain amount of information is missing (which is the case for any kind of inadequate or essentially incomplete experience, such as perception and interaction

¹¹⁹ “These descriptions [i.e. of oneric consciousness] mean that the unconscious is a perceptual consciousness, it proceeds like perceptual consciousness by means of a logic of implication and promiscuity, it gradually follows a path whose total slope it does not know [...]” (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 208).

with other people), we tend to fill it in with our expectations based on previous experiences. Even if we see objects only from a certain perspective and never from all possible angles, our perception still functions as if it were complete.

Thus, when Merleau-Ponty claims that “perception is unconsciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 189), he intends to emphasize not what one directly perceives as an object as being unconsciousness, but that perception functions as a medium through which objects are perceived in this or that manner. He states that unconsciousness “is and is not perceived. For one perceives only figures upon levels—and one perceives them only by relation to the level, which therefore is unperceived” (Ibid). Such a definition of the unconscious as a perceptual consciousness however does not imply that Merleau-Ponty ever intended to reject the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious altogether. He rather sought to avoid understanding the unconscious in terms of another psychic reality or some kind of other “I think,” which forms representations “behind the back” of the conscious subject (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 207). Instead of the strictly dualistic idea separating conscious and unconscious processing, Merleau-Ponty develops the idea that the unconscious is a necessary part of any conscious experience. The unconscious thus is not the opposite of consciousness, it is “the very perceptual consciousness in its ambiguity, opacity, multiplicity of meanings, and unending quest for interpretation” (Stawarska 2008, 62).

A similar critique of representationalism regarding consciousness and the unconscious returns in Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of memory in his lecture course on *Institution and Passivity*. In this course, the problem of memory oscillates between two modes of our relation to the past: memory as “construction” and memory as “conservation” of the past. In the first mode, roughly corresponding to that of explicit memory, the past is constituted as an object of one’s recollections. This is a transcendent past which gets to be constantly recreated in the history of subjective transformations. It is a “construction” as long as it becomes the past which I can remember and bring to my present awareness and link it actively to other events in my life. This is not the past which merely happened, but rather the past as it is remembered. As to the second mode, Merleau-Ponty first calls it “conservation” of the past, only to subsequently criticize this formulation as it relies on the idea of memory-traces or representations residing in some kind of reservoir or collector of past experiences.

Refuting this idea, Merleau-Ponty nevertheless claims that there is the past for us, which exists not in the mode of remembering but in the mode of oblivion.¹²⁰

Once again, the very idea of representation proves to be the main enemy obstructing the comprehension of subjective relations with the past, which makes the past either a mere construction of one's memory or a mere collection of memory-traces. Merleau-Ponty thinks that the truth lies in between these two modes of past-relation and can only be articulated when the idea of representation regarding memory is abandoned altogether. He claims that memory should not be seen as an opposite of forgetting but that it could be elucidated through our relation with a past on the pre-reflective level of embodied existence:

The problem of memory is at dead end as long as we hesitate between memory as preservation and memory as construction. We will always be able to show that consciousness finds in its "representations" only what it has put into them, that memory is thus construction—and that, however, behind the construction there must be another memory which evaluates the products of the first, a past given gratuitously and in inverse ratio to our voluntary memory. The immanence and the transcendence of the past, the activity and the passivity of memory, can only be reconciled if we give up posing the problem in terms of representation. If, to begin with, the present is not a "representation" (*Vorstellung*), but a certain unique position of the index of being in the world; if our relations with the present when it slips into the past, like our relationships with our spatial surroundings, were attributed to a postural schema which keeps in possession and designs a series of positions and temporal possibilities; and if the body is that which in every case answers the question "Where am I and what time is it?" then there would not be this alternative between preservation and construction. Memory would not be the opposite of forgetting, for we would see that true memory is found at the intersection of the two, at the instant in which the recollection which is forgotten and guarded by forgetfulness returns. We would see that explicit recollection and forgetting are two modes of our oblique relation with a past that is present to us only through the determinate emptiness that it leaves in us (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 208–209).

To summarize, there are several important steps clarifying Merleau-Ponty's approach to psychoanalysis and to the problem of the unconscious. First of all, unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology finds itself confronted with the same challenge which was central to the psychoanalytic endeavor and which concerns the issue of consciousness being intransparent to itself and defined as much by its explicit as by its

¹²⁰ "Le passé existe dans le mode de l'oubli" (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 272).

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implicit or latent dimensions. As he puts it: “Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel; much better, they are aiming toward the same *latency*” (Merleau-Ponty 1993, 71). Secondly, Merleau-Ponty believed that the idea of representation obscures the understanding of both consciousness and the unconscious. He aims to overcome this limitation in his theory of operative intentionality, embodiment, and perceptive consciousness. In the perspective opened by these ideas, he features the unconscious as a sedimented practical schema and as the subject’s ambiguity with regard to his own situatedness in the world. And finally, he applies his critique of representationalism to the phenomenon of memory and suggests that the subject’s relation to the past is mediated by forgetting as much as by remembering.

These last two directions in understanding the unconscious (via situated, embodied, perceptive consciousness and via non-representational relations to the past) remain very close to each other within Merleau-Ponty’s thought. The necessary step to bring them together has been accomplished by Thomas Fuchs’ phenomenology of body memory, one of the aims of which is to bring to the fore the basic temporal structure of embodied existence. By analyzing the phenomenon of implicit memory, Fuchs shows that it consists in a different kind of presence of the past than that of the explicit memory. While explicit recollection presumes the presentification of one’s past experiences in a personal autobiographical memory, implicit memory, for its part, cannot be clarified via any kind of representational relation. As embodied subjects we cannot be said to *have* the past as an object, but rather we *are* ourselves this past (Fuchs 2000, 76). This past becomes a modus of one’s bodily existence and stays unnoticed but effective, unseen but present through bodily dispositions, familiarities, habits, unintentional avoidances and omissions.

Body memory serves as a foundation for our personal identity—such an identity which exists beyond explicit memory and narratives we tell about our lives, but instead constitutes the indispensable basis for our self-familiarity. It is *personal* inasmuch as it accumulates experiences and dispositions specific for each particular individual. As Fuchs points out:

The basic continuity of the personal subject [...] emerges not from the store of explicit knowledge about one’s own biography, or from its momentary presentification in memory recall, but rather from a history, which has accumulated and sedimented in body memory and as such remains always implicitly given in every present moment (Fuchs 2015, 28).

The unconscious character of body memory once again is not due to any incarnation of an implicit core of subjectivity behind the back of consciousness in the form of either subconscious psychic or else automatic brain processes. Similar to Merleau-Ponty's views, Fuchs understands the unconscious not in terms of representations or hidden intentionalities but as a sum of bodily dispositions which tacitly define the individual relation to the world and to other people. For instance, a shy person does not need to form representations either consciously or unconsciously, in which her attitude would find its manifestation. Instead, as Fuchs remarks, such a person would exhibit her attitude in her very posture or tone of the voice, in her avoidance to assert herself firmly in front of other people or to risk expressing her opinions in public. In the same vein, in Merleau-Ponty's example, love is described not as relation to a person which could be grasped in a particular object-directed intentionality, but rather as "an existential signification," as a "way the lover establishes his relations with the world" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 401).

Another example can be found in the phenomenon of traumatic experience, which contributes to the phenomenological clarification of the dynamic unconscious. The repressed trauma does not survive as some kind of representation, objective "trace" or "image," which cannot be erased. Instead, it survives "only as a style of being and only to a certain degree of generality" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 85). As Fuchs points out, the influence of past traumatic experiences on a traumatized person manifests itself in resistance and defensive behavior (not necessarily transparent for the person) in situations triggering such unconscious dispositions (Fuchs 2012a, 98). The unconscious influence of traumatic experiences persists not in the form of explicit menacing objects, but as a medium making these objects appear as threatening. The dynamic unconscious is therefore not understood as a reservoir for repressed feelings, thoughts or desires, but as transformations of the lived body and the lived space, which restructure one's field of experience and determine against which background one would see and judge new existential situations and interactions with other people.

By extending the life of consciousness beyond the narrow focus of self-knowledge and present awareness, by bringing the experiencing subject back into the intersubjectively shared world and into the concreteness of its embodied and affective being, the phenomenology of the lived body overcomes the idea of the unconscious as hidden "behind the

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back” of consciousness, and takes it as the practical schema of our bodily being in the world and as the structure of our field of perception. Summarizing this position, Fuchs writes:

[The unconscious] surrounds and permeates conscious life, just as in picture puzzles the figure hidden in the background surrounds the foreground, and just as the lived body conceals itself while functioning. It is an unconscious which is not located in the vertical dimension of the psyche but rather in the horizontal dimension of lived space, most of all lodging in the intercorporeality of dealings with others, as the hidden reverse side of day-to-day living (Fuchs 2012a, 100).

While Bernet claims that the unconscious is the presence of the absent, appearance of the non-appearing, Fuchs develops Merleau-Ponty’s opposing view that the unconscious is “absence in presence, the unperceived in the perceived” (Fuchs 2012a, 101). This absence however is not the concealed or isolated reverse side of consciousness, but rather its own way of being—the sum of incorporated predispositions, habits and the like, which themselves do not appear in any graspable way, but instead constitute a background against which we relate to the world.

Both the above presented approaches to the phenomenological clarification of the unconscious rely on the presupposition that this issue demands a fundamental reconsideration of our idea of consciousness itself. Whether understood in terms of reproductive inner consciousness or through the pre-reflective dimension of embodiment and especially body memory—there is a clear tendency to provide a new way of approaching the basic definitions of consciousness which could account for the unconscious in a non-conflicting way. As I have already pointed out, this idea is consistent with Husserl’s own view. What’s more, in his later texts we can find a relevant outline of the phenomenological theory of the unconscious as founded on the exploration of affective consciousness.

11. The affective unconscious in Husserl's *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* and later manuscripts

Husserl's own most consistent attempt to provide an account of the unconscious hinges upon the level of pre-predicative experience and passive constitution. Similarly to the two previously discussed phenomenological approaches, for Husserl the unconscious is also the problem of consciousness. He decides, however, to work on it against the background of the idea of affectivity and associative syntheses, and not starting from the idea of *cogito* or intentional representation. A sketch of the phenomenological theory of the unconscious can be found in Husserl's *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* and later manuscripts, which are now published in the volume 42 of *Husserliana: Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte, Metaphysik, späte Ethik: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908-1937)*.¹²¹

In my view, there are three important aspects of the affective unconscious in Husserl that should be made explicit here. The first concerns its formal definition in terms of *Grenzphänomen* which designates the unconscious as the zero-level of affective vivacity and features it as relative to the graduality of consciousness. The second corresponds to the idea of the affective past-horizon and the unconscious as "sedimented." The third explores the topic of the affective conflict and Husserl's take on the issue of repression.¹²²

11.1. Zero-point of affective vitality and the unconscious as *Grenzphänomen*

The first and the most basic sense of the unconscious for Husserl is the non-vivacity as opposed to different degrees of vivacity of consciousness.

¹²¹ As for secondary literature, the topic of the affective unconscious as elaborated by Husserl in the *Analyses* has been discussed in Aaron Mishara's article *Husserl and Freud: Time, memory and the unconscious* (Mishara 1990), as well as in parts of Bruce Bégout's book *La généalogie de la logique: Husserl, l'antépédicatif et le catégorial* (Bégout 2000).

¹²² An important aspect of this topic, namely the one that concerns drives and instincts, will as such be absent from the current interpretation. However, it is essential to Husserl's analyses of association and affectivity and thereby makes up part of what I designate here as the affective unconscious.

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In the *Analyses*, Husserl employs several metaphors to describe this. Some of them, as Aaron Mishara illustrates (Mishara 1990, 36), evoke images from the German Romantic literary tradition, such as those of the “nightfall” or the “night of the unconscious.” Nicolas de Warren underlines Husserl’s employment of wakefulness and sleep as metaphors for transformations of time-consciousness, where de-presentification in retention and loss of “intuitivity” are seen as analogous to “falling asleep” (de Warren 2010). Other terms are used to feature the unconscious as the underworld, the realm of death and sleep. Closely related to these metaphors are the archeological images of sedimentation.¹²³ Other expressions play with the psychological and even psychophysical vocabulary of the time and situate Husserl’s notion of the unconscious at the threshold of affective intensity. The difference between conscious and unconscious is grasped in terms of foreground/background differentiations and in reference to affective power and powerlessness (*Kraftlosigkeit*). The mathematical vocabulary provided Husserl with another useful term for the unconscious as the zero level of vivacity and an “affective zero-horizon” (*affektiver Nullhorizont*) (Husserl 2001a, 216/167).

What brings these different metaphors and analogies together is an attempt to situate the unconscious at the border of the affective vivacity of consciousness. Such a border, however, is not something that exists objectively, which could be measured or determined in quantitative terms. Moreover, Husserl does not need to suggest any functional relation between the intensity of conscious representations and the intensity of physical phenomena,¹²⁴ since from the start he attributes intensity or vivacity to consciousness itself and not to its content.

[The unconscious] designates the nil of this vivacity of consciousness and, as will be shown, is in no way a nothing: A nothing only with respect to affective force and therefore with respect to those accomplishments that presuppose precisely a positively valued affectivity (above the zero-point). It is thus not a matter of a “zero” like a nil in the inten-

¹²³ All those metaphors get mixed in Husserl’s descriptions, as for instance : “...every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes *sedimented* in the *realm of the dead*, or rather, *dormant horizontal sphere*, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the *head*, the living process receives *new, original life*, at the *feet*, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentive synthesis becomes *steadily sedimented*” (Husserl 2001a, 227) – my emphasis.

¹²⁴ Cf. Brentano’s discussion on the intensity of presentations and the question of the unconscious in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Brentano 1973).

sity of qualitative moments, e.g., in intensity of sound, since by this we mean that the sound has ceased altogether (Husserl 2001a, 216).

The unconscious in Husserl is clearly a concept founded on the idea of *affective graduality of consciousness* and designates the zero-level of affective vivacity. However, the unconscious in this sense is by no means an opposite of consciousness, but is necessarily relative to it. It should be noticed that this formulation makes of the unconscious a *Grenzphänomen* and does not contribute to the substantial definition of the phenomenon. However, based on this general definition, Husserl succeeds—if not in fully developing a phenomenological account of the unconscious—at least in sketching several directions of its possible elaboration.

According to Mishara, there are two different types of the unconscious which can be separated here: the pre-affective unconscious in the impressional sphere of consciousness and the unconscious as the sphere of forgetfulness and the remote past (Mishara 1990). In Husserl, this distinction can be found in the appendix 22 to § 35 of the *Analyses* (Husserl 2001a, 525). The pre-affective unconscious mostly designates all the multiplicity of affective tendencies which do not reach the ego's awareness and thereby stay in the background against which prominent tendencies come to be differentiated.¹²⁵ In my view, this sense of the unconscious as pre-affective should rather be called pre-conscious and distinguished from the proper unconscious which refers to the past-horizon.¹²⁶ Later, this distinction is further clarified by Husserl by differentiating the sphere of the affective past-horizon and of “sedimentation,” on the one hand, and the pre-affective background, on the other hand. The term “unconscious” was then reserved for the sedimented: “there are no other unconscious backgrounds than those of sedimentation” (Husserl 2014, 37).

¹²⁵ “Affective syntheses are those that reach consciousness, ‘penetrating’ the topological surface as the highest peaks of the relief structure. ‘Preaffective’ syntheses are those, which at any given moment, do not ‘penetrate’ to egoic awareness. They form the valleys and the background relative to the ‘raised saliency’ (*Abhebung*) of the more prominent figures” (Mishara 1990, 39). And in Husserl: “Something that is given as unconscious here would be something that is not grasped and that toward which the ego does not let itself to be drawn even one step of the way. Something forgotten however is something that no longer has any prominence” (Husserl 2001a, 525)

¹²⁶ In what follows, I will restrict my analyses to the unconscious in this last sense.

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Thus, in order to understand Husserl's idea of the unconscious in this sense, we need to focus on the three following notions: background consciousness, past-horizon, and sedimentation. These clarifications will allow to go beyond merely formal definition of the unconscious as *Grenzphänomen* and to make explicit the important link between the problem of the unconscious and the problem of memory.

11.2. Affective past-horizon and the unconscious as "sedimented"

The past is a real stumbling block for any theory of memory which seeks not only to explain processes of retention and remembering but equally to understand how the past experience can be preserved so that it can be brought back to awareness. Merleau-Ponty pinpoints a certain paradox here, consisting in the fact that any idea of past-preservation already presumes that this past should be present in some peculiar way (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 436). Husserl successfully deals with this paradox in the case of retention which serves the double purpose of being past in the present and preservation of this present at the same time. The same goes for remembering which, by definition, is a *presentification* of the past. Only the remote past, the sphere of forgetfulness and sedimentation, appears to have this status of inexplicable absence: it is nowhere to be found, it does not appear in any way, and yet it must be somehow preserved since it affects our present life implicitly and can be reawakened in the explicit memory.

It is almost impossible to avoid this paradox within the frame of the temporal analytics of consciousness since this paradox itself belongs to the temporal order. As long as an approach to the problem of the past exclusively based on its temporal distance is chosen, this inconsistency is inevitable and there is no option but formulating a theory which makes the existence of this past in the form of neural traces or even unconscious representations plausible. In this perspective, the past becomes necessarily transcendent to the present life of consciousness.¹²⁷ However, as already argued in the previous section, the presence of the remote past and its effectiveness in nearly any domain of one's present life, can be approached without necessarily conceiving of it in terms of

¹²⁷ In the same vein, the issue of personal identity revolves around the question of identity between past or future self as transcendent for the present self.

hidden representations, but rather as an implicit dimension incorporated in one's way of being. Both Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs appeal to this dimension in terms of one's personal history as sedimented in the living body and the way it inhabits its space. Husserl also developed an idea of sedimentation and the remote past which served the purpose to solve the mentioned paradox and to explain how the "sphere of forgetfulness" can remain connected with the present life of consciousness.

In order to do so, Husserl speaks of the constitution of the past in terms of *horizon*, which makes the inclusion of the past in the sphere of living present possible only in its potentiality and not in its actuality. This potentiality of the past-horizon is made possible thanks to the retentive structure of consciousness in its double—affective and temporal—meaning as well as thanks to the fact that near retention belongs to the impressional present which serves as a source of all affective force.

The past-horizon is further divided into spheres of close past, as "the near horizon, and the realm of the retention that is still living" (Husserl 2001a, 529), and the horizon of the distant past or "empty horizon," as "the forgotten' that carries on the differentiated retentive path of the past" (Ibid). This retentive path is carried on into an indeterminate empty horizon, that Husserl describes as "dead horizon," "endless past," "sphere of forgetfulness" (Husserl 2001a, 513), and finally as the unconscious: "this is original forgetfulness, the retentive element that has become 'unconscious,' the just past that has become unconscious" (Husserl 2001a, 525).¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Similarly, in her analyses on retention in Husserl, Rodemeyer distinguishes between "near" and "far" retention (Rodemeyer 2006, 88-91). Whereas the former is involved in the constitution of the living present, the latter designates what is here called the distant past-horizon. In Rodemeyer, the past is thematized in the perspective of the temporal analytics of consciousness. Here, I am focusing instead on the affective dimension of subjectivity and memory. Based on their use made by Husserl, both terms "far (distant) retention" and the horizon of the distant past (or past-horizon) are very close to each other: "[...] everything that is retentive turns into the undifferentiated unity of the distant retention [*Fernretention*] of the one distant horizon, which extinguishes all differentiations" (Husserl 2001a, 422). Sometimes he even combines these two terms into "the distant horizon of retention" (Ibid, 418). In my work, I prefer maintaining this distinction in terms of retention and "past-horizon" (instead of distinguishing between near and far retention) for several reasons. First, this terminological choice allows to overcome all possible confusion between "near" and "far" types of retention, while preserving the sense of retention for the continuous temporal modification of the living present into the just-past. Secondly, it allows to clearly preserve Husserl's own difficulties regarding the extent of the retentive pro-

The horizon of the distant past presents a serious problem for the idea of temporal continuity of consciousness because it presumes the extension of the retentional process beyond the point where this process itself is finished. On the one hand, the distant past is constantly present “since the ‘distance’ is there precisely as a horizon in the present at all times” (Husserl 2001a, 533), but on the other hand, it is the unconscious as sedimented history which goes beyond temporal modifications: “The past is finished time (*erledigte Zeit*), the finished duration [...]” (Husserl 2001a, 520). Husserl asserts that the retentional process ceases and sinks into the atemporal unconscious.¹²⁹

How can one then make sense of this horizon of the empty past and the unconscious which became temporally atemporal? An important aspect of Husserl’s solution to this issue consists in considering this remote past-horizon not exclusively in terms of its temporal constitution but as an “affective horizon,”—that is as constituted essentially through modifications of the affective vivacity of consciousness. As already argued in § 8.4, retention is not only a matter of temporal modification but designates equally the loss of affective vivacity. Thus, the constitution of the affective past-horizon is above all a function of affective modification in retention. The past-horizon is therefore a horizon of affective gradations, which extends from its peak in the impressional present to the less and less affective retentional past until it reaches the point of ineffectiveness.

Accordingly, the end is completely undifferentiated; its lack of differentiation arises from complete powerlessness of affection. By every retentional procession losing its affective force in the process of change

cess. For him, retention presupposes, in the first place, a “connection to the immediate realm of the present” (Ibid, 416), whereas the distant “submerged” past exceeds the process of retentional modification. Husserl underlines that the retentional process stops at some point and gets transformed into the sphere of sedimented unconscious. This sedimented distant past constitutes the core of the past-horizon. Finally, the use of the term “past-horizon” instead of “far retention” allows to overcome the merely temporal aspects of the constitution of the past. The term “past-horizon,” therefore, is conceptually more suggestive and allows accounting for not merely temporal, but also “unconscious” and affective aspects of the distant past, as well as underlying its horizontal connectedness with the present.

¹²⁹“Earlier I thought that this retentional streaming and the constitution of the past would continue to go on incessantly even within complete obscurity. But now it seems to me that one can dispense with this hypothesis. The process itself ceases. [...] this retentional modification leads further and further into the one nil” (Husserl 2001a, 226).

it itself becomes dead, it can no longer progress by fusing under prominence; for positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life in dynamic connection and differentiation; if it is decreased to zero, its life ceases, precisely in its vivacity (Husserl 2001a, 219).

The retentive modification, as Husserl underlines repeatedly, is a transformation of consciousness itself, consisting of changing modes of temporal appearances as well as in the affective depleting of the original impressions. However, the retentive process is not only depleting and “clouding over,” but it is equally a process of identification, inasmuch as it is the conservation of noematic senses of objects. “And when there is no affection coming from the diverse objects, then these diverse objects have slipped into sheer nightfall, in a special sense, they have slipped into the unconscious” (Husserl 2001a, 221). This “nightfall,” however, is not nothing: all noematic senses are preserved there, but in such a peculiar and undifferentiated manner that prevents them from reaching conscious awareness.

Husserl underlines that “what is given to consciousness is continuously the same, but it is pushed back further and further into the past” (Husserl 2001a, 217). Thus, on the one hand, the retentive process is a process of identification securing the sameness of objective senses. On the other hand, it is a process of affective depleting and temporal modification. It means that an objective sense’s temporal mode changes, loses its affective impact on the impressional present and yet the sense itself is not altered in these transformations. A song heard yesterday is still the same song, even if it no longer belongs to one’s actual field of experience. “In the fading away, the tone itself thus does not lose anything that it originally was; if it is given at the end as completely empty of differences with respect to content, then this concerns its mode of givenness, not it itself” (Husserl 2001a, 220). Such a transformation of the mode of givenness consists in a shift “from an explicit sense to an implicit sense” (Husserl 2001a, 223). Moreover, empty presentations themselves cannot be described in terms of representational or explicit intentionality. The object-directedness in the past is therefore grasped as “implicit intentionality” (Husserl 2001a, 222), which can be reawakened and brought back to intuitive presentation, but which as such is in no way an actual objectifying intention.

Now, a self-imposing question needs to be answered on how this affectively depleted and temporally distant past can be reawakened again. Husserl claims that the unconscious past-horizon is a necessary condi-

tion for affective awakening and the latter is a prerequisite for remembering: “Awakening is possible because the constituted sense is actually implied in background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness” (Husserl 2001a, 228). In the process of awakening of the distant past, an affectively discharged, sedimented sense “emerges” from out of the “fog” and “what is implicit becomes explicit once more” (Husserl 2001a, 223–224). Such an awakening is a product of affective communication¹³⁰ and therefore a product of associative synthesis.

Affective awakening of the past and remembering are two closely related phenomena, which, however, should not be identified. While the first is essentially a phenomenon of affective nature, by means of which a past sense regains its affective force, the latter is an act of intuitive presentification, in which a sense becomes the object of an explicit intention. “The affective awakening,”—as Husserl remarks—“does not bring the uniform sense to intuition [...], but does indeed effect an un-uncovering” (Husserl 2001a, 225). Not all affectively awakened senses become actual intuitions or recollections, most of them never reach this level. In this sense, remembering is the transition of an awakened empty presentation in reproductive intuition. Without this awakening no remembering would be ever possible.

Thus, remembering is a modification of the mode of givenness of an objective sense and thereby of consciousness itself, and so is the retention: the latter changes the impressional consciousness into an undifferentiated past-horizon, the former transforms it into reproductive consciousness of the past. As one might remember, Bernet claims that such a reproductive consciousness itself can be understood as unconscious representation. However, in Husserl, the unconscious does not correspond to reproduction, but rather to this undifferentiated consciousness of the past-horizon. Moreover, I think it is consistent to claim that this consciousness is by no means a representational or an intentional one, but is an affective consciousness of the indistinct horizon of the past, which Husserl also calls background-consciousness.

One may well say that within the zero-stage, all special affections have passed over into a general indifferenced affection; all special consciousnesses have passed over into one, general, persistently *available*

¹³⁰ “Affective communication would mean that every contribution of affective force by any ‘member’ of something connected in distance through homogeneity and prominence augments the force of all its ‘comrades’” (Husserl 2001a, 224).

Chapter III. Affective memory and the unconscious

background-consciousness of our past, the consciousness of the completely unarticulated, completely indistinct horizon of the past, which brings to a close the living, moving retentional past (my emphasis – A. K.) (Husserl 2001a, 220).

In this sense, the past and all its content is preserved as a “horizon,” temporally and affectively relative to the impressional consciousness. This past, therefore, is not anywhere (as some kind of container or trace): it is at the same time now and not-now: “...it is the past given to consciousness as empty of content, a past of something that is still in the process of the constitutive becoming in its ever new present” (Husserl 2001a, 219).

[...] every accomplishment of the living presence, that is, every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented in the realm of the dead, or rather, dormant horizontal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the head, the living process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis becomes steadily sedimented (Husserl 2001a, 227).

Accordingly, the preliminary conclusion can be drawn that there are two main modes of our relation to the past: the remembered past, in which it becomes an object of explicit recollection, and the affective past, which is present as an affective horizon and as a sphere of sedimentation and forgetfulness. In this latter perspective, the past has no other reality which could be attributed to it besides affective reality, relative to one’s impressional present. In the *Analyses* as well as in later manuscripts, Husserl clarifies it as a sphere of unconscious sedimentation (*Sedimentierung*), whose affective status is always dependent on the actual impressional experience.

Man darf sich da nicht einen festen Vergangenheitshorizont vorstellen, einfach bestimmt durch eine gewisse subjektive Entfernung von der impressionalen Gegenwart. Es ist dabei zu bedenken, dass, wie gesagt, das Impressionale, die Wahrnehmungsgegenwart als solche nicht allzeit gleiche Kraft haben kann und nicht alles darin impressional Abgehobene notwendig affektiv sein muss (Husserl 2014, 40).

The idea of the unconscious as the past-horizon constituted through affective and temporal modifications is closely linked to the idea of its ineffectiveness. If, as Husserl insists, “positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life” (Husserl 2001a, 219), and if the affective

11. The affective unconscious in Husserl

vivacity of the unconscious is close to zero, then its affective impact must be fully dependent on the conditions of the present subjective experience. And indeed, this seems to be exactly what Husserl implies claiming that the affective reinforcement for the awakening of past senses must always come from the living present, as well as from dispositions and motivations inherent to it.

Although this position is arguably justified as it comes to the general conditions of affectivity (if the living present is completely empty and lifeless no communication with the past is possible), it nevertheless causes some trouble regarding the affective status of the past itself. Moreover, the reality of our subjective experience may cast some doubts on Husserl's view. The riddle of the past asserts its importance not because it has lost its impact on our present life but precisely because it has not. There are past experiences, which however temporally distant remain constantly affectively present to us, even if their influence as such remains unnoticed. Also the distinction between the sedimented, as characteristic of the distant past, and the totality of non-sedimented, as characteristic of the living present (Husserl 2014, 37), might appear contradictory. There is indeed a level of implicit and sedimented experience which by no means can be called unconscious as ineffective and dead for us. In what follows, I shall investigate the possibility to account for this issue within Husserl's own approach. Notably, his deliberations concerning repression and affective conflict come in handy and thereby allow me to draw some more explicit connections between the psychoanalytical and phenomenological approaches to the unconscious.

11.3. Affective conflict and the unconscious as repressed

One of the radical differences between Freud's and Husserl's theories of the unconscious concerns the affective status of the past and its capacity to affect the present. While for Husserl the unconscious corresponds to the zero level of affective intensity, it is the affective capacity of the unconscious which plays the major role for Freud. The main reason for taking the unconscious as ineffective and incapable of exercising any influence on the present consciousness lies in the very idea which specifies the unconscious as a frontier and the final point of modification and vitality.

However, Husserl also outlined other directions of enquiry concerning the affective status of the remote past and the sphere of forgetfulness. Already in the Appendix 19 to the *Analyses*, he questions the possible development of affections as “progressing” or “rousing from the unconscious” (Husserl 2001a, 518–519). In order to understand this line of thought, it is fruitful to address Husserl’s take on the issue of affective suppression.

First of all, in the *Analyses*, Husserl approaches suppression of affective tendencies as a function of contrast. In general, contrast delineates the affective relation between opposite or antagonistic tendencies. The highest form of contrast is affective conflict: “Contrast is the affective unification of opposites [...] Rivalry, conflict, is the dissension of opposite things” (Husserl 2001a, 514). The applications of the principle of contrast are quite broad. On the one hand, association of contrast can lead to the increase of affective intensity of affectively unified opposite terms. Husserl’s examples include the augmentation of the vivacity of the whole (a string of lights, a melody) by means of contrast between parts, so that a louder tone makes a softer one more noticeable, or a sudden change in brightness of a particular light influences the noticeability of the whole string. On the other hand, contrast in the form of affective conflict can lead to the suppression of concurrent affections, especially if they are not integrally cohesive (Husserl 2001a, 514). Interestingly, such suppression can equally result in an increase of affective vivacity which in this case is confined to the unconscious:

In this case, a special repression takes place, a repression of elements, which were previously in conflict, into the ‘unconscious,’ but not into the integrally cohesive sphere of the distant past; by contrast, in the living conflict, repression takes place as a suppression, as a suppression into non-intuitiveness, but not into non-vivacity—on the contrary, the vivacity gets augmented in the conflict, as analogous to other contrasts (Husserl 2001a, 514–515).

To a certain extent, the concurrence of affective tendencies which Husserl describes as pertaining to the affective relief of the living present is already a case of suppression and affective conflict: stronger affective tendencies win over their weaker counterparts and suppress them into the background. Moreover, any retentional modification also presupposes suppression of other affections which gradually lose their affective impact. However, as it can be seen in the above cited quote, Husserl also

has something more specific in mind. Affective conflict suppresses the affective tendencies in the unconscious, but in such a way that the affective vivacity of these tendencies increase instead of diminish. In this case, affection which is “winning out does not annihilate the other ones, but suppresses them” (Husserl 2001a, 518) and this suppression has a reverse effect on vivacity of contrasted affections. In this passage, Husserl underlines that repressed elements sink into the unconscious. However, this is not the unconscious in the sense of cohesive, undifferentiated past that has lost its affective impact. Husserl’s version of the “repressed” unconscious is alive and has its own affectivity which even imply that affections can evolve or progress from it.

Whether Husserl ultimately meant to separate these two versions of the unconscious—as undifferentiated past-horizon and as repressed—cannot be elucidated on the basis of his texts. Nevertheless, the fact that he was aware of the challenge that repression presents to the phenomenological theory of the unconscious is clear. Not accidental in this sense is the way he approaches it, seeing the repressed unconscious more as an open question than a solution:

Affections can play to each other’s advantage here, but they can also disturb one another. An affection, like that of extreme contrast (‘unbearable pain’) can suppress all other affections, or most of them [...]—this can mean to reduce to an affective zero—but is there not also a suppression of the affection in which the affection is repressed or covered over, but is still present, and is that not constantly in question here?” (Husserl 2001a, 518).¹³¹

It was clear to Husserl that repressed affections do not lose their affective vivacity and can even evolve from the unconscious. Not accidentally, he sees the question of repressed affects as one closely related to Freud’s psychoanalysis.¹³² In Husserl’s opinion, the phenomenological clarification of instinctual drives and repressed affections can contribute

¹³¹ A similar line of thought returns in the later manuscripts (1934), in which Husserl comes to thematize another kind of affective conflict—the one that belongs to the sphere of drives (*Triebe*) and affects (*Affekte*). In the Appendix XIV entitled “*Eingeklemmter Affekt*,” he notes that the intensity of desire is increased not only in an actual turning of one’s attention towards the object of such desire but also in the opposite case, when one’s desire is ignored and repressed (Husserl 2014, 112).

¹³² When he claims, for instance: “Alles Verdeckte, jede verdeckte Geltung fungiert mit assoziativer und apperzeptiver Tiefe, was die Freud’sche Methode ermöglicht und voraussetzt” (Husserl 2014, 113).

to the eidetic (as opposed to merely subjective) analyses of the unconscious which were first brought to light by the psychoanalytic approach (Husserl 2014, 126).

Bégout, who first linked these fragments from Husserl's later manuscripts to the question of affective efficacy of the past, believes that this might prove that Husserl's view on the affectivity of the past is not uniform. He writes in this regard:

In fact, Husserl develops the decisive idea according to which the repressed affections do not lose, contrary to what one might have thought, their affective validity and effectiveness. Indeed, repression of an affection by another affection privileged by the self, does not nullify its affective force (my translation – A. K.) (Bégout 2000, 187–188).

Bégout suggests distinguishing between on the one hand the retentional process, which corresponds to the constitution of the distant past as devoid of affective force, and on the other hand the process of repression, which also leads to non-intuitivity of the past but maintains affective vivacity of the repressed tendencies (Bégout 2000, 216). In a similar vein, when Nicholas Smith addresses the topic of the repressed unconscious in Husserl's work, he also underlines this double destiny of affective modification in retention. Notably, he shows how Husserl's analysis of the perseverance of sedimented experiences, especially in the sphere of drives and feelings, contributes to understanding the repressed unconscious through the lens of genetic phenomenology (N. Smith 2010, 228-241).

The phenomenon of repression illustrates that the past cannot be reduced only to temporally modified and obscure experience. Quite the contrary, seeing the past from the perspective opened up by analyses of affectivity allows accounting for essential differences in the way that it maintains connections to the living present. In this sense, it is plausible to accept the zero-affectivity of the past-horizon and repressed affectivity as *two main types of affective modification*, both of which contribute to the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious.

To summarize, there are several important points clarifying conception of the unconscious that emerges from Husserl analyses of passive synthesis. First, Husserl approaches the unconscious not in terms of cognitive or intentional structure, but as a phenomenon belonging to the affective order of subjective constitution. Husserl's idea of affectivity as constitutive dimension of subjectivity paves the way to seeing consciousness and the unconscious not as mutually

exclusive phenomena but as different levels on the scale of affective intensity. Secondly, Husserl develops his understanding of the affective unconscious as the sphere of sedimented past, horizontally connected to the living present. Concept of the affective past-horizon designates a particular mode of givenness of the past and intends to account for the connectedness between the present and the past life of consciousness which exists beyond the level of explicit memory and underlies the possibility of retroactive affective awakening. Finally, Husserl's inquiries into the topic of affective conflict and the issue of repression allow enriching his idea of affective modification and thereby contribute to a phenomenological clarification of the affective vivacity of the past.

As previously shown, all three discussed phenomenological accounts of the unconscious explicitly link this issue to the problem of memory. In Bernet, the unconscious mode of presentation is approached via the analyses of phantasy and reproductive consciousness. In Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs, it is the idea of non-representational past experience and the phenomenon of body memory which play a crucial role. And in Husserl, the topics of the affective past-horizon and of the affective conflict come prominently to the fore of phenomenological analyses. The discussion on memory, especially as portrayed in these last two accounts, clearly shows that this phenomenon cannot be limited to its representational or explicit form and demands a different understanding of past experience—an understanding that connects the past and the present life of consciousness on the implicit, immanent level, and allows to grasp the affective, non-representational presence of the past. In what follows, I am going to explore this implicit dimension of memory by inquiring into psychological and phenomenological approaches to the phenomenon. This new turn means leaving the purely phenomenological scene for a moment and looking at the same problem from a different angle.

12. Affective memory: A phenomenological account of implicit memory

Implicit memory is a topic of great importance in both psychological and philosophical investigations and one attracting increasing interest in contemporary research. It is important to note that the term “implicit memory” refers to not just one but different phenomena. The distinctive mark which allows describing memory as implicit presupposes two related moments: the detectable influence of past experiences, and the absence of explicit recollection of these experiences. For example, one of the most prominent researchers in this field, Daniel Schacter claims that the term implicit memory is applied “when people are influenced by a past experience without any awareness that they are remembering” (Schacter 1996, 161). Unsurprisingly, such a broad definition allows the inclusion of different types of unconscious memory in the equation. It is not an exaggeration to say that most of our everyday life is influenced by what we have learned, seen or heard before, while only a relatively small part of our past reaches the level of explicit remembering. In this perspective, explicit conscious recollection appears to be rather a rare and energy consuming activity, which can only partially account for the way our lives are defined and influenced by memory.

Despite the distinctively broad range of phenomena which appear to belong to implicit cognition, it is still a difficult task to come up with a convincing conceptualization and categorization which would be valuable both on the descriptive and explanatory levels. One of the reasons for this has something to do with the “negative” element in the definition of implicit memory, which has always been explored by contrast to “normal,” i.e. explicit, cognition. Similarly to mind and subjectivity, memory has been tackled as a predominantly cognitive phenomenon, open to internal observation and eventually even quantifiable by suitable research approaches. Implicit memory, in this perspective, is an elusive phenomenon by definition: if one is not aware of remembering, then one cannot be said to remember at all.

The history of philosophical thought, clinical observations, and experimental research on the topic shows that theories of implicit memory have been developed by consistently separating it from memory as self-knowledge and by including different phenomena in the equation on an *ad hoc* basis. For instance, the first approaches to what is now clarified as

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implicit memory concerned the area where the rational and self-reflective mind have no say—namely the body’s own workings and organization. In this perspective, implicit memory was conceived primarily as body memory (*mémoire corporelle*), preserved in our *physical* body (Summa 2014b, 296). One of the first references to this kind of implicit memory can be found in Descartes, who in a letter to Mersenne mentions that memory can be preserved in body’s muscles and nerves, as in a lute player who “has a part of memory in his hands” (Casey 1987, 146). The idea of body memory receives an important elaboration in both Maine de Biran (Maine de Biran 1954) and Bergson’s (Bergson 1946) philosophical endeavors. Both thinkers greatly contribute to the understanding of habitual memory, which they isolated from representational forms of remembering. This direction is crucial in the philosophical explorations of implicit memory, and lays the ground for the phenomenological theories of body memory, inspired by Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 2012) and developed by Thomas Fuchs (Fuchs 2012a, 2000, 2012b), Edward Casey (Casey 1984, 1987), and Michela Summa (Summa 2011, 2014b).

Thus, up to a certain point, there was only one particular type of implicit memory which attracted the attention of philosophers, namely memory enacted through physical body and bodily habits. This type of memory is best exemplified by the performance of bodily skills involved in any kind of habitual bodily movements: walking, riding a bicycle, swimming and so on. According to the psychological research, this type of memory is usually referred to as procedural memory, or “knowing how,” as opposed to “knowing that.” Despite the importance of procedural memory for the psychological account and of habitual body memory for the philosophical approach to implicit memory, it should be made clear that the true breakthrough in the studies on implicit memory occurred in relation to somewhat different phenomena. Within phenomenological philosophy, a significant development was achieved by the elaboration of the very idea of the lived body, which allowed to considerably widen the scope of body memory and to include situational, intercorporeal, and traumatic memory (Fuchs 2012b). Similarly, research on implicit memory in cognitive psychology has shown that its influence extends beyond mere bodily or perceptual experience and includes feelings, behavior, conceptual thinking, and the interaction with other people. It is precisely this perspective that justifies the position of implicit memory as a constitutive dimension of the pre-reflective self-experience, and thereby puts it in the center of the current research.

12.1. Implicit memory in psychological research

Most the empirical research on implicit memory comes from studies on and observations of amnesic patients. One of the first documented cases of implicit memory was recorded in 1889 by Russian psychiatrist, Sergei Korsakoff, in his paper *Étude médico-psychologique sur une forme des maladies de la mémoire* (Korsakoff 1889). Already in this short article, Korsakoff distinguishes several fascinating features of memory preservation in patients with severe anterograde amnesia induced by alcoholic intoxication. Apart from the already mentioned procedural or bodily memory preservation, there are two other phenomena that attract Korsakoff's attention and that subsequently become of great importance for the experimental research on implicit memory and for the very conceptualization of it. The first concerns the patient's capacity to correctly guess information in absence of any explicit recall:

What first strikes us is the fact that, even though the patient has no memory of traces of the impressions that he receives, these traces persist and probably influence, in some way, his unconscious intellectual activity. This seems the only way that we can explain the knowledge he exhibits in some cases. Two patients who had not met me before their condition always guessed that I was a doctor even though, every time they saw me, they categorically insisted that it was the very first time. Here is another case: I was giving a patient electroshocks with Spamer's machine. Every time I asked him what I would do to him he remained perplexed and answered that he did not know. I would urge him to look at the table where the case that enclosed the machine was placed. Then he told me that I was probably here to give him electroshocks. I know that he had only encountered this machine during his illness. Consequently, if he had not retained some trace of memory of the case containing the machine, he could not have guessed so quickly. Then it so happens sometimes that we enter a patient's room for the first time, he extends his hand, and says hello. When we leave the room for two or three minutes and then reenter, the patient does not say hello again. And if we ask him if he has met us before, he denies it. Meanwhile, we can observe in his behavior certain traces of past encounters in his soul and their effect on his intellectual activity (Korsakoff 1996, 9).

In the above quoted examples, one can notice that the influence of unconscious memories extends beyond the mere performance of body skills and includes conceptual thinking, attitudes, and behavior towards other people. Another feature which attracts Korsakoff's attention concerns the retention of feelings for forgotten events:

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Often, a rather interesting phenomenon occurs, when it seems all external perceptions and intellectual processes that took place in the brain have disappeared, some of the patients nevertheless seem to remember feelings that were evoked. When we observe how a patient conceives of a given object, we realize that the image of the object has disappeared from memory and that seeing the object does not remind the patient that he has seen it before. Instead the patient experiences an echo of the feeling first aroused by the object. This phenomenon also takes place with patients' treatment of people encountered during their illness. They do not recognize them and always think that they are meeting them for the first time; nevertheless, some people always seem to be sympathetic, and others not. The same thing applies to objects; one patient hated "electrolysis" sessions, and as soon as he saw an electrical machine, he was momentarily in a bad mood, even though he insisted that it was the first time that I was to treat him with it. I think that the only way to explain this phenomenon is to say that the memory of emotions lasts much longer than that of images (Korsakoff 1996, 9-10).

Similar observations were made by French psychiatrist Edouard Claparède about twenty years later in a 1911 paper "Recognition and Selfhood" (Claparède 1995, 1911), in which he describes the famous case of an amnesic woman diagnosed with Korsakoff syndrome. Similarly to Korsakoff himself, Claparède comments on the dissociations between explicit and implicit memory and illustrates his views with a now famous "experiment" he conducted on the patient: while shaking hands he stuck her with a pin hidden between his fingers. Even though she forgot the incident almost instantly, the patient refused to shake hands with doctor Claparède anymore reasoning on that occasion that "sometimes pins are hidden in people's hands" (Claparède 1995).

Subsequent researches not only confirmed Korsakoff's and Claparède's observations, but significantly widened the evidence supporting the existence of implicit memory. Interestingly, the groups of phenomena stayed almost exactly the same, but the body of research and conceptual definitions evolved significantly. For instance, Korsakoff's first observation about correct guesses in absence of explicit remembering was overwhelmingly studied in several experiments with both amnesic and normal subjects and has now received the prominent name of "priming."¹³³ In tests on word-fragment identification and word-stem completion (cued recall¹³⁴), which were designed as word guessing games, it was shown

¹³³ For review see: (Schacter et al. 1993; Schacter 1987; Roediger 1990; Shimamura 1986).

¹³⁴ Note that "cued recall" is an implicit memory test, whereas "recognition" and "free recall" are considered to be explicit memory tests.

that amnesic patients performed not only above chance level but also as good as control subjects (Weiskrantz and Warrington 1970). The basic hypothesis consists in stating that the so-called *priming effect* occurs independently of explicit memory tasks (such as recognition and free recall) and therefore constitutes the basis for independent memory processes. Priming means that the “performance can be facilitated or biased by recently encountered information” (Shimamura 1986, 94). It is presumed that this information needs not be consciously available for a person. Thus, in amnesic patients, the priming effect seems to be preserved despite the decline in explicit memory functions. The priming effect and its dissociation from explicit memory have also been observed in normal subjects confirming the researchers’ differentiation between implicit and explicit memory systems (Graf and Schacter 1985).

Priming effects on memory belong to the most experimentally studied part of implicit memory. However, as Schacter points out, priming is not restricted only to perceptual priming of words and objects, but can be extended to include conceptual priming, which has important consequences for the understanding of such topics as the formation of attitudes, gender and racial biases (Schacter 1996, 187-190). For instance, interpreting ambiguous behavior can be influenced by prior exposure to hostile concepts without subjects being aware of these effects taking place (Srull and Wyer 1979). Drawing from these type of experiments, Smith and Branscombe claimed that the phenomenon of category accessibility in social cognition can be seen as priming in person perception and hence as a form of implicit memory (E. R. Smith and Branscombe 1988).

A second important direction in the studies on implicit memory concerned the phenomenon of *implicit learning*, especially learning of new perceptual and motor skills, also known under the term of procedural memory, or “knowing how.” For example, in Milner’s and Corkin’s studies on the famous H. M. patient, it was shown that despite profound amnesia, the patient’s learning and retaining of motor skills were comparable to that of normal subjects (Corkin 1968; Milner et al. 1968). Cohen and Squire’s experiments confirm similar results for the learning of perceptual skills, such as learning how to read mirror-image versions of words (Cohen and Squire 1980). Although priming is sometimes seen as a part of procedural memory (Roediger 1990), Schacter underlines that implicit skill learning seems to be independent from priming and related to a different brain system (Schacter 1996). In this sense, it is more convenient to see priming and procedural skill learning as different types of implicit memory.

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The third group of phenomena involved in studying implicit memory concerns the *memory of emotions*.¹³⁵ Both Claparède's and Korsakoff's patients revealed something interesting in this regard. A long series of observational and experimental studies confirmed that amnesic patients preserve their attitudes and affections towards other people even if they have no explicit recollections of ever encountering them. For instance, the dissociation between implicitly preserved emotional preferences and explicit memory is shown in the case of the so-called Boswell patient (Damasio 1989). In the experiment, three researchers behave towards the patient in "good," "bad," or "neutral" ways. Consequently, when presented with their pictures paired with pictures of unfamiliar people, the patient consistently chose the "good guy" over the "bad" one and over unfamiliar people. Similarly, in a study by Johnson and colleagues, amnesic patients presented with fictional biographical information portraying one person as a "good guy" and the other as a "bad guy," developed affective preferences that were preserved over the twenty days retention interval even if they could not remember explicitly any reason for holding such preferences (Johnson et al. 1985).

Another important line of research contributing to the understanding of the emotional component of implicit memory comes from the research on dementia. In several studies, it has been shown that people with Alzheimer's disease can form emotional memories and show signs of their influence beyond any explicit recollection (Blessing et al. 2006; Guzmán-Vélez et al. 2014). These and similar findings have an important impact on the understanding of personal identity and selfhood in dementia and other amnesias as they show to what extent one's dispositions, emotions, and personal history are preserved despite the apparent decline in declarative memory functions.¹³⁶

From this short review of the psychological research on implicit memory, it can be concluded that priming and learning of skills constitute the core of this approach to the phenomenon. Emotional memory follows but stands somewhat apart. An ambiguous status of this type of implicit memory is probably due to the difficulties of a clear-cut differentiation: not all of emotional memory is necessarily implicit, but part of the implicit memory clearly relates to the retention of affections and feelings.

Thus, three groups of phenomena that have been proven to belong to implicit memory can be distinguished: (1) procedural memory ("know-

¹³⁵ More on this topic: (Kihlstrom et al. 2000).

¹³⁶ More on this topic: (Sabat 2001; Summa 2014a; Summa and Fuchs 2015).

ing how”) related to the preservation of bodily skills and implicit learning; (2) priming, which corresponds to the facilitation of memory performance based on previous experience in the absence of explicit recall; and (3) emotional memory without recall. All three are shown to be relatively independent from each other and related to different brain functions. What unites them is a definition. Some additional conceptual work can be clearly helpful in this area of psychological research.

12.2. Definitions: outlines of the phenomenological approach

For the purposes of the present work, I propose first of all to distinguish how exactly implicit memory is defined in cognitive psychology and phenomenological philosophy respectively. Such definitions should not only clarify how the phenomenon is understood, but more importantly provide the means for the classification of particular cases, that is to say to determine what group of phenomena can be subsumed by this term and potentially explained on the basis of each theory.

In both disciplines, the definition of implicit memory is dependent on the definition of explicit memory. Allegedly, it is generally agreed that explicit memory corresponds to the recollection or active remembering of a past event. It is assumed that a subject is aware of such recollection. In cognitive psychology, explicit remembering is further clarified as a form of autobiographical, declarative memory, or episodic memory. In phenomenology, especially in Husserl, explicit remembering belongs to the class of the so-called reproductive presentifications, that is to intuitions in which absent (i.e. past) objects are presentified, as opposed to intuitive presentations (such as perceptions) which designate intentions of present objects.

As previously outlined, in cognitive psychology, the definition of implicit memory and its distinction from explicit memory usually calls upon conscious awareness. For example, in Schacter, we find the following definition: “Explicit memory is roughly equivalent to ‘memory with consciousness’ or ‘memory with awareness.’ Implicit memory, on the other hand, refers to situations in which previous experiences facilitate performance on tests that do not require intentional or deliberate remembering” (Schacter 1989, 356). In other words, implicit memory designates such situations “when people are influenced by a past experience without any awareness that they are remembering” (Schacter 1996, 161).

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An operational definition of the phenomenon is then reduced to a presence of retention or response in absence and/or independent of explicit recollection. In experimental conditions, this means that implicit recall is shown to be independent from the explicit memory performance. This general definition allows including in the group of implicit memory such phenomena as: procedural memory of bodily skills, priming on both perceptual and conceptual levels, and emotional memory without recall. Simple recognition is excluded from the category of implicit memory, as it cannot be shown to be independent from explicit recollection. For the same reason, other phenomena—such as emotional and traumatic memory—fall into the grey area between implicit and explicit cognition.

From the phenomenological point of view, “remembering without awareness” is an ambiguous definition. First, it suggests that a subject remembers, but just does not show any sign of awareness. This can mean that conceptually implicit memory is just the same type of remembering as explicit recollection except that it is unconscious. Such an idea brings back the issue of unconscious representations already encountered in the discussion on the unconscious in Brentano and introduces the riddle of a “memory that does not remember.”

Phenomenology as a philosophical approach relies above all on conceptual (eidetic) and not empirical analyses, and hence must put into question the basic structure of experience which corresponds to the phenomenon/phenomena of implicit memory. According to the philosophical approach, in general, implicit memory is defined as non-representational form of memory as opposed to the representational or reproductive form of explicit memory. Already Bergson, describing the *mémoire habitude*, pointed out that this type of memory “no longer *represents* our past to us, it *acts* it, and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment” (Bergson 1991, 82).¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Similarly, Freud distinguishes between repetition and remembering as two types of our relation with the past. While remembering refers to the reproduction of past events as accomplished and far gone, repetition is a form of present activity, in which the past is not reproduced but acted out: “[...] the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it. For instance, the patient does not say that he remembers that he used to be defiant and critical towards his parents' authority; instead, he behaves in that way to the doctor. He does not remember how he came to a helpless and hopeless deadlock in his infantile sexual researches; but he

In the previous section, it has been argued that the non-representational relation to the past lies at the core of some phenomenological approaches to the unconscious. Merleau-Ponty seeks to overcome the representational idea of memory as oscillating between “preservation” and “construction,” and to disclose another type of subjective relation with the past which exercises its influence on the present “in the mode of oblivion.” He holds that the explorations of these types of past relations must be made in the realm of bodily dispositions (Merleau-Ponty 2010). This very direction has been elaborated in the contemporary phenomenology of the lived body which specifies this non-representational form of past-relation as essentially bodily.¹³⁸ In this case, body memory is not taken to be just a form of implicit memory but its “most concrete determination”:

Body memory coincides with implicit memory insofar as the latter is lived through by a bodily subject. Body memory, thus, embraces the totality of our subjective perceptual and behavioral dispositions, as they are mediated by the body. [...] rather than being a re-presenting or presentifying act of recollection, body memory designates the pre-thematic impact of preceding bodily experiences on the meaningful, and yet, implicit, configuration of our actual experience (Summa et al. 2012, 418).

In this perspective, body memory is in no way restricted to procedural memory and bodily skill learning. It “extends to the spaces and situations in which we find ourselves” (Fuchs 2012b, 13). Understanding implicit body memory as situational and spatial implies that this memory contributes to how we inhabit our life-space, how we interpret given—and often ambiguous—situations, and which types of behavior we favor without being aware of them. Situational memory is also what underlies the so-called expert intuition which relies on implicit knowledge accu-

produces a mass of confused dreams and associations, complains that he cannot succeed in anything and asserts that he is fated never to carry through what he undertakes. He does not remember having been intensely ashamed of certain sexual activities and afraid of their being found out; but he makes it clear that he is ashamed of the treatment on which he is now embarked and tries to keep it secret from everybody” (Freud 1914).

¹³⁸ Note that the lived body should be distinguished from the physical body, as it was first elaborated by Husserl (as distinction between “Leib” and “Körper”) and further developed by Merleau-Ponty: “If, following Merleau-Ponty, we regard the body not as the visible, touchable, and moving physical body, but first and foremost as our capacity to see, touch, move, etc., then body memory denotes the totality of these bodily capacities, habits, and dispositions as they have developed in the course of one’s life” (Fuchs 2012b, 10).

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mulated in the course of someone's professional experience. Such intuitive knowledge facilitates the recognition of relevant patterns in an observed situation—patterns which would not be available to just a regular observer (Kahneman and Klein 2009). Fuchs gives the example of an experienced psychiatrist, whose diagnostic skills rely not only on the particular symptoms and the history of a disease but equally on the impression she receives from the patient's behavior and life situation (Fuchs 2012b). In Klein's research on the topic, one can find many examples of expert intuition in highly skillful chess players, firefighters, nurses, and army officers (G. A. Klein 1999).

Another important dimension of body memory is designated by Fuchs as "intercorporeal memory," that is implicit memory which underlies and facilitates the tacit level of intersubjective interactions. In the developmental perspective, intercorporeal memory is involved in the acquisition of motor, emotional, and social skills through the interaction with caregivers. In the course of development, these "early interactions turn into implicit relational styles that form one's personality" (Fuchs 2012b, 15).

Part of the emotional body memory can be exemplified as traumatic memory. As it has already occurred to Freud, repressed and particularly destructive experiences, even if they cannot reach the level of explicit recollections, often find the way through repetitive actions and attitudes (Freud 1914). In the phenomenological perspective, this does not mean that such traumatic experiences are preserved somehow unconsciously and exercise their influence "behind the back" of one's consciousness, but rather that such experiences change one's implicit dispositions towards the world and other people. After a traumatic event, the same situations, which appeared before as harmless, can become a source of despair and anxiety. This also affects the intercorporeal level of implicit memory and finds its expression in the undermined trust in safety of interactions with other people.¹³⁹ Undoubtedly, according to this approach, body memory encompasses much more than just bodily skills and habits, as it rather touches upon the foundation of personal identity and can be seen as part of the personality structure:

¹³⁹ "Most of all, the intercorporeal memory of the traumatized person has changed deeply: He or she retains a sense of being defenseless, always exposed to a possible assault. The felt memory of an alien intrusion into the body has irreversibly shaken the primary trust into the world. Every person is turned into a potential threat" (Fuchs 2012b, 18).

Chapter III. Affective memory and the unconscious

All our interactions are based on such integrated bodily, emotional, and behavioral dispositions, which have become second nature, like walking or writing. [...] Our basic attitudes, our typical reactions, and relational patterns—in one word—our entire personality is based on the memory of the body (Fuchs 2012b, 15).

I have mentioned here only a few basic forms of body memory in the phenomenological approach. Based on Thomas Fuchs' classification, body memory can be studied in the following forms: procedural, situational, intercorporeal, incorporative, pain, and traumatic memory (Fuchs 2012b). Edward Casey distinguishes, instead, three types of body memory: habitual, traumatic, and erotic (Casey 1987). Concerning implicit memory, Michela Summa also draws attention to the issue of recognition and of involuntary associative memory. Based on Husserl's research on associations and passive constitution, Summa describes the "associative and affective emerging of occurring memories [*einfallende Erinnerungen*]" (Summa 2014b, 299) as a form of implicit memory, differentiating it thereby from explicit recollection. In the same vein, the phenomenon of recognition as it occurs in the most common everyday experience can be distinguished from explicit recognition. Implicit recognition accounts for the sense of familiarity with certain things, and is ensured by identification syntheses "between the perceptual appearance and the obscure appearance in memory" (Summa 2014b, 302).

Thus, to emphasize the point of this section once again, in both phenomenology and psychology, implicit memory encompasses several types of pre-reflective or pre-thematic memory functions. Whereas in psychology these main functions are bodily skill learning, different kinds of priming, and emotional memory without recall, in phenomenology, implicit memory is clarified as encompassing habitual bodily skills, situational memory, traumatic and intercorporeal memory, as well as involuntary memories and pre-thematic recognitions. As I have argued, what phenomena can be actually subsumed under the term of implicit memory is highly dependent on the conceptual definition behind the categorization itself. In cognitive psychology, the definition of implicit memory relies, first, on the presumed unconscious character of implicit remembering and, second, on the test-conditions in which implicit memory is differentiated from explicit recall. Besides the conceptual contradiction involved in the definition of implicit memory as remembering without awareness, this explanation also limits the categorization of the relevant phenomena. By making implicit memory dependent on the test-conditions and by designating it as "facilitation in per-

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formance” without deliberate recall, implicit memory is inevitably restricted only to such phenomena that can be shown to be independent from explicit recall in experimental conditions. However necessary and justified within the psychological approach, these restrictions make it difficult to understand phenomena that fall into the gray area between explicit and implicit cognition, such as: the variety of recognition, involuntary memory, emotional and traumatic memory, among others.

In phenomenology, the definition of implicit memory is derived from the experiential structure which appears to be common to this kind of past-relations. In several phenomenological approaches, this structure is seen as a non-representational, pre-thematic relation to the past, as opposed to the representational structure of explicit recollection. In the phenomenology of the lived body, this non-representational relation is further understood as essentially bodily. On this ground, implicit memory is clarified as body memory and includes different types of memory which could not be ascribed to it based on the psychological definition of implicit memory. It has been argued that Husserl’s investigations on affectivity and his conception of the unconscious can be taken as another possible explication of this non-representational past-relation. In the following and final section of this chapter, I will outline a phenomenological approach to implicit memory directly ensuing from these ideas.

12.3. Phenomenology of affective memory

Husserl devoted a significant part of his work to the phenomenological analysis of memory.¹⁴⁰ These investigations, as most of Husserl’s theories, can be seen only in development. Within such development, I suggest distinguishing three main stages.¹⁴¹ The first stage corresponds to Husserl’s theory of cognition, presented in his Göttingen lecture course

¹⁴⁰ The majority of it is assembled in the volume X of *Husserliana* dedicated to time-consciousness (Husserl 1991, 1966b) and volume XXIII about phantasy, image consciousness, and memory (Husserl 1980, 2006a). Several important texts on memory in its relation to *Fremderfahrung* can be found in the volumes dedicated to the analyses of intersubjectivity (Husserl 1973c, 1973b). The affective dimension of memory is mainly explored in the *Analyses concerning passive synthesis* (Husserl 1966a, 2001a).

¹⁴¹ Rudolf Bernet’s work on acts of phantasy, memory, and reproductive consciousness in Husserl (Bernet 2004) provides the theoretical basis to outline the distinction of the first two stages.

in the winter semester 1904/1905.¹⁴² At this stage, he elaborates a decisive definition of remembering in terms of intuitive presentification (*anschauliche Vergegenwärtigung*) and assigns it to the same class of phenomena as acts of phantasy, image-consciousness, and empathy. All these experiences are clarified as representing absent objects in the present consciousness. Thus, the focus of the first stage is the *intentionality* of recollection.

At the second stage, which corresponds to Husserl's turn to the analyses of temporality and inner time-consciousness, the riddle of memory becomes the riddle of the consciousness of the past. To this stage belong all the most decisive ideas concerning the distinction between primary and secondary memory, retentional modification, and reproductive consciousness, which have been discussed several times in the course of this enquiry. As Bernet argues, the crucial transformation in Husserl's theory of presentifying consciousness is due to the introduction of temporality, which implies that "each consciousness of an absent is only made possible by the temporal nature of consciousness itself" (Bernet 2004, 93).¹⁴³ The focus of the second stage is, therefore, the constitutive *temporality* of the reproductive consciousness of the past.

The third stage should not be seen as overcoming or rewriting the achievements of the previous stages, but rather as complementing them and opening the way to a new understanding of the phenomenon of memory from the phenomenological perspective. This new way is outlined by Husserl's thematization of the affective dimension of consciousness in general and of memory in particular. In the previous and in the current chapter, it has already been explained how the phenomenological enquiries on affectivity and associative connections shift the meaning of many familiar phenomenological concepts (e.g. synthesis and retentional modification) or how they open the way to the phenomenological clarification of phenomena which were previously inaccessible to the eidetic analyses of consciousness (e.g. the unconscious). I believe that the complementing of the phenomenological explorations of temporality with the investigation of affectivity is precisely what first allows Husserl to account not only for the possibility of remembering and the constitution of the temporal past-horizon, but also for other phenomena which belong to the realm of memory. Moreover, my claim

¹⁴² The third part of this course on phantasy and image-consciousness is published in *Husserliana XXIII* (Husserl 1980, 2006a).

¹⁴³ My translation of: "toute conscience d'une absence n'est rendue possible que par la nature temporelle de la conscience elle-même."

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is that Husserl's approach to affectivity provides all means to conceive of implicit memory as affective memory, provided that Husserl's view on affectivity is taken into account. The focus of the third stage is, accordingly, the *affective dimension* of memory.

Concerning the whole development, three main phenomenological categories come to the fore, that define the understanding of memory in Husserl's approach, namely: intentionality, temporality, and affectivity.¹⁴⁴ The application of these three fundamental categories of subjective experience to the investigation of memory implies that phenomenology aims to account for their three constitutive phenomena, namely: retention, recollection, and the constitution of the past. *Retention* designates a temporal modification of consciousness which allows for the continuity of experience and for the preservation of the elapsed moments in the present consciousness.¹⁴⁵ At first, Husserl calls retention "primary memory" and distinguished it from remembering as "secondary memory." This latter one, or *recollection*, refers to the explicit intention, which brings past experiences to present awareness. The term *constitution of the past* specifies the horizontal structure of consciousness which ensures that the past (both close and distant) is constantly connected to the living present in the non-representational way, so that it can be brought back to awareness explicitly (in recollection) or implicitly (in affective awakening).¹⁴⁶ Such a three-fold structure of memory presupposes that not one of these phenomena can be sufficient by itself and that all three should be accounted for in order to achieve an integrated theory of memory.

When applied to the phenomenon of implicit memory, this suggests that three constitutive phenomena should be accounted for: (1) the affective modification in retention, (2) the affective awakening of the past, and (3) the constitution of the affective past-horizon. The affective modi-

¹⁴⁴ One could also add corporeality (*Leiblichkeit*) as the fourth category, but such an approach is more characteristic of Merleau-Ponty and the contemporary phenomenology of the lived body than of Husserl's investigations on memory.

¹⁴⁵ By retention I mean the most common meaning of the term inside Husserl's approach, referring to the "near retention."

¹⁴⁶ The distinction between the retention and the constitution of the past is both terminological and conceptual. The terms "past-horizon" or "constitution of the past" focus on the totality of the past experience. While retention designates the modification of consciousness and specific past-intentionalities, the past-horizon or constitution of the past implies the totality of the undifferentiated past as horizontally connected to the present. Compared to retention, past-horizon has a wider conceptual meaning: it includes the totality of the sedimented past and the unconscious.

fication in retention has already been investigated in § 8.4, and Husserl's idea of the unconscious as past-horizon has been the topic of § 11.2. In what follows, I will focus on the "affective awakening of the past" as a phenomenon designating implicit remembering. I will also consider anew Husserl's idea of the affective past-horizon, now more specifically in the perspective of implicit memory.

I hold, therefore, that while the intentional analyses of remembering and the temporal analyses of reproductive consciousness belong to the realm of explicit memory, the investigations of the "affective awakening of the past" and of the "affective past-horizon" contribute to the phenomenological exploration of implicit memory.¹⁴⁷ It should be noted that in spite of the privileged status of affectivity, two other dimensions (intentionality and temporality) also play their role in the phenomenological analyses of implicit memory. Thus, the phenomenon of "affective awakening" belongs to implicit intentionality, and the constitution of the past-horizon is due not only to affectivity but equally to the temporality of consciousness. Let us now consider how exactly implicit memory can be clarified based on these two ideas.

a) "*Affective awakening of the past*" as implicit remembering

I consider the phenomenon of affective awakening of the past¹⁴⁸ presented by Husserl in his *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* to be a form of implicit memory in what concerns the intentional component of this latter. This means that the affective awakening of the past designates a particular type of intentionality which should be distinguished from the explicit intentionality of recollection. While the latter corresponds to the reproductive intuition which brings a past experience to awareness, the former is, above all, a passive occurrence in which a particular past experience regains its affective force by means of associative connection with the present. Such an awakening does not mean that the subject has an actual memory of the awakened event, or, in Husserl's own words: "this awakening does not imply an explicit process of bringing to intuition; what is awakened can be entirely or partially obscure" (Husserl 2001a, 405-406).

¹⁴⁷ What follows is my interpretation and elaboration of Husserl's account of memory and affectivity. It cannot be found in his work exactly in this form.

¹⁴⁸ In what follows, I will use the terms "affective awakening of the past" and "retroactive awakening" (*Rückstrahlende Weckung*) interchangeably.

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Husserl describes awakening of the past as an essentially affective phenomenon, which allows us to understand this mode of implicit memory as affective memory. Quite generally, retroactive awakening occurs when a prominent term from the present awakens something similar from the past. In other words, a reproductive association of similarity takes place.¹⁴⁹ Husserl understands such associative awakening as a product of “affective communication,” or “a special mode of synthesis” (Husserl 2001a, 533) of what is actually intuitive with what has become a part of a past-horizon: “affective communication would mean that every contribution of affective force by any ‘member’ of something connected in distance through homogeneity and prominence augments the force of all its ‘comrades’” (Husserl 2001a, 224).

Thus, while the synthesis of similarity is conceived of in terms of association, an actual “genetic phenomenon” of awakening occurs as transference of affective force from one prominent member from the living present to a hidden, implicit sense from the past. Husserl claims that “waking up sedimented sense can initially mean that it will become affective once more” (Husserl 2001a, 227). While retention is a process of identifying synthesis in continuous “clouding over” and affective depleting, retroactive awakening is a reverse process of *Ent-sedimentierung*. It also consists in an identifying synthesis, in which—contrary to retention—what is awakened regains its affective vivacity.

Interestingly, all affective awakenings (impressional and retroactive) consist in affective communication and the consequent affective reinforcing of associated terms, but the specificity of the awakening from the past lies in its capacity to reach into the sphere of the unconscious and bring back to life affectively dead objective senses. This implies that the affective communication is possible even if one of the associated terms lost all of its affective vivacity.

When Husserl writes about the “radiating back of affective force into the empty consciousness” (Husserl 2001a, 222), he sees it as a tendency coming from the living present and dependent upon the affective conditions proper to it. As is well known, Husserl features the living present in terms of the affective relief and the differences in

¹⁴⁹ In order to understand, how exactly Husserl approaches this phenomenon, we have to take a step back and return to the analyses of reproductive association in § 7.5 and of association as affective awakening in § 8.2. Here, both these aspects come to a unity, namely: affective awakening of the past (retroactive awakening) and reproductive association as designating different aspects of the same phenomenon.

affective intensities characteristic of prominent objects, affective interests and so on. Thus, for him, the interconnectivity with the past relies on the affective organization of the living present under two main aspects. The first is related to the principle of similarity. Husserl calls the associative principle of similarity the fundamental condition of awakening: “one color can awaken a concealed color, a pronounced sound, a sound that has become masked” (Husserl 2001a, 229). In the same context, he also remarks that the associative awakening can transgress sense-fields, so that, for instance, the rhythm of sounds can awaken similar rhythms in lights.

The second aspect which determines the possibility of retroactive awakening consists of affective preferences and motivations. Generally speaking, this suggests that affective communication is throughout determined by one’s dispositions, attitudes, moods and interests. Not only one series of sounds can recall another similar one, but one’s hunger at the moment could facilitate memories of the food, or a melancholic mood could create the conditions for the awakening of particularly sad memories.¹⁵⁰ As Husserl writes: “The motives [for awakening] must lie in the living present where perhaps the most efficacious of such motives [...] are ‘interests’ in the broad, customary sense, original or already acquired valuations of the heart, instinctive or even higher drives, etc.” (Husserl 2001a, 227–228).

Now, after the description of the phenomenon, it is important to clarify why exactly the affective awakening of the past should be considered as a type of implicit memory. The first argument consists in pointing out its essential differentiation from explicit remembering. The two phenomena are closely related, but should be strictly distinguished from one another. Retroactive awakening means that the past regains its affective impact on the present, but does not yet reach the level of presentifying intuition. The intentionality of affective awakening belongs, in my view, to the so-called non-objectifying intentionality.¹⁵¹ As for the manifestation of such implicit intentionality, it is above all not represen-

¹⁵⁰ In empirical research, this idea received confirmation in the studies by Gordon Bower on the relation between memory and emotion (Bower 1981). For a review on the research on state-dependent and mood-congruent memory, see: (Blaney 1986).

¹⁵¹ According to Bernet, other types of non-objectifying intentionality are those involved in the kinaesthetic and retentive self-consciousness. The non-objectifying intentionality also corresponds to the notion of operative intentionality, employed by Merleau-Ponty (Bernet 1994, 244).

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tational, but it rather concerns the way the past influences the present experience. Relevant phenomena for this type of implicit memory are, according to Summa, associative involuntary memory (“occurring memories”), implicit recognition, and the “implicit experience of familiarity” (Summa 2014b, 304). Affective awakening further contributes to what can be called the background atmosphere of one’s experience, the formation of affective attitudes and unconscious inferences.

Secondly, retroactive awakening is implicit not only in the sense that it is not yet a presentifying intuition, but also because it takes place “in the domain of passivity without any participation of the ego” (Husserl 1973a, 179). According to this point, such awakenings can indeed be called involuntary as they happen to us and are not brought about by some conscious effort. This fact however, does not necessarily imply that retroactive affective awakening designates only a particular type of involuntary associative memory. In my view, the phenomenon of affective awakening in Husserl cannot be restricted only to this specific memory performance of awakening of occurring memories, but rather constitutes the basis for any pre-thematic memory, and can, moreover, be regarded as a necessary condition for any explicit recollection. Husserl makes this point clear in *Experience and Judgment*: “active remembering is possible only on the basis of the associative awakening which has already taken place; the awakening itself is an event which always occurs passively” (Husserl 1973a, 179). Furthermore, in the *Analyses*, he claims: “In any case, the law holds that rememberings can only arise through the awakening of empty presentations” (Husserl 2001a, 231). Clearly, not all awakenings reach the level of actual memories, but all rememberings start as affective awakenings, and these latter can be seen as tendencies towards reproductive intuitions. As Bernet argues, objectifying (representational) and non-objectifying intentionalities are not independent from one another and actually complement each other. Accordingly, for Husserl, the retroactive affective awakening and the reproductive intuition are two different types of remembering which, however, both contribute to the constitution of this phenomenon.

The transition of awakened empty presentations into reproductive intuitions or actual recollections is by itself of particular interest. On the one hand, the conditions here are similar to that of impressional awakenings: tendencies have to be strong enough, form unities with other prominent elements, be favored by relevant affective interests and, after all, call for the ego’s attention. On the other hand, it should be noted

that affections only call for such attention, but whether the ego would actually respond to them depends on its own particular “decisions” and on the limits of its attentive scope.¹⁵² Beside the lack of attention on the part of the ego, there are also other obstacles to the transition of affective awakenings into reproductive intuitions: some affective tendencies can be suppressed into the background as a consequence of the concurrence with other, stronger tendencies, or in case of affective conflicts. Thus, a significant part of tendencies never comes to a relief and lingers in obscurity, thereby contributing to the general affective background of one’s experience. The opposite can also occur to those past elements that maintain especially strong connections with the present and are continuously reinforced by cues from the environment as well as from strong “interests” on the side of the self. Such affections can exercise an impact that by far surpasses even the actual, impressional, sources of affectivity. It is no surprise that the past can be more alive for us sometimes than actual reality, even to the extent that the present itself can be removed to the background.

In my view, this distinction between remembering and the affective awakening of the past can fruitfully contribute to the understanding of memory performances in amnesia. In cognitive psychology, implicit memory is defined as remembering without awareness, wherein the nature of this remembering is left undetermined. I believe that this kind of remembering can be clarified phenomenologically not in terms of unconscious representations but in terms of implicit or non-objectifying intentionality of affective awakening. As the affective conditions of retroactive awakening precede those of active recollections, they can be preserved even when the explicit memory functions decline. As a consequence of this interpretation, the phenomenon of implicit memory can be credited with a conceptually very interesting role: implicit retroactive awakening can be seen not as essentially different from explicit memory, but as underlying it. In this perspective, any explicit remembering relies on implicit awakenings.¹⁵³ And if the first is damaged (as it is the case of

¹⁵² Bernet makes this point particularly clear: “While Husserl increasingly conceded that the activity of intentionality initiated by the subject is most often preceded by the passivity of an experience undergone, he never abandoned the idea that the true life of the subject consists in responding in full lucidity to the solicitations of affect, in examining them from a critical viewpoint in order to decide whether there is reason or not to follow them” (Bernet 1994, 237).

¹⁵³ Another interesting feature of remembering which follows from its origins in the awakening of empty presentations consists in its intrinsically obscure character. In this perspective, all intuitive presentifications can be viewed as a mix-

amnesia), the latter may well be functioning. Past experiences continue influencing one's present through affective awakenings which simply never reach the level of intuitive recollection.

b) Affective past-horizon as implicit dimension of subjectivity

As the retroactive affective awakening is a necessary condition of remembering, similarly the background past-horizon is a necessary condition of retroactive awakening. It has been argued that this kind of awakening consists mainly in the affective reinforcement of something which is already there (Husserl 1973a, 179). It is genuinely possible only because "the constituted sense is actually implied in background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness" (Husserl 2001a, 228). This introduces the second aspect of the affective memory in the present interpretation of Husserl's account, namely the idea of the affective past-horizon and the sphere of the sedimented unconscious background. In the suggested three-fold structure of the memory phenomenon, this aspect refers not to the intentional component of implicit memory but to its horizontal part.

Husserl uses several kindred terms to describe this sedimented past. Most of the time, he speaks about it in terms of "empty horizon," but one can also encounter such expressions as "affective zero-horizon" (Husserl 2001a, 216), "horizon of forgetfulness" (Ibid, 530) or even a "dormant horizontal sphere" (Ibid, 227). I prefer the notion of "affective past-horizon"¹⁵⁴ as it emphasizes the three most important components of this phenomenon, namely that it describes the mode of givenness of the past (and not its existence for itself), that this mode of givenness is

ture of intuition with obscurity: "Now the past present is reproduced in the vivacity of the noetic-noematic flux with all accomplishments—with all accomplishments of remembering, which in the ideal case, are completely intuitive, while in truth remembering wavers in clarity and distinctness, thus, mixed with empty moments, a middle stage between pure, complete intuition and empty presentation" (Husserl 2001a, 232).

¹⁵⁴ It should be noted that Husserl employs this notion in §33 of the *Analyses* (Husserl 2001a, 204) and does not otherwise employ it very often. Generally, it can be seen as one of the many synonyms he uses to describe the sphere of the near and especially of the remote past in its horizontal connection with the living present. I think the notion itself is very telling as it underlines the affective component of the past constitution, which is favored in my interpretation of Husserl's work. Therefore, it is given here a much more prominent role than it has in Husserl's own vocabulary.

horizontal and that this past-horizon is constituted through affective modifications and is characterized in affective terms.¹⁵⁵

It has been already discussed that Husserl describes the unconscious in terms of sedimented senses which lost all their affective vivacity. However, he also talks about the possibility to conceive of the unconscious in terms of repressed affections which maintain their vivacity in the sphere of obscurity. Moreover, the very connectivity between the past and the present is based on the possibility of affective communication between the two, which presupposes that this past is constituted affectively and is affective—not in the same degree of intensity as the living present but precisely as horizon relative to this present. Even if distinct “empty presentations” might have lost their affective force and become a part of the undifferentiated background, affectivity of the past-horizon as a whole cannot be equal to zero, at least as long as the affectivity of the living present is still functioning.

Thus, it is consistent to claim that affectivity designates the main medium of connectivity between the present and the past in the sphere of passivity. This applies not only to affective awakenings but equally to the horizontal directedness or openness towards the past. Moreover, affectivity contributes to the understanding of the particular mode of consciousness which the idea of the past-horizon implies. It is important to constantly be reminded that, in the phenomenological perspective, the notions of retention, empty horizon, and recollection designate above all different modes of consciousness of the past. And the mode of consciousness identifying the past-horizon is the most paradoxical one as it presupposes such a givenness that has become absolutely non-intuitable. This is what the unconscious means for Husserl: such a consciousness of the past that is not phenomenally accessible to experience. And this is why the unconscious becomes indeed an ultimate *Grenzphänomen* for the phenomenology of consciousness, which unveils its own limits (Merleau-Ponty 1993).

Although I strongly believe that this line of thought is productive, I must concede that understanding the past and the unconscious as given

¹⁵⁵ Thus, I take what can be here called the *affective past* as different from the other two available notions of the past, namely the transcendent past given in recollection and the temporal past, which is also a “horizontal” notion, but one based on the idea of continuity and temporal modification. The temporal constitution of the past presupposes a distance between it and the present and, along with recollection, grounds the transcendence of the past. The affective past, then, can be thought of as belonging to subjectivity in its immanence.

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in the mode of “affective past-horizon” is far from being an ultimate answer to the question of how subjectivity maintains its unity with its past life. There are theoretical limits here that belong to the phenomenon itself. Merleau-Ponty in *Institution and Passivity* clearly underlined this fundamental ambiguity: we have to be able to think of the past beyond representation, that is, beyond the past as construction or as preservation (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 208). There must be, as he says, another way we relate to our past and yet such another way is constantly missing, most likely because this dimension of the past inevitably escapes the objective thought:

Existence always takes up its past, either by accepting or by refusing it. We are, as Proust said, perched upon a pyramid of the past, and if we fail to see it, that is because we are obsessed with objective thought. We believe that our past, for ourselves, reduces to the explicit memories that we can contemplate. We cut our existence off from the past itself, and we only allow our existence to seize upon the present traces of this past. But how would these traces be recognized as traces of the past if we did not otherwise have a direct opening upon this past? (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 413).

However, when it comes to Husserl’s approach to the unconscious, it should be noted that representational phenomena regarding the past are by no means dismissed by him. As we have seen, he attributes to the unconscious a peculiar form of “empty presentation,” devoid of affective vitality. Distinct from non-objectifying intentionality of awakened affections, as well as from explicit intentionality of recollections, “empty presentations” must be yet another kind of implicit intention. In these, Husserl asserts, the identical senses must be preserved in an implicit form without any actual intention taking place. As Bruce Bégout shows, such an idea raises many questions which might even undermine Husserl’s fundamental definition of intentionality in terms of noetic-noematic structure. He asks, namely, how can an objective sense be conceived beyond his mode of givenness and how, consequently, is it possible that a noematic sense can be preserved beyond any affective or active intention? (Bégout 2000, 204).¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ “Comment concevoir dès lors un sens objectal en dehors de son mode de donation, c’est-à-dire comment penser l’objet qui est visé (son *was*) séparément de l’objet tel qu’il est visé (son *als was*) [...] Comment un sens noématique peut-il être conservé hors de toute relation intentionnelle affective ou active?” (Bégout 2000, 204).

In Merleau-Ponty's terms, one could say that the idea of the past as preservation of memory "traces" is not completely alien to Husserl's thought. There is still some vagueness in Husserl's idea of the past: On the one hand, he conceives of it as horizontal and constituted through temporal and affective modifications while remaining connected to the present and containing the intrinsic possibility of awakening. On the other hand, the status of empty presentations, in which objective senses are preserved in the unconscious, is far from clear. I believe that at this point Merleau-Ponty's critique of representational intentionality of the unconscious is justified and should complement Husserl's idea of the affective past-constitution. If our present is directed towards the past in the horizontal manner,¹⁵⁷ this should not imply that the past is preserved in the form of unconscious, empty presentations. Merleau-Ponty's idea is that the unconscious and the past should be thought of not as sedimented in any representational way but rather as sedimented in the very structure of one's personality and behavior, in the way one perceives and interprets the world.

In order to better understand the idea of the affective past-horizon and especially why it should be considered as a part of implicit memory, it can be useful to read Husserl's idea of "horizon of forgetfulness" through the lenses of Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the past as existing in the mode of oblivion. In Husserl, forgetting is seen as a function of affective modification in retention. What is forgotten does not disappear but becomes a part of the implicit background of subjective experience. This past is not presentified nor given to any consciousness. Its mode of givenness is that of an indistinct horizon, a "dimension of escape and absence" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 436). Inspired by Proust,¹⁵⁸ Merleau-

¹⁵⁷ The horizontal structure of subjective experience is not limited to the so-called "horizontal intentionalities," which contribute to the adumbrational givenness of perceptual objects. Horizontality equally applies to expectations and to past-experience, meaning that the living present is always open towards not only its future but also its past.

¹⁵⁸ See, for example, the passage from Proust's *Within a Budding Grove*, which can be found among Merleau-Ponty's notes on memory published in *Institution and Passivity*: "And as Habit weakens every impression, what a person recalls to us most vividly is precisely what we had forgotten, because it was of no importance, and had therefore left in full possession of its strength. That is why the better part of our memory exists outside ourselves, in a blatter of rain, in the smell of an unaired room or of the first crackling brushwood fire in a cold grate: wherever, in short, we happen upon what our mind, having no use for it, had rejected, the last treasure that the past has in store, the richest, that which when all our flow of tears seems to have dried at the source can make us weep again."

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Ponty was looking to grasp this elusive givenness of the past “in the mode of oblivion,” therefore claiming that: “[...] explicit recollection and forgetting are two modes of our oblique relation with a past that is present to us only through the determinate emptiness that it leaves in us” (Merleau-Ponty 2010, 209).

From this viewpoint, it becomes evident that an important part of memory actually belongs not solely to what emerges on the surface of our affective consciousness but equally to what stays in the background. A person who once fell in love, learned how to read, heard a lion’s roar, understood Bayes’ theorem, or experienced a car accident will always remain affected by these experiences even if they are not constantly reactualized in his or her memory. Clearly, not all of these events will necessarily have an equal impact on that person’s life: some will become fundamental and define his or her personality, others will become acquired skills or habits, some will be reawakened only when similar situations are encountered, and a significant portion of them will probably simply sink into the undifferentiated background. The past remains: not as hidden senses or traces in some deep repository of the mind, but rather in the way these events shape and change one’s experience and thereby prefigure the totality of one’s attitudes towards the present and the future. Similar to the horizontal structure of perception, in which an object is always approached from different sides while still maintaining a quasi-complete way of appearing, the unconscious past-horizon is what enables the present itself to be experienced in a way that has a meaning within, and is coherent with, the whole of one’s experience.

To conclude this part on implicit memory, I would like to retrace my steps so far. First, I stated that in both philosophical and psychological approaches to this topic, implicit memory encompasses far more than just procedural or habitual body memory, but equally includes the wider scope of implicit cognition. In cognitive psychology, the three main groups of phenomena relevant for implicit memory are: procedural memory, priming, and emotional memory without recall. Within the phenomenology of

Outside ourselves, did I say; rather within ourselves, but hidden from our eyes in an oblivion more or less prolonged. It is thanks to this oblivion alone that we can from time to time recover the creature that we were, range ourselves face to face with past events as that creature had to face them, suffer afresh because we are no longer ourselves but he, and because he loved what leaves us now indifferent. In the broad daylight of our ordinary memory the images of the past turn gradually pale and fade out of sight, nothing remains of them, we shall never find them again” (Proust 1924).

the lived body, implicit memory is clarified as the non-representational relation to the past and includes different types of body memory (situational, traumatic, intercorporeal, among others).

In the last section of this chapter, I argued that Husserl's notions of the "affective awakening of the past" and of the "affective past-horizon" can offer further contribution to the phenomenological exploration of implicit memory. The basic presupposition is here the same, namely that implicit memory must be clarified phenomenologically in essentially non-representational terms. In addition, focusing on the affective dimension of memory allows to specify this non-representational way of remembering in terms of implicit non-objectifying intentionality of affective awakenings. I argued that retroactive affective awakening can be seen as implicit remembering which should be distinguished from explicit recollection. While the latter corresponds to an objectifying intuition, in which objects of past experiences come to present awareness, the former describes a passive occurrence in which a particular past experience regains its affective force by means of an associative connection to the present. This aspect of implicit memory answers the question of how the past stays present in the life of consciousness and exercises some influence on the ongoing experience beyond the scope of awareness.

Another important aspect concerns the "pastness" of the past. In this perspective, the past is neither reduced to its appearance, nor to its unconscious influences in the living present, nor to some kind of reservoir of memory traces or unconscious representations. Here, Husserl's theory of the affective past-horizon and Merleau-Ponty's idea of the past existing in the mode of oblivion proved to be particularly relevant. The concept of the affective past-horizon designates a particular mode of givenness of the past and intends to account for the connectedness between the present and the past life of consciousness which exists beyond the level of explicit memory and underpins the possibility of implicit awakening.

In what concerns an interdisciplinary perspective, the above presented account can offer a conceptual framework and provide important conceptual distinctions for theoretical explorations of implicit memory. While empirical research operates on the level of particular phenomena and is limited to the test-conditions, phenomenology can offer a conceptual structure supporting the differentiations presented in psychological accounts. For instance, the idea of "affective awakening of the past" allows to overcome the theoretical difficulties involved in the concept of unconscious remembering and unconscious representations. It is equally able to

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account for all distinct types of implicit awakenings without limiting their scope neither to emotional nor behavioral aspects. Further, the distinction between explicit recollection and implicit retroactive awakening allows situating implicit memory at the foundation of reproductive consciousness. It thus represents not a distinct and largely mysterious phenomenon, but it can rather be seen as a precondition of any possible remembering.

Finally, within phenomenology, this approach complements the existing accounts on body memory by extending the discussion to the realm of affectivity. It contributes, therefore, to the understanding of the pre-reflective level of subjective experience in its totality, and not as restricted to an abstract present moment. Connectivity between the past and present life of consciousness, enabled by the horizontal and affective structure of subjective experience, further contributes to the issue of personal identity. Affective identity accounts for the unity of subjective experience beyond the functions enabled by explicit memory. It actually underlies the narrative identity in the same way as implicit experience of the past underlies the explicit intentionality of remembering.